ORDER 1. This appeal by the defendants is directed against the confirming judgment and decree dated 18.2.2011 passed by III Additional Judge to the Court of Ist Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No.24-A/2010. Plaintiff's suit for declaration and permanent injunction has been decreed vide judgment and decree dated 30.7.2010 passed in Civil Suit No.44-A/2009. 2. Facts necessary for disposal of this appeal are to the following effect: Plaintiff – a registered Cooperative Housing Society with Registration No.040 dated 8.8.1966 filed a suit inter alia contending that the Society is engaged in activity of providing small plots to its members for residential purposes by division of land of its ownership. Plot No.59 situated at Govindpuri, Naulakha Pared, Thatipur, Morar is the suit property. Vide registered sale deed dated 3.8.1988 (Ex.P-7), the said property was transferred to one of its members namely Lt. Col. Indrapal Singh s/o Ganga Singh Chauhan having membership number 694 of the Society. However, at a later point of time, Col. Indrapal Singh submitted an application (Ex.P-8) before the management of the Society for surrendering the plot along with original sale deed. The same was approved. As such, the suit property again became available for sale to other members and the same was sought to be allotted to one of the members namely Munna Singh s/o Pooran Singh. On publication of notice in that behalf in the Hindi Daily Dainik Bhaskar dated 10.9.2001, appellant/defendant No.2 objected to the same claiming to have title and possession of the suit property with the assertion that the same was purchased by him from defendant No.1 Himandri Ghosh who had acquired right, title and interest therein after demise of his mother Monika Ghosh. She was a member of the Society and the suit plot was sold to her vide registered sale deed dated 26.12.1970. However, original sale deed was never submitted before the Court, instead certified copy thereof was filed in the trial Court. Plaintiff contended that Monika Ghosh was never a member of the Society. The suit plot was not sold to her. As such, defendant no.1 had no right, title or interest therein to transfer the same in favour of defendant No.2 vide alleged sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3). It was also denied that the suit property is in possession of defendant No.2. The suit plot was not sold to her. As such, defendant no.1 had no right, title or interest therein to transfer the same in favour of defendant No.2 vide alleged sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3). It was also denied that the suit property is in possession of defendant No.2. On the aforesaid pleadings, the trial Court framed the issues and allowed parties to lead evidence. 3. Plaintiff examined Vice President of the Society namely Yateendra Singh Tomar as PW1 and Col. Indrapal Singh Chouhan as PW2. PW1 deposed about his authority to file the suit on behalf of the plaintiff/Society with due reference to by law 39(2) of the Society and proved the authority letter (Ex.P-2). Indrapal Singh Chouhan (PW2) has deposed that the Society had executed the sale deed (Ex.P-7) transferring the title and possession of the suit property in his favour. There was no challenge to the aforesaid factum of execution of sale deed by the defendants as no evidence in that behalf was led. The original sale deed (Ex.P-7) was, accordingly, found proved. 4. Defendant No.2 produced certified copy of the sale deed (Ex.D-1) dated 26.12.1970 in support of his contention that the same was executed prior to execution of the alleged sale deed dated 3.8.1988 (Ex.P-7) in favour of Indrapal Singh Chouhan. However, to establish primacy of the said sale deed being of earlier point of time, plaintiff neither produced the original sale deed dated 26.12.1970, nor, sought permission of the trial Court to lead secondary evidence. As a result, certified copy of the aforesaid sale deed was not found to be admissible in evidence by the trial Court by its order dated 30.7.2010 passed separately and the document was not marked as exhibit. Further, defendant No.1 remained ex parte. Defendant No.2, to prove the sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) allegedly executed by power of attorney holder of defendnat No.1 Himendri Ghosh, neither examined defendant No.1 Himendri Ghosh nor his power of attorney holder Aparesh Majumdar s/o Animesh Majumdar who is alleged to have executed the sale deed. Besides, there was no document to establish that defendant No.1 had executed the power of attorney in favour of Aparesh Majumdar as even the power of attorney was not on record, so much so, that even defendant No.2 in his cross-examination in paragraph 7 has stated that he did not know the alleged power of attorney holder. Besides, there was no document to establish that defendant No.1 had executed the power of attorney in favour of Aparesh Majumdar as even the power of attorney was not on record, so much so, that even defendant No.2 in his cross-examination in paragraph 7 has stated that he did not know the alleged power of attorney holder. He has also deposed that the sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) was not executed in his presence. The demeanor of this witness has also been noted by the trial Court to the effect that he was answering the questions after looking at a paper taken out from his pocket. He also expressed his ignorance about the boundaries of the said property. As such, the evidence of defendant No.2 was not only infirm, inconsistent but also mutually destructive in nature. Consequently, the trial Court concluded that the plaintiff had proved that the suit property was of the ownership and possession of the plaintiff-Society. 5. Indrapal Singh Chouhan (PW2) has deposed that suit property was purchased by him and thereafter he had surrendered the same vide Ex.P-8 after ten years. Yateendra Singh Tomar (PW1) has deposed that Indrapal Singh had surrendered the said plot in terms of provision of bylaw 33(1) (Ex.P-2) to the Society. The trial Court has discussed the evidence of PW2 in detail in paragraphs 14 and 15 and concluded that the suit plot was surrendered by Indrapal Singh to the Society. The trial Court has also examined the oral and documentary evidence placed on record by the defendants and upon critical evaluation of the evidence on record, decreed the suit. 6. Before the first appellate Court, defendant No.2 filed an application under Order 41 rule 27, CPC for summoning the original of sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) as additional evidence. The application was opposed. The appellate Court in paragraphs 9 to 14 has discussed the rival contentions and considered the application on merits and thereafter rejected the same for the following reasons viz. (i) defendants had not assigned any reason for not producing original of the sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) either before the trial Court or before the appellate Court. The appellate Court in paragraphs 9 to 14 has discussed the rival contentions and considered the application on merits and thereafter rejected the same for the following reasons viz. (i) defendants had not assigned any reason for not producing original of the sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) either before the trial Court or before the appellate Court. Moreover, defendant No.2 had not sought permission of the trial Court to lead secondary evidence and as such copy of sale deed was not taken on record being not admissible in evidence; (ii) Further, in the sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3), it is mentioned that seller himself had purchased the suit property from the Society, but there was no evidence on record and contrary thereto, defendant No.2 has deposed that defendant No.1 acquired right after death of his mother Monika Ghosh and through power of attorney had transferred the same in his favour. There is no such mention/stipulation in the sale deed. Therefore, there is a concocted and manoeuvred attempt to claim right, title and interest of the suit property. As such, defendant No.2 failed to prove sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) itself; (iii) sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) was neither proved by adducing evidence of defendant No.1 nor otherwise and as such no presumption could be drawn of execution of such a document; (iv) as regards summoning of membership register, the Court found that defendant No.2 himself failed to bring on record the relevant evidence and failed to prove that Monika Ghosh was member of the Society. Therefore, for want of any evidence in that behalf the occasion did not arise to summon the membership register of 1970 from the Society; (v) no application under Order 41 rule 27 was filed before the trial Court and no reason perceivable in law was assigned for not filing such an application before the trial Court and, therefore, the appellate Court rejected the application. 7. On merits, the first appellate Court threadbare examined the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and confirmed the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court. 7. On merits, the first appellate Court threadbare examined the oral and documentary evidence placed on record and confirmed the findings of facts recorded by the trial Court. The appellate Court has discussed the alleged claim of sale of the said property in favour of Monika Ghosh vide sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) in paragraph 25 of its judgment with due advertence to the evidence on record and likewise the alleged sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) in paragraphs 28, 29, 32 and 33 and also examined the evidence of defendant No.2 in the context thereof and consequently dismissed the appeal. 8. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.2 has made the following submissions :- (i) The trial Court committed an error of law and fact while it held that the certified copy of sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) was not admissible in evidence for the reason that certified copy of sale deed is a public document and, therefore, admissible within the meaning of section 74 of the Evidence Act and, thus, production of certified copy of said document is permissible to prove the contents thereof under section 77 of the Evidence Act. In the alternative, he submitted that trial Court did not offer opportunity to lead secondary evidence to prove Ex.D-1 and committed an error of law having held that Ex.D-1 is inadmissible in evidence. (ii) Even if the appellant/defendant No.2 did not file the application under Order 41 rule 27 before the trial Court for summoning the original sale deed and membership register, the first appellate Court was empowered to call for record under section 165 of the Evidence Act. As such, the rejection of application filed under Order 41 rule 27 is unsustainable. (iii) The Courts below committed a grave error of law and fact having not considered the fact that even assuming that by registered sale deed dated 3.8.1988 (Ex.P-7) plot No.59 was transferred in favour of Indrapal Singh Chouhan, but unless the said plot was transferred back to the Society through a registered sale instrument, the Society did not acquire any right, title or interest therein. In this behalf, learned counsel relied upon Chandrakant Shankarrao Machale v. Parubai Bhairu Mohite [(2008 AIR SCW 5495)], to bolster his submission. In this behalf, learned counsel relied upon Chandrakant Shankarrao Machale v. Parubai Bhairu Mohite [(2008 AIR SCW 5495)], to bolster his submission. (iv) The application under Order 41 rule 27, CPC filed before this Court deserves to be allowed and the original sale deed dated 26.12.1970 and power of attorney be taken on record for decision in the matter. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent/plaintiff responded as under :- (i) Registered sale deed is not a public document in view of authoritative pronouncement of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rekha v. Smt. Ratnashree [( 2006(2) JLJ 275 )]. As such, the certified copy of the sale deed was not admissible in evidence, as rightly held by the trial Court. He further submitted that no application was filed by the appellant/defendant No.2 before the trial Court under section 65 of the Evidence Act seeking leave of the Court to lead secondary evidence. Therefore, the contention of denial of opportunity in that behalf is without any basis and contrary to record. (ii) There is no justifiable reason on record as to why and under what circumstances the original of sale deed (Ex.D-1) and membership register were not sought to be summoned before the trial Court. The requirement of Order 41 rule 27 as enumerated in sub-clause (aa) thereof that the party seeking to produce additional evidence should establish that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, was not fulfilled and, therefore, the appellate Court was justified having rejected the application. (iii) The judgment cited by learned counsel for the appellant/defendant No.2 in the case of Chandrakant Shankarrao Machale (supra), is of no assistance to the appellant as the same having no relevance to the facts in hand is distinguishable on facts. Indrapal Singh Chouhan (PW2) himself has deposed to have surrendered the plot under the provision of bylaws itself and no right, claim or interest therein has been made by him and he has no grievance. As such, no exception thereto can be taken. (iv) There is no reason or justification placed on record as to why the alleged original sale deed was not produced before the trial Court or the first appellate Court. As such, no exception thereto can be taken. (iv) There is no reason or justification placed on record as to why the alleged original sale deed was not produced before the trial Court or the first appellate Court. The documents sought to be produced before this Court are not eligible to be taken on record for the reason that contents of the sale deed (Ex.D-3) do not mention that the the suit property was purchased by Monika Ghosh by the sale deed (Ex.D-1). Instead it is mentioned that seller of Ex.D-3 had purchased the said property. Further, neither the alleged seller defendant No.1 Himandri Ghosh, nor his power of attorney were examined by the trial Court to prove the alleged sale deed (Ex.D-3). No such application was filed in the trial Court. The defendant No.2 has failed to lead evidence in support of sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1). Hence, no useful purpose would be subserved by taking these documents on record. Therefore, in the light of the judgment of the apex Court in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another [ (2012)8 SCC 148 )], the application under Order 41 rule 27, CPC cannot be allowed. 10. Heard, learned counsel for the parties. 11. Before adverting to the merits of the case, it would be apposite to consider the application (I.A. No.1524/11) filed under Order 41 rule 27 read with section 151, CPC, whereby appellant/defendant No.2 has sought to bring on record the self acclaimed original of sale deed (Ex.D-1), as well as, self acclaimed original power of attorney before this Court, mentioning therein that the same could not be filed before the Courts below for want of proper legal advice in spite of exercise of due diligence. 12. A bare perusal of the order of first appellate Court reveals that the alleged original of sale deed (Ex.D-1) which is sought to be produced before this Court, was neither produced before the trial Court nor was annexed with the application filed under Order 41 rule 27, CPC before the first appellate Court. No reason, much less plausible reason was assigned before the Courts below for not producing the same. Further, the appellant/defendant No.2 did not even seek permission to lead secondary evidence before the trial Court. No reason, much less plausible reason was assigned before the Courts below for not producing the same. Further, the appellant/defendant No.2 did not even seek permission to lead secondary evidence before the trial Court. Moreover, in sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) it is mentioned that defendant No.1 had purchased the suit property from the plaintiff-Society, whereas, appellant/defendant No.2 pleaded in his written statement that defendant No.2 had acquired right, title and interest over the said property after the death of his mother Monika Ghosh. As per copy of sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) the suit property is claimed to be purchased by Monika Ghosh from the plaintiff-Society, whereas the contents of sale deed (Ex.D-3) allegedly executed by Himandri Ghosh reveal that he had purchased the said property from the Society, which renders the sale deed (Ex.D-3) suspicious and not worthy of credence. Appellant/defendant No.2 neither examined defendant No.1 Himandri Ghosh, nor, his power of attorney to prove the sale deed (Ex.D-3). No evidence whatsoever was led by appellant/defendant No.2 before the Courts below to prove the membership of defendant No.1 or his mother in the plaintiff Society. Further, no plausible explanation perceivable in law was furnished by the appellant/defendant No.2 for summoning the alleged original of sale deed (Ex.D-1) from Sub-Registrar's Office, moreso in view of the fact the sale deed is not a public document as held by this Court in the case of Rekha (supra). 13. Now, at this stage, appellant/defendant No.2 has sought to bring on record the alleged original of sale deed (Ex.D-1) and power of attorney by way of instant application. Hon'ble the apex Court had the occasion to deal with identical question in the case of Ibrahim Uddin (supra), wherein the apex Court has held as under :- “37. The appellate Court should not ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. [ AIR 1978 SC 798 ]). 39. (Vide Haji Mohammed Ishaq v. Mohd. Iqbal and Mohd. Ali and Co. [ AIR 1978 SC 798 ]). 39. It is not the business of the appellate Court to supplement the evidence adduced by one party or the other in the lower Court. Hence, in the absence of satisfactory reasons for the non- production of the evidence in the trial Court, additional evidence should not be admitted in appeal as a party guilty of remissness in the lower Court is not entitled to the indulgence of being allowed to give further evidence under this rule. So a party who had ample opportunity to produce certain evidence in the lower Court but failed to do so or elected not to do so, cannot have it admitted in appeal. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, [ AIR 1957 SC 912 ]; and S. Rajagopal v. C.M. Armugam and others [ AIR 1969 SC 101 ]). 40. The inadvertence of the party or his inability to understand the legal issues involved or the wrong advice of a pleader or the negligence of a pleader or that the party did not realise the importance of a document does not constitute a "substantial cause" within the meaning of this rule. The mere fact that certain evidence is important, is not in itself a sufficient ground for admitting that evidence in appeal.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. Thus, in the backdrop of factual matrix in hand as enumerated above, and, in the wake of aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of Hon'ble the apex Court, no latitude can be given to the appellant/defendant No.2 at this stage in that behalf and, as such, his prayer for taking the said documents on record cannot be countenanced. The I.A., accordingly, stands rejected. 15. Now, adverting to the merits of the case. Both the Courts below have recorded concurrent findings of facts against the appellant/defendant No.2. As such, defendant No.2 has failed to prove the sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) or for that matter sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) before the Courts below by leading cogent evidence. The appellant/defendant No.2 has not been able to prove the very genesis and plank of his claim before the Courts below, as well as, before this Court. As such, defendant No.2 has failed to prove the sale deed dated 26.12.1970 (Ex.D-1) or for that matter sale deed dated 12.2.1992 (Ex.D-3) before the Courts below by leading cogent evidence. The appellant/defendant No.2 has not been able to prove the very genesis and plank of his claim before the Courts below, as well as, before this Court. Moreover, this Court finds substantial force in the contentions advanced by learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff, as contained in paragraph 9 (above) and the same are accepted as such. That apart, the entire gamut of matter is in the realm of facts. No question of law, much less substantial question of law arises warranting interference under section 100, CPC. 16. The appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.