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2017 DIGILAW 242 (UTT)

CAPTAIN ARVIND KAMBOJ v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

2017-04-18

U.C.DHYANI

body2017
JUDGMENT U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral) By means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicant seeks to quash the impugned order dated 07.04.2017, passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar in Misc. Case No. 110 of 2017, Vijay Kumar Kushwaha vs. Unknown, whereby the reinvestigation has been directed. 2. Respondent no. 2 lodged an FIR against the applicant and some others, for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 409 and 120-B of IPC. A Final Report was submitted by the Investigating Officer as below: “Sir, it is submitted that the above case was initiated at Police Station Kharkharee Kotwali Nagar Haridwar on 15.09.2015 based on the complaint made by the complaint. Initial investigation was conducted by Shri Vijendra Singh Kumai. On the orders of SSP, investigation was transferred to SIS branch and given to me SI. With reference to the allegations, detailed investigation pertaining to FIR 389/12 has been transferred to CBI vide Order of Hon’ble Uttarakhand High Court Nainital passed in Writ Petition No. 182/2013. CBI has registered FIR RCBD1/2015/E/0008 and the matter is pending investigation. All the accused and facts are the subject matter of the FIR No. 389/2012 of Janpad Dehradun & CBI FIR, and is a part of CBI seizure memo. All the facts are being investigated by CBI. Therefore, investigation in this matter is not proper. Thus, investigation in the matter vide FR No. 80/16 is closed. Please accept the FR.” 3. Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar by a detailed order dated 07.04.2017 accepted the Protest Petition and directed SHO, Kotwali for further investigation [In terms of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C.]. Aggrieved against the same, present C-482 Cr.P.C. petition has been filed. 4. A very short question, which arises for consideration of this Court, is- when the matter is being investigated by the C.B.I. and the investigation has not been completed as yet, whether it is within the domain of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar to direct further investigation? The report in final form was submitted by the Investigating Officer not on the merit of the case, but, only on the ground that the facts are being investigated by the C.B.I., therefore, according to this Court, further investigation in the mater will not be proper. 5. Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. will come into play only when the investigation is concluded. The report in final form was submitted by the Investigating Officer not on the merit of the case, but, only on the ground that the facts are being investigated by the C.B.I., therefore, according to this Court, further investigation in the mater will not be proper. 5. Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. will come into play only when the investigation is concluded. It speaks as under: Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C.- Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate and, where upon such investigation, the officer in charge of the police station obtains further evidence, oral or documentary, he shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed; and the provisions of sub- sections (2) to (6) shall, as far as may be, apply in relation to such report or reports as they apply in relation to a report forwarded under sub- section (2). 6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 986 : 2013 (1) NCC 1, has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Some of those principles, which are relevant in the context of present case, can be summarized as below: i. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. ii. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. iii. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. iii. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence. iv. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. v. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. vi. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. vii. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. viii. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. ix. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. It may be purely a civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its original jurisdiction. x. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. xi. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. xii. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full- fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. xiii. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution. xiv. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. xv. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. xv. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. xvi. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours otherwise, it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. xvii. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration. 7. Although inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself, but the instant case appears to be one such case in which this Court should intervene to quash the order impugned. 8. A Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision of Inder Mohan Gosami and another vs. State of Uttararanhal and others, reported in (2008) 1 SCC (Cri.) 259, has laid down the guidelines for exercising the powers under section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein it was held that inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can been exercised: i. to give effect to an order under the Code; ii. to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and iii. to otherwise secure the ends of justice. 9. Since the report under sub-section (2) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. has not yet been forwarded to the Magistrate, therefore, in the humble opinion of this Court, he could not have directed for further investigation. The investigation is still continuing and the offences are being investigated by the C.B.I. The Court has, therefore, no option but to set aside the order impugned, in the backdrop of facts enumerated here in above. 10. Accordingly Crl. Misc. Application No. 522 of 2017 filed by the applicant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. The investigation is still continuing and the offences are being investigated by the C.B.I. The Court has, therefore, no option but to set aside the order impugned, in the backdrop of facts enumerated here in above. 10. Accordingly Crl. Misc. Application No. 522 of 2017 filed by the applicant under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. As a consequence thereof, impugned order dated 07.04.2017 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar in Misc. Case No. 110 of 2017, Vijay Kumar Kushwaha vs. Unknown, whereby the reinvestigation has been directed, is set aside. 11. In the given facts and circumstances, this Court does not feel it necessary to issue notice to the private respondent. Still, liberty is granted to him to move for recall of this Order, if he feels aggrieved with the same.