ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. These two writ petitions have been filed by Laxman Sindhi and Kishore Sindhi, praying for quashment of orders F.NO. 673/06/2013 dated 30.05.2013 passed under Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short ‘the COFEPOSA Act’) and dated 16.07.2013 passed under Section 7(1) of the COFEPOSA Act and further to quash proclamation dated 02.08.2013 published in newspaper Dainik Bhaskar. 2. Facts of the case are that investigation was conducted by the officers of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Jaipur (for short ‘the DRI’) in respect of certain consignments, which arrived at Foreign Post Office, Jaipur in the name of M/s. Esdire International House No. 2305, Ghee Walon Ka Rasta, Johri Bazar, Jaipur. DRI officers visited Foreign Post Office, Jaipur and found two parcels covered under EMS Nos. EA055266881 HK and EA 055266895 HK consigned to the aforesaid firm lying there ready for clearance. The Customs Officers allowed clearance of these parcels without opening and without calling for import documents from the aforesaid firm. As per the show cause notice, the officers of DRI kept surveillance, during which they observed that one Shri Ram Prasad Gurjar, an employee of the postal department, removed both the parcels to the bonded godown. In the evening, when the DRI officers recalled and weighed the said parcels, they found some difference in the actual weights and declared weights. They also found that fresh tape was affixed on the parcels. On further search of the premises, the officers of DRI found two small packets in brown plain wrappers hidden in one corner of the godown underneath an almirah without having any EMS Slip or post office number. On interrogation, Shri Ram Prasad Gurjar admitted that the said small packets were removed by him from the subject two parcels under EMS Nos. EA 055266881 HK and EA 055266895 HK. DRM seized the parcels on 29.04.2011. Shri Ram Prasad Gurjar was arrested and after detailed investigation, the Commissioner of Customs issued a Show Cause Notice dated 17.10.2011 under Section 110 (2) of the Customs Act, 1962 (for short ‘the Customs Act’) stating therein that M/s. Esdire Internationals was engaged in smuggling of Iridium through fraudulent removal of part consignment from the post parcels received from Overseas Suppliers, without payment of duty, prior to customs checks, at Foreign Post Office, GPO, Jaipur. Glass Chatons used for concealment of Iridium was also being imported by misdeclaring as glass beads and undervaluing them with intent to evade payment of duty. It may be noted here that Iridium is a precious silver white transition metal of Platinum group. After further investigation, DRI issued show cause notice dated 24.04.2012 to the aforesaid firm, in response to which, Shri Vinod Kumar Vijay appeared for the first time on 12.06.2012 and gave his statement where the role of the petitioners was revealed. 4. Mr. A.K. Bhandari, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners argued that notices dated 27.04.2012, 30.05.2012 and 05.06.2012 were issued to the petitioners. The DRI issued an addendum/corrigendum dated 18.01.2013 to the said Show Cause Notice dated 24.04.2012 in which an entirely new case was set up where for the first time the petitioners were alleged to have been involved as receiver of consignment after clearance from Foreign Post Office. The petitioners filed detailed reply to the show cause notices denying all the allegations. However, the department, in utter disregard of the law and in gross abuse of the powers resting upon it, passed an order of detention dated 30.05.2013 under Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act against the petitioners with a view to prevent them from smuggling the goods in future. 5. Neither detention orders, nor the grounds for detention have so far been served upon the petitioners. They learnt about the same only when a proclamation was published thereabout in newspaper Dainik Bhaskar, Ajmer Edition dated 02.08.2013. The petitioners, therefore, challenged the said detention order by filing two writ petitions bearing no. 40/2013 and 41/2013 respectively. However, Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide its judgment dated 18.08.2015 dismissed the writ petitions. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners approached the Supreme Court by filing SLPs (Criminal), which too were dismissed vide order dated 22.11.2015. 6. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Srikant Vs. District Magistrate, Bijapur, (2007) 1 WLC 405 and the judgments referred therein, learned Senior Counsel argued that these writ petitions should be treated in the nature of habeas corpus and therefore, principle of res-judicata ought not be applied and the petitions may be heard and decided on merits, particularly when the petitioners have now raised additional and new argument. District Magistrate, Bijapur, (2007) 1 WLC 405 and the judgments referred therein, learned Senior Counsel argued that these writ petitions should be treated in the nature of habeas corpus and therefore, principle of res-judicata ought not be applied and the petitions may be heard and decided on merits, particularly when the petitioners have now raised additional and new argument. This additional argument is that pursuant to show cause notice dated 24.04.2012 and addendum/corrigendum dated 18.01.2013, the Customs Department initiated recovery and forfeiture proceedings against the petitioners and other persons mentioned in notice under Section 28 (1) and 28(a)(b), 114 of the Customs Act, 1962 and also proceedings for imposing penalty under various provisions of Customs Act, 1962. The Commissioner of the Department of Customs passed a final order on 10.10.2013 whereby he confirmed the recovery of custom duty and also imposed penalty to be recovered from the petitioners and other persons jointly and severely. Being aggrieved thereby, the petitioners filed appeal before the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (for short ‘the Tribunal’). The Tribunal passed final order on 20.06.2017 allowing the appeal and setting aside order dated 10.10.2013. It is argued that the Tribunal relying on the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of Mangali Impex Limited Vs. Union of India & Others (W.P. (C) No. 441/2013 and other connected petitions) decided on 03.05.2016 held that DRI was not competent to issue show cause notice dated 18.01.2013 under the Customs Act and remanded the matter to original adjudicating authority to decide the issue of adjudication afresh after decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Mangli Impex. Based on the judgment of the Tribunal, the petitioners submitted representation on 13.07.2017 to the respondents praying that detention orders be invoked, but without success. 7. Referring to the judgment passed by the Tribunal, learned Senior Counsel argued that the Tribunal in concluding para of the judgment has directed that till the final decision by the adjudicating authority, status quo will be maintained, which would mean that detention order could no more be acted upon and the petitioners should not be detained till any further fresh order is passed. It is argued that in earlier writ petitions, detaining authority had given reply that the detention order was based on proposal received from the Jaipur Unit of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI, Sponsoring Authority). It is argued that in earlier writ petitions, detaining authority had given reply that the detention order was based on proposal received from the Jaipur Unit of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI, Sponsoring Authority). In view of the judgment of the Tribunal, the DRI was not competent to issue show cause notice under the Customs Act. When the foundation of adjudication order, which was the show cause notice, is found to be non-est, the basis for passing of impugned order itself goes and the impugned order is also liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned Senior Counsel argued that name of petitioner Kishore Sindhi, as per own showing of the respondents, surfaced in the statement of Vinod Kumar on 12.06.2012 and in fact much before that on 17.10.2011 but the detention order was passed with long lapse of two years, therefore, same is, even otherwise, liable to be quashed and set aside. 8. Citing judgment of the Supreme Court in Additional Secretary to the Government of India & Others Vs. Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia & Another, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 496, learned Senior Counsel argued that it was held by the Supreme Court that the court has the power to interfere with the detention order even at pre-execution stage on five grounds mentioned in para 30 of the Report. Relying on the judgment of Supreme Court in SMF Sultan Abdul Kader Vs. Jt. Secy. To Govt. of India & Others, (1998) 8 SCC 343 , learned Senior Counsel argued that detention order has not been executed till date and non-execution of detention order is itself a ground to quash the same. The Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave Vs. Union of India & Another, (2014) 1 SCC 280 has only held that order of detention should not be quashed merely due to long lapse of time but the grounds of detention ought to be served on the proposed detenue, once he gains the knowledge that the order of detention is in existence so as to offer him a plank to challenge even the grounds of detention after which the courts will have to examine whether the order of detention, which was passed at the relevant time but could not be served, was based on sufficient material justifying the order of detention. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra) rather extended the scope of challenging order of detention at pre-execution stage, on any other ground, beyond five grounds, except the ground of long lapse of time. The Supreme Court in that case held that the five grounds mentioned in Alka Subhash Gadia case (supra), on which the Court can set aside the detention order at the pre-execution stage, are only illustrative but not exhaustive. It is argued that even if the petitioners in the earlier filed writ petitions raised some of the grounds either in arguments or in the pleadings, which they are now raising again, they cannot be precluded from raising such arguments, as this Court while deciding earlier writ petitions has not considered most of the arguments. Learned Senior Counsel in support of his arguments also relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and Another, (2011) 5 SCC 244 and Gimik Piotr Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Others, (2010) 1 SCC 609 . 9. Per Contra, Mr. R. D. Rastogi, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of respondents-Union of India as also Mr. Sandeep Pathak, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 4-DRI, opposed the petitions and argued that present writ petitions are barred by the principle of res( judicata and these writ petitions cannot be considered as habeas corpus petitions as the arguments, which the petitioners raised in the earlier filed writ petitions and which were available and were yet not raised, should be taken to have been considered and rejected. Till the petitioners are physically detained, present writ petitions cannot be treated as habeas corpus petitions and it cannot be argued that principle of res-judicata will not apply. Learned Additional Solicitor General referring from the grounds of writ petitions earlier filed by the petitioners submitted that most of the arguments, which the petitioners have raised now, have only been repeated by them in the present writ petitions and therefore, they should not be considered and petitions be rejected. It is argued that setting aside of adjudication order dated 10.10.2013 by the Tribunal has no bearing on the detention order, which has been passed on the basis of show cause notice dated 24.04.2012 and addendum/corrigendum dated 18.01.2013. It is argued that setting aside of adjudication order dated 10.10.2013 by the Tribunal has no bearing on the detention order, which has been passed on the basis of show cause notice dated 24.04.2012 and addendum/corrigendum dated 18.01.2013. The Tribunal has not interfered with any of them and it is on the basis of said show cause notice/addendum/corrigendum that detention orders were issued. Besides, the said detention orders have been affirmed by Division Bench of this Court, by dismissing the earlier filed writ petitions by the petitioners. The petitioners challenged the judgment of this Court before the Supreme Court by filing SLPs. The Supreme Court, vide its order dated 07.11.2015, dismissed the SLPs by observing that there was no merit to entertain the same. 10. Learned Additional Solicitor General didn’t dispute that the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra) extended the scope of challenging order of detention at pre-execution state beyond five grounds, enumerated in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra), except the ground of long lapse of time. But the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra) has already been considered by Division Bench of this Court while dismissing earlier filed writ petitions by the petitioners. Referring to para 41 and 42 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra), learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the Supreme Court taking note of Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act has observed that where proposed detenue is absconding or concealing himself, the Government may report the matter to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where the proposed detenue ordinarily resides for invoking the provisions of Sections 82 to 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. Parasmal Rampuria, (1998) 8 SCC 402 , learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the proposed detenue has to first surrender pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances examined on merits after he has had an opportunity to study the grounds of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds. 11. Parasmal Rampuria, (1998) 8 SCC 402 , learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the proposed detenue has to first surrender pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances examined on merits after he has had an opportunity to study the grounds of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds. 11. Learned Additional Solicitor General argued that the Tribunal has misunderstood and misapplied judgment of Delhi High Court in Mangali Impex Limited (supra) wherein it was held that Section 28 has been amended by Act of 2011 w.e.f. 08.04.2011 read with Section 28(11) which was amended vide Customs (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2011 w.e.f. 16.09.2011. Section 28(11) does not validate show cause notice issued by Commissione rates of Customs (Preventive), Directorate General of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence. In the present case, admittedly show cause notice was issued on 24.04.2012 and Addendum/Corrigendum was issued on 18.01.2013, thus both the dates fall much after 08.04.2011. Moreover, the judgment of Delhi High Court in Mangali Impex (supra) was challenged by Union of India by filing SLP (C) No. 20453/2011 before the Supreme Court and operation of that judgment has been stayed by the Supreme Court vide its order dated 01.08.2016. The Tribunal could not have, therefore, relied on the aforesaid judgment and remanded the matter. Even while remanding the matter, it erred in law by directing the parties to maintain status-quo, thus requiring adjudicating authority not to pass fresh order. It is contended that Union of India has been advised to file SLP before the Supreme Court against that order. Learned Additional Solicitor General argued that judgment passed by the Tribunal only affects the adjudication proceedings and it does not in any manner affect the order of preventive detention as the two Acts operate in different spheres and are not interdependent. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radheshyam Kejriwal Vs. State of West Bengal & Another, (2011) 3 SCC 581 , especially on para 38 (vi) of the Report, learned Additional Solicitor General argued that if the exoneration in adjudication proceedings is on technical ground and not on merit, prosecution may still continue. Learned Additional Solicitor General on the scope of interference by this Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. Arvind Shergill & Another, (2000) 7 SCC 601 . Learned Additional Solicitor General on the scope of interference by this Court relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Others Vs. Arvind Shergill & Another, (2000) 7 SCC 601 . Learned Additional Solicitor General argued that filing of present writ petitions is nothing but gross abuse of process of law and the same deserve to be dismissed with heavy cost. 12. We have bestowed our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully examined the material on record. 13. The petitioners earlier approached this Court challenging the very same detention orders, which they are challenging again in the present writ petitions, on the same grounds except the one which we shall deal with separately. This Court in its judgment dated 18.08.2015 took note of the case of the Department that in the case of goods imported through post, it is mandatory as per Section 82 of the Customs Act, 1962 that label or declaration should be accompanied with description, quantity and value of goods for the purposes of entry. In the present case, Iridium weighing 6.080 kg. seized by the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence was not specified in the declaration as required under Section 82 of the Customs Act, 1962 and was in excess of goods, viz. Glass Chatons included in the entry. The department seized iridium weighing 6.080 kg., market value of which was approximately Rs. 1.0 crore. Such seizure was made under Section 111(i) and (m) of the Customs Act, 1962. During investigation, it surfaced that previous eleven consignments cleared under eight invoices contained in excess 57.04 kg. goods suspected to be Iridium and same were not declared as per the declaration prescribed under Section 82 of the Customs Act, 1962. Validity of detention order was considered by this Court in writ petitions filed by the petitioners earlier precisely on the grounds on which they again seek to assail the same except one that the Tribunal has now set aside adjudication order and remanded the matter back to the adjudicating authority. 14. Validity of detention order was considered by this Court in writ petitions filed by the petitioners earlier precisely on the grounds on which they again seek to assail the same except one that the Tribunal has now set aside adjudication order and remanded the matter back to the adjudicating authority. 14. We have called for the records of writ petitions earlier filed by the petitioners and found that the petitioners raised; ground of delay in ground (c) of memorandum of those writ petitions, especially the ground that there was no nexus or direct link in between the alleged activities of smuggling relating back to the year 2011 and passing of the impugned orders in the year 2013; detention order being founded on solitary act of evasion of duty in ground (F); detention order could be challenged at preexecution stage in ground (G) and (H) with reference to five grounds enumerated in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) and that those five grounds are not exhaustive. Argument that obligation of the respondents to supply grounds of detention and place the material before this Court as to their subjective satisfaction was raised in ground (J); and that there was no evidence of fresh incident after the alleged evasion of customs duty as back as on 29.04.2011 in ground (K). None of these grounds appealed to the Court and this Court while taking into consideration the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia & Another (Supra); Subhash Popatlal Dave (Supra) and Deepak Bajaj (Supra) dismissed the writ petitions with the following conclusion: “Therefore, being cautious of our limited scope and self evolved judicial policy that the aggrieved person should first follow the due operation and implementation of the concerned law and exhaust the remedy provided by it, before approaching the High Court, we will not exercise our discretionary extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, being cautious that our powers are to be used sparingly and only in those circumstances where no other efficacious remedy is available. Thus, at preexecution stage of the detention order we are hesitant to cross the Lakshman Rekha of which the High Court has been reminded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in plethora of judgments.” 15. Thus, at preexecution stage of the detention order we are hesitant to cross the Lakshman Rekha of which the High Court has been reminded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in plethora of judgments.” 15. We may at the cost of repetition state that the aforementioned judgment was subject to challenge before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the SLPs vide order dated 27.11.2015, which reads as follows: “We find no merits to entertain these petitions, according, the special leave petitions are dismissed.” 16. We are not inclined to countenance the argument that since the order of preventive detention impugned herein is ultimately intended to put the petitioners under detention, these petitions should be considered in the nature of habeas corpus writ petitions and on that basis principle of res-judicata should not be held applicable to the present case. So long as the petitioners are not physically detained and put in confinement, present petitions challenging the order of preventive detention at pre-execution stage can, by no stretch of reasoning, be considered as a writ of habeas corpus. 17. No doubt, the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra) in para 49 of the Report held that the question whether the five circumstances specified in Smt. Alka Subhash Gadia (supra) are exhaustive of the grounds on which a preexecution scrutiny of the legality of preventive detention order can be undertaken was considered by the Supreme Court in earlier judgment in Subhash Popatlal Dave Vs. Union of India & Another, (2012) 7 SCC 533 and held therein that the grounds are not exhaustive. However, in para 49 of the later judgment in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra), His Lordship, Hon’ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar, in the concurring judgment, observed that it did not persuade him to hold that such a scrutiny ought to be undertaken with reference to the cases of those, who evaded the process of law. Question before the Court was whether the detention order impugned before it was illegal on the day of its making on any of the grounds known to law. The legislature was conscious of the fact that it can happen in some cases that the execution of the preventive detention order could be scuttled by the proposed detenue either by concealing himself or absconding from the process of law. The legislature was conscious of the fact that it can happen in some cases that the execution of the preventive detention order could be scuttled by the proposed detenue either by concealing himself or absconding from the process of law. Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act recognized such possibility and provided that the Government may report the matter to the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where the proposed detenue ordinarily resides. On making of such report by the Government, the provisions of Sections 82 to 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure apply to the proposed detenue and his property, as if the order of preventive detention is a warrant issued by the Magistrate under the provisions of the Code of criminal Procedure. In substance, the property of the proposed detenue could be attached and perhaps even be confiscated in an appropriate case. Apart from that, the State can also, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct the proposed detenue to appear before an officer specified in the said notification at such place and time. Failure to comply with such notified direction on the part of the proposed detenue without a reasonable cause is made an offence punishable either imprisonment for a term extending up to one year or with fine or both. 18. In fact, the Supreme Court in Subhash Popatlal Dave (supra) quoted with approval an excerpt from Parasmal Rampuria (supra) wherein it was held that the proper order, which is required to be passed is to call upon the detenue first to surrender pursuant to the detention order and then to have all his grievances examined on merits after he had an opportunity to study the grounds of detention and to make his representation against the said grounds as required by Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 19. The Supreme Court in Arvind Shergill & Another (supra) has delineated the scope of interference in such matters by writ courts by observing that the responsibility for making a detention order rests upon the detaining authority who alone is entrusted with the duty in that regard and it will be a serious derogation from that responsibility if the court substitutes its judgment for the satisfaction of that authority on an investigation undertaken regarding sufficiency of the material on which such satisfaction was grounded. The Court can only examine the grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object, which the legislation has in view, i.e. to prevent the detneue from engaging in smuggling activity. The said satisfaction is subjective in nature and such a satisfaction, if based on relevant grounds, cannot be stated to be invalid. Dealing with the scope of interference by writ courts in matter of preventive detention at pre-execution stage, the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra & Others Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande, AIR 2008 SC 1705 held as under: “57. From the foregoing discussion, in our judgment, the law appears to be fairly well- settled and it is this. As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a Detaining Authority under the relevant ’preventive detention’ law cannot be set aside by a Writ Court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Alka Subhash Gadia. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a ’suspicious jurisdiction’ i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken ’with a view to preventing’ a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a Court of Law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order.” 20. As regards judgment of the Tribunal, we notice from the record that operation of the judgment of Delhi High Court in Mangali Impex Limited (supra) has been stayed by the Supreme Court, a fact taken note of by the Tribunal in its order. But on reading the judgment, we find that the Delhi High Court in that case has only held that the department cannot authorise the officers of the Customs, DRI, the DGCEI etc. But on reading the judgment, we find that the Delhi High Court in that case has only held that the department cannot authorise the officers of the Customs, DRI, the DGCEI etc. to exercise powers in relation to non-levy, short-levy or erroneous refund for a period prior to 08.04.2011, if in fact, there was no proper assignment of the functions of reassessment or assessment in favour of officers, who issued such show cause notices since they were not ‘proper officers’ for the purposes of Section 2(34) of the Act. In the present case, admittedly, show cause notice was issued on 24.04.2012 and Addendum/Corrigendum was issued on 18.01.2013, both the dates fall much after 08.04.2011, therefore, ratio of judgment of Delhi High Court in Mangali Impex Limited (supra) cannot be applied here. In any case, adjudicatory proceedings are distinct and different than the proceedings of preventive detention, the latter being not founded on adjudicatory order, but on the show cause notice issued to the petitioners. Adjudicatory proceedings are not in lieu of proceedings of preventive detention but are in addition thereto and both operate in different spheres. Filing of present writ petitions by the petitioners again is nothing but gross abuse of process of law. We, therefore, in view of above discussion, do not find any merit in the present writ petitions and accordingly dismiss them with costs of Rs. 50,000/- in each of the writ petition, to be deposited with Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority within a month. 20. Office is directed to place a copy of this order on record of connected writ petition.