ORDER : 1. This petition is filed to quash the charge-sheet in C.C. No. 97 of 2013 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Ramanathapuram. 2. The complaint was given against the petitioner by the second respondent for the offences punishable under Sections 109, 419, 465, 468, 471, 420 and 506(ii) of I.P.C. and registered in Crime No. 7 of 2008 by first respondent. Subsequently, an enquiry was conducted and a charge sheet came to be filed and taken on file in C.C. No. 97 of 2013 on the file of the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Ramanathapuram. 3. The facts of the case are as follows: 3.1. The second respondent's father purchased a property situated in Sarkaraikottai by a sale deed dated 12.04.1996. The said property is a property measuring an extent of 1.77 acres of agricultural land in Survey No. 436/1B in Sarkaraikottai Group, Ramanathapuram District, bearing Patta No. 815. The said land was purchased from one Badhurusman. The petitioner's son, nearly after a period of eight years, seems to have purchased the same property from one Bathavisal ammal, wife of Kamruthin, in the year 2008. The petitioner's son also sold the said property to third parties in the year 2008 by registered instruments. 3.2. A criminal complaint was given by the de-facto complaint stating that the petitioner knowing full well that the de-facto complainant's father has purchased the property in the year 1994 and has sold the property to third parties through his son by forging few documents and by committing impersonation. It is also alleged in the complaint that the petitioner has created a mortgage in the year 2008 in respect of the property. The purchaser of the property from the petitioner's son is shown as Accused 2 and 3. The mortgage which was created in respect of the same property by the petitioner's son was in favour of the fourth accused. The complaint specifically states that the petitioner, who is the first accused, is the witness to the document under which the father of the de-facto complainant purchased the property. The mortgage which was created in respect of the same property by the petitioner's son was in favour of the fourth accused. The complaint specifically states that the petitioner, who is the first accused, is the witness to the document under which the father of the de-facto complainant purchased the property. It is only with an intention to grab the lands, it is stated that the first accused has committed forgery and cheating attracting Sections 109, 419, 465, 468, 420 and 506(ii) of I.P.C. In the charge sheet that was filed, the allegations found in the complaint are reiterated and it was ultimately found that the petitioner is guilty of the charges. 4. From the charge sheet the fact that is assumed by the respondent police is that the petitioner, who has no right in the property in dispute, has created forged document behind the back of one Bathavisal ammal, wife of Kamruthin and sold the property in favour of the second accused by fictitious sale deed. It is also alleged that the petitioner has created a mortgage on 20.04.2007 for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- and redeemed the same on 29.05.2008. As per the fictitious sale deed, the petitioner has sold the property once again in favour of the third accused by a document dated 30.05.2008. The first accused was the attesting witness to the document by which the father of the de-facto complainant purchased the property. Hence, the title of the father of the de-facto complainant is very well known to the petitioner/the first accused in the criminal case. Since the petitioner, namely, first accused signed the fake documents only to grab the property of the petitioner he has committed the offence charged under Sections 109, 465, 468, 471 and 506(ii) of I.P.C. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the sale deed of the year 1996 and it is also admitted by the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) that in the sale deed dated 12.04.1996 the petitioner has signed only as attestor. Similarly, it is also not in dispute that the petitioner has not signed in any other subsequent sale deed and he is not a signatory either as executant or attestor to the two sale deed alleged to have been executed by the petitioner in favour of the third parties namely Accused 2 and 3 in the complaint. Similarly, it is also not in dispute that the petitioner has not signed in any other subsequent sale deed and he is not a signatory either as executant or attestor to the two sale deed alleged to have been executed by the petitioner in favour of the third parties namely Accused 2 and 3 in the complaint. The allegations found in FIR are in the charge sheet are contrary to the documents which are the only basis for the respondent police to frame the charges. The petitioner's knowledge about the contents of the documents either in the sale deed in favour of the father of the de-facto complainant or the mortgage is not suggested even in the FIR or in the statement of any of the witnesses. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in the case of K.A. Selvanachi and Another vs. Dr. S.R. Sekar and Another, (2003) 1 MLJ 769 wherein it has been held that attestation of a document does not entitle any of the parties to establish or anyone claiming under them to regard such attestation, per se, as acceptance on the part of the attestor that the contents of the document are true and that such attestor had knowledge of the same unless there is evidence before the Court either intrinsic in the document itself or extrinsic to show that the attestor had knowledge of the contents and had accepted the same as correct. There are catena of decisions on this issue to hold that the attestation does not imply that the attestator had knowledge of the contents or that the attestor accepts the contents whatsoever in the statement therein. In this case, merely because the petitioner has attested the document in the sale deed of the year 1996 it cannot be termed that he had knowledge of the content thereof or that he was aware of the ownership of one Badhrusuman, wife of Ibrahim when the property was purchased by the father of the defacto complainant in the year 1996. 6. It is also admitted before this Court and the document also reveals the fact that the petitioner is not an the purchaser in the sale deed dated 19.11.2004. The petitioner has neither signed as a witness. Hence, the petitioner's own knowledge cannot be presumed without any further evidence. 6. It is also admitted before this Court and the document also reveals the fact that the petitioner is not an the purchaser in the sale deed dated 19.11.2004. The petitioner has neither signed as a witness. Hence, the petitioner's own knowledge cannot be presumed without any further evidence. It is stated that the petitioner has also signed in the mortgage deed which was executed in the year 2007. As held by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the petitioner's knowledge to the contents of the document namely mortgage deed cannot be presumed unless there is extrinsic evidence or material to show that the attestor had knowledge of the contents and had accepted the same as correct. In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that by virtue of petitioner's signature in the document of the year 1996 and the mortgage of the year 2007, it cannot be taken that he had knowledge about the title and rights of the parties who have transacted in respect of the property in question. 7. The next question is about the involvement of the petitioner either in the forgery or in cheating anyone. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohammed Ibrahim and Others vs. State of Bihar and Another, (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified in the following lines: “16. There is a fundamental difference between a person executing a sale deed claiming that the property conveyed is his property, and a person executing a sale deed by impersonating the owner or falsely claiming to be authorised or empowered by the owner, to execute the deed on owner's behalf. When a person executes a document conveying a property describing it as his, there are two possibilities. The first is that he bona-fide believes that the property actually belongs to him. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of false documents, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. The second is that he may be dishonestly or fraudulently claiming it to be his even though he knows that it is not his property. But to fall under first category of false documents, it is not sufficient that a document has been made or executed dishonestly or fraudulently. There is a further requirement that it should have been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by, or by the authority of a person, by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made or executed. 17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither section 467 nor section 471 of the Code are attracted.” 8. Further, in the same judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has also considered the scope of Section 420 of I.P.C. In paragraph 18 to 21 as follows: “18. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission. (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. 19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived: (i) to deliver any property to any person. 19. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived: (i) to deliver any property to any person. (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 20. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. 21. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner.” 9. Regarding impersonation under Section 419, absolutely there is no scope. It is not the case, the petitioner impersonated any one to cheat the de-facto complainant. Having regard to the documents produced and the contentions raised by the parties concerned, this Court is of the clear view that the admitted facts and the documents do not reveal any cognizable offence as against the petitioner. However, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) relied upon the statement under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C. obtained from the de-facto complainant. Having regard to the documents produced and the contentions raised by the parties concerned, this Court is of the clear view that the admitted facts and the documents do not reveal any cognizable offence as against the petitioner. However, the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) relied upon the statement under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C. obtained from the de-facto complainant. The allegations of the de-facto complainant, of course, refers to the offence but the facts stated therein are artificially made to attract the provisions of I.P.C. which is obvious. When the fact reveals that the de-facto complainant has come forward with a false case having regard to the materials produced by him and the admitted facts placed on record, this Court has no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the evidence collected by the second respondent from the statement of the de-facto complainant under Section 161(3) statement do not improve the case so as to take a different view. The charges refers to the statement and states that the petitioner has committed offences. However, from the First Information Report, the statement obtained from the persons under Section 161(3) and the admitted documents and the documents which were referred to in the statement obtained from the witnesses under Section 161(3), this Court is fully convinced that no offence made out attracting Sections 109, 419, 465, 468, 471, 420 of I.P.C. and hence, this Court is inclined to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 97 of 2013 on the file of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate No. III, Ramanathapuram. Accordingly, this Criminal Original Petition is allowed. It is to be noted that the findings or observations of this Court in this Criminal Original Petition shall not be construed in favour of the petitioner's son's title as no issue about the title or enjoyment of the property in dispute is considered in this proceedings.