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2017 DIGILAW 2370 (ALL)

RAM SARAN v. BOARD OF REVENUE

2017-10-13

B.AMIT STHALEKAR

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble B. Amit Sthalekar, J.—Heard Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 3 and Sri R.U. Ansari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 6 to 11. 2. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner challenging the orders dated 14.12.1978, 15.10.1979 and 10.12.1980 arising out of suit proceedings holding that the petitioner had 1/7 share in the joint family property. 3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that there was one Mahasukh, who had two sons, Girwar and Bucha. Girwar had one son Deva. Bucha had also one son Nand Kishore. Deva was issue-less whereas Nand Kishore had 8 children including the petitioner, of which the petitioner was the eldest. Out of the 8 sons, one son subsequently died and thus there were only 7 sons. 4. The contention of the petitioner is that he was adopted by Deva about 66 years before filing of the suit and has lived separately from the family of the Nand Kishore for the last 66 years. The said Deva died in the year 1939 whereas Nand Kishore died in the year 1943. The respondents herein filed a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 1950) for declaration that they were co-tenants of the entire property and also claimed that Deva had died issue-less and that his share would devolve upon their father Nand Kishore and they were all co-tenants alongwith the defendant-petitioner-Ram Saran each having 1/7th share of the joint family property. 5. The petitioner-defendant in the suit claimed that his natural father was Nand Kishore but he was adopted by Deva about 66 years back and therefore, upon the death of Deva the ancestral property of Deva would devolve exclusively upon the petitioner/defendant and not upon Nand Kishore and thereafter, his sons, equally, treating the petitioner also to be a part of the family of Nand Kishore as one of the sons of Nand Kishore. 6. Before the first appellate Court the petitioner filed several documents relating to 1347F, 1356F, 1359F as well as the other documents to show that his name had been recorded in the Khewat as son of Deva alongwith the names of the plaintiffs/respondents as sons of Nand Kishore. 6. Before the first appellate Court the petitioner filed several documents relating to 1347F, 1356F, 1359F as well as the other documents to show that his name had been recorded in the Khewat as son of Deva alongwith the names of the plaintiffs/respondents as sons of Nand Kishore. Both Deva and Nand Kishore having equal share and in the records of ‘Sir’ he was throughout shown as son of Deva. His case further was that he had filed a suit for possession in 1951 and at that time Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh and Uday Singh, sons of Nand Kishore were already major whereas Deputy, Hamvir Singh and Phal Singh @ Foran Singh were minor under guardianship of Natholi. In respect of Plots No. 5790/85, 5751/49, 5798M/0-3,580/84, 5805/71, 5806/51, 5808/71, 5809/92, 5862/62, 5819/42 the suit was decreed and also executed in Execution Proceedings No. 234. One suit was also filed by the plaintiffs/respondents for grant of share in the property in which Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh and Uday Singh were shown as major and Deputy, Hamvir Singh and Phal Singh were shown as minor. In the Suit the petitioner Ram Saran was impleaded as respondent. It is also stated that thereafter a compromise was arrived at between the parties through their joint application dated 18.3.1952. 7. So far as suit giving rise to the present proceedings is concerned, the same was decreed by the trial Court holding that the petitioner had failed to produce any evidence that there was any Godnama or any other document to show that he had been adopted by Deva. The Court also held that the suit was not barred by provisions of Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1953). Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court dated 14.12.1974, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, who dismissed the appeal by his order dated 15.10.1979 and thereafter, the petitioner filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue which was also dismissed by order dated 10.12.1980. Hence, the present writ petition. 8. Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court dated 14.12.1974, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, who dismissed the appeal by his order dated 15.10.1979 and thereafter, the petitioner filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue which was also dismissed by order dated 10.12.1980. Hence, the present writ petition. 8. The contention of the petitioner was that in the appeal before the Additional Commissioner, Agra he had filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. bringing on record several documents, namely, copy of Khatauni 1328 Fasli, 1347 Fasli, 1357 Fasli with regard to Khata No. 116, 117, 129, 147 and Khatauni 1357 Fasli in respect of Khata No. 278 and 447 and Khatauni No. 1359 Fasli, Khatauni 1360 Fasli, 1362 Fasli; GH Form-20, 25; copy of plaint dated 23.2.1951 in Suit (Ram Saran v. Natholi and others); copy of application for execution of decree dated 23.5.1952; Dakhalnama (Ram Saran v. Natholi) dated 26.6.1952; the compromise dated 18.3.1952; copy of the plaint dated 17.11.1951 in suit Ram Saran v. Natholi under Section 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act; application on complaint of Patwari dated 19.5.1952 showing Ram Saran as the adopted son of Deva; Kutumb Register of Village Avairni, CH Form 41 and CH Form 45. 9. This application under Order 41 Rule 27 was accepted by the appellate Court on payment of cost of Rs. 20/-. It is, however, stated that the Additional Commissioner failed to refer to any of these documentary evidences filed by the petitioner and has erroneously dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. It is further stated that the Board of Revenue while hearing the second appeal also failed to take into consideration any of these evidences and has wrongly dismissed the petitioner’s second appeal. 10. Sri R.U. Ansari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the land in dispute measures about 13 acres or 23 bigha of pacca construction and the share of the petitioner therein comes to only 1/7. 10. Sri R.U. Ansari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the land in dispute measures about 13 acres or 23 bigha of pacca construction and the share of the petitioner therein comes to only 1/7. The submission is that the petitioner was one of the eight sons of Nand Kishore and out of eight sons, one son having died during the pendency of the proceedings and that Deva had died issue-less, therefore, the share of Deva would also devolve upon Nand Kishore, father of the plaintiff-respondents, therefore, the share of the petitioner in the joint family property would only be 1/7 and not half share claiming to be the adopted son of Deva. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents on record. Two questions arise for determination in the present writ petition : (1) Whether the petitioner is the adopted son of Deva, if yes, what would be his share in the family property? (2) Whether the suit of the plaintiff-respondents was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act, 1953? The trail Court framed following four issues : (1) Whether the plaintiff is the Bhoomidar of the property in dispute? (2) Whether the property in dispute is the ancestral property of Deva or Mahasukh? (3) Whether the defendant petitioner is the adopted son of Deva? (4) Whether the suit of the plaintiff respondents is barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act, 1953? 12. So far as the first question as to whether the petitioner is the adopted son of Deva and what would be his share in the family property, the trial Court decided the issues No. 1 and 3 jointly. It examined the Khatauni of 1383-1388 Fasli showing the Khata No. 852, 371 and 182 in which the name of the petitioner/defendant is recorded as Ram Saran S/o Deva over the Khata No. 852 and 371 and over the Khata No. 182, the names of Natholi, Nihal Singh, Uday Singh, Kishan Singh, Deputy, Humveer Singh and Phal Singh @ Foran Singh have been recorded as sons of Nand Kishore. The allegation of the plaintiffs was that the property in dispute was a large joint family property held between Nand Kishore and Deva and that the petitioner had fraudulently got his name entered over the other properties of Deva showing himself to be the adopted son of Deva. The trial Court has referred to the statement of Ram Saran (petitioner) who stated that though he was son of Nand Kishore but about 66 years ago he had been adopted by Deva S/o Girwar according to Hindu rites. The trial Court, however, held that no Godnama or any proof of any such Hindu rite of adoption having been held, was produced as evidence by the petitioner/defendant. One Fateh Singh, DW-1 was examined and he has stated that he was informed by his uncle that the petitioner/defendant was the son of Nand Kishore but that he had been given in adoption to Deva long ago. Defence witness (D.W.)-2 Shoba Ram, being 55 years of age at the time of making of the statement, stated that the defendant-petitioner Ram Saran had been given in adoption to Deva when he was about six or seven years of age. The trial Court has, however, held that none of these witnesses could produce any Godnama and they were not the eye-witness of the adoption ceremony. One Roshan Lal was examined as P.W.-1 who expressed his ignorance about Ram Saran being taken in adoption by Deva and instead he stated that Ram Saran was one of the seven sons of Nand Kishore. The trial Court has therefore, held that the petitioner/defendant has failed to prove that he was the adopted son of Deva. 13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in L. Debi Prasad (dead) through Legal Representative v. Smt. Triveni Devi, AIR 1970 SC 1286 . In the said case, the Supreme Court has held that Hindu law does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance of adoption and all that is required for a valid adoption is that the natural father be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption and once the child is handed over, it shall be deemed to have been given in adoption. 14. 14. The Supreme Court has further held that in a case of the Hindu long recognition as an adopted son raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the validity of his adoption arising from possibility of the loss of his rights in his own family after being adopted in another family. So long as the question of proof of such adoption is concerned, the Supreme Court has held that while judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not it has to be borne in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place long years before it is questioned by anyone the most important evidence is that the alleged adoptive father upheld the person claiming to have been adopted, as his son, the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgement reads as under : “8. That is also the view expressed in Mayne’s Hindu Law wherein it is observed that-the giving and receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption; they are the operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the boy from one family to another; but the Hindu law does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned; for a valid, adoption all that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose. 9. There is no doubt that the burden of proving satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father and received by Gopal Das as his adoptive son is on Shyam Behari Lal. 9. There is no doubt that the burden of proving satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father and received by Gopal Das as his adoptive son is on Shyam Behari Lal. But as observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Rajendrao Nath Holder v. Jogendro Nath Benerjee and others that although the person who pleads that he had been adopted is bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact yet from the long period during which he had been received as an adopted son, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact was to be favourably entertained, and that the case was analogous to that in which the legitimacy of a person in possession had been acquiesced in for a considerable time, and afterwards impeached by a party, who had a right to question the legitimacy, where the defendant, in order to defend his status, is allowed to invoke against the claimant every presumption which arises from long recognition of his legitimacy by members of his family; that in the case of a Hindoo, long recognition as an adopted son, raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the validity of. his adoption, arising from the possibility of the loss of his rights in his own family by being adopted in another family. In Rup Narain and another v. Mst. Gopal Devi and others, the Judicial Committee observed, that in the absence of direct evidence much value has to be attached to the fact that the alleged adopted son had without controversy succeeded to his adoptive father’s estate and enjoyed till his death and that documents during his life and after his death were framed upon the basis of the adoption. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Balinki Padhano and another v. Gopalkrishntt Padhano and others, held that in the case of an ancient adoption evidence showing that the boy was treated for a long time as the adopted son at a time when there was no controversy is sufficient to prove the adoption although evidence of actual giving and taking is not forthcoming. We are in agreement with the views expressed in the decisions referred to above. 10. In the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Passage of time gradually wipes out such evidence. We are in agreement with the views expressed in the decisions referred to above. 10. In the case of all ancient transactions, it is but natural that positive oral evidence will be lacking. Passage of time gradually wipes out such evidence. Human affairs often have to be judged on the basis of probabilities. Rendering of justice will become impossible if a particular mode of proof is insisted upon under all circumstances. In judging whether an adoption pleaded has been satisfactorily proved or not, we have to bear in mind the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof. In the case of an adoption said to have taken place years before the same is questioned, the most important evidence is likely to be that the alleged adoptive, father held out the person claiming to have been adopted as his son; the latter treated the former as his father and their relations and friends treated them as father and son. There is no predetermined way of proving any fact. A fact is said to have been proved where after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. Hence if after taking an overall view of the evidence adduced in the case, we are satisfied that the adoption pleaded is true, we must necessarily proceed on the basis, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it is a valid adoption as well.” 15. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand only insisted that there was no registered deed of adoption of the petitioner to prove that he was given in adoption to Deva; that there no Godnama and there were no witnesses to the Hindu religious ceremony of the adoption. 16. There is another aspect of the matter, the said Deva is stated to have died in 1939 while Nand Kishore died in 1943. The trial Court has held that the name of defendant No. 1 i.e. petitioner herein was recorded in the revenue records in a representative capacity after the death of Deva. 16. There is another aspect of the matter, the said Deva is stated to have died in 1939 while Nand Kishore died in 1943. The trial Court has held that the name of defendant No. 1 i.e. petitioner herein was recorded in the revenue records in a representative capacity after the death of Deva. The question which arises is that if Deva had pre-deceased Nand Kishore, the question of Ram Saran, the name of the petitioner being shown in the revenue records in a representative capacity would not arise and instead the property would have to be recorded in the name of Nand Kishore, if the case of the plaintiff-respondent is accepted that the petitioner was not the adopted son of Deva and Deva had died without issue. No doubt the records which have been filed with the rejoinder-affidavit were not available before the trial Court but these documents were nevertheless filed before the first appellate authority through an application dated 13.7.1989 in appeal No. 58/78-79 through an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC on payment of Rs. 20/- by way of cost and therefore, the first appellate Court ought to have referred to these documents but the judgement of the appellate authority is absolutely silent and does not make any reference to those documents. The first appellate Court has not adverted to those documents at all. 17. What is not in dispute is that the petitioner alongwith his rejoinder-affidavit has filed all the documents which were filed by him initially through his application under Order 41 Rule 27 before the first appellate Court of Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra. The petitioner’s plaint in the suit filed by him for possession has been filed at page 27 which shows him as son of Deva in which the defendants are Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh, Uday Singh as major and Deputy, Hamvir Singh and Phal Singh as minor sons of Nand Kishore. In his application for execution of the decree of that suit also Ram Saran (petitioner) is shown as son of Deva whereas the respondents herein, sons of Nand Kishore have been shown as defendants there. In the Suit No. 395 of 1951 (Ram Saran v. Natholi and others), an application for compromise dated 18.3.1952 was filed which bears the signature of the petitioner as well as Natholi, Nihal Singh and Kishan Singh. 18. In the Suit No. 395 of 1951 (Ram Saran v. Natholi and others), an application for compromise dated 18.3.1952 was filed which bears the signature of the petitioner as well as Natholi, Nihal Singh and Kishan Singh. 18. In the application for passing a compromise decree it has been agreed that the plaintiff shall be the sole owner of the property in his possession and that the defendant-respondents shall not interfere with the same. The copy of the Khewat has been filed as Annexure-2 to the rejoinder-affidavit, which shows the status of ownership from 1262 Fasli and 1359 Fasli and therein it has been clearly shown that Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh, Uday Singh as major and Deputy, Hamvir Singh and Phal Singh as minor sons of Nand Kishore and Ram Saran S/o Deva having equal share. Page 18 is the copy of the record of ‘’Sir’ in which the property is shown as divided between Deva S/o Girwar and Nand Kishore S/o Bucha and thereafter the plots belonging to Deva are shown as devolved upon Ram Saran S/o Deva. In the copy of the Khatauni, page 20 of the rejoinder-affidavit, also Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh, Uday Singh, Deputy, Humvir Singh and Phal Singh are shown as sons of Nand Kishore whereas Ram Saran is shown as son of Deva and this document is dated 29.12.1949. In the Khatauni of 1360 Fasli filed at page 28 of the rejoinder-affidavit also Natholi, Nihal Singh, Kishan Singh, Uday Singh, Deputy, Humvir Singh and Phal Singh are shown as sons of Nand Kishore whereas Ram Saran is shown as son of Deva over Khata No. 135, 170, 500 and 136. Again in 1362 Fasli over Khata No. 86, plaintiff-respondents are shown as sons of Nand Kishore whereas Ram Saran, the petitioner, is shown as son of Deva and over the plots No. 165, 508, 175, the name of the petitioner is recorded as son of Deva. In the Akarpatra-20, again the name of Ram Saran, the petitioner, is clearly recorded as son of Deva. The Family Register dated 10.1.1979 filed at page 39 of the rejoinder-affidavit also shows Ram Saran to be the son of Deva. In Akarpatra-45 also the name of Ram Saran is clearly recorded as adopted son of Deva. In the Akarpatra-20, again the name of Ram Saran, the petitioner, is clearly recorded as son of Deva. The Family Register dated 10.1.1979 filed at page 39 of the rejoinder-affidavit also shows Ram Saran to be the son of Deva. In Akarpatra-45 also the name of Ram Saran is clearly recorded as adopted son of Deva. Thus, the overwhelming documentary evidence which are on record clearly point to the fact that the petitioner, since 1949 has been shown as the adopted son of Deva. 19. In my opinion, the overwhelming documents filed by the petitioner before the first appellate Court of Additional Commissioner, Agra Division under Order 41 Rule 27 leave absolutely no doubt that even as far back as in 1951 when the petitioner as well as the plaintiff-respondents filed their respective suits, as well as the compromise application and the revenue records going as far back as 29.12.1949, in all of which the petitioner is either referred to as or shown to be recorded as the son of Deva or as the adopted son of Deva, has not been disputed by the respondents apart from a bald denial that the petitioner is not the adopted son of Deva. The judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Debi Prasad (supra) therefore, clearly applies to the facts to the present case on the question of adoption. I, therefore, have absolutely no hesitation in holding that Ram Saran, the petitioner, was the adopted son of Deva and therefore, he was entitled to an equal right in the ancestral property of Mahasukh alongwith Nand Kishore father of the respondents. 20. So far as the question No. 2 as to whether the suit of the plaintiff was barred by the provisions of Section 49 of the Act, 1953, the objection of the petitioner was that the property in dispute was ancestral property through a common ancestor Mahasukh. Mahasukh had two sons Girwar and Bucha. Girwar’s son was Deva and Bucha’s son was Nand Kishore. Mahasukh had two sons Girwar and Bucha. Girwar’s son was Deva and Bucha’s son was Nand Kishore. Nand Kishore had eight sons of whom Ram Saran, the defendant/petitioner herein was given in adoption to Deva and out of the remaining seven sons, it is informed that one son had died and the fact regarding the entry of the name of the defendant/petitioner as the son of Deva was known to the parties even as far back as 1949 and when the previous suits of 1951 were filed. In those suits the petitioner has described himself as the son of Deva in which a compromise had also been arrived at between the parties and that being the admitted position, the objection that Ram Saran, the petitioner, was not the son of Deva and he was the son of Nand Kishore and that his share in the property is only 1/7 alongwith other sons of Nand Kishore, ought to have been taken by the plaintiff-respondents at the very instance in the consolidation proceedings itself. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that these objections were never raised by the plaintiff-respondents in the consolidation proceedings and therefore, it cannot be raised subsequently through the suit giving rise to the present proceedings. 21. Section 49 of the Act, 1953 reads as under : “49. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that these objections were never raised by the plaintiff-respondents in the consolidation proceedings and therefore, it cannot be raised subsequently through the suit giving rise to the present proceedings. 21. Section 49 of the Act, 1953 reads as under : “49. Bar to Civil Courts jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holder in respect of land lying in an area, for which a [notification] has been issued [under sub-section (2) of Section 4] or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no Civil or Revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect to any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act : Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the Assistant Collector from initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land, possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered to a Gaon Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 22. In respect of his contention Sri Arun Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Narender Singh and others v. Jai Bhagwan and others, (2005) 9 SCC 157 . 23. The learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand placed reliance upon the judgment of the supreme Court in Suba Singh v. Mahendra Singh, (1974) 1 SCC 418. He has next referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, (1984) (4) SCC 396. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgements of the High Court in Asha Ram v. Ravi Dutt and others, 1985 (1) RD 157 and Tilak Ram v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, 1982 RD 330. 24. He has next referred to the judgement of the Supreme Court in Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed, (1984) (4) SCC 396. Reliance has also been placed upon the judgements of the High Court in Asha Ram v. Ravi Dutt and others, 1985 (1) RD 157 and Tilak Ram v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad and others, 1982 RD 330. 24. The Supreme Court in Narendra Singh (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has considered its earlier judgement in the case of Suba Singh (supra) and has thereafter proceeded to hold, referring to the facts of the case of Narendra Singh that the argument that revenue entry in the name of father should have been treated in representative capacity for the sons is misleading. Whether the father was Karta and Manager of the family and as such could be recorded in the representative capacity for all co-owners in the family was also a question of title which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the authority under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 and that such plea of joint ownership having not been initiated under the Act of 1953 the High Court was right in invoking the bar against such plea in the suit in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Act. Paragraphs 8,10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the judgement read as under : “8. It is not in dispute that the suit lands were recorded exclusively in the name of the deceased defendant who was the father. The sons, even after becoming major and fully aware of the execution of the agreement of sale, did not make any attempt to get their names jointly recorded in the Revenue papers by appropriate proceedings under Section 49 of the Act of 1953. The present appellants have been brought on record of the suit only as legal representatives after death of the original defendant. Section 49 of the 1953 Act bars jurisdiction of Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute of rights and title relating to lands included in Consolidation Proceedings. The jurisdiction to decide dispute of rights and title of the lands in Consolidation Proceedings has been conferred by the Act exclusively on the authorities under the said Act. 9........................ 10. Section 49 of the 1953 Act bars jurisdiction of Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute of rights and title relating to lands included in Consolidation Proceedings. The jurisdiction to decide dispute of rights and title of the lands in Consolidation Proceedings has been conferred by the Act exclusively on the authorities under the said Act. 9........................ 10. The learned counsel for the respondents is right in his reply that the lands being exclusively recorded in the name of the father, the sons who claim joint ownership in the lands could and ought to have approached the authorities under the Act for getting them jointly recorded in the Revenue Papers. Such proceedings for recording them as joint owners having not been initiated under the Act of 1953, the High Court was right in invoking bar against such plea in the suit in accordance with Section 49 of the Act. We find that the contention advanced and accepted by the High Court gets full support from the following observations of this Court in the case of Sri Ram (supra) : “In the instant case respondent 1 was claiming an interest in the land lying in the area covered by notification issued under Section 4(2) on the basis that he is the son of Chhota, brother of Nanha and that the lands were recorded in the name of Nanha in a representative capacity on behalf of himself and his other brothers. This claim which fell within the ambit of Section 5(2) had to be adjudicated by the consolidation authorities. Since it was a matter falling within the scope of adjudicatory functions assigned to the consolidation authorities under the Act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit in respect of the said matter was expressly barred by Section 49 of the Act and the suit of the appellant was rightly dismissed on that ground.” 11.The argument that revenue entry in the name of father should have been treated as in representative capacity for sons is misleading.Whether the father was Karta and Manager of the family and as such could be recorded in representative capacity for all co-owners in the family was also a question of title which fell within exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. 12. 12. Apart from the bar under Section 49 of the Act of 1953, there is no equity in favour of defendant and his Legal Representatives. The jurisdiction exercised under Specific Relief Act is both legal and equitable. The father entered into an agreement of sale when the sons were major. In his oral evidence, plaintiff states that one of the sons took part in the negotiations of sale. In this appeal, learned counsel appearing submits that the sons were not parties to the suit in trial Court and the statement of plaintiff against them cannot be accepted without availability of any opportunity to lead evidence in rebuttal. 13. It is difficult to believe that the sons had no knowledge of the execution of the sale agreement by their father. Even after institution of suit, no attempt was made by the sons to approach the authorities under the Act of 1953 for getting get their names rec rded on the lands as joint owners. In such circumstances, they cannot be heard to say that the father was not competent to execute the agreement of sale and it is not binding on them. 14.Consequently, we find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs” 25. In the present case, the plea of the plaintiff respondents specifically was that the name of the defendant petitioner had been recorded in the revenue records in a representative capacity as the eldest son of Nand Kishore. This plea cannot be accepted at the cost of repetition for the reason that the undisputed facts between the parties as emerging from the documents on record was that Deva had died issue-less sometime in 1939 whereas Nand Kishore died in the year 1941 or 1943 but certainly after the death of Deva, therefore, Nand Kishore being alive at the time Deva died, the question of his eldest son Ram Saran, the petitioner, being recorded in the revenue records in a representative capacity as son of Deva does not arise and is thoroughly misconceived. If at all, the name of Nand Kishore should have been recorded over the land in dispute since the claim of the plaintiff was that the properties in question were joint family properties and Deva had died issue-less. 26. If at all, the name of Nand Kishore should have been recorded over the land in dispute since the claim of the plaintiff was that the properties in question were joint family properties and Deva had died issue-less. 26. That the petitioner was claiming himself to be the adopted son of Deva was well within the knowledge of the plaintiff respondents as various suits were filed in 1951 between the parties and the parties had also arrived at a compromise and, therefore, the plaintiff respondents were well aware of the fact that the plaintiff defendant was claiming exclusive ownership of the property as the adopted son of Deva in as far as it related Deva’s share inherited from the common ancestor Mahasukh, and not as one of the seven sons of Nand Kishore. 27. In view of this undeniable and unchallenged knowledge of the claim of the defendant petitioner, if the respondents had any claim over the joint family property and their claim was that the petitioner had only a 1/7 claim in the property after the death of Nand Kishore they could have and ought to have raised this objection in the consolidation proceedings which they have failed to do. 28. For reasons aforesaid, the impugned orders dated 14.12.1978, 15.10.1979 and 10.12.1980 are quashed. 29. The writ petition stands allowed. The parties shall bear their own cost.