JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this appeal, the State has challenged the judgment passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge (I), Mandi, District Mandi in Sessions Trial No. 15 of 2013 dated 15.1.2015 vide which, the present respondent/accused has been acquitted by the learned trial court for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC. 2. The case of the prosecution was that deceased Asha Devi was married with accused in the year 2010 and after about 4-5 months of marriage accused started physically assaulting her. On this, father of the deceased i.e. complainant Jindu Ram brought her back to his house in the year 2012 and kept her (deceased) with him for about 4 months. Thereafter accused along with Bhasker Ram, Rattan and Bali Ram came to the house of complainant and deceased was sent along with them to the house of accused. 3. As per the prosecution accused used to doubt the character of deceased and he also used to beat her on account of not bringing sufficient dowry. As a result of the cruelty so meted out to the deceased, she committed suicide on 2.4.2013. 4. On the basis of statement recorded under Section 154 Cr. P.C. of the complainant i.e. the father of deceased, FIR was registered, body of deceased was sent for post-mortem which revealed that deceased had committed suicide after consuming poison. 5. Investigation was carried out in the matter and after completion of investigation, challan was filed in the Court and as a prima facie case was made out against the accused, accordingly he was charged for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 6. On the basis of evidence produced on record by the prosecution both ocular as well as documentary it was held by learned trial court that prosecution had not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. 6. On the basis of evidence produced on record by the prosecution both ocular as well as documentary it was held by learned trial court that prosecution had not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. While arriving at the said conclusion, it was held by learned trial court that the evidence led by prosecution demonstrated that even the complainant, PW1 father of the deceased, had not corroborated the case of the prosecution, as it had not come in the statement of complainant that accused in fact had abetted his wife to commit suicide. Learned trial court further held that whereas case of the prosecution was that deceased had committed suicide, however, the testimony of PW2 Chuhari Devi mother of deceased was to the effect that deceased was murdered by accused. Learned trial court also held that no witness of near vicinity had been examined and even PW5, Bhaskar Ram and PW6 Bali Ram had not supported the case of prosecution. On these bases it was held by learned trial court that prosecution had not been able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Accordingly it acquitted the accused for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the said acquittal, the State has filed present appeal. 8. We have heard Mr. V.S. Chauhan, learned Additional Advocate General as well as Mr. Trilok Jamwal, learned counsel appearing for the accused and have also gone through the records of the case. 9. In the present case in order to prove its case prosecution examined 11 witnesses. Father of deceased Jindu Ram entered the witness box as PW1, mother of the deceased Chuhari Devi as PW2, brother of the deceased Mohan Lal as PW3, father-in-law of deceased Bhaskar Ram as PW5, maternal uncle of the accused Bali Ram as PW6 amongst others. Dr. Anup Shivhare who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased entered the witness box as PW4. 10. A perusal of FIR Ext. PW10/A, which was lodged on the basis of statement recorded by PW1 Jindu Ram under Section 154 Cr. Dr. Anup Shivhare who conducted the post-mortem of the deceased entered the witness box as PW4. 10. A perusal of FIR Ext. PW10/A, which was lodged on the basis of statement recorded by PW1 Jindu Ram under Section 154 Cr. PC, demonstrates that it was mentioned therein that deceased was married with the accused about one and half years back as per Hindu rites and though initially for a period of 4-5 months husband of the deceased had treated her properly but thereafter he started physically abusing her, as a result of which, deceased remained in the house of the complainant for a period of 4 months and thereafter accused took her back. It is further recorded in the FIR that accused used to verbally abuse the deceased by calling her characterless and ugly and he also used to physically assault her and demand dowry. It was further mentioned in the FIR that on these counts accused had abetted the deceased to commit suicide. Said complainant who entered the witness box as PW1 deposed in his examination-in-chief that on 2.4.2013 accused and his relatives had killed his daughter. He further deposed that the hands of the deceased were tied with a rope and there were injury marks on the body of deceased. In his cross-examination this witness deposed that he had read the statement of his, recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C before he signed it. He admitted that it was not recorded in the statement recorded by the police that deceased was murdered. He further stated in his cross-examination that accused had started demanding dowry after a few months of marriage. He further stated in his cross-examination that he did not remember as to when accused physically abused his daughter after she returned back from her parent's house. This witness admitted that his daughter had given birth to a male child after six months of marriage. He denied that when accused confronted the deceased as to whose child it was, she came back to her parental house. He denied the suggestion that there were no injury marks on the body of deceased and that he had deposed falsely. He admitted that he had not lodged any complaint to the effect that accused was demanding dowry from him before any authority. 11. He denied the suggestion that there were no injury marks on the body of deceased and that he had deposed falsely. He admitted that he had not lodged any complaint to the effect that accused was demanding dowry from him before any authority. 11. Mother of deceased Chuhari Devi who entered the witness box as PW2 deposed that after the marriage of deceased with accused he used to maltreat her and used to demand dowry. She further deposed that on account of ill behaviour being meted out to the deceased they had brought back the deceased to their house. She also deposed that her daughter was in fact killed by accused and his other family members. In her cross examination this witness deposed that she had not stated before the police that accused had abused her deceased daughter by calling her characterless and ugly and for this reason she committed suicide. She feigned ignorance to the effect that her daughter gave birth to a child after 5 months of the marriage. However, she admitted that deceased had come back to her parent's house after delivering the child. She also admitted in her cross-examination that no complaint had been lodged against the accused on the ground that he was demanding dowry. She denied the suggestion that her deceased daughter had conceived pregnancy from some other person than the accused. 12. Brother of deceased Mohan Lal who entered the witness box as PW3 deposed in the Court that the accused and his family members used to physically abuse the deceased on demand of dowry and his sister committed suicide to save herself from their atrocities. He further deposed that there were injuries marks on the body of his sister. In his cross examination he admitted it to be correct that his sister was not physically assaulted by accused in his presence. In his cross examination he also deposed that he was informed by the doctor that the deceased consumed poison. He admitted the suggestion that his sister had given birth to a child only after 5 months of marriage and thereafter relationship between his family and the family of accused had become strained. 13. Doctor Anup Shivhare who entered the witness box as PW4 proved on record the post-mortem report of deceased Ext. He admitted the suggestion that his sister had given birth to a child only after 5 months of marriage and thereafter relationship between his family and the family of accused had become strained. 13. Doctor Anup Shivhare who entered the witness box as PW4 proved on record the post-mortem report of deceased Ext. PW4/B. In his cross-examination this witness admitted it to be correct that there were no external marks of injury on the person of deceased and there were no marks of any kind of beatings on the body of the deceased. 14. Father-in-law of deceased was also examined by prosecution as PW5 and this witness deposed that his daughter-in-law gave birth to a child after 5 months of marriage and when she was asked as to whose child it was, she went to her parent's house where she stayed 2 to 3 months. He further deposed that thereafter brother and sister-in-law of deceased left her back in his (PW5) house and she remained in her in-laws house under stress and on this count she consumed poison. As he was declared as hostile witness he was cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. In his cross-examination he denied the suggestion that after the birth of child, deceased was verbally abused and physically assaulted. He also denied that in the year 2012 accused along with Bali Ram and Rattan Singh had gone to bring the deceased back from her parental house to her in-laws house. In his cross-examination by defence, this witness has deposed that the child to whom birth was given by deceased was residing in the house of the accused. 15. Before proceeding any further, it is relevant to take note of the fact that here is a case which admittedly is of unnatural death and the death has taken place within 7 years of the marriage of the deceased. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, 1872 reads as under:- "113-B. Presumption as to dowry death. - When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman, and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Section 304-B of the IPC reads as under:- "304-B. Dowry death. Section 304-B of the IPC reads as under:- "304-B. Dowry death. - (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called 'dowry death', and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death." 16. Thus, it is evident that for the purposes contemplated in Section 113-B of the Evidence Act 1872 and Section 304-B I.P.C., to spring into action, it is necessary to demonstrate that cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. Therefore, the interpretation of the words "soon before" assumes great significance and importance and these words have to be interpreted keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. The question obviously will be how "soon before" her death such woman was subjected by the accused to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. The cruelty or harassment will differ from case to case and it will obviously be relating to the mindset of people which will also vary from person to person. Besides cruelty being both mental and/or physical it can also be verbal or emotional. 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Surinder Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 129, has held as under:- "17. Thus, the words 'soon before' appear in Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also in Section 304-B of the IPC. For the presumptions contemplated under these Sections to spring into action, it is necessary to show that the cruelty or harassment was caused soon before the death. The interpretation of the words 'soon before' is, therefore, important. The question is how 'soon before'? This would obviously depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. The cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. It relates to the mindset of people which varies from person to person. Cruelty can be mental or it can be physical. Mental cruelty is also of different shades. It can be verbal or emotional like insulting or ridiculing or humiliating a woman. It can be giving threats of injury to her or her near and dear ones. It can be depriving her of economic resources or essential amenities of life. It can be putting restraints on her movements. It can be not allowing her to talk to the outside world. The list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Physical cruelty could be actual beating or causing pain and harm to the person of a woman. Every such instance of cruelty and related harassment has a different impact on the mind of a woman. Some instances may be so grave as to have a lasting impact on a woman. Some instances which degrade her dignity may remain etched in her memory for a long time. Therefore, 'soon before' is a relative term. In matters of emotions we cannot have fixed formulae. The time-lag may differ from case to case. This must be kept in mind while examining each case of dowry death. 18. In the present case, the marriage of the deceased was solemnized on 2010 and the death of the deceased has taken place on 2.4.2013. It is clearly proved by the Medical Officer that the death was caused due to poisoning. Thus, it was unnatural death and death has taken place within seven years of marriage and presumption of dowry death will be applicable. However, merely because the death has taken place within seven years from the date of marriage of the deceased, this does not mean that the presumption as contemplated in Section 113-A of the Evidence Act will not have to be substantiated by the prosecution by placing on record cogent and reliable material. 19. Evidence on record demonstrates that father and mother of deceased who entered the witness box as PW1 and PW2 have maintained that deceased was ill-treated by accused on account of demand of dowry and she was in fact killed by accused and his family members. 19. Evidence on record demonstrates that father and mother of deceased who entered the witness box as PW1 and PW2 have maintained that deceased was ill-treated by accused on account of demand of dowry and she was in fact killed by accused and his family members. However, it is a matter of record that accused has not been charged for the offence of murder but he has been charged for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. Though PW1, PW2 and PW3 have deposed in the Court that accused and his family members used to maltreat the deceased but no complaint in this regard was ever lodged by either of them or the deceased either to the Panchayat or Police personnel about the alleged ill-treatment meted out to the deceased by the accused for want of dowry. There is no material adduced on record by the prosecution to demonstrate that demand of dowry was made by the accused from the deceased as alleged. No independent witness has corroborated the version of the prosecution. 20. Besides this perusal of the statement of these witnesses who also happen to be closely related to the deceased also demonstrates that no specific incident of beating or demand of dowry has been narrated by them. Their cross examination further demonstrates that their credibility stands impeached by the defence in view of inconsistencies in the same and therefore their deposition cannot be said to be trustworthy so as to sufficiently prove the guilt of the accused. 21. Because a married woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage, presumption under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act would not automatically apply. The mandate of the law is also that where a woman commits suicide and it is shown that soon before her death such woman was subjected to cruelty or harassed for any demand of dowry, the presumption as envisaged under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act may attract, however having regard to all other facts and circumstances of the case, such as the suicide had been abetted by her husband or by some relative of her husband. This presumption according to us is discretionary. As far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was any dowry demand. This presumption according to us is discretionary. As far as the present case is concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has not succeeded in showing that there was any dowry demand. According to us, the circumstances of the case, as pointed out by the prosecution are totally insufficient to hold that the accused had abetted the deceased to commit suicide. 22. Let us test the veracity of the version of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 from another angle. We have gone through the evidence of said witnesses and we find that except making bald statement of assault and demands of dowry, there is no evidence adduced by them to prove any particular act of cruelty or harassment, to which the deceased was subjected to by the accused or that any complaint was made to the police about any such assault or harassment before the death of the deceased. Therefore, also in our opinion, the learned trial Court was entitled to take a view that the prosecution story as advanced from the evidence of said witnesses was not established beyond reasonable doubt. 23. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in Madivallappa V. Marabad and others v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 12 Supreme Court Cases 448, that in a case where no evidence is adduced to prove any particular act of cruelty or harassment to which the deceased was subjected to and where no complaint was made to the police about any such assault or harassment before the death of the deceased, the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court that the prosecution story was not established beyond reasonable doubt was the correct view. 24. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that it is a matter of record that deceased gave birth to a male child after six months of her marriage. It has come in the statement of brother of the deceased PW3 Mohan Lal that relations between the family of deceased and accused became strained after deceased gave birth to a child only 6 months after the marriage. It has also come on record that in fact deceased went back to her parental house after giving birth to the said child. It has also come on record that in fact deceased went back to her parental house after giving birth to the said child. In this view of the matter this possibility cannot be ruled out that the deceased was under stress on account of having given birth to a child after 6 months of marriage and her not being in a position to explain the same. Therefore, in view of above discussion we hold that prosecution was not able to prove its case against accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC. 25. In the present case the accused has also been charged for commission of offence punishable under Section 306 IPC. 26. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sangara Bonia Sreen v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1997 (5) Supreme Court Cases, 348, that the basic ingredients of offence under Section 306 are (a) suicidal death and (b) abetment thereof. In our considered view, in order to attract the ingredients of abetment the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide is necessary. 27. It is a unique legal phenomenon in the Indian Penal Code that the only act, the attempt of which alone will become an offence, is suicide. The person who attempts to commit suicide is guilty of the offence under Section 309 IPC, whereas the person who committed suicide cannot be reached at all. Section 306 renders the person who abets the commission of suicide punishable for which the condition precedent is that, suicide should necessarily have been committed. Thus, the crux of the offence under Section 306 itself is abetment. In other words, if there is no abetment there is no question, the offence under Section 306 comes into play. 28. Hereinafter, we will apply these principles to the facts of the present case. A close scrutiny of the statements of the prosecution witnesses will demonstrate that none of them have mentioned any explicit act on account of the accused which can be termed to be an act of abetment on his behalf which led deceased Asha Devi to commit suicide. Hereinafter, we will apply these principles to the facts of the present case. A close scrutiny of the statements of the prosecution witnesses will demonstrate that none of them have mentioned any explicit act on account of the accused which can be termed to be an act of abetment on his behalf which led deceased Asha Devi to commit suicide. On the basis of the statements of the prosecution witnesses who were also interested witnesses, it cannot be said that the prosecution was successful in demonstrating and proving that the accused had committed any act which could be termed to be an act of abetment towards the commission of suicide by deceased Asha Devi. 29. In order to substantiate the charge under Section 306 I.P.C., it has to be established that the death by commission of suicide was desired object of the abettors and with that in view they must have instigated, goaded, urged or encouraged the victim in commission of suicide. The instigation may be by provoking or inciting the person to commit suicide and this instigation may be gathered by positives acts done by the abettors or by omission in the doing of a thing. Thus, the acts or omission committed by the abettors immediately before the commission of suicide are vital. In the present case, we are afraid that the prosecution was not able to substantiate any of the above ingredients. The prosecution could not prove any act of provocation or incitement or omission or commission on the part of the accused, vide which he had instigated the deceased to commit suicide. 30. The prosecution has not been able to establish any intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgment passed by the learned trial Court whereby the accused has been acquitted is either perverse or the acquittal of the accused by the learned trial Court has amounted to travesty of justice. Thus, we conclude by holding that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused was guilty of the offences alleged against him. We have gone through the judgment passed by the learned trial Court at length. The learned trial Court after due deliberation and due application of mind has come to the conclusion that the prosecution could not bring home the guilt against accused beyond reasonable doubt. We have gone through the judgment passed by the learned trial Court at length. The learned trial Court after due deliberation and due application of mind has come to the conclusion that the prosecution could not bring home the guilt against accused beyond reasonable doubt. We find no reason to disagree with the said conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court. According to us also, the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt as the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Therefore, we uphold the findings recorded by the learned trial Court and the appeal is dismissed being without any merit. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged.