ORDER : 1. Shri S.K. Tiwari, counsel for the applicant. Shri Amit Goswami, counsel for the respondent No. 1. Mohd. Irshad, Panel Lawyer for the respondent No. 2/State. With the consent of the parties, the case is heard finally. 2. The necessary facts for the disposal of the application in short are that the respondent No. 1 has filed a Criminal Complaint against the applicants for offences punishable under sections 419, 420, 406, 34 of Indian Penal Code. It is the case of the respondent No. 1 that the applicants had entered into an agreement to sell their land Survey No. 631, area 0.37, Survey No. 631/936 area 0.38 hectares, Survey No. 902/1 area 6.20 hectares, Survey No. 902/1Kh area 7.74 hectares total 14.69 hectares for a consideration of Rs. 62,95,500/- @ Rs. 90,000 per bigha. The respondent No. 1 paid Rs. 6,29,550 by way of advance in the presence of the witnesses and it was agreed that the remaining amount will be paid on 1-9-2011 i.e. at the time of registration of the sale-deed. The agreement to sell was executed on 1-6- 2011. On 1-9-2011, the respondent No. 1 remained in the office Sub-Registrar, Dabra for the entire day, but the applicants did not turn up. The respondent No. 1 submitted his objection to the Sub-Registrar on the same day. Thereafter, the respondent No. 1 sent a legal notice through his Counsel on 6-9-2011 but with an intention to misappropriate the advance amount, the applicants have not executed the sale-deed. Thus, it was alleged that in fact the agreement to sell was executed by the applicants with an intention to cheat the respondent No. 1 and to misappropriate the amount given by way of advance by him. 3. The respondent No. 1 examined himself and his witnesses under sections 200 and 202 of Criminal Procedure Code and the Magistrate after considering the allegations as contained in the Complaint and the statements of the witnesses, took cognizance of offence by order dated 11-4-2012 under section 406 and 420 of Indian Penal Code. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the applicants filed a Criminal Revision which too has suffered dismissal by order dated 29-1-2016 passed by 1st A.S.J. Dabra in Criminal Revision No. 415/2012. 5. 4. Being aggrieved by the order of the Magistrate, the applicants filed a Criminal Revision which too has suffered dismissal by order dated 29-1-2016 passed by 1st A.S.J. Dabra in Criminal Revision No. 415/2012. 5. It is submitted by the Counsel for the applicants that even if the entire allegations as made in the complaint are taken on their face value, then it would be clear that the case is predominantly of Civil in nature and the respondent No. 1 has tried to give colour of criminal case which is not permissible. It is further submitted that the respondent No. 1 has an efficacious remedy of filing suit for specific performance of contract and in a case of mere breach of contract, criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. To buttress his contentions, the Counsel for the applicants has relied upon ARCI vs. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. (2016) 1 SCC 348 , V.Y. Jose vs. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78 and Sharon Michael vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2009) 3 SCC 375 and submitted that mere failure on the part of the applicants to keep their promise at a later stage would not bring the case within the meaning of Cheating. Further it was submitted that unless and until, there is an intention to cheat the complainant on the day one, no offence can be said to be made against the applicants. 6. Per contra, it is submitted by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1, that the applicants after having received an amount of Rs. 6,29,550 did not execute the sale-deed. They have misappropriated the said amount and hence, prima-facie offence has been committed. 7. Heard the learned Counsel for the parties. 8. The facts of this case lies in a very narrow campus. The allegations are that an agreement to sell was executed and an amount of Rs. 6,29,550 was received by the applicants by way of advance and thereafter they did not execute the sale-deed. Whether the non-execution of sale-deed would give rise to only civil dispute or it would include the criminal intent is a core question involved in this case. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under: “27. Whether the non-execution of sale-deed would give rise to only civil dispute or it would include the criminal intent is a core question involved in this case. 9. The Supreme Court in the case of Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 has held as under: “27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. section 397 and section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the Courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under section 397 or section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: 27.1 Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 27.2 The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima-facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 27.3 The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.3 The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 27.4 Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate Courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 27.5 Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 27.6 The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 27.7 The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ ulterior purpose. 27.8 Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 27.9 Another very significant caution that the Courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of Court leading to injustice. 27.10 It is neither necessary nor is the Court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 27.11 Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.11 Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 27.12 In exercise of its jurisdiction under section 228 and/or under section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed herewith by the prosecution. 27.13 Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima-facie. 27.14 Where the charge-sheet, report under section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 27.15 Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the Courts exist. (i) State of West Bengal vs. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 (ii) Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia vs. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 (iii) Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 (iv) Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 (v) G. Sagar Suri vs. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 (vi) Ajay Mitra vs. State of M.P. (2003) 3 SCC 11 (vii) Pepsi Foods Ltd. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 (viii) State of U.P. vs. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 (ix) Ganesh Narayan Hegde vs. S. Bangarappa, (1995) 4 SCC 41 (x) Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 (xi) Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. vs. Biological E. Ltd. (2000) 3 SCC 269 (xii) Shakson Belthissor vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 14 SCC 466 (xiii) V.V.S. Rama Sharma vs. State of U.P. (2009) 7 SCC 234 (xiv) Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna vs. Peddi Ravindra Babu, (2009) 11 SCC 203 (xv) Sheonandan Paswan vs. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288 (xvi) State of Bihar vs. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 222 (xvii) Lalmuni Devi vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 2 SCC 17 (xviii) M. Krishnan vs. Vijay Singh, (2001) 8 SCC 645 (xix) Savita vs. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 338 (xx) S.M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the Courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance to the requirements of the offence.” 10. Thus, a dispute which involves criminal intent also, cannot be quashed on the ground that it involves civil dispute also. 11. Now the question is that whether the allegations made in the present case are predominantly of civil in nature or they involve criminal intent also. 12. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Kumari vs. State of U.P. (2015) 13 SCC 689 held as under: “5. The appellants moved a petition under section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) before the High Court challenging the criminal proceedings initiated against them pleading that they are innocent and falsely implicated in the case. However, they admitted that they did had a talk regarding the sale of their land through a broker Tara Chand and they received an amount of Rs. 5,00,000 as advance money. It is alleged by the appellants that in their petition before the High Court that though as per the agreement within one month remaining sale consideration was to be paid to them, but for two years they kept on waiting for the full payment. 5,00,000 as advance money. It is alleged by the appellants that in their petition before the High Court that though as per the agreement within one month remaining sale consideration was to be paid to them, but for two years they kept on waiting for the full payment. They also disclosed that in the year 2009, they have already sold the property to third party, and that is why as a counterblast the first information report was got lodged by Respondent 2 in 2011 i.e. five years after the talks were held in 2006. Further stating that the criminal proceedings are based on malice, the appellants sought quashing of the proceedings of criminal case. However, the High Court, after hearing the parties and perusal of the papers on record, declined to interfere with the trial of the case. Hence this appeal through special leave. *** *** *** 8. On behalf of the appellants, our attention is drawn to Ram Biraji Devi vs. Umesh Kumar Singh and it is contended that the High Court should have quashed the proceedings as the dispute between the parties is, in substance, of property dispute. We have carefully gone through the said case law and we find that the facts of the said case cannot be said to be similar to the present one. In the present case, after investigation, charge-sheet has been filed, and investigating officer has stated that an amount of Rs. 42,00,000 in several installments was paid by Respondent 2 to the appellants, which the appellants appeared to have dishonestly retained with them. From the rejoinder affidavit, it appears that the appellants have repaid only Rs. 5,00,000 to Respondent 2 through two bank drafts mentioned above, that too after charge-sheet is filed. In such a situation, we cannot apply the law laid down in Ram Biraji Devi to the case at hand. 9. In R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta, in Paras 15-16, this Court, interpreting the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, has laid down the law as under: (SCC p. 523) “15. In such a situation, we cannot apply the law laid down in Ram Biraji Devi to the case at hand. 9. In R. Kalyani vs. Janak C. Mehta, in Paras 15-16, this Court, interpreting the inherent powers of the High Court under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, has laid down the law as under: (SCC p. 523) “15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence. (2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence. (3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus. (4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to continue. 16. It is furthermore well known that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down. Each case has to be considered on its own merits. The Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, although would not interfere with a genuine complaint keeping in view the purport and object for which the provisions of sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been introduced by Parliament but would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction in appropriate cases. One of the paramount duties of the superior Courts is to see that a person who is apparently innocent is not subjected to persecution and humiliation on the basis of a false and wholly untenable complaint.” 10. In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court, as above, and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any illegality with the impugned order passed by the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants in exercise of power under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code.” 13. In view of the principle of law laid down by this Court, as above, and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not find any illegality with the impugned order passed by the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants in exercise of power under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code.” 13. Thus, if the facts of this case are considered in the light of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Kumari (Supra), then it would be clear that the applicants by entering into an agreement to sell had received an amount of Rs. 6,29,550 by way of advance and thereafter they did not turn up for execution of sale-deed and in spite of the notice issued by the respondent No. 1, they neither repaid the amount so received by them at the time of the agreement to sell nor they executed the sale-deed. Thus, prima-facie the element of criminal intent is also available and it cannot be said that the case is predominantly of civil in nature. 14. Thus, this Court is of considered opinion that the complaint prima-facie discloses the commission of cognizable offence therefore, the Magistrate did not commit any mistake by taking cognizance of offence under section 406 and 420 of Indian Penal Code. Similarly, the Revisional Court did not commit any mistake by rejecting the Revision. 15. Hence, this application fails and is hereby dismissed.