JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sheo Kumar Singh-I, J.—This First Appeal From Order has been preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the judgment and order dated 15.11.2014 passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Special Judge (Anti-Corruption), Lucknow, whereby in Motor Accident Claim Petition No. 204 of 2011-Baijnath Srivastava and others v. M/s. Swapnil Constructions and others, learned Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 22,81,152/- with simple interest of 7% per annum as compensation in case of death of Smt. Vandita Srivastava. 2. The claimants Baijnath Srivastava and others had filed a petition under Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 with the averments that on 24.3.2009 when the deceased Smt. Vandita Srivastava wife of Baijnath Srivastava was coming back from Allahabad and reached near Suresh Filling Station in Haidergarh at about 12.00 in the night, the driver of vehicle No. UP 62 T 0871 was driving his vehicle in the backside without any signal and without any light against the traffic rules and collided the truck with Maruti Car of the deceased bearing Registration No. UP 32 W 0087 causing injuries to Smt. Vandita Srivastava and Sri Jagdish Srivastava, who died on the spot. Smt. Giriraj Kishori and Driver of the Maruti Car namely Vinod Kumar were seriously injured and later on Smt. Giriraj Kishori also died. Smt. Vandita Srivastava was aged about 44 years at the time of accident and was employed in Lucknow University as Assistant Librarian. She was getting an amount of Rs. 20,234/-. 3. Learned Tribunal issued notice to opposite parties, who filed their written statement and after recording the statement of the witnesses and after assessment of the evidence on record, allowed the claim petition, as above. 4. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Lucknow, has filed this appeal on the ground that the Tribunal has committed manifest error of law and wrongly appreciated the evidence on record on hypothetical conjectures and surmises. It has been submitted that learned Tribunal has failed to prove the rash and negligent driving of the offending truck and also not taken care of the fact that it was the Driver of the Maruti Car who could have avoided the accident if he would have taken proper care and attention. 5. Learned Tribunal had framed six issues. It has been submitted that learned Tribunal has failed to prove the rash and negligent driving of the offending truck and also not taken care of the fact that it was the Driver of the Maruti Car who could have avoided the accident if he would have taken proper care and attention. 5. Learned Tribunal had framed six issues. Issue No. 1 relates to the fact as to whether on 25.3.2009 at about 00.15 in the night on Lucknow-Sultanpur highway the vehicle Truck was driven by the Driver rashly and negligently in backside without back light and signal and collided with Maruti Car causing injuries and death of Smt. Vandita Srivastava, the deceased. After assessment of the evidence, examining PW-1 Baijnath Srivastava, PW-2 Vinod Kumar and PW-3 Muneer Alam, in light of the documents and other evidence filed by the parties, the learned Tribunal concluded the fact that the Driver of the Truck was rash and negligent in driving the vehicle and collided the Truck with Maruti Car causing injuries and death of the deceased Smt. Vandita Srivastava. Issue Nos. 2 and 3 were decided in terms that the vehicle was insured at the time of accident and the Driver had valid and effective license. Nothing was raised challenging these issues. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that issue No. 4 was framed to the effect that the Driver of the Maruti Car had not taken proper care and attention and by driving the vehicle rashly and negligently collided the vehicle with the Truck causing the accident. Thus, considering the contributory negligence, just compensation has not been awarded by the Tribunal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has challenged the finding of the Tribunal with regard to quantum of compensation awarded to the dependents of the deceased i.e. respondents on the ground that the vehicle was driven against the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and the amount of compensation with regard to annual income has not been calculated on the sound principles of law. 8. The expression ‘just compensation’ has been explained in Sarla Verma’s case - AIR 2009 SC 3104 , holding that the compensation awarded by a Tribunal does not become just compensation merely because the Tribunal considered it to be just. 8. The expression ‘just compensation’ has been explained in Sarla Verma’s case - AIR 2009 SC 3104 , holding that the compensation awarded by a Tribunal does not become just compensation merely because the Tribunal considered it to be just. ‘Just Compensation’ is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well-settled principles relating to award of compensation. After surveying almost all the previous decisions, the Court almost standardized the norms for the assessment of damages in Motor Accident Claims. At paragraph 24, it has been held as follows: “24. In Susamma Thomas, this Court increased the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit, the income was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of imponderables and uncertainties, we are in favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable range, the words ‘actual salary’ should be read as ‘actual salary less tax’). The addition should be only 30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should be no addition, where the age of deceased is more than 50 years. Though the evidence may indicate a different percentage of increase, it is necessary to standardize the addition to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different methods of calculations being adopted. Where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary (without provision for annual increments etc.), the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death, A departure therefrom should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances.” 9. In a recent decision, in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Limited and others, MANU/SC/0322/2012 : (2012) 6 SCC 421 , Sarla Verma’s case has further been explained with regard to the settled norms. It has been held in Paragraph 11 as follows: “11. We have considered the respective arguments. In a recent decision, in Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Co. Limited and others, MANU/SC/0322/2012 : (2012) 6 SCC 421 , Sarla Verma’s case has further been explained with regard to the settled norms. It has been held in Paragraph 11 as follows: “11. We have considered the respective arguments. Although, the legal jurisprudence developed in the country in last five decades is somewhat precedent-centric, the judgments which have bearing on socioeconomic conditions of the citizens and issues relating to compensation payable to the victims of motor accidents, those who are deprived of their land and similar matters needs to be frequently revisited keeping in view the fast-changing societal values, the effect of globalisation on the economy of the nation and their impact on the life of the people.” 10. Consequently, it has been held at Paragraphs 14 to 18, as follows: “14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale for the observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in Sarla Verma’s case that where the deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts will usually take only the actual income at the time of death and a departure from this rule should be made only in rare and exceptional cases involving special circumstances. In our view, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of a person who is self-employed or who is employed on a fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc., would remain the same throughout his life. 15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across the board. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor. As a matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directly impacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximum on those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore, they put in extra efforts to generate additional income necessary for sustaining their families. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. 16. The salaries of those employed under the Central and State Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities have been revised from time to time to provide a cushion against the rising prices and provisions have been made for providing security to the families of the deceased employees. The salaries of those employed in private sectors have also increased manifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could have imagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Government would be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higher echelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh. 17. Although, the wages/income of those employed in unorganized sectors has not registered a corresponding increase and has not kept pace with the increase in the salaries of the Government employees and those employed in private sectors but it cannot be denied that there has been incremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthly basis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of the fact that with a view to meet the challenges posed by high cost of living, the persons falling in the latter category periodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context, it may be useful to give an example of a tailor who earns his livelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increases and the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him to increase the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinary skilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler, mason etc. 18. Therefore, we do not think that while making the observations in the last three lines of paragraph 24 of Sarla Verma’s judgment, the Court had intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will be no addition in the income of a person who is self-employed or who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30 per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation.” 11. Rather, it would be reasonable to say that a person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixed wages will also get 30 per cent increase in his total income over a period of time and if he/she becomes victim of accident then the same formula deserves to be applied for calculating the amount of compensation.” 11. Since, the Court actually intended to follow the principle in the case of salaried persons as laid in Sarla Verma’s case and to make it applicable also to the self-employed and persons on fixed wages, it is clarified that the increase in the case of those groups is not 30% always; it will also have a reference to the age. In other words, in the case of self-employed or persons with fixed wages, in case, the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. Needless to say that the actual income should be income after paying the tax, if any. Addition should be 30% in case the deceased was in the age group of 40 to 50 years. 12. In Sarla Verma’s case (supra), it has been stated that in the case of those above 50 years, there shall be no addition. Having regard to the fact that in the case of those self-employed or on fixed wages, where there is normally no age of superannuation, it will only be just and equitable to provide an addition of 15% in the case where the victim is between the age group of 50 to 60 years so as to make the compensation just, equitable, fair and reasonable. There shall normally be no addition thereafter. 13. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the Application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. “Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to “make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just”. Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be ‘just’. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.” 14. The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Limited v. Mohd. Therefore, only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be ‘just’. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.” 14. The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Limited v. Mohd. Nasir and another, MANU/SC/0899/2009 : AIR 2009 SC 1219 and in Ningamma and another v. United Indian Insurance Co. Limited, MANU/SC/0802/2009 : (2009) 13 SCC 710 . 15. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the Court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the Court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the Court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim. 16. There is another reason why the Court should award proper compensation irrespective of the claim and, if required, even in excess of the claim. After the amendment of the Act by Act No. 54 of 1994 with effect from 14.11.1994, the Report on motor vehicle accident prepared by the police officer and forwarded to the Claims Tribunal under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 has to be treated as an Application for Compensation. 17. Section 158 (6) of the Act reads as follows: “158. Production of certain certificates, licence and permit in certain cases.— (1) to (5) xxx (6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and, where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer.” 18. Section 166(4) of the Act reads as follows: “166(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under Sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.” 19. Prior to the amendment in 1994, it was left to the discretion of the Tribunal as to whether the report be treated as an application or not. The pre-amended position under Sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act, read as under: “(4) Where a police officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if it thinks it necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for compensation under this Act.” 20. Rash and negligent driving has to be examined in light of the facts and circumstances of a given case. It is a fact incapable of being construed or seen in isolation. It must be examined in light of the attendant circumstances. A person who drives a vehicle on the road is liable to be held responsible for the act as well as for the result. It may not be always possible to determine with reference to the speed of a vehicle whether a person was driving rashly and negligently. Both these acts presuppose an abnormal conduct. Even when one is driving a vehicle at a slow speed but recklessly and negligently, it would amount to ‘rash and negligent driving’ within the meaning of the language of Section 279 Indian Penal Code. That is why the legislature in its wisdom has used the words ‘manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life’. The preliminary conditions, thus, are that (a) it is the manner in which the vehicle is driven; (b) it be driven either rashly or negligently; and (c) such rash or negligent driving should be such as to endanger human life. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the penalty contemplated Under Section 279 Indian Penal Code is attracted. 21. ‘Negligence’ means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. 21. ‘Negligence’ means omission to do something which a reasonable and prudent person guided by the considerations which ordinarily regulate human affairs would do or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person guided by similar considerations would not do. Negligence is not an absolute term but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative term. It is difficult to state with precision any mathematically exact formula by which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly measured in a given case. Whether there exists negligence per se or the course of conduct amounts to negligence will normally depend upon the attending and surrounding facts and circumstances which have to be taken into consideration by the Court. In a given case, even not doing what one was ought to do can constitute negligence. 22. The Court has to adopt another parameter, i.e., ‘reasonable care’ in determining the question of negligence or contributory negligence. The doctrine of reasonable care imposes an obligation or a duty upon a person (for example a driver) to care for the pedestrian on the road and this duty attains a higher degree when the pedestrian happen to be children of tender years. It is axiomatic to say that while driving a vehicle on a public way, there is an implicit duty cast on the drivers to see that their driving does not endanger the life of the right users of the road, may be either vehicular users or pedestrians. They are expected to take sufficient care to avoid danger to others. 23. The other principle that is pressed in aid by the Courts in such cases is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine serves two purposes - one that an accident may by its nature be more consistent with its being caused by negligence for which the opposite party is responsible than by any other causes and that in such a case, the mere fact of the accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The Courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. Secondly, it is to avoid hardship in cases where the claimant is able to prove the accident but cannot prove how the accident occurred. The Courts have also applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases where no direct evidence was brought on record. The Act itself contains a provision which concerns with the consequences of driving dangerously alike the provision in the Indian Penal Code that the vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to public life. Where a person does such an offence he is punished as per the provisions of Section 184 of the Act. The Courts have also taken the concept of ‘culpable rashness’ and ‘culpable negligence’ into consideration in cases of road accidents. ‘Culpable rashness’ is acting with the consciousness that mischievous and illegal consequences may follow but with the hope that they will not and often with the belief that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to prevent such happening. The imputability arises from acting despite consciousness (luxuria). ‘Culpable negligence’ is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of civic duty of circumspection. In such a case the mere fact of accident is prima facie evidence of such negligence. This maxim suggests that on the circumstances of a given case the res speaks and is eloquent because the facts stand unexplained, with the result that the natural and reasonable inference from the facts, not a conjectural inference, shows that the act is attributable to some person’s negligent conduct. 24. In the case of Nageshwar Shri Krishna Ghobe v. State of Maharasthra, MANU/SC/0182/1972 : (1973) 4 SCC 23 , the Court observed that the statements of the witnesses who met with an accident while travelling in a vehicle or those of the people who were travelling in the vehicle driven nearby should be taken and understood in their correct perspective as it is not necessary that the occupants of the vehicle should be looking in the same direction. They might have been attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. The Court held as under: “6. They might have been attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. The Court held as under: “6. In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses who would be in a position to affirm positively the sequence of vital events during the few moments immediately preceding the actual accident, from which its true cause can be ascertained. When accidents take place on the road, people using the road or who may happen to be in close vicinity would normally be busy in their own pre-occupations and in the normal course their attention would be attracted only by the noise or the disturbance caused by the actual impact resulting from the accident itself. It is only then that they would look towards the direction of the noise and see what had happened. It is seldom - and it is only a matter of coincidence - that a person may already be looking in the direction of the accident and may for that reason be in a position to see and later describe the sequence of events in which the accident occurred. At times it may also happen that after casually witnessing the occurrence those persons may feel disinclined to take any further interest in the matter, whatever be the reason for this disinclination. If, however, they do feel interested in going to the spot in their curiosity to know some thing more, then what they may happen to see there, would lead them to form some opinion or impression as to what in all likelihood must have led to the accident. Evidence of such persons, therefore, requires close scrutiny for finding out what they actually saw and what may be the result of their imaginative inference. Apart from the eye-witnesses, the only person who can be considered to be truly capable of satisfactorily explaining as to the circumstances leading to accidents like the present is the driver himself or in certain circumstances to some extent the person who is injured.” 25. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company has submitted that it is in the evidence that Driver of the vehicle of Maruti Car had seen the Truck from a distance of one kilometer and if he would have taken proper care and attention, the accident could have been avoided. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant/insurance company has submitted that it is in the evidence that Driver of the vehicle of Maruti Car had seen the Truck from a distance of one kilometer and if he would have taken proper care and attention, the accident could have been avoided. 26. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that it was the highway and the Maruti car was at the speed approximately of 60 kilometer per hour. The truck was being backed without any signal. The Driver of Maruti Car had seen the Truck from a distance of one kilometer approximately and he had only one minute’s time to assess the situation. The Driver of the Maruti Car considered it proper to cross the vehicle and to save the vehicle and had adopted the rest of the road in right side, the Truck was driven backside from left to right. In this way, the whole of the road or more than half of the road was covered by the body of the Truck and when the vehicle Maruti Car reached at the spot, the body of the Truck which was driven backside reached right side of the road causing accident. Secondly, the light of the truck was not in proper condition and was not working and the Driver of the Maruti Car was not in a position to assess the situation as to whether the Truck was moving in backside or in forward direction. Thus, the version of learned counsel for the appellant that it was the Driver of the Maruti Car who would have taken proper care and attention to avoid the accident is not tenable in the given situation. Learned Tribunal had properly assessed the situation and found that the police after investigation had submitted the charge-sheet against the Driver of the Truck and in the site map prepared by the Investigating Officer which reveals that the back light of the Truck was not in working condition and the Truck was driven backside without any proper care and attention which collided with the Maruti Car. 27. In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses and also to reach at any conclusion to the effect that out of two, who was in a position to avoid the accident. 27. In cases of road accidents by fast moving vehicles it is ordinarily difficult to find witnesses and also to reach at any conclusion to the effect that out of two, who was in a position to avoid the accident. In the given situation the Driver of the Truck is the offending vehicle and was driving the vehicle against the traffic rules without light and comparatively in faster speed. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that rule of contributory negligence is not applicable in the present case. The Insurance Company is responsible for payment of just compensation. 28. We have also considered the age of the deceased which was reported as 44 years and monthly pay calculating the annual income and the multiplier adopted by the Tribunal and are of the view that learned Tribunal has properly assessed the annual income and applied proper multiplication and properly assessed the just compensation and rate of interest, as such, no interference is required in the order impugned. 29. When an Appeal is filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 before the High Court, the normal Rules which apply to Appeals before the High Court are applicable to such an Appeal also. Even otherwise, it is well-settled position of law that when an Appeal is provided for, the whole case is open before the Appellate Court and by necessary implication, it can exercise all powers incidental thereto in order to exercise that power effectively. A bare reading of Section 173 of the Act also reflects that there is no curtailment or limitations on the powers of the Appellate Court to consider the entire case on facts and law. 30. It is well-settled that the right of Appeal is a substantive right and the questions of fact and law are at large and are open to review by the Appellate Court. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective. 31. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered within an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. Thus, such powers and duties are necessarily to be exercised so as to make the provision of law effective. 31. Generally, finding of fact recorded by Tribunal should not be interfered within an Appeal until and unless it is proved that glaring discrepancy or mistake has taken place. If the assessment of compensation by the Tribunal was fair and reasonable and the award of the Tribunal was neither contrary nor inconsistent with the relevant facts as per the evidence available on record then as mentioned hereinabove, the High Court would not interfere in the Appeal. In the case in hand, nothing could be pointed out to us as to what were the glaring discrepancies or mistakes in the impugned Award of the Tribunal, which necessitates the Appellate Court to take a different view in the matter. 32. In light of aforesaid discussions, we are of the opinion that the learned Tribunal has discussed every point of fact and law and found that late Smt. Vandita Srivastava succumbed to injuries on 24.3.2009/25.3.2009 when the aforesaid vehicle met with an accident due to careless and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle. At the time of accident, the vehicle was insured with the Insurance Company/appellant. Learned Tribunal has awarded the amount which is just and reasonable and we find no error in the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal. Thus, the First Appeal From Order against the impugned judgment and order lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. 33. Accordingly, the First Appeal From Order is hereby dismissed with cost of litigation to the tune of Rs. 20,000/- to the claimants to be paid by the appellant. 34. Statutory amount, if any, deposited by the appellant before this Court shall be remitted to the tribunal concerned within three weeks from today for adjustment and disbursement of rest of the amount to the claimants in accordance with the award.