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2017 DIGILAW 2439 (ALL)

RAMESH CHANDRA SRIVASTAVA v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-10-27

SUDHIR AGARWAL

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—Pursuant to order of date passed on Restoration Application, the revision is restored to its original number. 2. As requested and agreed by learned counsel for parties, I proceed to hear and decide this case at this stage. 3. Heard Sri Tarun Kumar Srivastava, Advocate, for Revisionist and Sri S. Ali Murtaza, A.G.A. for respondents. 4. This criminal revision under Section 401 read with Section 397 Cr.P.C. has been filed aggrieved by judgment and order dated 19.2.2004 passed by 1st Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate/Special Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur in Criminal Case No. 885 of 1993 convicting revisionist under Sections 2(i)(a), 7(i) and 16 (i)(a) of Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1954”) read with Rule 28 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules, 1955”) and sentencing him to undergo six months simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/-. Thereagainst accused-revisionists preferred Criminal Appeals No. 12 of 2007 which has been dismissed by District and Sessions Judge, Fatehpur vide judgment and order dated 9.5.2008. This revision has been filed challenging both the aforesaid orders.4. Now before examining the aforesaid two issues, the facts, in brief, leading to prosecution of revisionist and his conviction, may be taken note as under. 5. The facts in brief, leading to prosecution of revisionist and his conviction, may be taken note as under. 6. As per prosecution case, on 31.10.83 at 1.45 p.m., a retailer of food items, Ramesh Chandra Srivastava, son of Shyam Lal Srivastava, resident of Teckar Sarai, Police Statio Thariyao, District Fatehpur was found exhibiting food item ‘kampat goli’ (candy) weighing around 4.5 kg tablet for sale under Police Station Kasodhar. He introduced himself to the said seller and on being suspicious of adulteration, Food Inspector, Shri Riyaz Ahmad purchased 600 such candies on payment of Rs. 2.70/- and obtained a receipt thereof. Having made payment as demanded by the seller he obtained receipts of sample purchase and payment therefor. Having purchased 600 gram candies these were divided in three equal parts and put into three clean, dry and empty phials which were labelled and marked with sample No. F.T.P. 5/83. Every part was sealed. Wrapped with a paper, every part was pasted with a slip scribed with code name, number and signature of the local health authority and seller’s signature was obtained on the affixtures. Every part was sealed. Wrapped with a paper, every part was pasted with a slip scribed with code name, number and signature of the local health authority and seller’s signature was obtained on the affixtures. A notice on Form 6 was given to the seller. Persons present there were asked to stand witness but none was ready to testify. Having prepared a plate from a part of the aforesaid sample No. F.T.P. 5/83 and having kept therein a copy of Form 7 it was sealed. The sealed packet through a special messenger was sent to the Public Analyst, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow for examination. A copy of Form-7 having mark of sample seal was separately sent to the Public Analyst, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow through registered post. Rest two parts in a sealed packet were deposited in the office of the local health authority with two copies of Form 7. 7. Submitting the examination result of the aforesaid sample FTP 5/83, Public Analyst, Government of Uttar Pradesh in his report No. 19352 dated 14.12.83 opined: “Two prohibited charcoal colorants, namely, rhodamine B and malachite green have been used in the sample”. 8. On sample in question being found to be below the norms as in Rule 6 Appendix B of the Act, 1954, on the above-mentioned rules being violated and on the report of the Public Analyst, Lucknow Ex. ka-4 being received, its information was given to the local health authority by complainant through Ex. ka-5 and permission Ex. ka-7 to initiate case against the accused was obtained. Thereafter, complaint Ex. ka-8 was submitted to the Court followed by an intimation Ex. ka-10 in that respect on behalf of the complainant to the accused by registered post. Accused turned up in the Court and secured bail. Complainant, Shri Riyaz Ahmad, Ex-Food Inspector, was examined as PW-1 on behalf of prosecution under Section 244 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, charge was framed against revisionist under Section my learned predecessor-in-office framed against the accused the charges under Section 7/16 Sub-Section (a)(i) of Act, 1954 read with Rule 28 of Rules, 1955 was framed in which the accused pleaded not guilty and sought trial. 9. 9. On behalf of prosecution, PW-1 Shri Rijyaz Ahmed, Ex-Food Inspector, and PW-2 Shri S.P. Sahu, Senior Clerk/Food Clerk, were examined under Section 246 Cr.P.C. Documentary evidence adduced on behalf of prosecution consisted of Form 6 (Notice, Ex.-ka-1), receipt of sample purchase (Ex.-Ka-2), receipt of sample seal (Ex.-Ka-3), report of Public Analyst, Lucknow (Ex.-Ka-4), letter seeking approval under Section 20 (a) (Ex.-Ka-5), the letter dated 30.1.1984 of Food Inspector written to CMO (Ex.-Ka-6), approval letter dated 7.4.1984 (Ex.-Ka-7), receipt of registry under Section 13(2) (Ex.-ka-9), copy of the compliance notice under Section 13(2) (Ex.-Ka-10), the letter written to Court by CMO with two sealed envelopes (Ex.-ka-11) and the first report No. C.F.L.G.-14-06-/89(P.T.III)-370 dated 20.9.1989 and the second report No. C.F.L.G. 14-06/96 (P.T.II) dated 11.5.1990 from the Central Food Laboratory. The statement of accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he stated that case had proceeded wrongly. When the sample was taken, he was not asked about the variety of Kampat goli. 10. After completing the evidence of the complainant and recording the statement of accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., accused was provided an opportunity to defend himself, but no oral or documentary evidence was adduced on his behalf. Trial Court after hearing arguments of counsels for parties and perusing the documents available on record concluded the trail holding the revisionist guilty and imposing punishment whereagainst appeal preferred by revisionist has also been dismissed as noticed above. 11. Revisionist has been found guilty of adulteration of candies which are normally used and consumed by children. Chemical examination shows that prohibited colorants have been used. The judgments of Courts below have been assailed mainly on the ground of non compliance of Sections 10(7) and 13(2) of Act, 1954. It is contended that firstly there was no independent witness who has signed sample taken by Food Inspector. Therefore, entire prosecution is vitiated. Secondly it is contended that no evidence was placed on record to show that sample was sent to Public Analyst for examination. 12. Record shows that Food Inspector has mentioned in its report that he requested persons present on the spot for evidence but no one was ready and therefore he proceeded further. This finding of fact recorded by Court below has not been disputed or challenged before this Court. 12. Record shows that Food Inspector has mentioned in its report that he requested persons present on the spot for evidence but no one was ready and therefore he proceeded further. This finding of fact recorded by Court below has not been disputed or challenged before this Court. Mere absence of independent witness would not vitiate the proceedings and it cannot be said that there is non compliance of Section 10(7) of Act, 1954. Whether mention of fact that persons available on spot did not come forward to cooperate with the Officer concerned when he collected the sample and proceeded to seal the same is sufficient compliance of Section 10(7) has been considered time and again. 13. Section 10(7) of Act, 1954 reads as under: “Section 10(7)—Where the Food Inspector takes any action under clause (1) of sub-section (1), sub-section (2), sub-section (4), or sub-section (6), he shall call one or more persons to be present at the time when such action is taken and take his or their signatures.” 14. The objective of Section 10(7) of Act, 1954 is to ensure that actual or genuine transaction of sale of sample and its formalities have been observed. The provision is mandatory in so much so that Food Inspector must make genuine efforts to get the corroboration of one or more persons present on the spot to witness his act of taking sample and completion of other formalities. Once such an effort has been made, but in vain, it cannot be said that there is any non-compliance of Section 10(7) of Act, 1954. 15. Section 10(7) was amended in 1964 and prior thereto there were words “as far as possible call not less than two persons”. The words “as far as possible” were deleted by amendment of 1964. It was sought to be argued, therefore, that deletion means that if the independent witnesses do not corroborate the action of Food Inspector in taking sample etc. it shall vitiate the Trial. 16. A learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in The Food Inspector, Palakkad v. M.V. Alu and another, 1991 Cri LJ 2174, considered it and in para 2 of the judgment said that sub-section (7) of Section 10 is only intended as a safeguard to ensure fairness of action taken by Food Inspector. it shall vitiate the Trial. 16. A learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court in The Food Inspector, Palakkad v. M.V. Alu and another, 1991 Cri LJ 2174, considered it and in para 2 of the judgment said that sub-section (7) of Section 10 is only intended as a safeguard to ensure fairness of action taken by Food Inspector. What he is obliged to do is only to call one or more independent persons to be present and attest when he takes action. If independent persons were available and even then the Food Inspector did not want their presence or attestation, it could be said that he violated Section 10(7). If independent persons available did not care to oblige him in spite of his ‘call’, he cannot be said to have violated Section 10(7). The duty is only to make an earnest attempt in getting independent witnesses. If that earnest attempt did not succeed on account of refusal of independent persons, it cannot be said that Section 10(7) is violated. In such a contingency, nothing prevents the uncorroborated evidence of the Food Inspector being accepted, if found acceptable. 17. In another matter arisen from State of Uttar Pradesh itself, the three Judges Bench of Apex Court had occasion to consider this aspect in Shri Ram Labhaya v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, 1974(4) SCC 491 and in paras 5 and 6 thereof the Court said: “5. We are of the opinion, particularly in view of the legislative history of Section 10(7), that while taking action under any of the provisions mentioned in the Sub-section, the Food Inspector must call one or more independent persons to be present at the time when such action is taken. We are, however, unable to agree that regardless of all circumstances, the non-presence of one or more independent persons at the relevant time would vitiate the trial or conviction. The obligation which Section 10(7) casts on the Food Inspector is to ‘call’ one or more persons to be present when he takes action. The facts in the instant case show that the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shopkeepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate. He could not certainly compel their presence. In such circumstances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses. The facts in the instant case show that the Food Inspector did call the neighbouring shopkeepers to witness the taking of the sample but none was willing to co-operate. He could not certainly compel their presence. In such circumstances, the prosecution was relieved of its obligation to cite independent witnesses. In Babu Lal Hargovindas v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1971 SC 1277 it was held by this Court after noticing that Section 10(7) was amended in 1964, that non-compliance with it would not vitiate the trial and since the Food Inspector was not in the position of an accomplice his evidence alone, if believed, can sustain the conviction. The Court observed that this ought not to be understood as minimizing the need to comply with the salutary provision in Section 10(7) which was enacted as a safeguard against possible allegations of excesses or unfair practices by the Food Inspector. 6. As stated earlier the Food Inspector was unable to secure the presence of independent persons and was therefore driven to take the sample in the presence of the members of his staff only. It is easy enough to understand that shopkeepers may feel bound by fraternal ties but no Court can countenance a conspiracy to keep out independent witnesses in a bid to defeat the working of laws.” 18. From the above it is clear that Apex Court also took the view that what is important to attract Section 10(7) is that the Food Inspector atleast should try to secure presence of one or more independent witness when he take actions under any of the provisions mentioned in Section 10(7). Once that has been done evidence of Food Inspector himself, even if not corroborated by independent witnesses, can be relied if the Trial Court finds it otherwise acceptable and is not to be discarded only for the reason that independent witnesses have not signed the sample and seizure documents. 19. This Court also considered this aspect in Nagar Swasthya Adhikari Nagar Mahapalika v. Mohammad Wasim, 1993 ACC 47. Here the Court further said that object of indicating Section 10(7) is to ensure that particular sample is taken from the accused. The object is to keep the act of taking sample above suspicion. Compliance of sub-section (7) of Section 10 is necessary only for satisfying the Court that requisite sample was taken as alleged. Here the Court further said that object of indicating Section 10(7) is to ensure that particular sample is taken from the accused. The object is to keep the act of taking sample above suspicion. Compliance of sub-section (7) of Section 10 is necessary only for satisfying the Court that requisite sample was taken as alleged. Court’s scrutiny of such compliance becomes unnecessary when the accused admits taking of such sample. 20. Once the efforts have been made by Food Inspector to call for one or more independent witnesses but none agreed or cooperated, then it cannot be said that there is any breach of requirement of Section 10(7) and it will not vitiate the prosecution at all. Here I am fortified by a decision of Madras High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Ramachandran, 1993(1) FAC 93. 21. It is the duty of Food Inspector to call one or more independent persons to be present at the time of taking sample and once that is done by him it is sufficient but if the witnesses are not ready to come forward and sign the documents the Food Inspector cannot compel them and, therefore, where the attempt has been made but failed, lack of signature by independent witness would not vitiate the trial. 22. The Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Hanif, AIR 1992 SC 1121 , said that there is no such law that the evidence of Food Inspector must necessarily need corroboration from independent witnesses. His evidence is to be tested on its own merits and if found acceptable the Court would be entitled to accept and rely on to prove prosecution case. 23. In the present case, I do not find anything from record that any effort was made by revisionist to show or disprove the case of prosecution regarding calling of independent witnesses and their non-cooperation by refusing to give their names and addresses etc. In fact before Courts below, as is evident from the judgments, this issue has not been raised at all. Trial Court on its own has noticed that there is compliance of Section 10(7). In view thereof, the argument that there is no compliance of Section 10(7) has no basis and rejected. 24. In fact before Courts below, as is evident from the judgments, this issue has not been raised at all. Trial Court on its own has noticed that there is compliance of Section 10(7). In view thereof, the argument that there is no compliance of Section 10(7) has no basis and rejected. 24. With regard to compliance of Section 13(2) also Court find from record that registered notice was sent to revisionist which was received back and Chief Medical Officer submitted the same to the Court. Thereafter. Court made the said notice served upon accused. In this backdrop this Court may examine whether there is any non compliance of Section 13(2). The provisions reads as under: “Section 13(2)-On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A, forward in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or person that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the Court within a period of ten days from the date of report of the copy of report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.” 25. The further procedure in this regard is contained in Rule 9-B of Rules, 1955. The further procedure in this regard is contained in Rule 9-B of Rules, 1955. It reads as under: “9-B. Local (Health) Authority to send report to person concerned.—The Local (Health) Authority shall within a period of ten days after the institution of prosecution forward a copy of the report of the result of analysis in Form II delivered to him under sub-rule (3) of Rule 7, by registered post or by hand, as may be appropriate, to the person from whom the sample of article was taken by the Food Inspector and simultaneously also to the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars has been disclosed under Section 14-A of the Act: Provided that where the sample conforms to the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder, and no prosecution is intended under sub-section (2) or no action is intended under sub-section (2-E) of Section 13 of the Act, the Local (Health) Authority shall intimate the result to the vendor from whom the sample has been taken and also to the person, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A of the Act, within 10 days from the receipt of the report from the public analyst.” 26. It contemplates sending of copy of analysis report after institution of prosecution against the person from whom article or food was taken, informing him that if so desired he may make an application to the Court for getting the sample of article or food kept with Food Inspector, i.e., Local (Health) Authority, to be analyzed by by Central Food Laboratory. This request can be made by the person facing prosecution within 10 days from the date of receipt of report. 27. Record shows that Chief Medical Officer’s Cover letter PFA 31/84/26121-13 dated 16.5.1984 alongwith Public Analyst Report No. 19352 dated 14.12.1983 was sent to accused by registered post vide Receipt No. 3180 dated 10.5.1984 which was made Ex. Ka-9. Cover letter was made Ex. Ka-10. It is not disputed that address mentioned on the said letter is correct. In this backdrop it cannot be said that there is non compliance of Section 13(2) and the proceedings are vitiated for that reason alone. 28. Next submission is that Court may reduce the punishment to the extend the period already undergone. I find difficult to eschew this submission. In this backdrop it cannot be said that there is non compliance of Section 13(2) and the proceedings are vitiated for that reason alone. 28. Next submission is that Court may reduce the punishment to the extend the period already undergone. I find difficult to eschew this submission. Here is a case of adulteration of food items and that too items which are to be consumed by young people i.e. by children. 29. Adulteration in food article has a direct adverse consequence to the health of public. Many a times such adulteration with food causes such serious loss to the consumer, which is unrecoverable and create permanent disability or loss etc. The adulterated item is bound to cause such loss as it could be and the consumer would suffer without having any knowledge therefor. The people who are indulged in adulteration are more serious enemy of humanity than those who commit crime by killing a person in a straight manner. Here the hidden crime cause injury to a person who has no idea as to how he has suffered. He believed that food articles contain substance as naturally are supposed to be present there, but adulteration has changed its nature in a bad way. Consumer suffers in ignorance but with an obvious confidence that whatever he is intaking is alright. The adulterators, therefore, do commit a much henious and serious crime to the Society as a whole and deserve no sympathy. 30. In fact, in our Country, we deal with adulteration with lot of sympathy which is encouraging continuous indulgence in such activities and the reason is that adulteration is not being treated with such seriousness as it ought to be. This treatment to adulteration is anti-human and anti-society. The act of adulteration need be viewed with absolute strictness and stringent measures must be taken to prevent it, else Society in general would continue to suffer in the hands of adulterators, who are minting money playing with health of public at large without taking care whether suffering consumer would be an innocent child, a pregnant lady, a patient in Hospital fighting for his life or any such other needy person. 31. In the present case, the prosecution has proved the case beyond doubt. Accused has been found guilty of adulteration of candies. 31. In the present case, the prosecution has proved the case beyond doubt. Accused has been found guilty of adulteration of candies. Court below has already taken a lenient view by imposing punishment of only six months’ simple imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1000/-. Attempt to grant any indulgence in such a matter, when the Court below has already taken a lenient view in awarding punishment, would be nothing but making mockery of justice. Society had a confidence in the system of justice and is waiting that persons found guilty of committing henious crimes are punished appropriately and suitably, even if punishment is executed with lot of delay since Society has no control over delay occurring in Court but it has a faith in the system of justice and, therefore, not deterred from delay but is satisfied even when justice comes highly belated, provided it is not diluted and lean in favour of accused so as to treat him like a victim ignoring the loss suffered by actual victim. 32. Even otherwise, punishment imposed by Court below after finding charge proved beyond doubt is not to be interfered lightly unless the Court finds adequate and appropriate reason therefor. 33. In the matter of awarding punishment multiple factors have to be considered by this Court. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflicting claims and demands. Security of individuals as well as property of individuals is one of the essential functions of the State. The administration of criminal law justice is a mode to achieve this goal. The inherent cardinal principle of criminal administration of justice is that the punishment imposed on an offender should be adequate so as to serve the purpose of deterrence as well as reformation. It should reflect the crime, the offender has committed and should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. Sentencing process should be sterned so as to give a message to the offender as well as the person like him roaming free in the society not to indulge in criminal activities but also to give a message to society that an offence if committed, would not go unpunished. The offender should be suitably punished so that society also get a message that if something wrong has been done, one will have to pay for it in proper manner irrespective of time lag. 34. The offender should be suitably punished so that society also get a message that if something wrong has been done, one will have to pay for it in proper manner irrespective of time lag. 34. Further sentencing process should be sterned but tampered with mercy where-ever it is so warranted. How and in what manner element of leniency shall prevail, will depend upon multifarious reasons including the facts and circumstances of individual case, nature of crime, the matter in which it was committed, whether preplanned or otherwise, the motive, conduct, nature of weapon used etc. But one cannot be lost sight of the fact that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to justice system as it is bound to undermine public confidence in the efficacy of law. The society cannot long endure such serious threats. It is duty of the Court to give adequate, proper and suitable sentence having regard to various aspects, some of which, are noticed above. 35. In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed and another v. State of Gujrat, 2009 (7) SCC 254 , the Court confirmed that: “any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-wise counter productive in the long run and against the interest of society which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system”. (Emphasis added) 36. In Jameel v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2010 (12) SCC 532 , Court held that: “It is the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The sentencing Courts are expected to consider all relevant facts and circumstances bearing on the question of sentence and proceed to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence.” 37. In Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settapa v. State of Karnataka, 2012 (8) SCC 734 , Court said that: “The cry of the collective for justice, which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored.” 38. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 (3) JT 444 , the Court said that: “Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. In Guru Basavaraj @ Benne Settapa v. State of Karnataka, 2012 (8) SCC 734 , Court said that: “The cry of the collective for justice, which includes adequate punishment cannot be lightly ignored.” 38. In Gopal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2013 (3) JT 444 , the Court said that: “Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence” 39. In Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar and another, 2013 (9) SCC 516 , the Court observed that: “We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every Court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The Court must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment”. (Emphasis added) 40. The revisionist has not shown that punishment, awarded by Court below, is unjust, arbitrary or otherwise illegal. However, what it is trying to take advantage is that the act of the Court should come to his rescue inasmuch as it is this Court which has taken a long time in taking up this revision and this should come to rescue of the revisionist for making reduction in punishment drastically though otherwise what has been done by the Court below cannot be said per-se illegal, unjust or improper. It is well-settled that the act of the Court prejudice none. The failure of this Court in taking up these matters within the reasonable time should not become a hand to the offender like present one to claim reduction in the punishment as a matter of right ignoring the fact that the society requires that an offender should be punished adequately and over the above the victim, who has suffered, is waiting for its own rights in having the offender punished suitably, even if the system of justice takes a long time. The delay in Courts cannot become a factor to convert and accused as a victim ignoring all the rights of the actual victim, who has suffered, his family and the society in shown. Moreover, when the finding of guilty and punishment imposed by the Court below is not found erroneous in any manner, I am of the view that such an order of the Courts below cannot be interfered in exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. 41. The judicial review in exercise of revisional jurisdiction is not like an appeal. It is a supervisory jurisdiction which is exercised by the Court to correct the manifest error in the orders of subordinate Courts but should not be exercised in a manner so as to turn the Revisional Court in a Court of Appeal. The legislature has differently made provisions for appeal and revision and the distinction of two jurisdictions has to be maintained. 42. Construing old Section 439 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, pertaining to revisional jurisdiction, the Court in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, AIR 1951 SC 196 , said that revisional jurisdiction under Section 439 of the Code ought not to be exercised lightly particularly when it is invoked by private complainant against an order of acquittal which could have been appealed against by the Government under Section 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. In other words, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be invoked merely because the lower Court has taken a wrong view of law or misappreciated the evidence on record. 43. In K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788 , it was held that revisional jurisdiction should be exercised by the High Court in exceptional cases only when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law resulting in flagrant miscarriage of justice. However, this was also a case in which revisional jurisdiction was invoked against an order of acquittal. If the Court lacks jurisdiction or has excluded evidence which was admissible or relied on inadmissible evidence or material evidence has been overlooked etc., then only this Court would be justified in exercising revisional power and not otherwise. 44. However, this was also a case in which revisional jurisdiction was invoked against an order of acquittal. If the Court lacks jurisdiction or has excluded evidence which was admissible or relied on inadmissible evidence or material evidence has been overlooked etc., then only this Court would be justified in exercising revisional power and not otherwise. 44. The above view has been reiterated in Mahendra Pratap Singh v. Sarju Singh, AIR 1968 SC 707 ; Khetrabasi Samal v. State of Orissa, AIR 1970 SC 272 ; Satyendra Nath Dutta and another v. Ram Narain, AIR 1975 SC 580 ; Jagannath Choudhary and others v. Ramayan Singh and another, 2002(5) SCC 659 ; and, Johar and others v. Mandal Prasad and another, 2008 Cr LJ 1627 (SC). 45. In Duli Chand v. Delhi Administration, 1975(4) SCC 649 , the Court reminded that jurisdiction of High Court in criminal revision is severely restricted and it cannot embark upon a re-appreciation of evidence. While exercising supervisory jurisdiction in revision the Court would be justified in refusing to re-appreciate evidence for determining whether the concurrent findings of fact reached by learned Magistrate and Sessions Judge was correct. 46. In Pathumma and another v. Muhammad, 1986(2) SCC 585 , reiterating the above view the Court said that in revisional jurisdiction the High Court would not be justified in substituting its own view for that of a Magistrate on a question of fact. 47. In Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan and another, 2001(9) SCC 631 , the Court said: “The revision power under the Code of Criminal procedure cannot be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate Courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the First Information Report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.” 48. In Ram Briksh Singh and others v. Ambika Yadav and another, 2004(7) SCC 665 , in a matter again arising from the judgment of acquittal, the revisional power of High Court was examined and the Court said: “4. Sections 397 to 401 of the Code are group of sections conferring higher and superior Courts a sort of supervisory jurisdiction. These powers are required to be exercised sparingly. Though the jurisdiction under Section 401 cannot be invoked to only correct wrong appreciation of evidence and the High Court is not required to act as a Court of appeal but at the same time, it is the duty of the Court to correct manifest illegality resulting in gross miscarriage of justice.” 49. In view of above exposition of law and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds no merit in any of the submissions advanced on behalf of revisionist. 50. The revision is, accordingly, dismissed. 51. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 52. The revisionist Ramesh Chandra Srivastava is on bail. His bail bonds and surety bonds are cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fatehpur shall cause him to be arrested and lodged in jail to serve out the sentence passed against him. The compliance shall be reported at the earliest. 53. Certify this judgment to the lower Court immediately.