JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. When hearing of these appeals began, prefatory submissions were made by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Arshad Hidayathulla, instructed by Mr. P. Reghunath the learned counsel for various appellants, that a particular issue involved in these appeals, in the domain of the Income Tax Act, is res nova and has never been considered by any other High Court or by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to his information. The prospect of being called upon to decide virgin and uncontested issues in unchartered territory was gripping and virtually exhilarating for us and therefore, it had our undivided and focused attention. 2. We are, however, after such converged consideration, certain that we have to answer the issues against the appellants holding ourselves in conformity with the view, opinion and findings of the learned Single Judge. 3. Two nascent provisions in the Income Tax Act enacted by the Taxation Law Amendment Act falls for decoding by this Court in these appeals. The provisions are Sections 206C and 44AC, the latter of which now stands repelled by the Finance Act, 1992 with effect from 01.04.1993. 4. These provisions which were engrafted in the Act together and were intended to act as a special purpose provision adjunctly for addressing and remedying certain mischief that was noticed by the legislature in its nomothetic wisdom. It is precisely the repealing of Section 44AC but allowing continuance of Section 206C that has prompted the appellants to raise questions as to the independent competence of Section 206C without its fraternal twin provision, in a manner of speaking, to operate as a tax collection mechanism. Since the provisions called into the question for cryptanalysis in these appeals are not one which are usually employed in application to quotidian fiscal areas but only in specialised and specific situations, as special purpose provisions and hence are not among the more familiar Sections of the Act in its routine application to every day life, we think, to assist in elucidation the sections, as it were enacted, require to be placed for reference in this judgment. We do so as under: “44AC. We do so as under: “44AC. Special provisions for computing profits and gains from the business of trading in certain goods.- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sections 28 to 43C, in the case of an assessee, being a person other than a public sector company (hereafter in this section referred to as the buyer), obtaining in any sale by way of auction, tender or any other mode, conducted by any other person or his agent (hereafter in this section referred as as the seller),- (a) any goods in the nature of alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than Indian-made foreign liquor), a sum equal to forty percent, of the amount paid or payable by the buyer as the purchase price in respect of such goods shall be deemed to be the profits and gains of the buyer from the business of trading in such goods chargeable to tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”: (b) the right to receive any goods of the nature specified in column (2) of the Table below, or such goods, as the case may be, a sum equal to the percentage, specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said Table, of the amount paid or payable by the buyer in respect of the sale of such right or as the purchase price in respect of such goods shall be deemed to be the profits and gains of the buyer from the business of trading in such goods chargeable to tax under the head “Profits and gains of business or profession”. 206C. Profits and gains from the business of trading on alcoholic liquor, forest produce, scrap, etc.- (1) Every person, being a seller referred to in Section 44AC, shall, at the time of debiting of the amount payable by the buyer referred to in that section to the account of the buyer or at the time of receipt of such amount from the said buyer in case or by the issue of a cheque or draft or by any other mode, whichever is earlier, collect from the buyer of any goods of the nature specified in column (2) of the table below, a sum equal to the percentage, specified in the corresponding entry in column (3) of the said table; of such amount as income-tax on income comprised therein. S. No. Nature of goods Percentage i. Alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than Indian made foreign liquor) Timber obtained under a forest lease Timber obtained by any mode other than under a forest lease Any other forest produce not being timber 15% (2) The power to recover tax by a collection under sub-section (1) shall be without prejudice to any other mode of recovery. (3) xxx xxx xxx (4) Any amount collected in accordance with the provisions of this section and paid under sub-section (3) shall be deemed as payment of tax on behalf of the person from whom the amount has been collected and credit shall be given to him for the amount so collected on the production of the certificate furnished under sub-section (5) in the assessment made under this Act for the assessment year for which such income is assessable. (5) xxx xxx xxx (5A) xxx xxx xxx (6) Any person responsible for collecting the tax who fails to collect the tax in accordance with the provisions of this section, shall, notwithstanding such failure, be liable to pay the tax to the credit of the Central Government in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). (7) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (6), if the seller does not collect the tax or after collecting the tax fails to pay it as required under this section, he shall be liable to pay simple interest at the rate of two percent per month or part thereof on the amount of such tax from the date on which such tax was collectible to the date on which the tax was actually paid. (8) Where the tax has not been paid as aforesaid, after it is collected, the amount of the tax together with the amount of simple interest thereon referred to in sub-section (7) shall be a charge upon all the assets of the seller.” 5. The reasons for the legislation of these provisions have been explained by the Finance Bill, 1988 as under: “Considerable difficulty has been felt in the past in making assessment of incomes in the case of persons who take contracts for sale of liquor, scrap, forest products, etc. The reasons for the legislation of these provisions have been explained by the Finance Bill, 1988 as under: “Considerable difficulty has been felt in the past in making assessment of incomes in the case of persons who take contracts for sale of liquor, scrap, forest products, etc. It has been the Department's experience that for taking such contracts, firms or associations of persons are specifically constituted and very often no trace is left regarding them or their members after the contract has been executed. Persons have also been found to have taken contracts in benami names by floating undertakings or associations for short periods. Since tax is payable in the assessment years in respect of the incomes of the previous years, the time by which the incomes from such sources become assessable, such persons are not traceable. At the time of assessment in these cases, either the accounts are not available or they are grossly incorrect or incomplete. Thus, even its assessments could be made on ex parte basis, it becomes almost impossible to collect the tax found due, either because it becomes difficult to establish the identity of the persons and trace them or because of the fact that the persons in whose names contracts are taken are men of no means. With a view to combat large-scale tax evasion by persons deriving income from such business, the Bill seeks to insert, a new section 44AC to provide for determination of income in such cases. Taking into account the experience gained in the past regarding the ratio of profit to the sale consideration the proposal is to provide that sixty percent of the amount paid or payable by such persons on sale would constitute income of the tax payers, i.e. the buyer. The provisions of this section will apply only to an assessee, being a buyer of any goods in the nature of alcoholic liquor for human consumption (other than Indian-made foreign liquor) or any forest produce, scrap or waste, whether industrial or non-industrial, or such other goods, as may be notified by the Central Government, at the point of first sale. The word 'seller' connotes the Central Government, State Government, or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a Central Act or any company. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any buyer in the second or subsequent sale of such goods. The word 'seller' connotes the Central Government, State Government, or any local authority or corporation or authority established by or under a Central Act or any company. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any buyer in the second or subsequent sale of such goods. This amendment will take effect from 1st April, 1989 and will, accordingly, apply to assessment year 1989-90 and subsequent years. Further, with a view to facilitate collection of taxes from such assessees, it is proposed to introduce a new section 206C to provide that any person, being a seller, referred to in section 44AC, shall collect income-tax of a sum equal to twenty per cent of the amount paid or payable by the buyer, as increased by a surcharge for purposes of the Union calculated on the income-tax at the rates in force. Such sum is required to be collected either from the buyer at the time of debiting the said amount to the account of the buyer or at the time of the receipt of that amount from the buyer, whichever is earlier. This mode of recovery of tax shall be without prejudice to any other mode of recover. The tax so collected by the seller shall be paid to the credit of the Central Government or as the Board directs, within seven days from the date of collection. It will be treated as tax paid on behalf of the person from whom the amount has been collected and credit shall be given for such amount in the assessment made under this Act on production of a certificate. The new section also provides that if a seller does not collect or after collecting fails to pay the tax, he shall be deemed to be an assessee in default in respect of the tax and the amount of the tax together with the amount of simple interest, calculated at the rate of two percent per month or part thereof, shall be a charge upon all the assets of the seller.” 6. There is no doubt that the reasons for the legislation of these provisions were intended to ensure that there is no evasion of tax with respect to certain specified items as are mentioned therein. There is no doubt that the reasons for the legislation of these provisions were intended to ensure that there is no evasion of tax with respect to certain specified items as are mentioned therein. This cannot be doubted because, as is perspicuous from the explanation given in the memorandum of Finance Bill, the provisions were created to get over the difficulty that were felt in the past in making assessment of income in the case of persons who take contracts for sale of liquor, scrap, forest products, etc., since by the time the assessments were made, the accounts of such transactions were not available or were grossly incorrect and in some cases the identity of the persons itself was found not to be traced. It was, therefore, that Section 44AC was introduced to determine the income, on a presumptive basis, in such cases. The experience gained in the past regarding the ratio of profit to the sale consideration was assessed to be 60% of the amount paid or payable by such persons on sale, which was then constituted to determine the income of the tax payers, i.e. the buyer. The provisions were very clear that it were intended to apply only to an assessee being a buyer of any goods in the nature of the articles mentioned in the sections. It was also made clear that the sections would not apply to any buyer in the second or further sale of such goods. Once the income is determined at the hands of the buyer, Section 206C was introduced to collect tax of a sum equal to a particular percentage of the amount paid or payable by the buyer and the obligation to collect such tax was cast upon the seller. This obligation to collect tax was also qualified with a specific mandate that if the seller does not collect or after collecting fails to pay tax, he shall be deemed to be an assessee-in-default in respect of the tax and the amount of the tax with interest. 7. The validity of the provisions, namely Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act were challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a series of litigations from various parts of the country on several grounds including legislative competence of the Parliament to enact them and violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. 7. The validity of the provisions, namely Sections 44AC and 206C of the Act were challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a series of litigations from various parts of the country on several grounds including legislative competence of the Parliament to enact them and violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was, therefore, drawn to analyse the provisions in extreme detail, specifically as to whether the twin provisions would amount to charging sections and whether Section 44AC, in particular, operates so as to levy a charge. This issue had pointedly been considered in the context of the legislative competence of the Parliament and the contentions against the sections that adoption of purchase price as a measure for determining the income tax suffers from constitutional infirmity. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, after an arduous analysis of the provisions of the law, concluded that Section 44AC read with Section 206C are not charging sections but are only machinery provisions. The opinion was that since the income or profit is embedded even at the point of purchase, these sections only provide machinery or mechanism to tap the income which accrues under Sections 4 and 5 of the Act. The sections were granted imprimatur by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that since the legislative measure is only a machinery provision, it is open to the legislature in its wisdom to specify the stage at which it is to be levied, the rate at which it is to be levied and other details. The conclusions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are summarised in paragraph 15 of the judgment in Union of India and another etc. etc. v. A. Sanyasi Rao (AIR 1996 SC 1129), which, for its felicity, needs a complete reading. We therefore, extract the same as under: “Counsel for the Revenue, Dr. Gaurishankar, vehemently contended before us that Section 44AC read with Section 206C are only machinery provisions and not charging sections. We see force in this plea. The charge for the levy of the income that accrued or arose is laid by the charging sections viz. Sections 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Section 44AC or Section 206C. Gaurishankar, vehemently contended before us that Section 44AC read with Section 206C are only machinery provisions and not charging sections. We see force in this plea. The charge for the levy of the income that accrued or arose is laid by the charging sections viz. Sections 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Section 44AC or Section 206C. The fact that the income is levied at a flat rate or at an earlier stage will not in any way alter the nature or character of the levy since such matters are completely in the realm of legislative wisdom. We hold that what is brought to tax, though levied with reference to the purchase price and at an early point is nonetheless income liable to be taxed under the Income Tax Act. We repel the plea by the assesses to the contrary.” 8. It is, therefore, ineluctable that the operational confines of the provisions is that they are only machinery and not charging sections. We point out this especially because we see that the specific contention of the appellants is that Section 44AC was the charging section and that Section 206C is the machinery provision to give effect to Section 44AC. This submission, we must say immediately, would not continue to hold water for the specific and express reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has declared that the provisions are only machinery and are not charging in its amplitude. In fact, their Lordships went on to clarify the position further by saying that the 'charge for the levy of income is led by the charging section, namely Sections 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Sections 44AC and 206C'. There cannot be a more emphatic declaration on this point and we are, of course, bound completely by it. 9. Thus far, our path is lightened and irradiated by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 10. The genesis of the legal and factual disputations in these appeals is the Finance Act, 1992, which omitted Section 44AC with effect from 01.04.1993. The reasons that compelled the said section to be omitted has been explained in the said Finance Act itself. A reading of the explanation would be of great benefit, since it would show as to what prompted the legislature to repeal Section 44AC while maintaining Section 206C in the statute itself. The reasons that compelled the said section to be omitted has been explained in the said Finance Act itself. A reading of the explanation would be of great benefit, since it would show as to what prompted the legislature to repeal Section 44AC while maintaining Section 206C in the statute itself. The explanation is extracted as under: “Section 44AC has been omitted with effect from 1-4-1993 by the Finance Act, 1992, so as to remove the provisions for presumptive basis of computing profits and gains of persons engaged in the trading of country liquor, timber obtained under forest lease, timber obtained by any other mode other than under a forest lease and any other forest produce not being timber. The omission ensures that in such cases the assessment is done in accordance with the existing provisions of the Income-tax Act. This has been done as the interpretation of the section gave rise to controversy and administrative difficulties. Section 206C which provides for collection of tax at source in respect of such income will continue to remain in force with the amendments made therein consequent to the omission of section 44AC.” 11. It is the forensic scenario after the repeal of Section 44AC as above, that Mr. Hidayathulla asserts, is the unchartered area for out analysis, since, according to him, the position after the repeal has not been considered by any court before these cases. 12. Submissions have been made before us in great detail and with meticulous precision by both the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Arshad Hidayathulla and Mr. P.K.R. Menon appearing for the appellant and the Revenue respectively. We have enjoyed the benefit of the manifest expertise of both the learned Senior Counsel, who have presented their versions regarding the facts and the law involved with absolute certainty and with great amount of erudition and sagacity. 13. It is indubitable that the principal and singular assertion of Mr. Hidayathulla is that after the repeal of Section 44AC, being the adjunct provision and which was an intrinsic part of the composite mechanism, the remaining section, namely, Section 206C, can only still operate for the same purposes for which the special purpose mechanism was postulated. 13. It is indubitable that the principal and singular assertion of Mr. Hidayathulla is that after the repeal of Section 44AC, being the adjunct provision and which was an intrinsic part of the composite mechanism, the remaining section, namely, Section 206C, can only still operate for the same purposes for which the special purpose mechanism was postulated. His contention is that the operational ambit of Section 206C, is, in spite of the repeal of Section 44AC, confined to the purposes for which it was originally legislated, namely as a measure against evasion and not as independent free standing provision for tax collection. The specific submission of the appellants in the confines of these assertions, is that since the trade in which they are involved in do not have any room for evasion, the rigor of Section 206C under which they are obliged to collect at source, would not apply at all and that consequently non deduction of such amounts would not render them assessees in default. 14. Before analysing the submissions it would be prudent to have a glance of the facts which led to the controversy in these cases. The appellants maintain that it imports timber from outside India and that it sells the same to various retailers and other customers in Kerala. It appears that a survey under Section 133A of the Income Tax Act was carried out in the premises of the appellants during the course of which it was noticed that they were not collecting Tax at Source, as obligated, under Section 206C of the Act, from its buyers. The details of such sales made to retail traders were obtained during the survey and handed over to the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Kozhikode. A show cause notice was thereafter issued to the appellants as to why they should not be treated as assessees-in-default under Section 206C(6) in respect of non-deduction; why interest under Section 206C(7) should not be charged; and why penal action should not be initiated against them for having failed to collect tax at source, under Section 206C(1) of the Act. 15. All the above appeals have, in their respective dominion, the same set of facts. The only difference in the case of W.A.No.981/2015 is that it relates to the years from 2011-12 to 2013-14, whereas apropos of other four appeals the relevant assessment years are from 2009-10 to 2013-14. 15. All the above appeals have, in their respective dominion, the same set of facts. The only difference in the case of W.A.No.981/2015 is that it relates to the years from 2011-12 to 2013-14, whereas apropos of other four appeals the relevant assessment years are from 2009-10 to 2013-14. Since all the appeals have substantially the same set of facts, have identical contentions and seek similar reliefs, we propose to dispose of all of them by this judgment. 16. The pleadings on record and the submissions at the Bar would make it irrefragable that the entire hypostatis of the appellant's defence against the demand is built on the assertion that Section 206C co-existed with Section 44AC and that, therefore, once the latter was deleted, the coverage of Section 206C do not get enlarged or changed. According to the appellants, section 206C is the charging section and that the legislative intend in retaining Section 206C is only to cover the situations of collection of tax in the context of timber obtained from forest produce from India. They maintain that timber obtained by importing from other countries do not fall within the mischief of 'by any other mode' and that only the timber which is generated from the soil of India would be so covered. 17. According to the appellants, the only purposive interpretation that Section 206C would concede to is that it applies only to cases where standing timber is sold and such buyers collect timber and obtain timber from such lands - forest or private, where it is not possible for the department to collect the actual details of quantity of timber so obtained by the buyer. 18. They further assert that if Section 206C is to be applied to the case of sale of timber imported by the persons like the appellant to other registered dealers, it will indubitably create a separate class - timber dealers, who are different from normal traders which classification is unauthorised by the Constitution of India. 19. The gravamen of the appellant's submissions, as we understand, is that once the timber is imported to India, it is to be deemed and treated like any other product and that its sale by the sellers like the appellant cannot be brought under the umbra of Section 206C, since even though the commodity sold is timber, it is to be treated like any other article. 20. 20. The appellants further profess that the only reason to include timber in Sections 44AC and 206C was because the legislature intended it to mean timber obtained from a forest produce or from such other modes relating to standing trees because there was no method of assessing the actual quantity of timber obtained from such trees and sold by the seller or 'obtained' by the buyer. They interpret these provisions to mean that it was intended only to ensure that while effecting sale of the timber so obtained from a forest lease or such other modes, the seller will be obliged to collect tax from the buyer because the actual quantity of timber sold and thus 'obtained' by the buyer could be determined only at the point of sale, since the timber has been sourced from standing trees, taken on contract by the seller as such and converted into timber later. 21. As regards the timber brought to India after import is concerned, it is the singular contention of the appellants that when timber is brought into India under a valid import, there is clear assessment by quantification and value by central levy in the nature of customs duty at the proper rate. According to them, since the timber so imported is covered by a bill of entry and since the assessment under the Customs Act is made before the timber is permitted to brought into India, no question of evasion as to the quantity or value could ever been thought of and hence it would be completely beyond the reach of Section 44AC or Section 206C. 22. There is no doubt that the entire foundational basis of the appellant's case is built on the bedrock that Sections 44AC and 206C were a composite mechanism to avoid evasion of tax and that even after repeal of Section 44AC, its fraternal twin, namely, Section 206C continues to have the same soul as that of the repealed. The appellant has not discharged the obligation cast by Section 206C to collect tax from the buyers on their supposition that they were not obliged to do so since the articles sold by them, even though timber, would not be covered by the said section since there cannot be any question of evasion of tax on same being imported to India. This is how they have sought to make a distinction from the timber obtained from other sources of India and the timber imported to India. They say that the words 'other modes' under Sections 44AC and 206C would not cover the articles they are selling even if they are timber because what is intended by these section is to bring into its fold all articles including timber which cannot be quantified in value or quantity precisely until its sale takes places to the buyer. According to them, it was, therefore, that a provision for presumptive income at the hands of the buyer under Section 44AC and the obligation to collect advance tax by the seller under Section 206C was brought into the statute as a special purpose composite mechanism. 23. We have given the assertions, submissions and contentions of the appellant a great amount of thought. It is undoubted that Sections 206C and 44AC were brought in for a particular purpose. In fact, we have seen in the earlier paragraphs of the judgment that it does not brook any further doubt especially because the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly, in Sanyasi Rao's case, (supra) declared the law. However, what is also declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as we have already seen above, is that Section 206C or Section 44AC were not charging sections but tax collecting machinery provisions. We have noticed this in paragraph 8 of this judgment earlier and therefore, the contention of the appellant to the contrary does not require countenance and does not deserve any merit. Once it is seen that both these sections are not charging ones, but machinery provisions, the only question that will have to be considered is whether Section 206C, after the repeal of Section 44AC, would partake the comportment of a free standing and independent built provision without being circumscribed or manacled by the provisions of Section 44AC or the reasons for which the provisions were brought in as a composite system. 24. It is obvious from the Finance Act, 1992, even though Section 44AC stands repealed, it expressly provides for the continuation of Section 206C as an independent provision for collection of tax at source. 24. It is obvious from the Finance Act, 1992, even though Section 44AC stands repealed, it expressly provides for the continuation of Section 206C as an independent provision for collection of tax at source. Once Section 44AC has been repealed, obviously Section 206C was then intended to collect tax not on the income presumptively determined under Section 44AC but on that income that was charged under the relevant charging sections, namely Sections 5 to 9 of the Income tax Act. We have no doubt about this because the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in Sanyasi Rao (supra) held that the charge of levy of the income that accrued or arose is laid by the charging sections, namely Section 5 to 9 and not by virtue of Section 44AC or Section 206C. Therefore, the only issue would then remain is the interpretation of Section 206C as to whether it is still bound within the confinements for the purpose for which it was originally enacted. However, the very fact that even when Section 44AC was consciously repealed, Section 206C was allowed to remain would indicate and show otherwise. 25. Normally, there would not have been, lexicographically or semantically, any doubt as to the meaning of the words 'by any other modes' found in Section 206C of the Act. The appellant is seeking to make a distinction between the timber imported to India and the timber obtained from standing trees in the soil of India only on account of the habiliment of the purposes for which Sections 44AC and 206C were initially engrafted. Since the initial intention of the legislature was obviously to avoid evasion of income from the sale of timber obtained from standing trees, the appellant say that the timber imported from outside India would not come within the sweep of Section 206C as it stands today. 26. Ironically, these submissions would have been much more apposite at the time when Section 44AC was in the statute. Since it would have then been possible for the appellant to claim terra firma that only those products, including timber which were amenable to evasion at the time of sale could be covered by those provisions and that, therefore, the timber obtained from outside India would not be hit by its rigor. Since it would have then been possible for the appellant to claim terra firma that only those products, including timber which were amenable to evasion at the time of sale could be covered by those provisions and that, therefore, the timber obtained from outside India would not be hit by its rigor. However, once Section 44AC has been repealed, Section 206C then became independent and completely beyond the cloister of the purposes for which it was originally legislated. The distinction that the appellant is seeking to bring in would be valid only if Section 206C continues to operate solely for the purpose for which it was originally created along with Section 44AC. If, otherwise the words 'any other mode' would obviously cover every type of timber obtained either under a forest lease or otherwise. If Section 206C had been tied down to Section 44AC, the contentions of the appellant would have perhaps gained better footing but once Section 44AC stood repealed, the foundation of their contentions have obviously been greatly enervated. 27. If, as contended by the appellant, the intention of the legislature was not to deliquesce the purposes for which Sections 44AC and 206C have been initially engrafted, it could have repealed both the sections in one go. The fact that Section 206C was allowed life would certainly lead to no other inference that the legislature wanted it to continue as a tax collecting machinery provision in the nature of one relating to collection of tax at source. 28. The specific intention of the legislature to make Section 206C as a free standing and independent spirited provision would also become conspicuous from the fact that after Section 44AC was repealed, Section 206C continued to have amendments, bringing into its fold various articles which were not included at the time when they were initially embeded into the Statute. For example, the article 'scrap' was added as per Finance Act, 1992 with effect from 01.04.1992; 'minerals' as per Finance Act, 2012 with effect from 01.07.2012; and in between other amendments were also brought in as per Finance Act 1996 and Finance Act 2003. The rates of tax to be collected under Section 206C were also changed from time to time. Similar is the position with respect to the burden of tax imposed. The rates of tax to be collected under Section 206C were also changed from time to time. Similar is the position with respect to the burden of tax imposed. The Finance Act, 1992 added an Explanation with effect from 01.04.1992 removing the burden of tax from the buyer who purchased goods for further sale but as per the Finance Act, 2003, if the seller had sold the goods to the retailer, he was not liable to deduct tax at source. However, as per the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2003, which came into effect on 08.09.2003, exemption from deduction of tax became permissible only where the buyer satisfies the condition that the goods were purchased by them for personal consumption. 29. It is, therefore, obvious that the section underwent changes from time to time and evolved itself in order to meet the requirements that the legislature found to be remedied periodically. The onto-genesis of the section is thus ineluctable and it grew not to be limited to or confined for the purposes for which it was initially brought in with new articles being added into it, rates being modified from time to time and methods of collection having changed periodically, obviously taking into account the changing needs and purposes, thus making it a provision for tax collection without reference to the exclusive possibility of chance of evasion. 30. Our survey of the Statute and the provisions in particular would lead to the indubitable conclusion that what has been attempted by the Parliament is to collect tax from the buyers on certain items iterated therein and to ensure that the collection of tax is cast as an obligation on the seller by deducting tax at source from such buyers. Obviously therefore, the fiscal burden is squarely and completely upon the buyer of the goods and not on the seller. The appellants in this case are sellers and are, therefore, under no legal burden of any fiscal or other liability, but their obligation, statutorily fixed, is only to collect tax from the buyers at the rates mentioned in Section 206C. This burden was cast upon them while Section 44AC was alive and also thereafter. 31. The appellants in this case are sellers and are, therefore, under no legal burden of any fiscal or other liability, but their obligation, statutorily fixed, is only to collect tax from the buyers at the rates mentioned in Section 206C. This burden was cast upon them while Section 44AC was alive and also thereafter. 31. The appellants have chosen to interpret the provisions on their own to arrive at a conclusion that they are not liable to deduct tax on the assumption that the timber imported by them do not fall under the mischief of Section 206C as it stands today. We are unable to see how the appellants could say this, since the Statute, in unmistakable words, makes it incumbent upon every buyer to pay tax on the timber they purchase or obtain and consequentially casts an obligation on the seller to collect such tax at source from them. This position has not undergone any change when Section 44AC was alive or after it was repealed. The appellants have elected to interpret the provisions in a manner to suit themselves by carving out an exemption for imported timber which, unfortunately, does not have any legal sanction. They have chosen to interpret the provisions on their own and to their advantage and any such attempt would always be fraught with the hazard of being otherwise and would be to their peril, if, unfortunately, such interpretation finds no support in judicial evaluation. We are firm in our mind that Section 206C of the Act was intended as a tax collection mechanism all through and the intention of the Parliament to have it as such was clear from the fact that it was allowed to remain in the Statute even after Section 44AC was repealed. The appellants have chosen not to deduct tax from their buyers even though they were fully aware that the section required and mandated them to do so. Their only defence appears to be that they were under the impression, on the basis of the interpretation made by themselves, that they were not required to do so since the articles sold by them would not come under the sweep of Section 44AC and hence they have exemption from the requirements under Section 206C. This appears to be completely untenable and without nomothetic or legal sanction. 32. This appears to be completely untenable and without nomothetic or legal sanction. 32. We have already noticed that there is no fiscal or financial burden cast upon the seller under the provisions of Section 206C and that the entire compulsion to pay tax is upon the buyer. However, the statutory devoir of the seller to deduct tax at the rates shown therein is the only fiscal obligation that is placed on them and if they do not do so, obviously, the residuary provisions making them liable as an assessee-in-default would operate as per the rigor of the section and it would thereupon be on the seller to discharge that burden by such methods as are available to them. Therefore, we are unable to understand the reason or the locus for the appellants to assert that they are not liable to deduct tax when the obligation to pay such tax is not on them, but on the buyer. When the section makes it incumbent upon the buyer to pay tax at a particular rate, it would cause absolutely no prejudice to the appellants to deduct the same under its mandate. 33. However, we see the problem that the appellants are facing is that they have chosen not to deduct tax as required under the section and they are now facing the proceedings under Section 206C(6) of the Act as assessee-in-default. We are of the view that this is something that the appellants have brought upon themselves by venturing into an interpretation of the section in a manner that they say were according to their comprehension but unfortunately is to the contrary, according to us, after judicial evaluation. We are aware that the appellants may have statutory remedies against the impugned orders in these appeals and we do not want nor do we intend to frustrate it in any manner. We are, therefore, sure in our mind that we have not gone into the merits of the demands raised against the appellants but that we are only declaring the law that Section 206C operates independently and without the rigor for the purposes for which it was originally enacted along with Section 44AC. We are, therefore, sure in our mind that we have not gone into the merits of the demands raised against the appellants but that we are only declaring the law that Section 206C operates independently and without the rigor for the purposes for which it was originally enacted along with Section 44AC. Once the law is so settled, it would then be open to the appellants to seek remedies against the demands made against them in any manner and in any of the methods available to them under the provisions of the Act and we make it clear that we have not in any way sought to be impede such opportunity, rights and remedies available to the appellants. 34. We, therefore, reiterate for all the reasons that we have recorded above that consequent to the repeal of Section 44AC, Section 206C would no longer be sequestered in its operational ambit or its functional parameters by the reasons that were originally available at the time when they were legislated together and it would operate as a free standing and independent provision for tax collection in the manner mandated therein. In such view of the matter, the appeals fail and are dismissed, but subject to our observations allowing liberty to the appellants as indicated above. In the particular and singular facts and circumstances of this case, we make no order as to costs and the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.