JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Heard Mr. D. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner who was working as the Assistant Teacher in St. Paul’s School under a contractual engagement since 30.01.2012 has challenged the decision of not granting her continuation as recorded in the Minutes of the meeting of the St. Paul’s School Full Management Committee held on 16.12.2015. Having found the petitioner’s service satisfactory, her contract was renewed for the successive years but her contractual engagement came to its end from the month of December, 2015. When other contractual teachers got their engagement extended, the petitioner approached the respondent No.5 when she was informed that her appointment would be provided subsequently. The petitioner time and again persuaded the respondent No.4 and 5 for extension of her contractual engagement by way of renewal of the contract, but she did not get any positive result. The petitioner collected minutes of the meeting of the St. Paul’s School Full Managing Committee held on 16.12.2005. From the said minutes, the petitioner could gather the real reason for non-renewal of the contract. The minutes of the said meeting (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) has been made part of the writ petition and the relevant part concerning the petitioner is as under: “Mrs. Priyanka Roy’s case: As per the findings of the school authority and the detailed reports being placed before the house about the leakage of question papers, and Mr. Priyanka Roy being found guilty, the house has resolved not to sign her further contract. And the authority will take the necessary steps to replace her.” 3. The petitioner has categorically averred in the writ petition that the allegations against her as considered by the St. Paul’s School Full Managing Committee is absolutely baseless as the petitioner had no nexus either with the question setting or in the custody. Therefore, the petitioner cannot have any role to leakage of the question paper of the school examination. The petitioner has averred in paragraph 8 of the writ petition as under: “To this aspect, the petitioner humbly submits that in 2015 third term examination of class IX Geography subject neither the petitioner was a question setter nor the petitioner was custodian of the question papers. The petitioner has averred in paragraph 8 of the writ petition as under: “To this aspect, the petitioner humbly submits that in 2015 third term examination of class IX Geography subject neither the petitioner was a question setter nor the petitioner was custodian of the question papers. Rather other two Geography teachers were the question setter. Needless to mention her that to do private tuition there is a competition between all the teachers. By dint of competition this allegation of leakage question paper has been slapped against the petitioner very cleverly but on the contrary if an independent inquiry be made it will be crystal clear that the petitioner is no where involved in such type of nasty jobs.” The petitioner has urged this court to quash the relevant and concerned extract of the minutes dated 26.12.2015 and direct the respondents to appoint the petitioner as the Assistant Teacher in the said school. 4. The respondents by filing their reply on 04.06.2016 has raised jurisprudential objection that the respondent No.5 cannot be treated “as the State” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and when there is no relief against the respondent No. 4 and 5, the other respondents are improper parties inasmuch as against them there is no relief, even no averment made against in the writ petition. They have further stated that the writ petition is entirely misconceived inasmuch as the respondents No. 4 and 5 have not imposed any punishment on the petitioner. It is on expiry of the contractual tenure, her appointment was not renewed. The observation made in the meeting was not the foundation of such termination. Even the said minute is not in the public domain to create prejudice to the petitioner. 5. Mr. D. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, on the question of maintainability has relied upon a few decisions of the Apex Court, such as, Tikaram vs. Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal and others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 1621 which, in the considered view of this court, is not relevant in the context. Even the decision in K. Krishnamacharyulu and others vs. Sri Vankateswara Hindu College of Engineering and another reported in (1997) 3 SCC 571 cannot be applied straightway. However, in that decision the Apex Court has held as under: “The private institutions cater to the need of providing educational opportunities. Even the decision in K. Krishnamacharyulu and others vs. Sri Vankateswara Hindu College of Engineering and another reported in (1997) 3 SCC 571 cannot be applied straightway. However, in that decision the Apex Court has held as under: “The private institutions cater to the need of providing educational opportunities. The teacher duly appointed to a post in the private institution also is entitled to seek enforcement of the orders issued by the Government. The question is as to which forum on should approach. The High Court has held that the remedy is available under the Industrial Disputes Act. When an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the teacher, being the arm of the institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under ; the jurisdiction part is very wide. It would be different position, if the remedy is a private law remedy. So, they cannot be denied the same benefit which is available to others. Accordingly, we hold that the writ petition is maintainable”. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel has referred another decision of the Apex Court in K.K. Saksena vs. International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage and others reported in (2015) 4 SCC 670 where the Apex Court had occasion to observe as under: “34. In this context, the first question which arises is as to what meaning is to be assigned to the expression 'any person or authority'. By catena of judgments rendered by this Court, it now stands well grounded that the term 'authority' used in Article 226 has to receive wider meaning than the same very term used in Article 12 of the Constitution. This was so held in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra). In that case, dispute arose between the Trust which was managing and running science college and teachers of the said college. It pertained to payment of certain employment related benefits like basic pay etc. Matter was referred to the Chancellor of the Gujarat University for his decision. The Chancellor passed an award, which was acceptor by the University as well as the Slate Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the award. The Chancellor passed an award, which was acceptor by the University as well as the Slate Government and a direction was issued to all affiliated colleges to pay their teachers in terms of the said award. However, the aforesaid Trust running the science college did not implement the award. Teachers filed the writ petition seeking mandamus and direction to the trust to pay them their dues of salary, allowances, provident fund and gratuity in accordance therewith. It is in this context an issue arose as to whether writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was maintainable against the said Trust which was admittedly not a statutory body or authority under Article 12 of the Constitution as it was a private trust running an educational institution. The High Court held that the writ petition was maintainable and said view was upheld by this Court in the aforesaid judgment. 35. The discussion which is relevant for our purposes is contained in paras 15 to 20. However, we would like to reproduce paras 15, 17 and 20, which read as under: "15. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to Mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It has to be appreciated that the appellants-trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as Government aid. Public money paid as Government aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like Government institutions discharge public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. (See - The Evolving Indian Administrative Law by M.P. Jain (1983) p.266). So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff arc, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. So are the service conditions of the academic staff. When the University takes a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff arc, therefore, not purely of a private character. It has super-added protection by University decisions creating a legal right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party. xx xx xx 17. There, however, the prerogative writ of mandamusmus (sic) confined only to public authorities to compel performance of public duty. The 'public authority' for them means every body which is created by statute - and whose powers and duties are defined by statute. So Government departments, local authorities, police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all ‘public authorities’. But there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus'. Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Court to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to 'any person or authority'. It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose. xx xx xx 20. The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning like the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Art.32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied." 36. In para 15, the Court spelled out two exceptions to the writ of mandamus, viz. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied." 36. In para 15, the Court spelled out two exceptions to the writ of mandamus, viz. (i) if the rights are purely of a private character, no mandamus can issue; and (ii) if the management of the college is purely a private body "with no public duty", mandamus will not lie. The Court clarified that since the Trust in the said case was an aiding institution, because of this reason, it discharges public function, like Government institution, by way of imparting education to students, more particularly when rules and regulations of the affiliating University are applicable to such an institution, being an aided institution. In such a situation, held the Court, the service conditions of academic staff were not purely of a private character as the staff had super-aided protection by University's decision creating a legal right and duty relationship between the staff and the management. 37. Further, the Court explained in para 20 that the term ‘authority' used in Article 226, in the context, would receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12, inasmuch as Article 12 was relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 31, whereas Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also non-fundamental rights. What is relevant is the dicta of the Court that the term 'authority' appearing in Article 226 of the Constitution would cover any other person or body performing public duly. The guiding factor, therefore, is the nature of duty imposed on such a body, namely, public duty to make it exigible to Article 226.” [Emphasis added] The Apex Court has culled out the law in K.K. Saksena (supra) as under: “On the other hand, even if a person or authority does not come within the sweep of Article 12 of the Constitution, but is performing public duty, writ petition can lie and writ of mandamus or appropriate writ can be issued. However, as noted in Federal Bank Ltd. (supra), such a private body should either run substantially on State funding or discharge public duty/positive obligation of public nature or is under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.” [Emphasis added] According to Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel by imparting education to the students, the respondent No.5 has been performing a public duty and as such the writ petition would lie. Further, Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel having referred to another decision of the Apex Court in Raj Kumar vs. Director of Education and others reported in (2016) 6 SCC 541 has contended that since the respondent No.5 has been imparting education, the respondent No.5 can be treated as “the State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. 6. From the other side, Mr. Kohinoor N. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the petitioner did not invest even a single paragraph in the writ petition to place the materials to demonstrate that the respondent No.5 has been discharging the public duty in any manner. He has referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court in M.K. Gandhi and others vs. Director of Education reported in 2005 (4) ESC 2265 where it has been held approvingly reproducing an earlier decision of the said High Court in P.K. Biswas vs. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology reported in 2002 (5) ESC 286 summarized the principle as under: “The picture that ultimately emerges is that, the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex-hypothesis, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be--whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State”. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State”. [Emphasis added] For purpose of illustration in M.K. Gandhi (supra) the Allahabad High Court had given an illustration related to that case which is as under: “The D.P.S. School is managed by a private committee of management. There is neither any pleading nor any averment that it is a State within the meaning, of Article 12 of the Constitution. There is also no pleading that it receives any financial aid from the Government or a body that is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. During arguments a statement was made at the bar that the D.P.S. School does not receive any financial aid or grant-in-aid from any Government agency. There is no Government control. The D.P.S. School is not a State within the meaning of the Article 12 of the Constitution.” Thus, Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has stated that similar is the case of the respondent No. 5 and hence no writ petition seeking the mandamus can be maintained against those respondents No. 4 and 5. In Union of India and another vs. Satish Joshi, Delhi High Court by their judgment dated 14.08.2013 delivered in LPA 197 of 2013 has held that this recommendation of the external committee was accepted and it was decided not to extend the contract of service of the respondent. In a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this court is not required to examine the merits of the decision of the appellants or to evaluate the performance of the respondent in discharge of his services under the service agreement. It is sufficient to note that a committee considered the aspects which are relevant for the purpose of deciding whether the contract of service of the respondent should be extended or not. In another decision, in Vatsal Gupta vs. State of UP and others delivered in Special Appeal No. 530 of 2015, the reason given by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court has been related to this context. In another decision, in Vatsal Gupta vs. State of UP and others delivered in Special Appeal No. 530 of 2015, the reason given by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court has been related to this context. For purpose of reference, a part of the judgment is extracted hereunder: “Based on the aforesaid discussion specially the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Ramesh Ahluwalia (supra) wherein a writ petition under Article 226 against a private unaided educational institution was held to be maintainable on the ground of performance of public functions and the decision BCC case (supra), even if it is assumed that this writ petition at the behest of the petitioner against a private educational institution is maintainable, it would only be half the job done and the question would still remain whether in the facts of the present case there is any such statutory or positive obligation based on public law element or as stated in the Anadi Muta’s case in para 22 thereof whether there is any such duty imposed upon the school for admitting the student in standard XI by Charter. Common law, Custom or Contract or not. The fact that a writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution does not ipso-facto lead to the issuance of a writ. A writ petition may be maintainable yet a writ or any order or direction in the nature of such a writ may not be liable to be issued. Assuming the maintainability of this petition it is the second question which requires consideration. The counsel for the petitioner was not able to place before the court any statutory rules imposing any statutory obligation on the opposite parties conferring a corresponding right in favour of the petitioner against the respondent institution. He was also not able to show any such obligation imposed by any Charter. Common law, Custom or Contact between the parties. As far as reference by the petitioner to the enquiries conducted by the State authorities and directions issued by them to the respondent institution are concerned, there is no statutory backing to justify such action on their part. The assertion that the action of respondent school being arbitrary was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution has been made only for being rejected. The assertion that the action of respondent school being arbitrary was hit by Article 14 of the Constitution has been made only for being rejected. The fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution is available against a State and its authorities and not against a private body certainly not for maintaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against such bodies. Arbitrary action, if any, may give cause for the aggrieved person to initiate civil action before the Civil court but not a writ petition against a private educational institution. The opposite parties have been able to demonstrate that admission to standard XI is a fresh admission and not an automatic promotion, a stand supported by learned Senior Advocate Sri Nagar, who appeared and argued on behalf of Indian School Certificate Board and placed before the Court the relevant Regulations in this regard. It is unfortunate that the institution has disowned its student of 13 years. It may or may not be having good reasons to support its action but there is no doubt that there was no statutory or other obligation as referred hereinabove on the part of the school which could attract the issuance of a writ as prayed for in the writ petition. The first relief claimed in the writ petition is for issuance of a writ of certiorari quashing the letter dated 21.06.2015 written by the Principal of the School, which is a private unaided educational institution. Moreover, the said letter is in response to some letter written by the District Inspector of Schools Anglo India Schools Lucknow, issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing a reply such as the one contained in the letter dated 21.06.2015 is unheard of. The claim for issuance of such a writ is not supported by any decision. A writ of certiorari cannot be issued to quash a letter/reply sent by the Head of the private institution. The Indian School of Certificate Board to which the institution is affiliated, is, itself not a statutory authority nor any effort was made by the petitioner to prove that it was. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it hardly needs to be emphasized that in the facts of the present case, no case is made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or mandamus as prayed for in the writ petition. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it hardly needs to be emphasized that in the facts of the present case, no case is made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or mandamus as prayed for in the writ petition. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed”. [Emphasis added] In Vatsal Gupta (supra), the Delhi High Court had continued to observe as under: “The learned Single Judge has referred to and we reiterated the relevant observations and guiding principles made by the Apex Court in the case of Federal Bank vs. Sagar Thomas reported in (2003) 10 SCC 733 , wherein the maintainability of a writ petition against a private body discharging public duty or positive obligation of public nature is carried out, yet in the light of the reasons recorded as above, the learned Single Judge found it difficult to grant the relief in favour of the appellant for the reason that admissions of students in the institutions were in the realm of a private affair and such a subject could not be expanded to the degree of public duty which of course would mean the issues like securing general safety of the students maintaining cleanliness in the institution and adhering to the other norms for upgrading the standards of education etc”. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has therefore contended that unless the material in support of discharging the public duty is properly placed in the form of averments, it would be highly cumbersome for the court to entertain such writ petition. Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel has further contended that the Apex Court had interfered the judgment of M.K. Gandhi and others (supra). By their judgment and order dated 16.08.2007 in Civil Appeal No. 339 of 2007 [Committee of Management, Delhi Public School and another vs. M.K. Gandhi and others] the Apex Court had observed as under: “In our opinion, the direction given by the Allahabad High Court to the CBSE is totally misconceived and uncalled for. By their judgment and order dated 16.08.2007 in Civil Appeal No. 339 of 2007 [Committee of Management, Delhi Public School and another vs. M.K. Gandhi and others] the Apex Court had observed as under: “In our opinion, the direction given by the Allahabad High Court to the CBSE is totally misconceived and uncalled for. When the Allahabad High Court has already held that the DPS School is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition is not maintainable, there was no necessity for giving a direction to the CBSE which virtually amounts to granting a declaration in favour of those teachers whose services have been terminated. We fail to appreciate the view taken by the Allahabad High Court by unnecessarily complicating the issue by involving the CBSE for a private dispute between the teachers and the DPS. The Allahabad High Court should have stop short of holding that the said DPS is a private body and the writ is not maintainable. Hence, we are of the view that no writ is maintainable against a private school as it is not a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and no direction could have been given by the High Court to the CBSE for interfering with the termination of the teachers. The proper remedy for the teachers was to file a civil suit for damages, if there was any.” [Emphasis added] Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has also produced the records of the minutes of the said meeting that was held on 16.12.2015 and this court strangely finds that even the minutes differs from the minutes placed with the writ petition. By pen through, the words “guilty” appearing in the minutes produced by the writ petitioner has been changed to “not suitable”. That apart, the respondents in terms of the leave as extended to them on the request of their counsel have submitted an affidavit on 08.03.2017 which is placed in the record. By the said affidavit, the respondents have submitted that they will expunge the resolution 12(a) relating to Mrs. Priyanka Roy (the petitioner) from the minutes taken in the meeting of the Full Managing Committee held on 16.02.2015. 7. This undertaking would essentially impact the adjudication. By the said affidavit, the respondents have submitted that they will expunge the resolution 12(a) relating to Mrs. Priyanka Roy (the petitioner) from the minutes taken in the meeting of the Full Managing Committee held on 16.02.2015. 7. This undertaking would essentially impact the adjudication. In view of the law, as laid down by the Apex Court, when against a private body, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would lie, this court is of the opinion that for that purpose averments are to be made in the writ petition adequately referring to the materials to establish that the said private body comes within the meaning of “State” as provided under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Ordinarily, the private schools cannot come within the meaning of the “State” unless those elements as referred in K.K. Saksena (supra) are apparent on the face of the records. However, for the recent development of law, if those private schools discharge the public duty or there is public importance element in their function then in appropriate cases the High Court may exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. Truly, what has been pointed out by Mr. Bhattacharji, learned counsel for the respondents is that there are no such averments or material in the writ petition. Hence, this court is constrained to observe that the writ petition cannot be maintained. This court would not have proceeded further but in view of the statement made by the Full Managing Committee in the form of the affidavit dated 08.03.2017. From the records, it surfaced that the stigmatic remark was without any notice or affording any opportunity to the petitioner. Now the remark stands expunged from the minutes of the meeting of the St. Paul’s School Full Managing Committee held on 16.12.2005. As such, the petitioner may file a representation to the respondents No. 4 and 5 for renewal of her contract. It will remain within the domain of the Full Managing Committee to consider whether the petitioner’s engagement be renewed or not. In this matter, this court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in any manner. If the representation is filed by the petitioner within 15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the said representation, the Full Managing Committee shall take a decision and the said decision shall be communicated to the petitioner. 9. In this matter, this court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in any manner. If the representation is filed by the petitioner within 15(fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the said representation, the Full Managing Committee shall take a decision and the said decision shall be communicated to the petitioner. 9. Having observed thus, this writ petition stands disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.