ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. The present interlocutory application has been preferred under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for suspension of sentence awarded to this appellant by the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Godda in Sessions Case No. 1 of 2010 whereby, this appellant has been convicted mainly for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with Section 34 thereof and punished for life imprisonment for causing murder of Mahesh Kant Jha. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the evidences on record, there is prima facie case against this appellant-accused. As the criminal appeal is pending, we are not much analyzing the evidences on record, but, suffice it to say at this stage looking to the depositions given by P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.5 and P.W.6 there is prima facie case against this appellant. P.W.1 and P.W.2 are the eye witnesses. They have clearly narrated the role played by this appellant in causing head injury upon the deceased which is the cause of death as per the medical evidence. Looking to the medical evidence given by P.W.6-Dr. Pradeep Kr. Sinha, injury no.2 was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. This injury is prima facie, tallying with the nature of weapon used by this appellant-accused in causing head injury upon the deceased as narrated by P.W.1 and P.W.2. 3. Much has been argued out by the counsel for the appellant about contradictions in depositions of P.W.1 and PW.2 because one is not showing the presence of another. This contention is of no help to this appellant mainly for the reasons that: (a) discrepancy in evidence is different from contradiction. (b) it ought to be kept in mind that contradictions cannot be verified vis-a-vis depositions given by the two eye witnesses or two prosecution witnesses. (c) “contradiction” has its own meaning, as given under Section 162 of Cr.P.C. more particularly explanation thereof. (d) contradiction has to be seen from the statement given by the witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C. to be read with the deposition given by the very same witness. Contradiction has to be proved by the Investigating Officer. (e) if the two witnesses are giving different type of depositions, it is not a contradiction at all. It is a discrepancy in the evidence. Contradiction has to be proved by the Investigating Officer. (e) if the two witnesses are giving different type of depositions, it is not a contradiction at all. It is a discrepancy in the evidence. (f) the two witnesses are giving two different versions with slight variation that is so because the deposition in the court is given after few months and sometimes after few years. The deposition in the court depends upon: (i) capacity of observation; (ii) capacity of memory; and (iii) capacity of reproduction of what witness has observed and what he has memorized. (g) if the two witnesses are giving different depositions of any occurrence with slight deviation that reflects the truth and not the falsehood because of their different capacities of observation, memory and reproduction. (h) slight variation in the deposition of two witnesses is not a contradiction at all and the trustworthiness of these witnesses is to be judged by the cross-examination of these witnesses. (i) it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P. vs. Lekh Raj and Another reported in (2000)1 SCC 247 especially in paragraph nos. 7 and 8 as under : “7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrotlike statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagdish v. State of M.P. this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. 8. Referring to and relying upon the earlier judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, Rammi v. State of M.P. and this Court in a recent case Leela Ram v. State of Haryana held : “There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence…. The court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations: whereas some become speechless, some start wailing while some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that the wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise.” (Emphasis Supplied) (j) it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in (2004) 1 SCC 184 especially in paragraph no. 11 as under : “11. Coming to the plea that the contradictions noticed by the trial court were ocular vis-à-vis the medical evidence, we find on reading of the judgment it is not to be so. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) applies when the same person makes two contradictory statements. It is not permissible in law to draw adverse inference because of alleged contradictions between one prosecution witness vis-à-vis statement of other witnesses. It is not open to the court to completely demolish the evidence of one witness by referring to the evidence of other witnesses. Witness can only be contradicted in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act by his own previous statement and not with the statement of any other witness. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra.) As was held in the said case, Section 145 applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding. If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statement under Section 145 of the Evidence Act only. Section 145 has no application where a witness is sought to be contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another witness.” (Emphasis supplied) (k) it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State v. Saravanan and another reported in (2008) 17 SCC 587 especially in paragraph no.18 as under : “18. The High Court also held that as there were some discrepancies and improvements in the statement of the witnesses, their evidence should not be relied upon. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony this Court has laid down the approach which should be followed by the court in such cases: (SCC pp. 514-15, para 10) “10. The High Court also held that as there were some discrepancies and improvements in the statement of the witnesses, their evidence should not be relied upon. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony this Court has laid down the approach which should be followed by the court in such cases: (SCC pp. 514-15, para 10) “10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer.” Even otherwise, it has been said time and again by this Court that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters without affecting the core of the prosecution case, ought not to prompt the court to reject evidence in its entirety. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer.” Even otherwise, it has been said time and again by this Court that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters without affecting the core of the prosecution case, ought not to prompt the court to reject evidence in its entirety. Further, on the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness, the trial court upon appreciation of evidence forms an opinion about the credibility thereof, in the normal circumstances the appellate court would not be justified to review it once again without justifiable reasons. It is the totality of the situation, which has to be taken note of. Difference in some minor detail, which does not otherwise affect the core of the prosecution case, even if present, that itself would not prompt the court to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies.” (Emphasis supplied) Hence, the contention raised by the counsel for the appellant that there is slight deviation in the depositions of P.W.1 and P.W.2 is a contradiction is not accepted by this Court because discrepancy and contradiction are different. Even otherwise also, we have perused the cross-examination of P.W.2. There is no suggestion in the cross-examination to P.W.2 that P.W.1 was never present. Hence, the arguments cannot be canvassed by this appellant that P.W.2 when came at the place of occurrence, P.W.1 was not present nor it can be argued that when P.W.1 was present P.W.2 was absent. There is no such suggestion in their cross-examination. 4. Period of custody from the year, 2009 alone cannot be a ground for suspension of sentence, looking to the gravity of the offence, evidences on record and the manner in which this appellant is involved in the offence of murder of the deceased. 5. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Another, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528 [: 2005 (2) JLJR (SC) 15] especially in para14 and 21 as under : “14. We have already noticed from the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that the present accused had earlier made seven applications for grant of bail which were rejected by the High Court and some such rejections have been affirmed by this Court also. We have already noticed from the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that the present accused had earlier made seven applications for grant of bail which were rejected by the High Court and some such rejections have been affirmed by this Court also. It is seen from the records that when the fifth application for grant of bail was allowed by the High Court, the same was challenged before this Court and this Court accepted the said challenge by allowing the appeal filed by the Union of India and another and cancelled the bail granted by the High Court as per the order of this Court made in Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 2001 dated 2572001. While cancelling the said bail this Court specifically held that the fact that the present accused was in custody for more than one year (at that time) and the further fact that while rejecting an earlier application, the High Court had given liberty to renew the bail application in future, were not grounds envisaged under Section 437(1) (i) of the Code. This Court also in specific terms held that the condition laid down under Section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to being enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail. 21. 21. For the reasons stated above, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in granting bail to the first respondent on the ground that he has been in custody for a period of 31/2 years or that there is no likelihood of the trial being concluded in the near future, without taking into consideration the other factors referred to hereinabove in this judgment of ours.” (Emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajesh Ranjan Yadav alias Pappu Yadav Vs. CBI through its Director, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 70 [: 2007 (1) JLJR (SC) 34] especially in paragraph nos.8, 9 and 10 as under : “8. Learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the decision of this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab. In para 2 of the said decision it was observed as under: (SCC pp. 292-93) “It would indeed be a travesty of justice to keep a person in jail for a period of five or six years for an offence which is ultimately found not to have been committed by him. Can the Court ever compensate him for his incarceration which is found to be unjustified? Would it be just at all for the Court to tell a person: ‘We have admitted your appeal because we think you have a prima facie case, but unfortunately we have no time to hear your appeal for quite a few years and, therefore, until we hear your appeal, you must remain in jail, even though you may be innocent?’ What confidence would such administration of justice inspire in the mind of the public? It may quite conceivably happen, and it has in fact happened in a few cases in this Court, that a person may serve out his full term of imprisonment before his appeal is taken up for hearing. Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? Would a Judge not be overwhelmed with a feeling of contrition while acquitting such a person after hearing the appeal? Would it not be an affront to his sense of justice? Of what avail would the acquittal be to such a person who has already served out his term of imprisonment or at any rate a major part of it? It is, therefore, absolutely essential that the practice which this Court has been following in the past must be reconsidered and so long as this Court is not in a position to hear the appeal of an accused within a reasonable period of time, the Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent grounds for acting otherwise, release the accused on bail in cases where special leave has been granted to the accused to appeal against his conviction and sentence.” 9. Learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the decision of this Court in Bhagirathsinh v. State of Gujarat, Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P., etc. 10. In our opinion none of the aforesaid decisions can be said to have laid down any absolute and unconditional rule about when bail should be granted by the court and when it should not. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and it cannot be said that there is any absolute rule that because a long period of imprisonment has expired bail must necessarily be granted. (Emphasis Supplied) 7. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ash Mohammad Vs. Shiv Raj Singh alias Lalla Babu and Another reported in (2012) 9 SCC 446 especially in paragraph no.30 as under : “30. We may usefully state that when the citizens are scared to lead a peaceful life and this kind of offences usher in an impediment in establishment of orderly society, the duty of the court becomes more pronounced and the burden is heavy. There should have been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needless to say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the order admitting an accused to bail. The question should be posed whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and only thereafter issue of imposing conditions would arise. There should have been proper analysis of the criminal antecedents. Needless to say, imposition of conditions is subsequent to the order admitting an accused to bail. The question should be posed whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail or not and only thereafter issue of imposing conditions would arise. We do not deny for a moment that period of custody is a relevant factor but simultaneously the totality of circumstances and the criminal antecedents are also to be weighed. They are to be weighed in the scale of collective cry and desire. The societal concern has to be kept in view in juxtaposition of individual liberty. Regard being had to the said parameter we are inclined to think that the social concern in the case at hand deserves to be given priority over lifting the restriction on liberty of the accused.” (Emphasis Supplied) 8. In view of these evidences on record and the judicial pronouncements, there is no substance in this interlocutory application and hence, the same is hereby, dismissed. 9. Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this judgment and order to: (i) all the Principal District Judges of all the districts. (ii) Principal Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi. (iii) Director, Judicial Academy, Dhurwa, Ranchi. (iv) Principal, Police Training College, Hazaribagh. These officers will supply the copy of this judgment and order to subordinate judges in district.