JUDGMENT & ORDER : By means of this petition, the petitioners who are working as the Panchayet Extension Officers, have challenged the common seniority list of eligible officers holding the feeder posts of TCS Grade-II (Group-A), as disclosed by the letter No. F.42(28)-GA(P&T)/12 dated 02.11.2012 issued by the State Public Information Officer, GA (P&T) Department, Government of Tripura (Annexure-P/4 to the writ petition). Further, the petitioners have urged this court to consider the officers holding the feeder posts of TCS Grade-II (Group-A), in pursuance to the Tripura Civil Service (28th Amendment) Rules, 2011, which came into force w.e.f. 24.11.2012, as eligible for being considered for promotion to the TCS Grade-II on completion of 5(five) years of service by them being in the feeder posts of TCS Grade-II (Group-A) meaning from 24.12.2011. The petitioners have also urged this court to prohibit the respondents from filling up the vacancies in the TCS Grade-II as per the provisions of Section 5(1)(b) of the TCS Rules, 1967 on the basis of the purported common seniority list of the eligible officers holding the feeder posts of TCS Grade-II (Group-A). 2. The facts are mostly admitted. By the Notification under No.F.10(1)-GA(P&T)/2009 dated 19.12.2011 as issued by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tripura, GA(P&T) Department (Annexure-P/2 to the writ petition), the amendment of Tripura Civil Services Rules, 1967 has been caused. By the said amendment called “Tripura Civil Service (28th Amendment) Rules, 2011”, a few more posts borne in Group-A and Group-B have been declared as the feeder posts for promotion to the post of TCS Grade-II and those posts have been incorporated in the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules, 1967. Group-A posts those have been declared as the feeder posts and incorporated in the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules are (i) Cooperative Officer, (ii) Cooperative Inspector, (iii) Inspector, Small Savings and (iv) Inspector, Tribal Welfare. Group-B posts. Those have been declared as the feeder post and incorporated in the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules are (i) Inspector, Legal Metrology, (ii) Inspector of Food, (iii) Inspector of Taxes and (iv) Labour Inspector. The said amendment rules were published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Tripura Gazette on 24.12.2011 and, as such the said rules have come into effect from 24.12.2011. 3. The said amendment rules were published in the Extraordinary Issue of the Tripura Gazette on 24.12.2011 and, as such the said rules have come into effect from 24.12.2011. 3. There is no dispute that, as per Rule 5 of the TCS Rules, 1967, from the feeder posts as shown in Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules, 1967, 50% of the total strength of the Tripura Civil Service shall be filled up by promotion. Rule 14 of the TCS Rules, 1967 further provides that the Selection Committee constituted in terms of Rule 13, shall consider from time to time the cases of the officers eligible under clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and who have served in the respective cadres or posts, as the case may be, for not less than five years on regular basis in case of officers under Group-A and Group-B of Schedule-IV, prepare a list of officers recommended for purpose of recruitment by promotion, taking into account the actual vacancies at the time of selection and those likely to occur during a year of the selection for inclusion in the list. The recommendation shall be based on merit and suitability in all respect for appointment to the Tripura Civil Service with due regard to seniority. The petitioners’ grievance emanates from the inclusion of those new posts as enumerated above. Thus, they have challenged the common seniority list where the officers holding the newly incorporated posts in Schedule-IV. 4. Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the seniority of the persons who were borne in the feeder posts, newly included in the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules, cannot be counted for purpose of recording seniority inasmuch as the said amendment rule has been given prospective effect. He has further submitted that if their seniority is counted in terms of Rule 14 of the TCS Rules that would amount to giving retrospective effect to the said amendment rules. The right to be considered for the promotion being in the feeder posts is a vested right and that cannot be impaired by giving the retrospective operation of the amendment rule. Mr. Deb, learned counsel, in support of that contention has referred to the following decisions of the apex court: (i) Uday Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. etc., reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 451; (ii) Baleshwar Paswan & Ors. Mr. Deb, learned counsel, in support of that contention has referred to the following decisions of the apex court: (i) Uday Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. etc., reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 451; (ii) Baleshwar Paswan & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2004) 9 SCC 79 ; (iii) S. Sivaguru Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. etc., reported in (2013) 7 SCC 335 ; (iv) Panchraj Tiwari Vs. Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 101 ; (v) K.K. Dixit & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & Anr., reported in (2015) 1 SCC 474 ; (vi) T.R. Kapur & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 584; (vii) Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., reported in (1998) 7 SCC 676 ; (viii) State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Yogendra Shrivastava, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 538 ; (ix) Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623 . 5. In Uday Pratap Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors. etc., reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 451, the apex court has held that, by operating retrospectively any right which has been crystallised cannot be destroyed. 6. In Baleshwar Paswan & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., reported in (2004) 9 SCC 79 , the apex court has observed having referred to Uday Pratap Singh (supra) that: “This Court held that the appellants, who were placed in a similar situation as in the present case, had entered the merged cadre of senior branch on a particular date and while the respondents therein had entered the department as direct recruits prior thereto and, therefore, they should be treated as senior to the respondents (SIC) appellants”. [Emphasis added] 7. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has also placed reliance on S. Sivaguru Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. etc., reported in (2013) 7 SCC 335 to bring to the notice of this court the following observation of the apex court: 72.9. The continuance of the existing promotion channels as Non-Medical Supervisor and Health Educator to the re-designated Health Inspector Grade I (erstwhile Leprosy Inspectors) did not amount to bestowing a double benefit upon this category. Therefore, the High Court did not enforce negative equality. The continuance of the existing promotion channels as Non-Medical Supervisor and Health Educator to the re-designated Health Inspector Grade I (erstwhile Leprosy Inspectors) did not amount to bestowing a double benefit upon this category. Therefore, the High Court did not enforce negative equality. The High Court has correctly observed that upon integration and merger into one cadre, the pre- existing length of service of the Leprosy Inspectors re-designated as Health Inspector Grade IB had to be protected as it cannot be obliterated. Therefore, the Leprosy Inspectors have been correctly placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the already existing Health Inspectors Grade I w.e.f. 27-6-1997 1997. Therefore, it cannot be said that benefit has been given to the Leprosy Inspectors/Health Inspector Grade IB/Health Inspector Grade I with retrospective effect. [Emphasis supplied] 8. In Panchraj Tiwari Vs. Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board & Ors., reported in (2014) 5 SCC 101 , the apex court has held that: “Chances of promotion are not conditions of service, but negation of even the chance of promotion certainly amounts to variation in the conditions of service attracting infraction of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No employee has a right to particular position in the seniority list but all employees have a right to seniority since the same forms the basis of promotion.” [Emphasis supplied] On the basis of that, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has contended that the advantage of the seniority that the petitioners were holding would be destroyed if the occupants of the newly incorporated posts are included in the seniority list without any protection to the persons who were already there in the seniority position and expecting the promotion at any point of time before the said amendment rule came into force. 9. Another decision has been referred by Mr. Deb, learned counsel for this purpose in K.K. Dixit & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & Anr., reported in (2015) 1 SCC 474 , where the apex court had occasion to observe that, separate seniority list shall be prepared for the two separate kinds of incumbents and thus, Mr. 9. Another decision has been referred by Mr. Deb, learned counsel for this purpose in K.K. Dixit & Ors. Vs. Rajasthan Housing Board & Anr., reported in (2015) 1 SCC 474 , where the apex court had occasion to observe that, separate seniority list shall be prepared for the two separate kinds of incumbents and thus, Mr. Deb, learned counsel has submitted that between the persons who are holding the seniority list of the feeder posts of promotion to the TCS Grade-II and the persons who have been included in the seniority list by virtue of the said amendment rule, there shall be some distinction between the persons who were occupying earlier before the amendment rules has come into force. Their advantage of seniority cannot be impaired. Mr. Deb, learned counsel has further submitted that such advantage to the seniority is the petitioners” vested right and such vested right cannot be impaired in any manner. 10. Reliance has been placed to buttress this point on T.R. Kapur & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., reported in 1986 (Supp) SCC 584, where the apex court has categorically observed that : “It is equally well-settled that any rule which affects the right of a person to be considered for promotion is a condition of service although mere chances of promotion may not be. It may further be stated that an authority competent to lay down qualifications for promotion, is also competent to change the qualifications. The rules defining qualifications and suitability for promotion are conditions of service and they can be changed retrospectively. This rule is however subject to a well recognised principle that the benefits acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by an amendment with retrospective effect, that is to say, there is no power to make such a rule under the proviso to Article 309 which affects or impairs vested rights. Therefore, unless it is specifically provided in the rules, the employees who are already promoted before the amendment of the rules, cannot be reverted and their promotions cannot be recalled. [Emphasis supplied] 11. In Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., reported in (1998) 7 SCC 676 , the apex court has observed as under: 35. [Emphasis supplied] 11. In Food Corporation of India & Ors. Vs. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., reported in (1998) 7 SCC 676 , the apex court has observed as under: 35. The last of the above cases has been decided by the Constitution Bench in which one of us (Justice Agrawal) was a Member and he spoke for the Bench. It will be advantageous to quote the following passage in that judgment: (SCC p.638, para 24) "In many of these decisions the expressions “vested rights” or “accrued rights” have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." [Emphasis supplied] 12. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Yogendra Shrivastava, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 538 , the apex court had occasion to restate the law in the following manner: 15. It is no doubt true that Rules under Article 309 can be made so as to operate with retrospective effect. But it is well settled that rights and benefits which have already been earned or acquired under the existing rules cannot be taken away by amending the rules with retrospective effect. (See : N.C. Singhal vs. Armed Forces Medical Services : (1972) 4 SCC 765 ; K.C. Arora vs. State of Haryana : (1984) 3 SCC 281 and T.R. Kapur vs. State of Haryana : 1986 (Supp) SCC 584). Therefore, it has to be held that while the amendment, even if it is to be considered as otherwise valid, cannot affect the rights and benefits which had accrued to the employees under the unamended rules. [Emphasis supplied] 13. Finally, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the right to claim seniority is a vested right of an employee. [Emphasis supplied] 13. Finally, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the right to claim seniority is a vested right of an employee. In Chairman, Railway Board & Ors. Vs. C.R. Rangadhamaiah & Ors., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 623 , the apex court has re-stated the law that, in many decisions as referred in para 23 of the said report, the expressions "vested rights" or "accrued rights" have been used while striking down the impugned provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority, substantive appointment, etc. of the employees. The said expressions have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit already available to the employee under the existing rule is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 14. Mr. B.C. Das, learned Advocate General appearing for the State, in order to repeal the submission of Mr. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners, has very succinctly submitted that, as a result of the amendment the said categories of posts have been included in the feeder posts of TCS Grade-II. The inclusion of those posts in the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules would only widen the zone of consideration for promotion which might cause the petitioners “chance of getting promotion reduced to a certain extent. He has submitted that the right to consideration for promotion is a condition of service but a mere chance of promotion is not a condition of service. It has been further contended by Mr. Das, learned Advocate General that the petitioners” right to be considered of promotion was not at all affected in any manner. However, the chance of promotion can be stated to have affected as the zone has widened by way of inclusion of many more posts in Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has further submitted that reduction in the chance of promotion is inconsequential and within the competence under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has further submitted that reduction in the chance of promotion is inconsequential and within the competence under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Such reduction does invalidate the action in any manner. To buttress his contention, he has referred to the celebrated decision of the apex court in Mohammand Shujat Ali & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. etc., reported in AIR 1974 SC 1631 , where the apex court has observed that, if the chances of promotion are affected and the conditions of service are changed to their disadvantage, such action cannot be questioned inasmuch as the chances of promotion are not conditions of service. It has been categorically held in Mohammand Shujat Ali (supra) as under: “Now, here in the present case, all that happened as a result of the application of the Andhra Rules and the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Rules was that the number of posts of Assistant Engineers available to non-graduate Supervisors from the erstwhile Hyderabad State for promotion, was reduced ; originally it was fifty per cent, then it became thirty-three and one third per cent, then one in eighteen and ultimately one in twenty four. The right to be considered for promotion was not affected but the chances of promotion were severely reduced. This did not constitute variation in the condition of service applicable immediately prior to 1st November, 1956 and the proviso to S. 115, sub-section (7) was not attracted. This view is completely supported by the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. The State of Maharashtra, W.P. No. 299 of 1969, D/-12-11-1973 = ( AIR 1974 SC 259 = 1974 Lab IC 165).” [Emphasis supplied] 15. Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has referred another decision of the apex court in High Court of Delhi & Anr. Vs. A.K. Mahajan & Ors. etc., reported in AIR 2009 SC 2497 , to contend that, there can be no benefit of consideration. To be considered is a right of employee but merely being considered in itself is not a benefit as it may or may not result in the selection or promotion of an employee and hence it is in the nature of a chance. A mere chance of promotion being affected by amendment is, in our opinion, inconsequential. To be considered is a right of employee but merely being considered in itself is not a benefit as it may or may not result in the selection or promotion of an employee and hence it is in the nature of a chance. A mere chance of promotion being affected by amendment is, in our opinion, inconsequential. The apex court has time and again held that since promotion is not a right of the employee, a mere chance of promotion if affected cannot and does not invalidate the action on the part of employer. 16. Finally, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted that the TCS Rules, 1967, as it exists after the 28th Amendment shall be applicable for all future promotion. In this regard he has referred a decision of the apex court in Deepak Agarwal & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in (2011) 6 SCC 725 , where the apex court has clearly laid down the law in the following terms: 24. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah case : (1983) 3 SCC 284 would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The aforesaid judgment was rendered on the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Service Rules, 1976. The aforesaid Rule provided for preparation of a panel for the eligible candidates every year in the month of September. This was a statutory duty cast upon the State. The exercise was required to be conducted each year. Thereafter, only promotion orders were to be issued. However, no panel had been prepared for the year 1976. Subsequently, the rule was amended, which rendered the petitioners therein ineligible to be considered for promotion. In these circumstances, it was observed by this Court that the amendment would not be applicable to the vacancies which had arisen prior to the amendment. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amendment rules would be governed by the old rules and not the amended rules. 25. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast upon the respondents to either prepare a year-wise panel of the eligible candidates or the selected candidates for promotion. In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the State to keep any post unfilled. 25. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast upon the respondents to either prepare a year-wise panel of the eligible candidates or the selected candidates for promotion. In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the State to keep any post unfilled. Therefore, clearly there is no statutory duty which the State could be mandated to perform under the applicable rules. The requirement to identify the vacancies in a year or to take a decision how many posts are to be filled under Rule 7 cannot be equated with not issuing promotion orders to candidates duly selected for promotion. In our opinion, the appellants had not acquired any right to be considered for promotion. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhawan that the vacancies, which had arisen before 17-5-1999 had to be filled under the unamended rules. 26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the “rule in force” on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case : (1983) 3 SCC 284 lays down any particular time frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants have been taken away by the amendment. [Emphasis supplied] 17. On the contention of the petitioners that after the 28th Amendment the persons, who are occupying the newly included posts of the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules have to gather another five years experience for purpose of consideration for promotion under Rule 5 of the TCS Rules read with Rule 14 of the TCS Rules, 1967, Mr. [Emphasis supplied] 17. On the contention of the petitioners that after the 28th Amendment the persons, who are occupying the newly included posts of the Schedule-IV of the TCS Rules have to gather another five years experience for purpose of consideration for promotion under Rule 5 of the TCS Rules read with Rule 14 of the TCS Rules, 1967, Mr. Das, learned Advocate General has submitted that this proposition is entirely contrary to the provisions of Rule 14 of the TCS Rules as Rule 14 provides that, for purpose of consideration for promotion to the TCS Grade-II, persons holding the feeder posts shall have five years of regular service in their respective cadres or posts. Since Rule 14 of the TCS Rules is not under challenge, such submissions from the petitioners cannot be entertained. 18. It is apparent on the face of the record that the chance of promotion has been affected. As the chance of promotion is not condition of service the petitioners cannot be allowed to hold that any vested right relating to their service has been impaired. The apex court, having been confronted with the similar challenge in State of Tripura & Ors. Vs. Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty & Ors., reported in 2017 (1) Scale 599, has observed as under: 9. In Deepak Agarwal (supra) the appellants were Technical Officers who along with Assistant Excise Commissioners were eligible to be considered for promotion to the post of Deputy Excise Commissioner. Two days before the DPC was scheduled to meet to consider the cases of all eligible officers for promotion, the concerned Rules were amended and Technical Officers stood excluded as the feeder post for the next promotional post of Deputy Excise Commissioner. The challenge to such exclusion having been negated by the High Court the matter reached this Court and the relevant paragraphs of the decision were: "2. The old vacancies have to be filled under the old rules is the mantra sought to be invoked by the appellants in support of their claim that the vacancies arising prior to 17-5-1999, ought to be filled under the 1983 Rules as they existed prior to the amendment dated 17-5-1999. The claim is based on the principle enunciated by this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 . .............. 23. The claim is based on the principle enunciated by this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah v. J. Sreenivasa Rao, (1983) 3 SCC 284 . .............. 23. Could the right of the appellants, to be considered under the unamended 1983 Rules be taken away? The promotions to the 12 vacancies have been made on 26-5-1999 under the amended Rules. The High Court rejected the submissions of the appellants that the controversy herein is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in Y.V. Rangaiah. The High Court has relied on the judgment of this Court in K. Ramulu (Dr.) v. Dr. S. Suryaprakash Rao, 1997 (1) S.C.T. 763 : (1997) 3 SCC 59 . 24. We are of the considered opinion that the judgment in Y.V. Rangaiah case would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The aforesaid judgment was rendered on the interpretation of Rule 4(a)(1)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration and Subordinate Service Rules, 1976. The aforesaid Rule provided for preparation of a panel for the eligible candidates every year in the month of September. This was a statutory duty cast upon the State. The exercise was required to be conducted each year. Thereafter, only promotion orders were to be issued. However, no panel had been prepared for the year 1976. Subsequently, the Rule was amended, which rendered the petitioners therein ineligible to be considered for promotion. In these circumstances, it was observed by this Court that the amendment would not be applicable to the vacancies which had arisen prior to the amendment. The vacancies which occurred prior to the amended Rules would be governed by the old Rules and not the amended Rules. 25. In the present case, there is no statutory duty cast upon the respondents to either prepare a year-wise panel of the eligible candidates or of the selected candidates for promotion. In fact, the proviso to Rule 2 enables the State to keep any post unfilled. Therefore, clearly there is no statutory duty which the State could be mandated to perform under the applicable Rules. The requirement to identify the vacancies in a year or to take a decision as to how many posts are to be filled under Rule 7 cannot be equated with not issuing promotion orders to the candidates duly selected for promotion. In our opinion, the appellants had not acquired any right to be considered for promotion. The requirement to identify the vacancies in a year or to take a decision as to how many posts are to be filled under Rule 7 cannot be equated with not issuing promotion orders to the candidates duly selected for promotion. In our opinion, the appellants had not acquired any right to be considered for promotion. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan that the vacancies, which had arisen before 17-5-1999 had to be filled under the unamended Rules. 26. It is by now a settled proposition of law that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, which implies the "rule in force" on the date the consideration took place. There is no rule of universal or absolute application that vacancies are to be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arises. The requirement of filling up old vacancies under the old rules is interlinked with the candidate having acquired a right to be considered for promotion. The right to be considered for promotion accrues on the date of consideration of the eligible candidates. Unless, of course, the applicable rule, as in Y.V. Rangaiah case lays down any particular time-frame, within which the selection process is to be completed. In the present case, consideration for promotion took place after the amendment came into operation. Thus, it cannot be accepted that any accrued or vested right of the appellants has been taken away by the amendment." 10. The law is thus clear that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, namely, "rules in force on the date" the consideration takes place and that there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably be filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. As against the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra), in the instant case certain additional posts have been included in the feeder cadre, thereby expanding the zone of consideration. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. It is not as if the writ petitioners or similarly situated candidates were totally excluded. At best, they now had to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must be filled invariably by the law existing on the date when the vacancy arose, the State was well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. Secondly, the process to amend the Rules had also begun well before the Notification dated 24.11.2011. 11. In our view, the instant case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Deepak Agrawal (supra) and the High Court was completely in error in allowing the writ petition and in dismissing the writ appeals. We, therefore, allow these appeals, set aside the judgment under appeal and dismiss the Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 104, 105, 106 153 and 181 of 2012. [Emphasis supplied] 19. The challenge in Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (supra) was also in respect of the 28th Amendment of the TCS Rules, 1967. It has been recorded in Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (supra) as under: 4. State of Tripura was desirous of amending the aforesaid Schedule IV by including certain other posts as feeder posts in "Group A" and "Group B" and a proposal to that effect was forwarded to Tripura Public Service Commission on 23.08.2011. The Commission accepted the proposal vide its communication dated 26.09.2011. On 24.11.2011, in pursuance of Rule 13 of the Rules, a Selection Committee was constituted for considering cases of eligible officers holding feeder posts in "Group A" and "Group B" of Schedule IV of the Rules for appointment to the post of Tripura Civil Service Gr.II against promotional quota. On 24.12.2011 a Notification dated 19.12.2011 was published in the Gazette amending the Rules by 28th Amendment including additional posts in Group A and Group B of Schedule IV to the Rules, which was in conformity with the proposal accepted by the Commission. 5. Soon thereafter, a communication was addressed by General Administration (Personnel & Training) Department of State of Tripura to all the concerned departments that information/particulars of all eligible officers holding feeder posts of TCS (Groups- A & B) as amended by 28th Amendment be sent to the Department for taking necessary action. 6. 5. Soon thereafter, a communication was addressed by General Administration (Personnel & Training) Department of State of Tripura to all the concerned departments that information/particulars of all eligible officers holding feeder posts of TCS (Groups- A & B) as amended by 28th Amendment be sent to the Department for taking necessary action. 6. The action on part of State of Tripura in relying upon the amended Rules and thereby expanding the feeder posts was immediately challenged by 22 interested candidates by filing Writ Petition Nos.104, 105, 106, 153 and 181 of 2012. It was submitted that the Notification dated 24.11.2011 having constituted a Selection Committee for filling up posts of TCS Gr.-II against promotional quota and information/particulars of eligible officers having already been called for, 28th Amendment effected in December, 2011 could not be pressed into service; that the instant selection ought to be governed by pre-amendment situation and as such a direction be issued to the State to confine the selection to those categories which were mentioned in Schedule IV to the Rules as they existed before the amendment. The Advocate General appearing for the State relied upon certain decisions of this Court including Deepak Agarwal & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2011 (2) S.C.T. 766 : (2011) 6 SCC 725 to contend that a vacancy ought to be filled in terms of the amended Rules. The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petitions holding that the selection in the present case ought to be undertaken in terms of pre-amended Rules. 7. The aforesaid decision was questioned by interested candidates, who as a result of the 28th Amendment were entitled to be considered, by filing Writ Appeal Nos.62, 63 and 64 of 2012. These appeals were dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court at the preliminary stage. The submission that the Single Judge had not considered the ratio of the decision of this Court in Deepak Agarwal (supra) was dealt with by the Division Bench as under: "17. Mr. Bhowmik has tried to convince us that though the learned Single Judge took note of Deepak Agarwal (supra), but did not give any reason why the ratio of the said decision would not apply in the case in hand. 18. Mr. Bhowmik has tried to convince us that though the learned Single Judge took note of Deepak Agarwal (supra), but did not give any reason why the ratio of the said decision would not apply in the case in hand. 18. There is no doubt that the learned Single Judge did not go for detailed reasoning, but it cannot be said that he has not discussed the said decision while passing the impugned judgment. However, as the said decision is placed before us again, we have also gone through the paragraph-26 of the said decision......" The Division Bench however, confirmed the view taken by the Single Judge and dismissed the appeals at the admission stage, which decision is presently under appeal. [Emphasis supplied] 20. In view of Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (supra), this court is not required to provide an elaborate reasoning inasmuch as it has been clearly held by the apex court that a candidate has the right to be considered in the light of the existing rules, “rules in force”, on the date the consideration takes place and there is no rule of absolute application that vacancies must invariably filled by the law existing on the date when they arose. It has been further observed that, in the case of total exclusion and absolute deprivation of a chance to be considered as happened in the case of Deepak Agarwal (supra) the result would be different. In the instant case, certain additional posts have been included in the feeder posts extending the zone. It is not as if the writ petitioners who are similarly situated candidates, were totally excluded. At best, they now have to compete with some more candidates. In any case, since there was no accrued right nor was there any mandate that vacancies must invariably be filled up, by the law existing on the date, when the vacancy arose, the State is well within its rights to stipulate that the vacancies be filled in accordance with the Rules as amended. 21. In the considered opinion of this court, this writ petition is squarely covered by the decision of Nikhil Ranjan Chakraborty (supra) and, in the result, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.