ORDER : The lands, which stood originally in the name of the petitioners' father, were acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, (Central Act 1 of 1894) by invoking the urgency clause. W.P.Nos.12272 and 12273 of 1984 were filed against dispossession without a specific challenge to the land acquisition proceedings at the instance of the petitioners' father and the same was dismissed. An award was passed on 26.09.1984 and possession was also taken and handed over to the third respondent. Thereafter, the fourth respondent was allotted the lands. Seeking to invoke Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, W.P.No.2518 of 2013 was filed, which was also dismissed, confirming the order rejecting the request made. Not satisfied with the same, placing reliance upon Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, (Central Act 30 of 2013) interalia contending that possession has not been divested with and the compensation amount as mandated under Section 31(2) of the Act 1 of 1894, has not been deposited in the Court, the present writ petition in W.P.No.7103 of 2014 has been filed. The said writ petition was dismissed on 18.01.2016 with the following finding. “32. On considering the facts and circumstances of the case, arguments advanced by the learned counsel on either side and on perusing the typed set of papers, this Court is of the view that the subject lands had been allotted to the fourth respondent on 02.07.1992. The fourth respondent had stated his manufacturing unit and the same had been inspected by the Chief Inspector of Factories, who also sent a communication, dated 17.02.1995, to the fourth respondent stating that Plot No.77 is owned by the fourth respondent. Therefore, it clearly proves that the subject lands are under the occupation and enjoyment of the fourth respondent. Award has been passed on 26.09.1984. Hence, the petitioners are not entitled to receive remedy under the new Land Acquisition Act. Besides, the land acquisition proceedings had been completed during 1984. Therefore, after a lapse of around thirty years, the writ petition is now maintainable, since the original cause of action arose during 1980. In such circumstances, the writ petition does not generate sufficient force to allow it and hence it is liable to be dismissed. 33. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Therefore, after a lapse of around thirty years, the writ petition is now maintainable, since the original cause of action arose during 1980. In such circumstances, the writ petition does not generate sufficient force to allow it and hence it is liable to be dismissed. 33. In the result, the writ petition fails and it is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Seeking to review the said order on the premise that the import of the Right to Fair compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, has not been taken note of, the present review application has been filed. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that there is an error apparent on the face of record. The grounds raised qua the applicability of the Act 30 of 2013 have not been considered. The very same learned Judge, on three other occasions, applied the provision of Section 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013 and granted the relief though the acquisition was much earlier. Thus, dismissing the acquisition proceedings on the ground of delay and laches is bad in law. The land acquisition manual has no application in not having statutory prescription and confirming the power contrary to Section 55 of the Act 1 of 1894. The case of the petitioners would come under Section 31(2) of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894) read with 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013. Admittedly, no deposit has been made as mandated under Section 32(2) of the Act 1 of 1894. Non receipt of the compensation amount would amount to refusal to give the consent. Section 31(1) of the Act only deals with payment and not otherwise. The dismissal of the writ petitions filed earlier would not bar the relief sought for. A mere request made seeking the release of the land under Section 48(B) of the Act 1 of 1894 will disentitle the petitioners from getting the relief sought for. The possession has not been taken and the formalities have not been completed. Therefore, the writ petition will have to be allowed. To buttress his submissions, the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions. 1. Padmavathi and another V. State of Tamil Nadu, Rep., by its Secretary, Education Department and another ((1978) 91 Law Weekly 80) (DB); 2. Vengaivasal Village Panchayat by its President Vs. Therefore, the writ petition will have to be allowed. To buttress his submissions, the learned counsel has relied on the following decisions. 1. Padmavathi and another V. State of Tamil Nadu, Rep., by its Secretary, Education Department and another ((1978) 91 Law Weekly 80) (DB); 2. Vengaivasal Village Panchayat by its President Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, by its Secretary to the Revenue Department, Chenni and 3 others ((2005) 3 Law Weekly 351); 3. State of Haryana V. Mahender Singh and others ((2007) 13 Supreme Court Cases 606); 4. Karuppathal V. State of Tamil Nadu ((2014) SCC Online Mad. 2376); 5. K.Velusamy and another V. Government of Tamil Nadu and others ((2014) SCC Online Mad 12213); 6. G.Thomas Devanandam and others V. The Government of Tamil Nadu and others ((2014) SCC Online Mad 9307); 7. R.Shanmugam and State of Tamil Nadu and others ((2014) SCC Online Mad 2379); 8. M.Perumal V. The District Collector and others ( (2017) 4 CTC 443 ); 9. Vijay Latka and another V. State of Haryana and others ((2016) 12 Supreme Court Cases 487); 10. Govt. of NCT of Delhi V. Manav Dharam Trust and others ((2017) 3 CTC 740); 11. Delhi Development Authority v. Reena Suri and others ( (2016) 12 SCC 649 ); 12. Proceedings of the Special Tahsildar(LA), SIPCOT Unit-I, Hosur dated 16.03.1985. 13. Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki ( (2014) 3 SCC 183 ); 14. P.Jayadevan V. the State Government ((2014) 5 CTC 187; 15. Rattan Singh V. UOI ( (2015) 16 SCC 342 ); 16. The Working Friends Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. V. State of Punjab and another ((2015) SCC Online SC 936); and 17. Delhi Development Authority V. Sukhbir Singh and others ((2016) SCC Online SC 929). 3. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the third Respondent and the learned counsel appearing for the other respondents would make the following submissions. There is no error apparent on the face of record warranting interference. What the petitioners want is a re-hearing, which is impermissible in law. The Land Acquisition Manual prescribes a complete procedure, which has been complied with. Rule 6 attached to Appendix II framed under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, speaks about the procedure which has been complied with by depositing the amount in the Treasury. What the petitioners want is a re-hearing, which is impermissible in law. The Land Acquisition Manual prescribes a complete procedure, which has been complied with. Rule 6 attached to Appendix II framed under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, speaks about the procedure which has been complied with by depositing the amount in the Treasury. Notice under Section 12(2) of the Act has been issued to the original owner. Form-9 clearly speaks about the consequence that would follow. There is a difference between Section 31(1) and 31(2) of Act 1 of 1894. Possession has been taken long time back. There is a huge delay in seeking the relief. The two writ petitions filed by the petitioners have been dismissed. When once a reconveyance has been sought, the same would mean the transfer of title along with possession. In support of his contention, the learned Additional Advocate General has made reliance upon the following decisions: 1. K.Govinda Babu V. M/s Vasantham Properties Pvt. Ltd., (W.P.Nos.14292, 6900, 7171 and 9059 of 2001; 2. A.Ayyavu (died) V. State of Tmil Nadu ((2017) 1 CWC 100); and 3. State of West Bengal and others V. Kamal Sengupta and another ((2008) 8 Supreme Court Cases 612. 4. Coming to the question of maintainability, this Court finds that most of the grounds raised by the petitioners are on the basis of Act 30 of 2013 with specific reference to Section 24(2). As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioners the said issue has not been taken note of while dismissing the writ petition. Thus, this Court is of the view that the review application is maintainable as there is an error apparent on the face of record. The principle enshrined in the Civil Procedure Code qua a review may have some bearing. 5. The contention made with respect to the delay also required to be answered in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners are seeking the relief as discussed earlier based upon Act 30 of 2013. Thus, the cause of action for filing the writ petition would start after the new enactment and therefore, the length of time prior to it cannot be taken note of to deny the relief on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. After all, these are all not principles of law but one on practice and prudence. 6. Thus, the cause of action for filing the writ petition would start after the new enactment and therefore, the length of time prior to it cannot be taken note of to deny the relief on the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence. After all, these are all not principles of law but one on practice and prudence. 6. On the merits of the case, the records would indicate that the possession indeed been taken long time back. It is for the petitioners to prove the factum of possession with them. The lands acquired were vacant at the time of acquisition. The fact that the father of the petitioners sought for reconveyance itself would show that the possession has been taken. The award was passed in the year 1984. The attempt made by the petitioners' father to protect his possession by way of writ petitions in W.P.Nos.12272 and 12273 of 1984 ended in failure. He was also informed about the allotment made in favour of the fourth respondent at the time of rejecting his request for reconveyance. The order rejecting the reconveyance has also become final with the dismissal of the writ petition filed. Thus, this Court is of the view that the petitioners have not proved the factum of possession with them. To that extent, the order passed in the writ petition does not warrant interference. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would vehemently contend that inasmuch as there is no statutory compliance of Section 31(2) of the Act in depositing the award amount in the Sub Court, the proceedings would lapse as per Section 24(2) of Act 30 of 2013. Much reliance has been made on the decision of the Apex Court in Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki ( (2014) 3 SCC 183 ); Rattan Singh V. UOI ( (2015) 16 SCC 342 ); The Working Friends Co-operative House Building Society Ltd. V. State of Punjab and another ((2015) SCC Online SC 936); and Delhi Development Authority V. Sukhbir Singh and others ((2016) SCC Online SC 929). There is no difficulty in appreciating the ratio laid down therein. However, the question for consideration is as to whether the case on hand would come under Section 31 (1) or 31(2) of Act 1 of 1894 as the case may be. 8. There is no difficulty in appreciating the ratio laid down therein. However, the question for consideration is as to whether the case on hand would come under Section 31 (1) or 31(2) of Act 1 of 1894 as the case may be. 8. Notice under Section 12(2) has been served on the petitioners' father as per the counter affidavit filed. There is no denial of this factum. In any case, this was not denied and proved by the father of the petitioners while he was alive. From the records, it is clear that notice requiring the father of the petitioners to attend the award enquiry has also been issued. Thus, he was asked to participate in the award proceedings and thereafter, to receive the compensation fixed. He did not respond to the aforesaid notices. 9. The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, can be safely divided into two parts. The first part deals with the process involving the acquisition of the land. The second part deals with the issue qua compensation. After a declaration is passed, the process of fixing compensation starts. This process starts with passing of the award and ends with an award of the jurisdictional Court. The first award was passed under Section 11 by the Collector after conducting enquiry. The second award was passed by the Court. After making award under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector is required to make the payment of compensation awarded by him. This is mandated by Section 31(1) of the Act. For better appreciation, the aforesaid provision is reproduced hereunder. “31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.” (1) On making an award under section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section. (2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under section 18 would be submitted.” 10. Section 31 deals with the payment of compensation or deposit of same in the Court. Section 31 deals with the payment of compensation or deposit of same in the Court. Therefore, it forms two parts. One is with respect to the payment of compensation and other is deposit with the Court. Under Section 31(1) of the Act, the Collector has to make the payment of compensation to the person interested and entitled to unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned under Sub Section (2). Therefore, in a case where the Collector is prevented, then he is not required to make the payment or contingencies as mentioned in Sub Section (2) is available. In the first part, the Collector has to be prevented and in the second one more exigencies would be sufficient. 11. Sub Section 2 of Section 31 of the Act speaks about the duty of the Collector to deposit the compensation amount before the Reference Court. This would come when a person interested is not entitled to receive it or if there is no person concerned competent to alienate the land acquired or if there exists a dispute to the title or to the apportionment. Therefore, in a case where a land owner merely not shown any interest to receive the amount, it would be termed, as if, he has refused to give consent to receive the amount. This can be seen in the different context as well. The object of depositing the amount with Sub Court is for the purpose of adjudication by it That is the reason why, the Court is a reference Court. We are not dealing with the acquisition, per se, after the award is passed. That stage is prior to the award. Thus, once compensation is fixed, it is only with reference to the quantum alone, hence, the consent has to be referred to with respect to the proposed action by the person interested seeking enhanced compensation apart from other contingencies provided under Section 31(2) of the Act. If one reads sub section (2) of the Section 31 of the Act as a whole, the position is very clear. The Court can go into the question of title, lack of competency on the part of the person claiming compensation and apportionment apart from enhancement. If one reads sub section (2) of the Section 31 of the Act as a whole, the position is very clear. The Court can go into the question of title, lack of competency on the part of the person claiming compensation and apportionment apart from enhancement. Thus, while it can be said that a mere non receipt of the compensation per se cannot be termed as a refusal to give consent, which is relatable to a right to seek compensation under Section 18 of the Act. Such a consent or its refusal, as discussed already, cannot be presumed to a challenge to the acquisition which stage has crossed already. 12. In the case on hand, the original land owner was issued with a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act 1 of 1894 through Form-9. This notice not only informed about him the award passed, but also, the consequence that would follow, which in specific terms mandates the authority to serve notice on a person interested at the earliest so as to enable him to file objections seeking reference. The operative portion of Form-9 is as under: Form 9 Notice of award under Section 12(2) of Act I of 1894. ... is/are hereby informed that he/they should appear either in person or by an authorized agent before the undersigned within ............. days after the issue of this notice, and receive the amount specified above, failing which, the said sum of money will be kept to Revenue deposit and will bear no interest. Station. DATE 19 . Land Acquisition Officer. Note:- The paragraph below the statement in this notice should be deleted when the notice is served on those who are not awardees. If the persons interested are present, the contents of the award should be made known to them and the compensation amount tendered to the awardees immediately. The notice of the award under Section 12(2) of the Act to the persons interested who are absent should be served without delay as any objections can be filed within six weeks of the service of the notice or within six months from the date of the award whichever period shall first expire.” Therefore, without going into the validity of the Land Acquisition Manual, it can be seen that even in the notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act, the object is made known to the original owner. This Court feels that the said notice is perfectly inconsonance with the import of Section 31 of the Act. 13. Yet another contention has been raised on the validity of the Land Acquisition Manual. This Court is not willing to go into the abovesaid aspects. The discussion made above on the interpretation of Section 31 of the Act would be sufficient to non suit the relief sought for by the petitioners. The notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act I of 1894 through Form 9 by its own nomenclature is an intimation. The original owner was accordingly informed about the award passed, reminding him of his rights available under Section 18 of the Act, which provides for a reference. Incidentally, he was also informed that if he does not turn up then the sum decided as compensation shall be kept in revenue deposit without interest. Therefore, it is an action under Section 31(1) of the Act and not on Section 31(2) of the Act. 14. One more incidental aspect will have to be seen. The petitioners and their predecessor in title viz., their father were aware of the proceedings right from the beginning. Thus, the question of compensation deposited, its possession and then the allotment in favour of the fourth respondent were known to them long time back. Hence, even on that score, this Court is of the view that though the learned single Judge has dismissed the writ petition on the single ground, for the reasons stated above, the review petitioners are not entitled for the relief sought for. Accordingly, the Review Application stands dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is also dismissed.