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Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 2424 (ALL)

SHAYAMDHAR v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-10-26

SUDHIR AGARWAL, UMESH CHANDRA TRIPATHI

body2017
JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Govind Krishna, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State. 2. By means of this writ petition, order dated 10.12.2014 (annexure-8) passed by respondent No. 5-District Magistrate, Allahabad has been challenged. By the impugned order, District Magistrate has rejected representation of the petitioner with regard to delimitation and separation of village, Bhavapur from gram panchayat Deeha on the ground that representation has been submitted after expiry of the period within which objection ought to have been filed. 3. In brief facts of the case are that petitioner is resident of village Bhavapur, gram panchayat Deeha, Tehsil Soraon, District Allahabad and is engaged in cultivation. State Government issued the order dated 16.8.2014 setting forthwith the guidelines for re-organization/delimitation of gram panchayats. Thereafter, petitioner made an application dated 15.9.2014 before respondent No. 3 praying for separation of village Bhavapur from gram panchayat Deeha. Another application dated 20.10.2014 with same prayer was also submitted to respondent No. 3 but all in vain. Thereafter, petitioner has approached this Court by means of Writ C No. 60848 of 2014 which was decided by this Court vide order dated 25.11.2014 directing respondent No. 3 to consider the grievance of the petitioner within eight weeks from the date of presentation of such representation. Pursuant to the order passed by this Court, petitioner has again approached to respondent No. 3 by representation dated 3.12.2014. Consequently, vide office memo dated 10.12.2014, said representation of the petitioner was rejected by respondent No. 5 i.e. District Magistrate on the ground that it was submitted after expiry of period mentioned in executive order dated 16.8.2014. 4. Counsel for petitioner contended that respondents ought to have constituted separate village Bhavapur from gram panchayat Deeha. 5. The submission is thoroughly misconceived. The contention that a particular part should have been included or excluded is not within right of any resident of concerned area since the exercise, in effect, is in the nature of legislative function, and, unless it can be shown to be violative of any statutory provision, no interference is called for in exercise of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner could not show as to what statutory provision has been violated by the State Government. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere. 7. 6. Learned counsel for petitioner could not show as to what statutory provision has been violated by the State Government. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere. 7. Constitution of Gram Panchayat, decision to include a particular area in a particular local body etc., are all legislative functions and policy matters of the State. Interference therein is not ordinarily within the domain of Court unless it is shown that exercise is in violence of some statutory provisions or the constitutional provisions or is so patently arbitrary, as is evidence from bare perusal of record. (See: State of Punjab v. Tehal Singh and others, JT 2002 (5) SC 40). 8. The legislative functions and policy matters of the State are not to be interfered ordinarily by the Court. In Union of India and others v. Kannadapara Sanghatanegala Okkuta & Kannadigara and others, 2002(10) SCC 226, it was held that it is not the function of the Court to decide location or situs of the headquarter since it is the function of Government and it was followed in Collector and others v. P. Mangamma and others, 2003(4) SCC 488 . Similar is the view taken in State of Rajasthan and others v. Lata Arun, 2002(6) SCC 252 and Premium Granites and another v. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 1994(2) SCC 691. 9. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh, 2000(10) SCC 646 , a direction was issued by the Court to construct road. It was seriously deprecated by Apex Court holding that it amounts to financial indiscipline since it is within the domain of Government and not Court. Similar is the view taken in J.R. Raghupathy and others v. State of A.P. and others, AIR 1988 SC 1681 and Federation of Railway Officers Association and others v. Union of India, 2003(4) SCC 289 . 10. In Samvidhan Bahali Andolan and another v. Union of India (UOI) and others, AIR 1998 All 210 , the Court said that creation of revenue districts etc. is the internal arrangement of State and a policy matter to be decided by the Government. It is not to be interfered by the Court unless it is shown that there is some violation of statutory provision. 11. No such violation of any statutory provision could be shown by learned counsel for petitioner in the case in hand. is the internal arrangement of State and a policy matter to be decided by the Government. It is not to be interfered by the Court unless it is shown that there is some violation of statutory provision. 11. No such violation of any statutory provision could be shown by learned counsel for petitioner in the case in hand. He, however, placed reliance on Apex Court’s decision in Baldev Singh v. State of Himanchal Pradesh, AIR 1987 SC 1239 . Having gone through the aforesaid decision, in our view, the same has no application at all the the facts of this case and, therefore, does not help the petitioner in any manner. 12. In view of above, we do not find any merit in the writ petition. 13. Dismissed.