JUDGMENT & ORDER : Heard Mr. S. Dey, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. SK Borkotoky, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This appeal u/s 82 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as ‘said Act’) is against the order dated 26.6.06 passed by the Employees Insurance Court, Guwahati in E.S.I. Case No. 1/03. By the said order, the application filed by the respondent herein u/s 75 of the said Act read with Rule 13 of the Assam State Employees’ Insurance Rules, 1959, was allowed. 3. This Court admitted the appeal for hearing by the order dated 19.11.07 on the following substantial question of law: “Whether M/s Sahara India Limited is covered by the provisions of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 though it is a non-banking financial institution?” 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the respondent herein was allotted Code No.43-3457-101 by the appellant and on 23.3.2000, the appellant conducted a preliminary inspection where it was recorded that there are six branch offices of the respondent within the area covered by the Guwahati Municipal Corporation including the zonal office wherein about 60-70 workers were found working with about 300-400 agents engaged in promoting/developing their non-banking business. The said report was submitted before the concerned authorities of the Regional Office of the appellant. Thereafter, the appellant by the letter No. 43-3457 dated 11.6.01 made a demand of contribution from 23.3.2000 to September, 2000 for which Rs.97,598/- assuming the contribution of Rs.3,575/- per month for 60 numbers of employees @ 6.5%. It is stated that as per the said inspection report, the respondent did not produce any record for examination when the inspector of the appellant has visited their premises for inspection on 23.3.2000. Thereafter, another inspection was carried out on 17.5.01 and Calcutta regional office of M/s Sahara India Limited by the appellant’s Calcutta office and on such inspection, the respondent’s Calcutta office disclosed that 94 numbers of employees were working therein. 5. In the meantime, the respondent was directed to show cause and to appear before the competent authority on 18.6.01 by the letter dated 11.6.01 before imposition of adhoc assessment but the respondent did not comply with the said direction and accordingly recovery action had been initiated against the respondent. 5. In the meantime, the respondent was directed to show cause and to appear before the competent authority on 18.6.01 by the letter dated 11.6.01 before imposition of adhoc assessment but the respondent did not comply with the said direction and accordingly recovery action had been initiated against the respondent. The appellant projected that another organization carrying similar business like the respondent herein, namely, Peerless General Insurance Company Limited, which was also a non-banking financial institution was held to be covered within the scope of the Act and, as such, the respondent was also covered by the provision by the provision of the said Act. 6. In this regard, the learned counsel for the appellant has produced a print out of copy of the order dated 13.6.96 passed by the Calcutta High Court obtained from the website, namely, indiakanoon.org, of the case of Regional Director….. -Vs.- Peerless General Finance and ….. reported in 1996 (74) FLR 2253 , by which the appeal filed by the ESI was allowed by holding that the writ petitioner/company was also covered within the scope of Sub-Section (5) of Section 1 of the Act. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the LCR along with their written statement, the appellant had submitted a copy of the order dated 26.11.96 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No.21806/1996 which was from the judgment and order dated 13.6.96 in Appeal No. 1001/93 of the High Court of Calcutta whereby the said SLP was dismissed. 8. The appellant by filing an additional affidavit on 17.11.16 produced a copy of the notification dated 22.7.75 bearing No. GLR.385/74/56 dated 22.7.75 issued by the Department of Labour, Govt. of Assam, Guwahati and submits that the establishment of the respondent was clearly covered by the ESI Act as because under the said notification, the town of Guwahati in the district of Kamrup (undivided district as it was then) within the municipal corporation and the areas comprising within the revenue village of the above district. The said notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred by the Sub-Section (5) of Section 1 of the Act. 9. The said notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred by the Sub-Section (5) of Section 1 of the Act. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant also relies in the case of Southern Agencies, Rajahmundry –vs.- A.P. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation reported in AIR 2000 SC 3718 : (2001) 1 SCC 411 to project that as the Government of Assam had extended the application of the said Act to different classes of establishment including the shop, the shop of the respondent was covered under the Act by applying the ratio of the aforesaid case where the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the Government of A.P. had extended the applications of the said Act to different classes of establishment including the ‘shop’. 10. Mr. Borkotoky, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to Sub-Section (5) of Section 1 of the said Act to submit that the respondent is not covered by the coverage of ESI Act. He submits that the requirement of Sub-Section (12) of Section 2 to project that the ‘factory’ as defined therein when covered only those establishment where 10 or more persons were employed and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried. He further refers to Sub-Section (14) (AA) to project that the word “manufacturing process” will have to read as per the meaning assigned in the meaning of the Factory Act, 1948. In the Factory Act, 1948, “manufacturing process” is defined in Sub-Section (k) of Section 2. By referring to said provisions, it is argued that the respondent is a Residuary Non-Banking Company (for short, ‘RNBC’). He refers to his pleadings before the ESI court in the application u/s 75 of the said Act to project that nature of business of the respondent company is like a Bank which is excluded from the coverage of the said Act. He refers to his pleadings before the ESI court in the application u/s 75 of the said Act to project that nature of business of the respondent company is like a Bank which is excluded from the coverage of the said Act. It is submitted that banks have been excluded from the coverage of ESI Act and, as such, there is no reason for the authorities of the appellant to make a demand of contribution on the respondent which is doing similar/identical business and the only differences being as follows: RNBC is allowed “to receive deposits under any scheme by whichever name nor any one lumpsums or any installment by way of contribution or subscription or by sale of units or certificate or any other manner and which is not in all the company business defined in NSFC direction 1977 or MNBC direction 1977” and the banking business as defined in Section 5(d) of the Banking Regulations Act, 1949 as per which banking means, “accepting for the purpose of lending or investment or deposits of money receipts from the public re-payable on demand or withdrawal by cheque, draft order or otherwise.” 11. In this regard, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to his pleading before the ESI Court. He further submits that on receipt of ad-hoc demand by the appellants, the respondents had submitted replies and representations dated 30.3.01, 7.4.01, 30.8.01, 17.11.01, 6.2.01 to explain before the authorities that its activities did not falls within the ambit and scope of provisions of the said Act. 12. He further submits that the coverage of Peerless General Insurance Company Limited, Calcutta within the scope of the said act cannot be deemed to be persuasive factor before this Court because in that case, the coverage was in respect of notified areas within the State of West Bengal and as the notification dated 22.7.75 has produced by the appellants did not bring the business of RNBC within the coverage of the said Act in the State of Assam and the respondent is not liable to be covered by the said Act in the State of Assam. 13. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties, it would not be out of place to extract here-in-below the some of the relevant provisions of the said Act. Section 1, Section 2(1), (12) & (14-AA) reads as follows: “1. 13. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for both the parties, it would not be out of place to extract here-in-below the some of the relevant provisions of the said Act. Section 1, Section 2(1), (12) & (14-AA) reads as follows: “1. Short title, extent, commencement and application. — (1) This Act may be called the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948. (2) It extends to 2 the whole of India (3) It shall come into force on such date or dates as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint, and different dates may be appointed for different provisions of this Act and for different States or for different parts thereof. (4) It shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government other than seasonal factories. Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to a factory or establishment belonging to or under the control of the Government whose employees are otherwise in receipt of benefits substantially similar or superior to the benefits provided under this Act. (5) The appropriate Government may, in consultation with the Corporation and where the appropriate Government is a State Government, with the approval of the Central Government, after giving one month’s notice of its intention of so doing by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Act or any of them, to any other establishment, or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. Provided that where the provisions of this Act have been brought into force in any part of a State, the said provisions shall stand extended to any such establishment or class of establishments within that part if the provisions have already been extended to similar establishment or class of establishments in another part of that State. (6) A factory or an establishment to which this Act applies shall continue to be governed by this Act notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below the limit specified by or under this Act or the manufacturing process therein ceases to be carried on with the aid of power. 2. Definitions. (6) A factory or an establishment to which this Act applies shall continue to be governed by this Act notwithstanding that the number of persons employed therein at any time falls below the limit specified by or under this Act or the manufacturing process therein ceases to be carried on with the aid of power. 2. Definitions. — In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context— (1) “appropriate Government” means, in respect of establishments under the control of the Central Government or a railway administration or a major port or a mine or oil-field, the Central Government, and in all other cases, the State Government ;” …….. “(12) “factory” means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon ten or more persons are employed or were employed on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on or is ordinarily so carried on, but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952), or a railway running shed ;” ………. “(14AA) “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948) ;” 14. “(14AA) “manufacturing process” shall have the meaning assigned to it in the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948) ;” 14. Factories Act, 2 (k) and Section 2(m) reads as follows: “2.(k) "manufacturing process" means any process for- (i) making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing, oiling, washing, cleaning, breaking up, demolishing, or otherwise treating or adapting any article or substance with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal, or (ii) pumping oil, water, sewage or any other substance; or (iii) generating, transforming or transmitting power; or (iv) composing types for printing, printing by letter press, lithography, photogravure or other similar process or book binding; or (v) constructing, reconstructing, repairing, refitting, finishing or breaking up ships or vessels; or (vi) preserving or storing any article in cold storage; (l) "worker" means a person employed, directly or by or through any agency (including a contractor) with or without the knowledge of the principal employer, whether for remuneration or not, in any manufacturing process, or in cleaning any part of the machinery or premises used for a manufacturing process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, or connected with, the manufacturing process, or the subject of the manufacturing process but does not include any member of the armed forces of the Union;” “2.(m) "factory" means any premises including the precincts thereof- (i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or (ii) Whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on,- but does not include a mine subject to the operation of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952)] or a mobile unit belonging to the armed forces of the Union, a railway running shed or a hotel, restaurant or eating place.” 15. This Court has observed that Chapter I, II, III and VIII of the said Act has been enforced throughout India vide notification No.S.S.21(2)(1) dated 31.8.1948 and, as such, the said Act is also in force in the State of Assam. This Court has observed that Chapter I, II, III and VIII of the said Act has been enforced throughout India vide notification No.S.S.21(2)(1) dated 31.8.1948 and, as such, the said Act is also in force in the State of Assam. So, the State of Assam had framed a set of Rules called The Assam Employees Insurance Courts Rules, 1959. Moreover, by the herein above mentioned notification dated 22.7.75, the Government of Assam by publication in the Assam Gazette dated 22.1.75 appointed the midnight of 16th August, 1975 as the date on which all provisions of the said Act was extended to the classes of establishment and in the areas as specified in the schedule annexed thereto. 16. The schedule to notification dated 22.7.75 is extracted below: SCHEDULE Description of Establishment Areas in which the establishment are situated (1) (2) 1. Any premise including the precincts thereof whereon ten or more persons but in any case more than twenty persons are employed for wages on any day of the proceeding 12 months and in any part of which manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power but excluding mine subject to operation of Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running shed or an establishment which is exclusively engage in one or more of the manufacturing processes specified in clause 12 of Sec.2 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948). All the areas in the State of Assam wherein Chapter IV & V of the E.S.I. Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) are already in force. Detail list is specified below. 2. Any premise including the precincts thereof whereon ten or more persons- -are employed for wages on any day of the proceeding 12 months and in any part of which the manufacturing Proceeding is being carried on without aid of power but excluding mine subject to the operation of Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952) or a railway running shed or an establishment which is exclusively engage in one or more of the manufacturing processes specified in clause 12 of Sec-2 of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948). The following establishment whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the proceeding Twelve months namely. The following establishment whereon twenty or more persons are employed or were employed for wages on any day of the proceeding Twelve months namely. (i) Hotels, (ii) Restaurants, (iii) Shops, (iv) Road Motor, Transport establishment, (v) Cinemas including preview theatre’s (vi) Newspaper establishments as defined in Section 2(d) of the working Journalists (condition of service) and miscellaneous provision Act, 1955 (45 of 1955) All the areas in the State of Assam wherein Chapter IV & V of the E.S.I. Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) are already in force. Detail list is specified below. All the areas in the State of Assam where Chapter IV & V of the ESI Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) Are already in force. Detail list is specified below. 8. The following areas where the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 are in force in the State of Assam on this date of issue of this notification. (1) District of Kamrup:- Town of Gauhati within the Municipal Corporation and the areas comprising within the revenue village of the above district. A.(i) Japorigog, (ii) Udalbakra, (iii) Fatashil, (iv) Kahilipara N.C. (v) Dispur, (vi) Noonmati Grant, (vii) Sarumotira in Beltola Mouza- B.(i) Santipur, (ii) Maligaon, (iii) Pachhim Jalukbari in Ramchariani Mouza.” 17. Accordingly, it is apparent that the classes of establishment as mentioned in the said notification dated 22.7.75 are covered within the scope of the said Act in the State of Assam. 18. In the case of Southern Agencies, Rajahmundry (supra), the appellant therein was a partnership firm deals in Godrej, steel furniture, usha fans and similar items having its administrative office at Rajah Mundry also having a sales office there with separate units at Kakinada, Visakhapatnam, Vizianagaram, Srikakulam, Khammam, Warrangal. In the said case, the Full Bench of A.P. High Court took a view that for the purpose of the Act, the office of the appellant at Rajahmundry can be treated as an ‘shop’ and dismissed the appeal, aggrieved by which the appellant therein had approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court. It would be relevant to extract the paragraph-4, 5 & 6 of the said judgment, whereby the Apex Court held that establishment falls within the definition of expression –‘shop’. “4. In Kirloskar Consultants Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. after referring to the decisions in International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., Hindu Jea Band v. Regional Director, ESIC and ESI Corpn. “4. In Kirloskar Consultants Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. after referring to the decisions in International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn., Hindu Jea Band v. Regional Director, ESIC and ESI Corpn. v. R.K. Swamy we have examined the scope of the expression “shop” used in the notification issued under the Act and held that the word “shop” has acquired an expanded meaning. Where in a premises any economic activity is carried on leading to sale or purchase, that premises will have to be held a “shop” for the purpose of the Act even though there is no actual giving or taking of goods in such premises. If the business carried on in a premises results in having some nexus with the purchase or sale of goods it is sufficient to be a “shop” for the purpose of the Act. 5. Admittedly, in the present case, the appellant supervises and controls the sales in all its branch offices and takes a share of their income and, therefore, we think, there is absolutely no justification to take any contrary view. The nature of the activities carried on by the appellant is commercial or economical and would amount to parting with such services for a price through its different outlets. Further the administrative office and different branches constitute a single entity as held by the courts below which on examination of the facts such conclusion has been reached. The evidence tendered by the General Manager indicated that the branches are responsible and answerable to the appellant; that the head office keeps track of the efficiency of each branch and its profitability; that the head office has control over the branch offices and gets information periodically as to stocks received and goods sold from each branch from time to time; that the business in respect of all branches is carried on with the same funds and there are transfers of employees as well from one branch to another branch; that a single audit is made by preparing a single statement of accounts including sales in all the branches which are put together. These factors clearly indicate that the administrative office at Rajahmundry is nothing but a controlling office to supervise the sales taking place in different branches and thus falls within the definition of the expression “shop”. 6. We find no merit in this appeal and the same shall stand dismissed. These factors clearly indicate that the administrative office at Rajahmundry is nothing but a controlling office to supervise the sales taking place in different branches and thus falls within the definition of the expression “shop”. 6. We find no merit in this appeal and the same shall stand dismissed. No costs.” 19. This Court has also observed that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of KR Anitha and others vs. Regional Director, ESI Corporation and others reported in 2003(10) SCC 303 , has approved the judgment passed by the Kerala High Court by stating that High Court was right in holding “Todi Shop is a premise where the business of buying and selling is going on, therefore, according to us, Todi Shop would come under the Entry ‘Shop’ in the Schedule” and thereby dismissed the appeal. 20. Further, in the case of Bangalore Turf Club Limited vs. Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation and other connected cases reported in (2014)9 SCC 657 had held the race club to be a ‘shop’ for the purpose of ESI Act. 21. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: “5. To appreciate the viewpoints of the learned counsel, we require to notice certain provisions of the ESI Act. The relevant sections are sub- section (4) and sub-section (5) of Section 1 of the ESI Act, and further the respective impugned notifications in the present set of appeals. The relevant provisions are reproduced: “1. Short title, extent, commencement and application.—(1)-(3) * * * (4) It shall apply, in the first instance, to all factories (including factories belonging to the Government) other than seasonal factories: * * * (5) The appropriate Government may, in consultation with the Corporation and where the appropriate Government is a State Government, with the approval of the Central Government, after giving one month’s notice of its intention of so doing by notification in the Official Gazette, extend the provisions of this Act or any of them, to any other establishment or class of establishments, industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise:” Sub-section (4) of Section 1 provides that the ESI Act shall apply to all factories including factories belonging to the Government other than seasonal factories. Sub-section (5) of Section 1 enables the appropriate Government to extend the provisions of the ESI Act to any other establishment or class of establishments — industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. Sub-section (5) of Section 1 enables the appropriate Government to extend the provisions of the ESI Act to any other establishment or class of establishments — industrial, commercial, agricultural or otherwise. The State Government is empowered, subject to the conditions specified in the aforementioned provision, to extend the provisions of the ESI Act, by issuing a notification in the Official Gazette, to any establishment or class of establishments as specified therein. This sub-section is an enabling conditional legislation. 6. The meaning of the words “or otherwise” after the words “industrial, commercial or agricultural” establishments in sub-section (5) of Section 1 indicates that the Government can extend the ESI Act or any portion thereof to any other establishment or class of establishments. The genus lies in the words “any other establishment or class of establishments”. The three words industrial, commercial and agricultural represent a specie. Since the legislature did not want to restrict the operation of the ESI Act to these three species, has used the catch words “or otherwise”. 7. The notification that prompted the appellant, Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. to initiate proceedings before various forums reads as under: “NOTIFICATION In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (5) of Section 1 of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948) the Government of Karnataka having already given six months’ notice as required thereunder, vide the Government of Karnataka Notification No. SWL/134/LSI/76 dated 19-12-1976 published in the State Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 19-12-1976 hereby appoints 27-1-1985 as the date on which all provisions of the said Act shall extend to the classes of establishments and in the area specified in the Schedule annexed hereto: SCHEDULE Description of establishment Name of the centre Area in which establishments are situated 1. * * * 2. * * * 3. Shops, road motor transport establishments, cinema including preview theatres and newspaper establishments which are employing or were employing twenty or more persons for wages on any days of the preceding twelve months.” 8. In view of the aforesaid notification issued by the Government of Karnataka, ESI Corporation had directed the appellant Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. to make contributions with regard to all its employees in accordance with the provisions of the ESI Act, since the race club is covered under the term “shop” as enumerated in the notification.” ..... “16. In view of the aforesaid notification issued by the Government of Karnataka, ESI Corporation had directed the appellant Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. to make contributions with regard to all its employees in accordance with the provisions of the ESI Act, since the race club is covered under the term “shop” as enumerated in the notification.” ..... “16. The primary rule of interpretation of statutes may be the literal rule, however, in the case of beneficial legislations and legislations enacted for the welfare of employees, workmen, this Court has on numerous occasions adopted the liberal rule of interpretation to ensure that the benefits extend to those workers who need to be covered based on the intention of the legislature. 17. The ESI Act is a welfare legislation enacted by the Central Government as a consequence of the urgent need for a scheme of health insurance for workers. It would be beneficial to reproduce the Preamble of the ESI Act in this context. It is as under: “An Act to provide for certain benefits to employees in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury and to make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto”” “31. We may safely conclude that the literal rule of construction may be the primary approach to be utilised for interpretation of a statute and that words in the statute should in the first instance be given their meaning as understood in common parlance. However, the ESI Act is a beneficial legislation. It seeks to provide social security to those workers as it encompasses. In the light of the cases referred above, it may be seen that the traditional approach can be substituted. A dictionary meaning may be attached to the words in a statute in preference over the traditional meaning. However, for this purpose as well, the scheme, context and objects of the legislature must be taken into consideration. Taking into due consideration the nature and purpose of the ESI Act, the dictionary meaning as understood in the context of the said Act would be preferable to achieve the objects of the legislature.” ...... “34. In the absence of any definition as provided in the ESI Act, this Court may look into its dictionary meaning for guidance or as an aid of construction of the term “establishment”. Dictionaries do define the meaning of a word as understood in common parlance: 34.1. “34. In the absence of any definition as provided in the ESI Act, this Court may look into its dictionary meaning for guidance or as an aid of construction of the term “establishment”. Dictionaries do define the meaning of a word as understood in common parlance: 34.1. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. (1999), the term “establishment” means, inter alia: “establishment.— n. … (2) An institution or place of business.” 34.2. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 15, the term “establishment” has been held to mean, inter alia, the following: “An establishment means a permanent commercial organisation or a manufacturing establishment. Spielman v. Industrial Commission, NW p. 4.” “An establishment is the place where one is permanently fixed for residence or business such as an office or place of business with its fixtures. Lorenzetti v. American Trust Co., F Supp p. 139.” 34.3. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LXXX, the term “establishment” has been explained as follows: “Establishment.— … More specifically, a fixed place where business is conducted, or a place where the public is invited to come and have its work done; an institution or place of business with its fixtures and organised staff; any office or place of business, with its fixtures, the place in which one is permanently fixed for residence or business; a permanent commercial organisation, as a manufacturing establishment; the place of business or residence with grounds, fixtures, equipage, etc., with which one is fitted out; also that which serves for the carrying on of a business.…” 35. Therefore, it can be simply stated that an “establishment” is a term which can have a wide meaning. It would be any place where business is conducted, or in other words, it would be any place of business. Now the question arises whether a “race club” is in the nature of a place where business is conducted. To answer the same, the activities that are undertaken by the appellant Turf Club require to be noticed.”” .......... “37. The term “establishment” would mean the place for transacting any business, trade or profession or work connected with or incidental or ancillary thereto. It is true that the definition in dictionaries is the conventional definition attributed to trade or commerce, but it cannot be wholly valid for the purpose of constructing social welfare legislation in a modern welfare State. “37. The term “establishment” would mean the place for transacting any business, trade or profession or work connected with or incidental or ancillary thereto. It is true that the definition in dictionaries is the conventional definition attributed to trade or commerce, but it cannot be wholly valid for the purpose of constructing social welfare legislation in a modern welfare State. The test of finding out whether professional activity falls within the meaning of the expression “establishment” is whether the activity is systematically and habitually undertaken for production or distribution of the goods or services to the community with the help of employees in the manner of a trade or business in such an undertaking. If a systematic economic or commercial activity is carried on in the premises, it would follow that the establishment at which such an activity is carried on is a “shop”. This Court, in Hyderabad Race Club case, keeping in view the systematic commercial activity carried on by the club has held that the race club is an establishment within the meaning of the said expression as used in the notification issued under Section 1(5) of the ESI Act. Therefore, in our considered view, the view expressed by this Court is in consonance with the provisions of the ESI Act and also settled legal principles. Therefore, the said decision does not require reconsideration. 38. The next point to be considered by this Court, in accordance with the reference order, would be whether a “race club” would be covered under the definition of a “shop”? The term “shop”, again, has not been defined in the ESI Act. Therefore the meaning assigned to this word in dictionaries may be noticed: 38.1. As per Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edn. (Revised), the term “shop” has been given the following meaning: “shop.— n. (1) a building or part of a building where goods or services are sold.” 38.2. According to Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 14th Edn. (1993), a “shop” has been said to mean: “Shop.— a place where things are kept for sale, usually in small quantities, to the actual consumers.” 38.3. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. (1999), the term “shop” has been stated to mean: “shop.— n. A business establishment or place of employment; a factory, office, or other place of business.” 38.4. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. (1999), the term “shop” has been stated to mean: “shop.— n. A business establishment or place of employment; a factory, office, or other place of business.” 38.4. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 39, the term “shop” has been stated to mean, inter alia, the following: “The word shop means a room or building in which the making, preparing, or repairing of any article is carried on, or in which any industry is pursued; the place where anything is made; the producing place or source. State v. Sabo, NE p. 500.” “Worcester defines a shop as a place, building, or room in which things are sold; a store. Salomon v. Pioneer Coop. Co., Fla p. 384.” “Webster defines the word shop as follows: (1) A building in which goods, wares, drugs, etc. are sold at retail; (2) a building in which mechanics work, and where they keep their manufacturers for sale. State v. O’Connell, Ind p. 267; Salomon v. Pioneer Coop. Co., Fla p. 384.” 38.5. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LXXX, the term “shop” has been explained as follows: “Shop.— As a noun. The word shop appears to be derived from the old high German ‘schopf’ or ‘scopf’ which meant a building without a front wall. It is a term of various significance, and has many definitions, and it may have different meanings when used with different texts. In its popular sense, as well as its legal meaning, the term shop is not confined to a store, and it may include both a store and a workshop. * * * The word shop may denote a place where goods are sold, a place, building, or room in which things are sold; and, expressing this concept, the term is defined as meaning a place kept and used for the sale of goods; a place where goods are sold for retail; .…” 38.6. From the above, it can be said that a “shop” is a place of business or an establishment where goods are sold for retail. However, it may be noted that the definitions as given in the dictionaries are very old and may not reflect, with complete accuracy, what a “shop” may be referred to as in the present day. From the above, it can be said that a “shop” is a place of business or an establishment where goods are sold for retail. However, it may be noted that the definitions as given in the dictionaries are very old and may not reflect, with complete accuracy, what a “shop” may be referred to as in the present day. Therefore, it may be pertinent to consider the manner in which this Court has dealt with the word “shop” in its judicial decisions. 39. The term “shop”, in regard to the ESI Act, has been discussed in earlier cases by this Court. In Hindu Jea Band it is observed that a “shop” would be a place where services are sold on a retail basis. In International Ore and Fertilizers (India) (P) Ltd. v. ESI Corpn. this Court stated that a “shop” would be a place where the activities connected with buying and selling of goods are carried on. In Cochin Shipping Co. the Court observed that a “shop” must be held to be a place where commercial activity of buying and selling of merchandise takes place. In R.K. Swamy case the Court extended the meaning of a “shop” to include even sale of services. 40. Therefore, certain basic features of a “shop” may be culled out from the above. It can be said that a “shop” is a business establishment where a systematic or organised commercial activity takes place with regard to the sale or purchase of goods or services, and includes an establishment that facilitates the above transaction as well. 41. The word “shop” is not defined either in the ESI Act or in the notification. The ESI Act being a social welfare legislation intended to benefit as far as possible workers belonging to all categories, one has to be liberal in interpreting the words in such a welfare legislation. The definition of a shop which meant a house or building where goods are sold or purchased has now undergone a great change. The word “shop” occurring in the notification is used in the larger sense than its ordinary meaning. What is now required is a systematic economic or commercial activity and that is sufficient to bring that place within the sphere of a “shop”. 42. The word “shop” occurring in the notification is used in the larger sense than its ordinary meaning. What is now required is a systematic economic or commercial activity and that is sufficient to bring that place within the sphere of a “shop”. 42. In view of the fact that an “establishment” has been found to be a place of business and further that a “shop” is a business establishment, it can be said that a “shop” is indeed covered under, and may be called a subset of, the term “establishment”. 43. The next point for our consideration is whether the activities of a race club are “entertainment”? The said meaning is sought to be ascertained in order to determine whether the appellant Turf Clubs are engaged in providing entertainment to those who come to their premises. Again, in the absence of any definition to that effect in the ESI Act, it may be relevant to understand its meaning in common parlance: 43.1. As per Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 11th Edn. (Revised), the word “entertainment” has been assigned the following meaning: “entertainment.— n. the action of providing or being provided with amusement or enjoyment an event or performance designed to entertain.” 43.2. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, 7th Edn. (1999), the term “entertain” means, inter alia: “entertain.— vb. … (2) To amuse or please.” 43.3. According to Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 14-A, the term “entertainment” has been held to mean, inter alia, the following: “Entertainment denotes that which serves for amusement, and ‘amusement’ is defined as a pleasurable occupation of the senses, or that which furnishes it, as dancing, sports, or music. Young v. Broadwater County High School, P 2d at p. 726.” 43.4. According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. XXX, the term “entertainment” has been explained as follows: “Entertainment.— * * * The second meaning of the term is a diverting performance, especially a public performance, as a concert, drama, or the like; a source or means of amusement; instruction or amusement afforded by anything seen or heard, as a spectacle, a play, etc.; mental enjoyment, or that which amuses or diverts; that which serves for amusement; also the act of providing gratification or diversion. The term has been held to include recreational activities, such as games, sports, plays and dancing.” 43.5. The term has been held to include recreational activities, such as games, sports, plays and dancing.” 43.5. Therefore it can be safely concluded that “entertainment” is an activity that provides with amusement or gratification. Further, it would include public performances, including games and sports.” ........ “51. It can be safely concluded that, the appellant Turf Clubs conduct the activity of horse racing, which is an entertainment. The appellant Turf Clubs provide various services to the viewers, ranging from providing facilities to enjoy viewership of the said entertainment, to the facilitating of betting activities, and that too for a consideration—either in the form of admission fee or as commission. An argument may be advanced that not all persons who come to the race would avail the services as provided by the appellant Turf Clubs, however the same would fail as even in the case of a shop in the traditional meaning, that is to say, one where tangible goods are put for sale, a customer may or may not purchase the said goods. What is relevant is that the establishment must only offer the clients or customers with goods or services. In this light, it is found that a race club, of the nature of the appellants, would fall under the scope of the term “shop” and thereby the provisions of the ESI Act would extend upon them by virtue of the respective impugned notifications issued under sub-section (5) of Section 1 of the ESI Act.” ......... “59. This Court must also address the issue that arose in the course of the arguments that the word “shop” has been used in the impugned notifications as well as the 1948 Act and the 1961 Act and therefore assistance may be taken from the latter statutes to interpret the notification. This argument, in light of the above discussion, does not appeal to us. In Directorate of Enforcement v. Deepak Mahajan this Court referred to the book titled The Loom of Language, wherein it has been stated as follows: (SCC p. 469, para 93) “93. ‘Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. They do not come in standard shapes and sizes like coins from the mint, nor do they go forth with a decree to all the world that they shall mean only so much, no more and no less. ‘Words are not passive agents meaning the same thing and carrying the same value at all times and in all contexts. They do not come in standard shapes and sizes like coins from the mint, nor do they go forth with a decree to all the world that they shall mean only so much, no more and no less. Through its own particular personality, each word has a penumbra of meaning which no draftsman can entirely cut away. It refuses to be used as a mathematical symbol.’” 22. In the present case in hand, there is no dispute that the respondent is carrying out business as RNBC. There is an admission in the application of the respondent filed u/s 75 of the said Act before the ESI court that it is carrying on business at the premises within the jurisdiction of Guwahati as an RNBC with its main function to mobilize deposit from the public for the purpose of investment under certain prescribed securities and then such deposits are returned to the depositor with interest accrued thereon. Therefore, it is apparent that the products of the respondent are sold to the depositor by providing service ancillary thereto and therefore, the establishment of the respondent is covered within the definition of ‘shop’. The staff and employees and agents acts as a person to mobilize deposits for the respondent, amounting to sale of the products, and in the process debtor and creditor relationship arises between the contractual parties. In pargarph-78 of judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd.(supra), a reference is made to the ratio of ESI Corporation –vs- RK Swamy reported in (1994) 1 SCC 445 ) wherein an “advertising agency” was held to be ‘shop’ for the purpose of ESI Act by virtue of their existing the systematic commercial activities and rendering of service taking place. 23. Therefore, in terms of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the cases referred to above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that systematic commercial activities is taking place in the establishment of respondent herein and therefore, it is held that the respondent herein falls within the meaning of word ‘shop’ as mentioned in the notification dated 22.7.75 issued by the Government of Assam under the ESI Act. Therefore, it is held that the provisions of ESI Act would be extended to cover the respondent also. 24. Therefore, it is held that the provisions of ESI Act would be extended to cover the respondent also. 24. In view of the said findings of this Court, holding the respondent to be covered by the said Act, the other arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent need not be gone into or answered. 25. Accordingly, the substantial questions of law is answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondent by holding that the respondent i.e. Sahara India Financial Corporation Limited with its office in the city of Guwahati though a non-banking financial institution (NBFC) and/or Residuary Non-banking Company (RNBC), it is covered by the provisions of Employees State Insurance Act, 1948. 26. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.6.06 passed by the learned Employees Court, Guwahati in E.S.I. Case No.1/03 is hereby interfered with and the same is set aside and quashed. 27. Consequently, the appeal stands allowed. 28. Let the LCR be returned forthwith.