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2017 DIGILAW 244 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Bharatsinh Ratansinh Sodha Parmar

2017-02-01

ABDULLAH GULAMAHMED URAIZEE

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JUDGMENT : Abdullah Gulamahmed Uraizee, J. 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant-State has challenged the judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, 4th Fast Track Court, Nadiad dated 30.06.2007 rendered in Atrocity Criminal Case No. 7 of 2007, whereby the learned trial Judge acquitted the original accused, the opponents herein of the charges for the offence punishable under Sections 504, 506(2) and 114 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Atrocity Act' for short). 2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution, as set out before the learned Trial Court, read as under:- "The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that the original complainant - Manibhai Chhaganbhai Harijan, who is a member of the Scheduled Caste, raised the issue of his outstanding dues during the meeting of village panchayat which was convened on 12.01.2006 at about 3 PM in the Community Hall. The complainant raised the aforesaid issue of his outstanding dues during the course of discussion. Therefore, accused Nos. 1 and 2 who were present there got excited and gave filthy abuses to the complainant. When the complainant raised objection to the same, accused No. 1 gave abuses like 'Sala Dheda and Bhangiya' and asked him to leave the Community Hall while accused No. 2 pushed the complainant away from the Hall. Accused No. 3 is also alleged to have given abuses to the complainant. Therefore, the complainant had left the house and thereafter lodged the complaint against the accused persons with Kapadvanj Rural Police Station being C.R. No. II 3 of 2006 for the offences punishable under sections 504, 506(2) read with section 114 of the IPC and sections 3(1)(x) of the Atrocity Act." 3. After completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Kapadvanj. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, learned Magistrate Court under Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr.P.C.) committed the said case to the Court of Special Judge, 4th Fast Track Court, Nadiad, which was, thereafter, numbered as Atrocity Criminal Case No. 7 of 2007. Since the accused persons did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried, they were tried for the alleged offences. Since the accused persons did not plead guilty and claimed to be tried, they were tried for the alleged offences. The prosecution has examined the following witnesses and produced the following documentary evidence in support of its case:- P.W. No. Name of the Witness Exhibit Nos. 1 Manibhai Chhaganbhai Harijan, Complainant 7 2 Kodarbhai Javanbhai sodha, Panch Witness 11 3 Punjabhai Dhulabhai Soda Parmar 13 4 Bharatbhai Manilal Harijan 14 5 Kantibhai Shakrabhai Harijan, Panch witness 15 6 Manabhai Punjabhai Rathod 16 7 Kanubhai Jesingbhai Harijan 17 8 Shantaben Manilal Harijan 18 9 Kiritkumar Balashankar Maheta 19 10 Sarjibhai Khajuti Ninama 21 Sr. No. Documentary evidence Exhibit Nos. 1 Original Complaint 9 2 Scene of offence panchnama 12 3 Caste Certificate of the complainant 20 4. At the end of the Trial and after recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and hearing the arguments on behalf of the prosecution and the defence, the learned Special Judge, 4th Fast Track Court, Nadiad acquitted the accused of all the charges leveled against them. On completion of the trial, the Sessions Court passed the judgment and order acquitting the opponents. 5. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Court, the appellant-State has preferred the present Criminal Appeal. 6. Ms Rita Chandarana, learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently, submitted that the learned Trial Judge ought to have considered the evidence of the complainant-Manibhai Chhaganbhai Harijan, who was examined at Exh:7. It is submitted that he belonged to the scheduled caste and he produced caste certificate to prove his caste. The learned APP, further, submitted that this Criminal Appeal is required to be allowed. 7. Mr. Japan Dave, learned advocate for the respondents is not present when the matter is called out. 8. The principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court against an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In Para-54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under; "54. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of the High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In Para-54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under; "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 9. Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; 1. An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. 3. Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. 4. An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 5. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. 5. If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 10. Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate powers, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 11. Even in the case of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran & Anr., (2007) 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In Para-16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under; "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 12. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 12. Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by L.R.s v. State of MP, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal, are well settled. 13. In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh & Ors., (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in Paras-10 and 11 has held as under; "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 14. Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah & Anr. v. State, rep. By the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in Para-4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 15. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under: "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary, (1967) 1 SCR 93 : AIR 1967 SC 1124 that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 16. In the recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivasharanappa & Ors. In the recent decision, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shivasharanappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, JT 2013 (7) SC 66 has held as under: "That appellate Court is empowered to re-appreciate the entire evidence, though, certain other principles are also to be adhered to and it has to be kept in mind that acquittal results into double presumption of innocence." 17. Having gone through the entire record and proceedings, the complainant has been examined at Exh:7 and the medical evidence does not support the case of the prosecution and therefore, looking to the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this is not a case where it can be said that the reasons recorded by the learned Judge are perverse or contrary to law. 18. I find that the Trial Court, while considering the evidence on record, has rightly acquitted the accused persons. The Trial Court has observed that there are various discrepancies and contradictions in the oral evidence of the complainant as regards delay in lodging the complaint. As per the complaint he lodged the written complaint after consulting advocate and did not go to police station immediately and thus, there is a delay in lodging the complaint. The offending words are not attributed to respondent No. 3-Sarpanch. PW No. 4 and PW No. 8 are not the eye witnesses whereas PW No. 3 - Punjabhai Dhulabhai Soda Parmar, eye witness, has not supported the case of the prosecution. There are loopholes in the evidence and investigation which has been observed by the Trial Court. Moreover, the incident is of the year 2006 and I do not find any strong ground to reverse the decision of the Trial Court. In that view of the matter, the view taken by the Trial Court is not required to be disturbed. 19. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that the findings recorded by the Trial Court in acquitting the accused of the charge leveled against them are absolutely just and proper and in recording the said findings, no illegality or infirmity has been committed by it. I am in complete agreement with the reasonings given and the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. No interference is warranted with the judgment and order of the Trial Court. 20. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. I am in complete agreement with the reasonings given and the findings arrived at by the Trial Court. No interference is warranted with the judgment and order of the Trial Court. 20. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and order of the learned Special Judge, 4th Fast Track Court, Nadiad dated 30.06.2007 rendered in Atrocity Criminal Case No. 7 of 2007 is hereby confirmed. Bail and bail bonds of the accused, if any, stands discharged. R & P be sent back to the concerned trial Court, forthwith.