JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 30.09.2014 passed by Additional District and Sessions Judge (No. 3), Sikar (for short 'the trial court') whereby the trial court has convicted the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo six months simple imprisonment. 2. Brief and relevant facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on 03.09.2010, the complainant Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5) lodged a written report (Exhibit P-1) against the accused appellant at Police Station, Laxmangarh, District Sikar alleging therein that the accused-appellant has committed murder of his wife namely Suman Devi. On the basis of the above mentioned report, the police registered FIR No. 221/2010 (Exhibit P-2) for offence under Section 302 IPC and commenced investigation. Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted challan against the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Laxmangarh, District Sikar. The offence being exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Sikar and ultimately the case came to be transferred to the court of learned Additional District Sessions Judge No. 3, Sikar for trial. The trial court after hearing the arguments on charge, framed the charge against the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC. The accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed to be tried. During trial the prosecution examined as many as 20 witnesses and exhibited 42 documents in support of its case. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., 1973 wherein he denied the prosecution case and stated that he has been falsely implicated by the police without any connecting or corroborating evidence, he is innocent and has not committed any such alleged offence. The learned trial vide impugned Judgment dated 30.09.2014 convicted the accused-appellant for offence under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him in the manner indicated above. 3. Mr. Ripu Daman Singh Naruka, learned counsel for the accused-appellant argued that the impugned Judgment passed by learned trial court is legally not sustainable being contrary to the provisions of law as also the facts of the present case. The learned trial court has committed serious error of law as well as fact in convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant for offence under Sections 302 IPC. The learned trial court has committed serious error of law as well as fact in convicting and sentencing the accused-appellant for offence under Sections 302 IPC. It is submitted that no such alleged offence is made out and proved against the accused-appellant from the evidence on record. It is submitted that the prosecution has completely failed to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond all reasonable doubt, hence the conviction of the accused-appellant is bad in law and he deserves to be acquitted. The learned trial court has further failed to consider that while appreciating the evidence in a criminal case, the court should keep in view the two cardinal principles that the guilt against the accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the burden on the accused is not so heavy to prove the plea taken by him as it lay on the prosecution The burden can be discharged by the accused merely by showing the preponderance of probability in favour of the plea taken by him. There are several infirmities and contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses and therefore no reliance can be placed upon the testimony of such witnesses. The conviction based on such evidence is not sustainable and the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. 4. Learned counsel argued that the statements of the prosecution witnesses are inconsistent, contradictory and also suffer from infirmities. The witnesses of the prosecution have suppressed the genesis of the occurrence, therefore, the prosecution witnesses cannot be treated as credible and reliable. In such circumstances the conviction, on the basis of statements of such witnesses, is not sustainable in the eyes of law and same is liable to be set aside by this Court. Learned trial court has failed to consider that in this case there is no eye witness of the alleged incident and the entire prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence but the chain of circumstance is not complete. Hence the conviction of the accused appellant is bad in law and he deserve to be acquitted. The learned trial court has further failed to consider that in this case the prosecution case started from written report (Exhibit P-1) and for proving the same, the prosecution has got examined witness Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), who has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. The learned trial court has further failed to consider that in this case the prosecution case started from written report (Exhibit P-1) and for proving the same, the prosecution has got examined witness Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), who has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. Learned trial court has further failed to consider that Nemi Chand (P.W.6) is the witness of panchnama, who is not the eye witness of the alleged incident. In his cross examination, the said witness has stated that it is correct that at the time of alleged incident he was not present and he has not seen any person committing the alleged offence and further stated that he did not know where the panchnama was prepared by the police. It is submitted that the said witness has not been declared hostile by the prosecution hence there is no reason to not to believe on his evidence. The learned trial court has further failed to consider that in this case Ganesh Ram (P.W.8) has been shown as eye witness by the prosecution but the said witness has also not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. 5. It is further submitted that the other important witnesses namely Gajendra Prasad (P.W.11) and Smt. Santosh (P.W.12) have also not supported the prosecution case and they have been declared hostile, hence conviction of the accused-appellant is bad in law and he deserves to be acquitted. In the facts and circumstances of the case and from a bare perusal of the material and evidence available on record and from a bare perusal of the impugned Judgment, it is clear that the learned trial court has neither properly considered nor critically examined the statements of the prosecution witnesses and in a general and routine manner has discussed the same and after taking into consideration the few words from the statements, has passed the impugned judgment of conviction. This method adopted by the learned trial court is against the criminal jurisprudence. Thus, the conviction of the accused appellant is bad in law. The learned trial court has not properly appreciated the material and evidence available on record in it's true sense and has passed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence in a cursory manner which is liable to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. Thus, the conviction of the accused appellant is bad in law. The learned trial court has not properly appreciated the material and evidence available on record in it's true sense and has passed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence in a cursory manner which is liable to be quashed and set aside by this Hon'ble Court. The findings arrived at by the learned trial court are vitiated being based on misreading and non reading of the material evidence, as well as on mere surmises and conjectures. It is submitted that the findings arrived at by the learned trial court are further vitiated as no critical appreciation and analysis of evidence has been made by the learned trial court. Learned counsel argued that two daughters of the accused-appellant namely Sarla Tanwar (P.W.14) aged 14 years and Priyanka (P.W.15) aged 11 years, who were cited as eye witnesses by the prosecution have also not supported the case of the prosecution. 6. Mr. R.S. Raghav, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and referred to statements of prosecution witnesses which we shall deal with at appropriate place. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the deceased was found along with the accused in a room. Since the deceased happened to be his wife, presumption under section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 has rightly been drawn against the accused-appellant by the trial court. Besides, weapon of offence i.e. 'Raapda' has been recovered at the instance of accused-appellant vide Exhibit P-7, which as per FSL Report (Exhibit P-36) was found to contain human blood of B Group. Human blood of B Group was also found on the blouse of the deceased. Besides, human blood was found on the sari of the deceased and pant of the accused, thus linking the accused-appellant with the crime. It is, therefore, prayed that appeal may be dismissed and the judgment passed by the trial court may be confirmed. 7. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 8. It is, therefore, prayed that appeal may be dismissed and the judgment passed by the trial court may be confirmed. 7. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 8. It is no doubt true that informant Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), who happens to be brother of the accused; his wife Smt. Santosh (P.W.12), who happens to be 'bhabhi' of the accused; Sarla Tanwar (P.W.14); Priyanka (P.W.15); daughters of the accused; Ganesh Ram (P.W.8), cousin of the accused; Gajendra Prasad (P.W.11) father of the accused and Smt. Durga Devi (P.W.13) mother of the accused have not supported the case of the prosecution and they were declared hostile. Obviously, they, being closely related to the accused-appellant, had change of heart and did not support the case of the prosecution. Besides, Ganesh Ram (P.W.8) and Krishan Kumar (P.W.4), who are attesting witnesses of recovery memo of weapon of offence 'Raapda' (Exhibit P-7) and site plan thereof (Exhibit P-8); recovery memo of blood stained clothes of the deceased (Exhibit P-6) and recovery memo of samples of blood (Exhibit P-5) also turned hostile. Even otherwise, these witnesses being interested witnesses, their testimony is required to be examined with greatest care. 9. First information report (Exhibit P-2) was registered on the basis of written report submitted by none other than, brother of the accused Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), who was informed by his wife Smt. Santosh (P.W.12), who in turn was informed by Priyanka (P.W.15) when she saw the dead body of her mother in the room where his father was also sitting. Smt. Santosh (P.W.12) immediately telephoned her husband Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), who was a teacher in government school and came to the house and then informed the police. When the police reached the place of occurrence, written report (Exhibit P-1) was submitted by Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5) to SHO, Police Station Laxmangarh. Even though Mahesh Kumar has turned hostile, but the fact that written report was given by him to SHO stands proved by testimony of Tara Chand (P.W.19), SHO of Police Station Laxmangarh, who has stated that he received telephonic information. This information was entered as Rapat no. 110 in the rojnamcha at 2.15 P.M. on 03.09.2010. Therein, it was mentioned that a telephonic information had been received that Girdhari Balai resident of Ward No. 22 of Laxmangarh Town has murdered his wife by 'kulhadi' blow. This information was entered as Rapat no. 110 in the rojnamcha at 2.15 P.M. on 03.09.2010. Therein, it was mentioned that a telephonic information had been received that Girdhari Balai resident of Ward No. 22 of Laxmangarh Town has murdered his wife by 'kulhadi' blow. Police party started for the place of incident along with SHO, Tarachand. Detailed narration of the steps taken by the investigating officer/SHO on arrival at the place of incident has been made in Rapat No. 111 which Exhibit P-35A. Tara Chand (P.W.19) further stated that when he reached at the place of occurrence, written report was given to him by Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), which is Exhibit P-1. Investigating officer has proved inquest report (Exhibit P-3) and site plan of the place of incident (Exhibit P-4); recovery of blood on a cotton gauze lying on the cot and pillow vide Exhibit P-5; Post Mortem Report (Exhibit P-25); blood stained clothes of the deceased (Exhibit P-6); arrest memo of the accused vide Exhibit P-3. Investigating officer has also proved recovery of weapon of offence 'Raapda' (Exhibit P-7); site plan of place of recovery of weapon of offence (Exhibit P-8); blood stained clothes of the accused (Exhibit P-9); receipt of deposit of all the articles in FSL (Exhibit P-32) and photographs of the place of incident and the deceased (Exhibit P-13 to 24). Notwithstanding many of the prosecution witnesses turning hostile and not supporting the case of the prosecution, lodgment of FIR and various stages of the investigation stand proved. In fact, Dilip Singh (P.W.18), Sub Inspector of Police stated that Laxman Narain constable, who was deputed by the investigating officer Tarachand from place of incident returned back to police station and submitted written report (Exhibit P-1) to him on the basis of which regular FIR No. 221/2010 (Exhibit P-2) for offence under Sections 302 IPC was chalked out. Mobile Unit of Sikar arrived at the scene of occurrence and prepared Exhibit P-42. Rajendra (P.W.16), constable has proved deposit of five packets against receipt (Exhibit P-32). 10. Though, Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), the informant has turned hostile but in the cross examination, he has also categorically stated that site plan (Exhibit P-4) contains his signatures and signature of Krishan Kumar (P.W.4), cousin of the accused. Rajendra (P.W.16), constable has proved deposit of five packets against receipt (Exhibit P-32). 10. Though, Mahesh Kumar (P.W.5), the informant has turned hostile but in the cross examination, he has also categorically stated that site plan (Exhibit P-4) contains his signatures and signature of Krishan Kumar (P.W.4), cousin of the accused. Inquest report (Exhibit P-3) was also prepared by the police in his presence and the blood samples of the deceased were collected by the police at the place of occurrence vide Exhibit P-5 and clothes of the deceased were recovered vide Exhibit P-6. Police recovered weapon of offence 'Raapda' in his presence vide Exhibit P-7 and site plan of which was Exhibit P-8. All these memos contained his signatures. His signatures were also contained on arrest memo of the accused (Exhibit P-12). In cross-examination, this witness has categorically admitted that Girdhari was sitting in the room where the incident had taken place at the time when the police arrived there and arrested him. When he reached at the place of occurrence, those present there informed him that Girdhari had murdered his wife. It is, therefore, clear that despite having turned hostile on other aspects, this witness has substantially supported case of the prosecution. 11. At this juncture, we may refer to certain precedents on the question that part testimony of even hostile witness can be relied for conviction of the accused. The Supreme Court in Ram Prasad Mishra observed that evidence of hostile witness could not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused, but the same can be subjected to close scrutiny and the portion of the evidence, which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence, may be accepted. The Supreme Court in Rajender Singh v. State of Haryana; (2009) 11 SCC 382 held that even if a witness refused to have given statement to the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 and when this witness is confronted with the previous statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., 1973 and he does not offer any explanation, that portion becomes admissible in evidence as per the proviso attached to Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C., 1973 12. The Supreme Court in Prithi v. State of Haryana; (2010) 8 SCC 536 held that even if a witness is declared hostile and is allowed to be cross-examined by the Public Prosecutor with the permission of Court, his evidence remains admissible and there is no legal bar to record a conviction upon his testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. In Akhtar & Others v. State of Uttaranchal; (2009) 13 SCC 722 , it was held by the Supreme Court that evidence of hostile witnesses can be relied upon to corroborate date, time and place of occurrence. In Jodhraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan; (2007) 15 SCC 294 , it was held by the Supreme Court that only because a witness, for one reason or the other, has to some extent, resiled from his earlier statement, that by itself may not be sufficient to discard the prosecution case in its entirety. Keeping in view the materials available on record, it is permissible for a court of law to rely upon a part of the testimony of the witness who has been declared hostile. 13. The Supreme Court in Attar Singh v. State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 1091/2010 decided on 14/12/2012 held in para 13 of the judgment, as under:- "13. We have meticulously considered the arguments advanced on this vital aspect of the matter on which the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant is based. This compels us to consider as to whether the conviction and sentence recorded on the basis of the testimony of the witness who has been declared hostile could be relied upon for recording conviction of the accused-appellant. But it was difficult to overlook the relevance and value of the evidence of even a hostile witness while considering as to what extent their evidence could be allowed to be relied upon and used by the prosecution. It could not be ignored that when a witness is declared hostile and when his testimony is not shaken on material points in the cross-examination, there is no ground to reject his testimony in to as it is well-settled by a catena of decisions that the Court is not precluded from taking into account the statement of a hostile witness altogether and it is not necessary to discard the same in to and can be relied upon partly. If some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence, it can be relied upon. He cannot be thrown out as wholly unreliable. This was the view expressed by this court in the case of Syed Akbar v. State of Karnataka reported in AIR 1979 SC 1848 whereby the learned Judges of the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Karnataka High Court which had discarded the evidence of a hostile witness in its entirety. Similarly, other High Courts in the matter of Gulshan Kumar v. State (1993) Crl.L.J. 1525 as also Kunwar v. State of U.P. (1993) Crl.L.J. 3421 as also Haneefa v. State (1993) Crl.L.J. 2125 have held that it is not necessary to discard the evidence of the hostile witness in toto and can be relied upon partly. So also, in the matter of State of U.P. v. Chet Ram reported in AIR 1989 SC 1543 = (1989) Crl.L.J. 1785; it was held that if some portion of the statement of the hostile witness inspires confidence it can be relied upon and the witness cannot be termed as wholly unreliable. It was further categorically held in the case of Shatrughan v. State of M.P. (1993) Crl.L.J. 120 that hostile witness is not necessarily a false witness. Granting of a permission by the Court to cross-examine his own witness does not amount to adjudication by the Court as to the veracity of a witness. It only means a declaration that the witness is adverse or unfriendly to the party calling him and not that the witness is untruthful. This was the view expressed by this Court in the matter of Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration AIR 1976 SC 294 . Thus, merely because a witness becomes hostile it would not result in throwing out the prosecution case, but the Court must see the relative effect of his testimony. If the evidence of a hostile witness is corroborated by other evidence, there is no legal bar to convict the accused. Thus testimony of a hostile witness is acceptable to the extent it is corroborated by that of a reliable witness. It is, therefore, open to the Court to consider the evidence and there is no objection to a part of that evidence being made use of in support of the prosecution or in support of the accused." 14. Thus testimony of a hostile witness is acceptable to the extent it is corroborated by that of a reliable witness. It is, therefore, open to the Court to consider the evidence and there is no objection to a part of that evidence being made use of in support of the prosecution or in support of the accused." 14. Laxmi Narayan (P.W.1) has proved that a written report (Exhibit P-1) which Mahesh Kumar gave to SHO, Tarachand was handed over to him by SHO for being taken to police station and he went to the police station where it was formally registered as regular FIR (Exhibit P-2). Murliram (P.W.2) has proved that memo of recovery of weapon of offence Raapda (Exhibit P-3) was prepared in his presence and also in the presence of Shankar, Mahesh, Krishna and Nemichand. Even Krishan Kumar (P.W.4) has also stated that inquest report (Exhibit P-3) was prepared in his presence and he admitted in cross-examination that his signatures were contained on the memo of recovery of weapon of offence (Exhibit P-7). Nemichand (P.W.6) has stated that on the day of Goga festival in 2010, his aunt Suman was sleeping in her room. Accused-appellant Girdhari inflicted a blow of 'Raapda' on her neck, as a result of which she died. Inquest report (Exhibit P- 3) was prepared by the police in his presence, which contains his signature. Ram Kumar and Chhagan Lal were also present there. Even Ganesh Ram (P.W.8), cousin of the accused has been declared hostile, but in cross examination he stated that site plan (Exhibit P-4), memo of blood sample on the cotton gauze (Exhibit P-5); blood contained clothes of the deceased (Exhibit P-6) and recovery memo of Raapda (Exhibit P-7) and site plan thereof (Exhibit P-8) and recovery memo of clothes of the accused (Exhibit P-9) contained his signatures. Uttam Singh (P.W.10), Malkhana Incharge of Police Station Laxmangarh stated that Tara Chand (P.W.19) investigating officer deposited five sealed packets in the malkhana, entry of which was made at Serial No. 482 in the malkhana register, which was Exhibit P-26 and copy of which was Exhibit P-26A. 15. Gajendra Prasad (P.W.11) father of the accused-appellant has stated that a son was born to Girdhari 3-4 months before the incident, who died. Girdhari used to stay in the house and he did not work anywhere. 15. Gajendra Prasad (P.W.11) father of the accused-appellant has stated that a son was born to Girdhari 3-4 months before the incident, who died. Girdhari used to stay in the house and he did not work anywhere. Wife of Mahesh Kumar, Smt. Santosh (P.W.12) had gone to one saint named Sangliya Maharaj. Wife of the accused wanted to take him to Sangaliya Maharaj for treatment, but Girdhari refused to go with her. Gajendra Prasad (P.W.11) then stated that he was working in his agricultural field, which was situated about 1.5 km away. Two children came to him and informed that the quarrel was taking place in the house. When he reached, he was followed by his wife and police had also come there. This witness was declared hostile. Smt. Santosh (P.W.12) has stated that after the death of his son, Girdhari started consuming alcohol. He was being treated also. Deceased Suman was working in a school as cook. Though this witness was declared hostile but in cross-examination she admitted that Girdhari was sitting in the room where dead body of the deceased was lying. She also admitted that she informed her husband, who in turn informed the police about the incident. Smt. Durga (P.W.13), mother of the deceased has also stated that Girdhari was working as a masonry labourer. His wife Suman used to work in a school for preparing mid-day meal. Suman wanted to take Girdhari with her to Sangliya Maharaj Ji, but Girdhari did not agree. This witness was declared hostile. 16. Sarla Kanwar (P.W.14) aged 14 years happens to be daughter of the deceased and accused-appellant. Although she was turned hostile, but in cross-examination she has admitted that her father was sitting in the same room, in which her mother died but denied suggestion that she was not speaking truth to save her father. Priyanka (P.W.15) another daughter of the deceased and the appellant aged about 11 years, in answer to a query by the Court as to why she has come to the Court, replied that she had come to Court to save her father but she had stated that injuries were received by her mother on the neck and head and she told this fact to her sister Sarla Kanwar. This witness even stated that she went to call her aunt Santosh, who came to their house and slapped her father twice. This witness even stated that she went to call her aunt Santosh, who came to their house and slapped her father twice. Tone and tenor of this witness thus clearly indicates that when the incident took place, the deceased and the accused-appellant were alone in the room and after the incident, the accused-appellant continued to stay in the room and when his daughter Priyanka (P.W.15) came there she called her sister Sarla and aunt Santosh and Santosh immediately on arriving in the room gave two slaps on the cheek of the accused-appellant. In our considered view, learned trial court was perfectly justified in invoking presumption under Section 106 of the Evidence Act against the accused-appellant which inter alia provides that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. 17. The Supreme Court in Ashok v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 4 SCC 393 held that initial burden of proof is always on prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence pointing towards guilt of accused. However, in case it is established that accused was last seen together with the deceased, the prosecution is exempted to prove exact happening of incident as the accused himself would have special knowledge of incident and thus, would have burden of proof as per Section 106 of the Evidence Act. But, last seen together itself is not conclusive proof but along with other circumstances surrounding the incident, like relations between accused and deceased, enmity between them, previous history of hostility, recovery of weapon from accused, etc. non-explanation of death of deceased, etc. may lead to a presumption of guilt of accused. In that case, no other clinching evidence was produced by the prosecution in support of the last seen together theory so as to shift burden of proof onto accused. 18. The Supreme Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 4 SCC 715 was dealing with a case where last seen together was the only circumstantial evidence against the accused. It was held that circumstance of last seen together does not by itself necessarily lead to inference that it was accused, who committed crime. There must be something more establishing connection between accused and crime, that points to guilt of accused and none less. It was held that circumstance of last seen together does not by itself necessarily lead to inference that it was accused, who committed crime. There must be something more establishing connection between accused and crime, that points to guilt of accused and none less. Mere non-explanation of being last seen together with deceased person on part of accused, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against him. Conviction of the accused-appellant therein was reversed. 19. The Supreme Court in State of W.B. v. Mir Mohammad Omar and others, (2000) 8 SCC 382 held that presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule of law of evidence that a fact, otherwise doubtful, may be inferred from certain other proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches to a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India, when Section 114 was incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact, which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. Our this view finds support from the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Murlidhar & Others v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2005 SC 2345 . In that case, the prosecution sought to prove its case by producing eye-witnesses. When eyewitnesses were not believed, the prosecution sought to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act and argued that it was for accused to prove the facts especially within their knowledge. Rejecting such argument, the Supreme Court in Para 22 of the judgment, observed as under:- "In our judgment, the High Court was not justified in relying on and applying the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to the case. Rejecting such argument, the Supreme Court in Para 22 of the judgment, observed as under:- "In our judgment, the High Court was not justified in relying on and applying the rule of burden of proof under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to the case. As pointed out in Mir Mohammand Omar (supra) and Shambu Nath Mehra (supra), the rule in Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply when the facts are "especially within the knowledge of the accused" and it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish such facts, "especially within the knowledge of the accused." In the present case, the prosecution did not proceed on the footing that the facts were especially within the knowledge of the accused and, therefore, the principle in Section 106 could not apply. On the other hand, the prosecution proceeded on the footing that there were eye witnesses to the fact of murder. The prosecution took upon itself the burden of examining Babulal (PW-5) as eye witness. Testimony of Ram Ratan (PW-7) and Isro (PW-10) shows that their agricultural land was situated in a close distance from the house of Khema Ram. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, it is highly unlikely and improbable that their kith and kin Ramlal would have been given beating resulting in his death by the accused-appellants while keeping lights of their house on and door of the room opened. It is also unlikely that the accused-appellants would have taken the risk of dragging Ramlal to the house of Khema Ram, which was situated in the vicinity of agricultural land and well of Isro (PW- 10), the father of Ramlal. The evidence of Govind (PW-13) also appears to be unnatural, as he had not disclosed the incident to anybody. The High Court has correctly analysed that all the witnesses, namely, Babulal (PW-5), Ram Ratan (PW-7), Isro (PW-10) and Govind (PW-13) are wholly unreliable as their evidence is replete with contradiction and inherent improbabilities." 20. Recovery of weapon of offence 'Raapda' at the instance of accused-appellant has been proved by testimony of not only Tara Chand (P.W.19) Investigating Officer, but also Ganesh Ram (P.W.8) and Krishan Kumar (P.W.4) who though had been declared hostile but admitted having signed recovery memo as attesting witnesses and recovery memo of the blood stained clothes of the deceased and the accused appellants. Report of FSL (Exhibit P-36) clearly proves that the Packet A containing gauze piece of blood lifted from the place of occurrence was found to contain human blood of B group. At the same time, 'Raapda', a sharp edged weapon, from packet C was also found to contain human blood of B group. Apart from that, sari of the deceased from packet B and pant and vest (baniyan) of the accused from Packet D were also found to contain human blood. This further provides corroboration to the evidence otherwise available on record that the deceased was put to death by use of weapon recovered at the instance of accused-appellant. FSL Report categorically states that the packets(s) A, B, C, D, and A which was/were properly sealed, bearing seal impression, which tallied with the specimen seal impression forwarded. Dr. Gangadhar Thalaud (P.W.17) has proved Post Mortem Report of deceased (Exhibit P-25), according to which the deceased received following injuries: "1. Incised wound left cheek and left side of nose below left eye 3" x" upto bow clotted blood. 2. Incised wound along with clotted blood-left mandibular region and left ear pinna starting from pinna of left ear, along with left mandibular up to chin 6" x 1" x upto bow muscles over mandible cut and a piece of left mandible 1" x" cut separated. 3. Incised wound left side of neck, starting from below left pinna to mid line of neck at level of adlm's appla. Muscles of left side of neck cut, left carotid artery cut open. Clotted blood present. Size 7" x 1" upto bow. 4. Incised would along with blood-left side of neck lateral aspect 3" x "x" below injury no. 3." 21. In the opinion of Medical Board all the injuries of the deceased were ante mortem in nature and cause of death was extensive neck and brain injury leading to haemorrhage and neurogenic shock. 22. In view of the analysis of the evidence and above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned trial court recording conviction of the accused-appellant. The appeal is dismissed. Judgment dated passed by the trial court is confirmed.