JUDGMENT : Ritu Raj Awasthi, J. Heard learned counsel for appellant as well as Mr. Moti Chand Yadav, learned counsel for respondents and perused the records. 2. The instant second appeal has been filed under section 100 CPC against the judgment and decree dated 13.1.2005 passed in Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1995 (Jagdish Singh v. Amresh Singh and another) as well as the judgment and decree dated 28.1.1995 passed in Regular Suit No. 341 of 1992 (Jagdish Singh v. Amresh and another) whereby the suit for permanent injunction filed by the appellant-plaintif was dismissed and the first appeal filed before the lower appellate Court has been decided with consent of the parties' counsel in terms of the Commissioner's report and map which made part of the impugned judgment and decree. 3. At the time of filing of the appeal, the Court vide order dated 20.4.2005 has passed the following order: "The learned counsel for the appellant urges that no statement was given by the counsel for the appellant before the appellate Court, disowning the appellant's claim in respect of any land or stating that the appeal be decided on the basis of the statement of the parties' counsel. The learned counsel for the appellant also says that the judgment was not pronounced in open Court so that the appellant's counsel could have refuted the observation of the Court about his having made any statement respecting compromise between the parties. He seeks time to file papers. List in the first week of May, 2005." 4. As per facts of the case as borne out from the record, the appellant-plaintiff had filed a suit for permanent injunction. The appellant-plaintiff claimed himself to be the owner of the house in question which was marked as Ka, Kha, Ga, Gha in the map situated at village Dakhili Purey Hindu Singh, Pargana Hisampur, Tehsil Kaiserganj, District Bahraich. The land apprutinent to the house in question which was claimed to be sahan was shown as Ga, Gha, Ya, Ra in the map. It was claimed that the appellant-plaintiff used this land for putting his animals, etc. The plaintiff and defendants are relatives being uncle and nephew. It was claimed that the partition of the property between the father of the plaintiff late Bachchu Singh and respondent-defendant was made and as per said partition the appellant-plaintiff was in possession over the property in question. The plaintiff and defendants are relatives being uncle and nephew. It was claimed that the partition of the property between the father of the plaintiff late Bachchu Singh and respondent-defendant was made and as per said partition the appellant-plaintiff was in possession over the property in question. The respondents-defendants have no concern with the property in question. When the respondents-defendants started interfering in the peaceful possession of the appellant-plaintiff, he had filed the suit for permanent injunction which was dismissed by the Trial Court without properly considering the evidence on record. The appellant-plaintiff thereafter had preferred first appeal before the lower appellate Court which was decided on the basis of alleged consent of the parties' counsel and the commissioner report (49-ga) and the map annexed with the commissioner report (49-ga/3) was made part of the judgment and decree. 5. The contention of learned counsel for appellant is that the appellant-plaintiff had not given any consent for deciding the appeal in terms of the commissioner report (49-ga). He had not instructed his counsel to give any such consent. It is also contended that the counsel for the appellant before the first appellate Court had not given any consent and the first appellate Court has wrongly recorded the consent of parties' counsel while deciding the appeal and has committed gross illegality in deciding the appeal on the basis of alleged consent of the parties' counsel. 6. No other issue has been raised by the counsel for the appellant. 7. Mr. Moti Chand Yadav, learned counsel for respondents on the other hand vehemently contradicts the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that no such consent was given by the learned counsel for the appellant to decide the first appeal in terms of the advocate commissioner report (49-ga). It is also submitted by him that the judicial pronouncement has to be given weightage and cannot be disbelieved merely on the basis of allegation made by the learned counsel for the appellant at this stage that no such consent was given. 8. I have considered the submissions made by the parties' counsel and gone through the records. 9. It is to be noted that the suit for permanent injunction filed by the appellant-plaintiff was dismissed by the Trial Court on merit after hearing both the sides. 8. I have considered the submissions made by the parties' counsel and gone through the records. 9. It is to be noted that the suit for permanent injunction filed by the appellant-plaintiff was dismissed by the Trial Court on merit after hearing both the sides. The appellant-plaintiff had failed to establish before the Trial Court that he has any right or title over the property in question and is in rightful possession. At the stage of first appeal which was filed by the appellant-plaintiff, it appears that at the time of final hearing the counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff as well as respondents-defendants had given their consent to get the appeal decided in terms of the advocate commissioner report (49-ga) which was on record. The first appellate Court recording the consent of the Lawyers who had appeared for the appellant as well as respondents-defendants had proceeded to decide the appeal and had held that the commissioner report (49-ga) which also contains the map (46-ga/3). 10. It is well-settled in law that the observations made in the judicial order have to be given precedence and cannot be disbelieved merely on the assertion made by the parties subsequent to the said decision. 11. Learned counsel for appellant has not been able to prove before this Court that the learned counsel for the parties who had appeared before the first appellate Court had not given their consent to decide the first appeal in terms in which it has been decided. 12. It is to be noted that neither the appellant had filed any complaint against his Lawyer before the Bar Council or before any other authority nor has taken any action against him. In this regard, he had also not applied for review of the impugned judgment and decree on this ground before the concerned Court. As such, at this stage it cannot be said that the learned counsel who had appeared before the Court had not given their consent to decide the appeal in terms of the commissioner report (49-g) which was already on record, as such, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant having no force is rejected. 13. As such, at this stage it cannot be said that the learned counsel who had appeared before the Court had not given their consent to decide the appeal in terms of the commissioner report (49-g) which was already on record, as such, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant having no force is rejected. 13. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that there is no statutory compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is concerned, suffice is to observe that the Apex Court in a recent judgment dated 4.8.2017 passed in Civil Appeal No. 9951 of 2017; U. Manjunath Rao v. U. Chandrashekhar and Another has held that the compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC will depend in the facts and circumstances of the case and in case there is substantial compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 no illegality can be attributed. In the present case there is substantial compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC as such the contention raised has no force. 14. In view of above, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned judgment and decree. The appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be dismissed at the admission stage. 15. The substantial questions of law proposed in the instant appeal do not involve any legal issue. 16. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed.