JUDGMENT: By this Second Appeal, the Appellants-Original Plaintiffs have challenged the Judgment and Decree passed by the Additional District Judge, North Goa whereby the learned District Judge set aside the decree of mandatory injunction granted by the learned Civil Judge against the Defendants. Mandatory injunction in essence was not to obstruct the construction work carried out by the Appellants. 2. The Appellants, referred to as Plaintiffs, a partnership firm, filed Regular Civil Suit no. 55/95/D in the Court of Civil Judge Senior Division, Ponda on 2 May 1995. The case of the Plaintiffs was, briefly as follows that the Defendants approached the Plaintiffs with a proposal to construct a project for a Super Centre in the property bearing plot no. 35 to 42 situated at Usgao, Goa. The Defendants prepared construction plan in respect of the building in plot no. 35 to 40 and 41(part) and 42(part) and the plans were approved by the Ponda Planning & Development Authority. The entire Floor Area Ratio (F.A.R) admeasuring 2317.97 sqmts on a plot admeasuring 3028.75 sq.mts was permitted to be developed by the proposed construction. The Defendants had also obtained construction licence dated 19 June 1993 from the Village Panchayat of Usgao. An agreement was entered into between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants on 30 January 1994. In the agreement it was specified as entered into between the Plaintiffs and two groups of Defendants, as Group-1 and Group-2. Each group was to be paid a particular cash consideration and was entitled to some portion of the construction. It was contemplated that the Group-1 will get certain cash component and a constructed shop admeasuring 38.65 sq.mts and a flat admeasuring 85.55 sq.mts on the first floor. Group-2 was to receive certain cash component and a shop admeasuring 38.65 sq.mts. The total valuation of the shares of both these groups each, was Rs.7,31,000/-. Part of the cash component was given to the Defendants when the construction was being carried out and it came up to the plinth level. The Group-1 Defendants, i.e. Defendants no. 1 to 8, obstructed the construction taking a stand that they will not permit two structures which were situated on plot no. 37, to be demolished. The Engineer of the Plaintiffs was also manhandled and the Defendant no. 5 started expanding the business of a garage from the suit structure and started parking vehicles, thereby obstructing the construction. 1 to 8, obstructed the construction taking a stand that they will not permit two structures which were situated on plot no. 37, to be demolished. The Engineer of the Plaintiffs was also manhandled and the Defendant no. 5 started expanding the business of a garage from the suit structure and started parking vehicles, thereby obstructing the construction. All efforts to persuade the Defendants no. 1 to 8 not to obstruct the construction failed and since the agreement was not terminated by any party and only some of the parties to the agreement, i.e. Defendants no. 1 to 8 were obstructing the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs filed a suit and sought for order of permanent injunction against the Defendants, more particularly Defendant no. 5, to restrain them from interfering with the construction activities and for a mandatory injunction to remove the garage from the eastern portion of the suit property. 3. The written statement was filed on behalf of Defendants no. 9 to 10, the Group-2. These Defendants, accepted the fact that the plans were sanctioned as stated by the Plaintiffs and also that the construction license was granted. It was also stated by these Defendants that the Defendant no. 5 is needlessly obstructing the construction activities to be carried out by Plaintiffs due to which these Defendants, who were entitled to get benefit of the development, were deprived of the same. Accordingly, these Defendants supported the case of the Plaintiffs. 4. The suit was contested by the Defendants no. 1 to 8, contending that the approval of the project which was specified in the plan was not the consideration of the agreement. The Plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to the suit structures and there is no question of any obstruction being created by these Defendants. These structures which were never part of the agreement, therefore, did not have to be removed which was informed to the Plaintiffs from time to time. There is no reference to these structures in the agreement. On these grounds the Defendants no. 1 to 8 contested the suit and sought for its dismissal. 5. The Plaintiffs examined the Architect who prepared and submitted the plan for approval, the Partner of the Plaintiffs-firm and an officer from the Planning Authority which approved the plan. The Defendants no. 1 to 8 examined the Defendant no. 5 as their witness. Both the parties adduced documentary evidence. 6. 5. The Plaintiffs examined the Architect who prepared and submitted the plan for approval, the Partner of the Plaintiffs-firm and an officer from the Planning Authority which approved the plan. The Defendants no. 1 to 8 examined the Defendant no. 5 as their witness. Both the parties adduced documentary evidence. 6. The learned Civil Judge framed issues as to whether as per the terms of the agreement the Plaintiffs needed to construct a building on the plots in question, whether the agreement provided for payment of consideration to the Defendants, whether the part of the structure on the western portion was to be removed by the Defendant no. 5, and whether the Defendants proved that the suit property was not subject matter of the agreement dated 30 January 1994 and other allied issues. The main issue being, whether the structures were to be removed pursuant to the agreement dated 30 January 1994. The learned Civil Judge, after considering the rival contentions and evidence on record, partly decreed the suit by Judgment and Order dated 30 March 2002. The learned Civil Judge granted permanent injunction against the Defendants, more particularly, Defendant no. 5, restraining them from interfering in the structure in the eastern portion of the suit property. Defendant no. 5 was directed to remove the garage and other structure on the eastern portion of the suit property, to demolish the cabin like structure as shown in Exhibit Pw-1/B at point 'A' and point 'B'. The prayer of the Plaintiffs for mandatory injunction to remove the shop and cabin like structure, was refused. 7. The Defendants no. 1 to 8, being aggrieved, filed Regular Civil Appeal 65 of 2002 in the Court of District Judge, North Goa, Panaji. The contention of the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 in the Appeal was that the demolition of the suit structure was never in contemplation and the Defendants no. 1 to 8 never agreed that the development of the suit plots would be upon removal of the suit structure, which included the garage, which was their source of livelihood. The learned District Judge framed sole issue as to whether the Defendant no. 5 was liable to remove the garage structure from the eastern portion of the suit structure and held it in favour of the Defendants no. 1 to 8. The learned District Judge framed sole issue as to whether the Defendant no. 5 was liable to remove the garage structure from the eastern portion of the suit structure and held it in favour of the Defendants no. 1 to 8. The learned District Judge concluded that the plans stated to be approved by the Ponda Planning & Development Authority were not produced on record and that the location of the structure could not be ascertained, neither it can be asserted whether they were marked for demolition. The learned District Judge also concluded that the relief could not have been granted to the Plaintiff since the agreement dated 30 January 1994 contemplated payment of damages. The learned District Judge accordingly allowed the Appeal filed by Defendants no. 1 to 8 by Order dated 5 May 2004 and dismissed the suit filed by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs-Original Respondents filed the present Second Appeal. 8. The Second Appeal was admitted on 25 February 2005 on the following substantial questions of law: (a) Whether, in the face of the fact that the plans approved by the Ponda Planning & Development Authority, and the Panchayat were produced on record by the Plaintiff s as exhibit PW.1/B and the undisputed position that in terms of the approved plans F.A.R. Related to the area of the entire plot admeasuring 3028.75 square meters had been availed of by the Defendants, the finding of the First Appellate Court that the structures existing in the property were not liable to be demolished and removed, is perverse? (b) In the face of the uncontroverted evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, the architect and the engineer/employee of the Ponda Planning and Development Authority respectively, categorically stating that the existing structures admeasuring 112 square meters in the property to be developed were to be demolished as per the documents submitted to the office of the Ponda Planning and Development Authority, the Defendants could contend that the said structures were not liable to be demolished, being estopped from doing so, having entered into an agreement for development on the strength of the approved plans, and induced the Plaintiff s to change their position in terms of the agreement? 9. I have heard Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Shri S. S. Kantak, learned Senior Advocate for the Defendant nos. 9. I have heard Shri S. D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel for the Plaintiffs and Shri S. S. Kantak, learned Senior Advocate for the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 and Shri P. A. Kholkar, learned Counsel for the Defendant nos. 9(A) to 9(F) and 10. 10. Shri S. D. Lotlikar, the learned Senior Advocate for the Plaintiffs submitted: The suit is for mandatory injunction. The agreement between the parties subsists and it has not been terminated. It is only because some of the signatories to the agreement, without terminating the agreement, are obstructing the Plaintiffs and the remaining signatories to the parties are willing to go on as per the agreement, the suit for mandatory injunction for removal of the obstruction had to be filed. After taking into consideration the total area of the plot, the plans have been approved for the purpose of development. The Plaintiffs have examined the partner of the firm, the Architect and the Officer from the Planning Authority, and their evidence clearly shows that the plans were drawn as per the instructions of all the Defendants and approved by the authorities. There is hardly any cross-examination of the witnesses examined by the Plaintiffs. The parties have entered into an agreement specifically stating that they have examined the plans referred to in the agreement, from which there is no deviation. Since a particular FAR was needed for the planned construction, the entire plot had to be vacant and if any structure had to be retained, it had to be specifically provided in the Agreement. The Agreement does not specify that a particular structure needs to be retained. The only argument of these Defendants is that they have not agreed to demolish the structure, which is not available to them having signed the agreement for development. The agreement itself refers to permission being granted to the plans giving their specific particulars. The witnesses have asserted that the plans were sanctioned. In view of this admitted position on record, the learned District Judge was in error in dismissing the suit of the Plaintiffs-on the sole ground that the approved plans had to be produced on record. The question of location of structure is irrelevant and as for development of entire plot, to achieve a particular FAR, these structures, since they are within the plot, had to be demolished. The question of location of structure is irrelevant and as for development of entire plot, to achieve a particular FAR, these structures, since they are within the plot, had to be demolished. The learned District Judge was in error to hold that the Plaintiffs could not seek injunction in view of the clause regarding damages in the agreement, since seeking damages was an only option open to the Plaintiffs. In these circumstances, a suit for mandatory injunction was rightly decreed by the Trial Court. On irrelevant criteria of non-production of approved plan, the learned District Judge has reversed the decree for injunction. The Plaintiffs has made substantial investment. The structure has come up to the plinth level. All other Defendants, except the contesting Defendants are ready for development, so also the Plaintiffs and, therefore discretion used by the learned District Judge in reversing the order of injunction was a perverse exercise. 11. Mr. Kholkar, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of legal representatives of Defendants no. 9 and Defendants no. 10, (Respondent nos. 9(A) to 9(F) and 10 in this Appeal), submitted that they support the case of the Plaintiffs, as they had done in the Courts below. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Kantak, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Defendant nos. 1 to 8, (Respondent nos. 1 to 8 in this Appeal) the contesting Defendants submitted: The suit was filed by the Plaintiffs so as to avoid filing suit for specific performance, which could not be filed in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as there was clear stipulation in the agreement regarding payment of damages. The suit which is filed for perpetual injunction is covered by Chapter 8 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and this relief is discretionary. Since the agreement provides for payment of damages and that equities were not in favour of the Plaintiffs, the learned District Judge has rightly exercised the judicial discretion and has reversed the grant of perpetual injunction. The only prayer made in the suit is to direct the Defendants nos. 1 to 8 in respect of allowing the Plaintiffs to carry on construction as per the plan. The only prayer made in the suit is to direct the Defendants nos. 1 to 8 in respect of allowing the Plaintiffs to carry on construction as per the plan. The permission and licence by the Ponda Planning & Development Authority was granted on 14 February 1996, which was only valid for 3 years and also the licence issued by the Village Panchayat on 19 February 1993 was valid only for one year, and they have lapsed as per Section 46 of the Goa Government Town & Country Planning Development Act. Therefore, relief as sought for, cannot be granted. The approved plans relied upon by the Plaintiffs were not produced and the Plaintiffs have avoided to produce the approved plans. Without the approved plans, the location of the structure in question and whether they need to be demolished, cannot have been established. The learned District Judge was therefore right in refusing relief to the Plaintiffs on the ground that approved plans were not produced. The Defendants no. 1 to 8 were not party to the approved plans and the agreement did not contemplate that the parties would act as per the approved plans, but it was contemplated that fresh plans would be drawn up. There is no stipulation of whatsoever nature in the agreement dated 30 January 1994, that the structures in question have to be demolished. Since there is no stipulation in the Agreement, and that damages can be paid, relief of injunction was rightly refused and no question of law as framed are for consideration in the Second Appeal. 13. The questions of law framed are broadly relating to the FAR of the area of entire plot to be availed and in that context whether the structure needs to be demolished. The second question of law is regarding the effect of the uncontroverted evidence of the Partner of the Plaintiffs-firm, the Architect and the Engineer of the Planning Authority. 14. Some of the contentions of Mr. Kantak need to be dealt with at the onset. First is, that the suit for injunction simpliciter has been filed only to overcome the legal position that suit for specific performance in the circumstances could not be filed. There is no merit in this submission. The Plaintiffs have filed a suit seeking mandatory injunction against the Defendants no. 5 in particular, on the basis that the Defendants no. First is, that the suit for injunction simpliciter has been filed only to overcome the legal position that suit for specific performance in the circumstances could not be filed. There is no merit in this submission. The Plaintiffs have filed a suit seeking mandatory injunction against the Defendants no. 5 in particular, on the basis that the Defendants no. 5 and persons through him and the other Defendants were obstructing the construction activity in the eastern portion of the property. The agreement dated 30 January 1994 has not been terminated till date. Even the authority in favour of the Plaintiffs as contemplated in the agreement dated 30 January 1994, still continues. One set of Defendants, i.e. Group-2, are supporting the Plaintiffs and want the development to proceed. The Plaintiffs have also not terminated the Agreement. In this backdrop no case arose for seeking specific performance of the Agreement. All that was being done by the Defendants no. 5 and the other Defendants in Group-1 was to obstruct the construction. Since, according to the Plaintiffs, FAR of the entire plot was calculated on the basis that the entire plot being vacant, it was implicit therein that the structure had to be demolished. Since the Defendants no. 5 and other Defendants through him were not permitting the Plaintiffs to carry out the construction, the suit for injunction had to be filed. There is no bar for filing such suit under Chapter 8 of the Specific Relief Act. In the facts of the present case it was not necessary for the Plaintiffs to file a suit for specific performance. Therefore, on this ground, the relief sought cannot be denied to the Plaintiffs. 15. The second submission of Mr. Kantak is that the suit for specific performance of an agreement which only gives developmental rights could not be sought for. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Cheda Housing Development Corporation v/s. Bibijan Shaikh Farid, 2007 (3) ALL MR780. According to Mr. Kantak, the agreement only stipulated that a permission was granted to the Plaintiffs to enter upon the property to carry out the construction and there is no right created in favour of the Defendants so as to seek any specific performance therein. According to Mr. Kantak, the agreement only stipulated that a permission was granted to the Plaintiffs to enter upon the property to carry out the construction and there is no right created in favour of the Defendants so as to seek any specific performance therein. He contended that to avoid this legal bar to file a suit for specific performance, that the present suit had to be filed. This contention also has no merit. As held above, the facts of the present case were such that there was no question of seeking specific performance. The authority of the Plaintiffs to carry out construction has not been terminated by any of the parties, and since the Defendants no. 5 and the other group of Defendants, were obstructing them from carrying out the activity of construction as contemplated in the agreement, the suit was filed. Therefore, the arguments of Mr. Kantak based on these decisions which do not arise from such factual matrix would not assist the Defendants. 16. The third argument raised by Mr. Kantak is that the reliefs have become infructuous. It was contended that the permissions, even assuming they were granted in favour of the Plaintiffs by the Village Panchayat and the Planning Authority, have expired and looking at the nature of the relief sought, they do not survive as on date. Again this submission also cannot be accepted. In the plaint the Plaintiffs has prayed to restrain the Defendants, more particularly, Defendants no. 5 from interfering with the construction activity. As per the agreement dated 30 January 1994, the Plaintiffs is given authority to carry out the construction in the suit plots. This authority has not been terminated. The agreement also contemplates that the Plaintiffs would be entitled to seek renewal of the permissions and to carry out all necessary documentation for the purpose of carrying out construction. This power granted to the Plaintiffs, is also not terminated as on date and continues. Furthermore, as rightly contended by Mr. Lotlikar, that the date when the suit was filed the permissions were valid and if it was to be contended by the Defendants nos. 1 to 8 that the suit has become infructuous, such subsequent event will have to be specifically pleaded. There is no such case pleaded or argued in both the Courts that the suit has become infructous because the licences have expired. 1 to 8 that the suit has become infructuous, such subsequent event will have to be specifically pleaded. There is no such case pleaded or argued in both the Courts that the suit has become infructous because the licences have expired. Therefore, these submissions cannot be advanced by the Defendants nos. 1 to 8 first time in this Second Appeal. The manner in which the prayers are cast, the suit will not become infructuous since the Plaintiffs continues to have power and authority under the agreement to carry out construction and ask for renewal of permissions. 17. Having dealt with these three grounds raised by Mr. Kantak and which were in the nature of preliminary objections, it will have to be seen whether the decision of the learned District Judge in setting aside the decision of the learned Civil Judge was correct in law and whether the questions of law will have to be answered in favour of the Plaintiffs or the Defendants. 18. The suit filed by the Plaintiffs was simplistic. According to the Plaintiffs, pursuant to their plans sanctioned, the Defendants had executed an agreement for development of the suit plot with the Plaintiffs. The sanctioned plans and the FAR to be calculated from the suit plot and the consequent development, was depending on the entire plot being vacant. The licence and the permission granted referred to in the Agreement, which the Defendants including the Defendant no. 1 to 8 verified and accepted and in spite of this decision, the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 were trying to obstruct the Plaintiffs from carrying out the construction activity, for which the order of injunction needs to be issued. This basically is the sum and substance of the plaint filed by the Plaintiffs. 19. The Defendant nos. 1 to 8 filed written statements, which was primarily denial of the averments made in the plaint. The only case that appears to have been put forth by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 is that, it is not stated in the agreement dated 30 January 1994 that two structures, more particularly the structure in which a garage was being operated, had to be demolished. Therefore, the contention of the Defendant nos. The only case that appears to have been put forth by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 is that, it is not stated in the agreement dated 30 January 1994 that two structures, more particularly the structure in which a garage was being operated, had to be demolished. Therefore, the contention of the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 was limited to the fact that the agreement does not specifically state that the structures existing on the suit property had to be removed and therefore they could not be removed and there is no question of issuing injunction against Defendant nos. 1 to 8 not to interfere with the construction activity to be carried out by the Plaintiffs. In view of this sole defence advanced by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8, the question that primarily arose for the consideration of both the Courts was whether the agreement contemplated removal of the structures, or not. 20. A contention was advanced by Mr. Kantak that the agreement dated 30 January 1994 did not contemplate that construction had to be carried out as per the sanctioned plans, but it was in contemplation that some other plans will be prepared which will have to be signed by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8. This submission is made across the bar is made first time in the Second Appeal. There is no such case pleaded at all in the memo of Second Appeal, nor there is any argument made to the effect in both the Courts, nor there is any finding of both the Courts on the issue. It has never been the case of Defendant nos. 1 to 8 that the Agreement contemplated, not the sanctioned plans but the plans which had to be made separately to be signed by Defendant nos. 1 to 8. Such arguments made for the first time, therefore cannot be accepted. 21. This brings us to the two main findings of the learned District Judge. Firstly, that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to the injunction in view of the fact that the sanctioned, approved plans were not placed on record. Secondly, that the agreement contemplated payment of damages and therefore relief of injunction need not be granted. 22. On the aspect of non-production of the approved plans, Mr. Lotlikar submitted that the agreement dated 30 January 1994 and the permissions, were produced on record. Secondly, that the agreement contemplated payment of damages and therefore relief of injunction need not be granted. 22. On the aspect of non-production of the approved plans, Mr. Lotlikar submitted that the agreement dated 30 January 1994 and the permissions, were produced on record. He submitted that the evidence of the witnesses of the Plaintiffs, has remained uncontroverted. It was contended that learned District Judge, disregarding this uncontroverted evidence has allowed the First Appeal only on the ground of non-production of the approved plans. It was submitted that there was no need of producing the approved plans as locating the actual position of the structures and to find out whether they were earmarked for demolition in the plan was irrelevant. According to Mr. Kantak, since approved plans was the foundation of the Plaintiffs case, they ought to have been produced and therefore there was no error committed by the learned District Judge. 23. The agreement dated 30 January 1994 refers to the approval dated 14 January 1993 bearing no. PPDA/P/1191/1138/93-94 issued by the Ponda Planning Development Authority, Construction Order from the Ponda Planning Development Authority dated 15 February 1993 bearing no. PPDA/P/P/119/1275/92-93, Construction Licence from Usgao Village Panchayat dated 18 June 1993 bearing no. 93/94/LIC/Buildings/Res/Tisk/5. These details have been specified in the agreement itself. Therefore, in the Agreement the particulars about the construction and the share of both the groups of the Defendants has been specified. The Agreement specifically refers to the fact that the Plaintiffs will build on the property as per the approved design, making obvious reference to the plans and sanctions in the earlier part of the Agreement. The Agreement also states that the Defendants have accepted the plan given by the Developer and they are verified and inspected and there are no changes and if there are any changes they will make them in writing. Therefore, all parties clearly understood that permissions have been granted by the Planning Authority and the Village Panchayat. These permissions were specified in the Agreement and the construction would be as per the said Agreement. This fact was asserted by the witness for the Plaintiffs, PW-1 in his deposition. 24. The Architect, Mr. Ramesh Kamat, examined by the Plaintiffs stated that he had submitted development plans prepared by him to the office of the Planning Authority and they were approved by the Planning Authority on 15 February 1993. This fact was asserted by the witness for the Plaintiffs, PW-1 in his deposition. 24. The Architect, Mr. Ramesh Kamat, examined by the Plaintiffs stated that he had submitted development plans prepared by him to the office of the Planning Authority and they were approved by the Planning Authority on 15 February 1993. Copy of the approval, was produced on record. He had specifically stated that in the plans, gross area of the plot was shown as 3028.75sq.ts, area of 261.57 sq.mts lost in proposed road reducing the actual plot size to 2766.18sq.ts. He asserted that the total floor area ratio contemplated for the plot was 2317.97sq.ts. He had asserted that when he visited the suit property there were two structures standing in the suit property and these structures had to be demolished for the purpose of achieving the FAR. The Architect thereafter categorically asserted that when the plans were sanctioned he calculated area available for construction and the structures had to be demolished to achieve the FAR. There is hardly anything in the cross-examination of the Architect. The main assertion that the plans were sanctioned and that, to achieve the structures had to be demolished, was not controverted. 25. The Plaintiffs also examined Mr. Kanchan Parsekar, the Engineer of the Planning Authority. He stated that the total area of the plot was 3028.75sq.ts; that there were structures and the structure admeasuring 112 sq.mts had to be demolished as per the plan which was sanctioned by the authority. Though the witness stated that the when the Exhibit Pw1/B was shown to him it did not bear the seal of the authority, however, from this statement it cannot be concluded that the plans were never sanctioned. The Architect had categorically stated that the plans were sanctioned and he had produced the permissions for the same. These permissions were also referred to in the Agreement. Even for this witness, there is hardly any cross-examination. 26. On behalf of the Defendants nos. 1 to 8, Vishwas K. Chodankar, i.e. Defendants no. 5, was examined. His main assertion was that the suit structure was not contemplated to be demolished. He however accepted the position that the entire plot was given for development. There was some dispute between the parties as to whether some construction was carried out after the order of temporary injunction was passed. This witness denied having carried out any such construction. His main assertion was that the suit structure was not contemplated to be demolished. He however accepted the position that the entire plot was given for development. There was some dispute between the parties as to whether some construction was carried out after the order of temporary injunction was passed. This witness denied having carried out any such construction. 27. It was thus established by the Plaintiffs that the entire plot was to be developed and the FAR of 2317.97 sqm.ts had to be achieved. The position that development had to be carried out with the FAR of 2317.97 sq.mts was, in fact, not seriously controverted by the Defendants nos. 1 to 8 in their written statements nor in their evidence. 28. Therefore, the main question would then arise is whether the position that the two structures admeasuring 112 sq.mts were to be demolished was needed to be specified in the agreement. According to Mr. Lotlikar, it was not necessary to specify the same, while it is the submission of Mr. Kantak that if the structures had to be demolished, it had to be specified in the agreement. 29. The agreement dated 30 January 1994 has to be seen in totality. The entire suit plot had to be developed for FAR 2317.97 sq.mts to be achieved. It has come on record that, this FAR was for the vacant plot. Once, all the Defendants had agreed that this entire suit property had to be developed with FAR 2317.97 sq.mts and that it has been established that to achieve the FAR, the plot needed to be vacant, then it was implicit in the agreement itself that these structures had to be removed, so as to make the plot vacant. There is an uncontroverted evidence that if these structures were retained, the specified FAR could not be achieved. If the Agreement was to be deviated from, then it had to be specified either by way of some modification or a separate agreement. Once the plot had to be vacant to achieve a FAR and if any party wanted to retain a particular structure, because of which FAR would get reduced, then it had to be specifically provided for. Therefore, the case of the Defendant nos. Once the plot had to be vacant to achieve a FAR and if any party wanted to retain a particular structure, because of which FAR would get reduced, then it had to be specifically provided for. Therefore, the case of the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 that, because it is not specified in the agreement that the structures including the garage could not be demolished, had no merit and was rightly refused by the learned Trial Court. 30. The learned District Judge non-suited the Plaintiffs on the ground that the approved plan was not on record, from which the location of the structures could not be ascertained. This is entirely irrelevant. Once the entire plot had to be vacant to arrive at FAR of 2317.97 sq.mts., then where the structures are located within the plot is not material. Therefore there was no question of Plaintiffs on demonstrating where the structures were located through the approved plans. The view taken by the learned District Judge, therefore, is entirely incorrect and contrary to the unquestioned evidence on record. 31. As regard the aspect of damages is concerned, the learned District Judge held that the Plaintiffs is not entitled to injunction because the agreement contemplates payment of damages. The learned District Judge relied upon the following clause in the agreement: “In case there is delay in any of the terms and conditions of this AGREEMENT on the part of the OWNER/VENDORS in every such case the present agreement shall be recinded by giving one months advance notice to the owners by the developer and in very such case the owners shall refund all the money's received by them by that time to the developer with interest @18% p.a. and shall also pay Rs.500/-per day towards damages to the Developer”. As rightly contended by Mr. Lotlikar, this clause itself shows that the Plaintiffs has an option to seek damages, and Plaintiffs cannot be forced. Neither the Plaintiffs nor the Defendants have terminated the Agreement and the Plaintiffs is willing to go ahead with the construction and offer the constructed portion plus compensation as envisaged under the Agreement to the Defendants. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs is dis-entitled to seek order of injunction and must be forced to accept the damages. Such would be a perverse reading of the agreement. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Plaintiffs is dis-entitled to seek order of injunction and must be forced to accept the damages. Such would be a perverse reading of the agreement. Therefore, both these grounds which have been held against the Plaintiffs by the learned District Judge are incorrect in law. 32. The relief of injunction under Chapter 8 of the Specific Relief Act is an equitable remedy. It is contented by Mr. Kantak that the garage on the plot is the only source of livelihood for his clients. Though this may be one of the parameters that would go in the exercise of judicious discretion, the other factors are in favour of the Plaintiffs. The Agreement is of the year 1994. This agreement subsists as of today and it has not been terminated by the Defendants. One set of Defendants want the development to be undertaken by the Plaintiffs and have supported the Plaintiffs in this litigation. It is agreed that one group of Defendants would receive cash compensation plus constructed shop and a residential flat and the other group would receive constructed shop with increased compensation. The work which had reached plinth level has been stalled. Neither the Defendants have terminated the agreement, nor they have received total compensation, nor the development has proceeded. This impasse has been created only due to stand taken by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8. Because of this obstinate stand taken by the Defendant nos. 1 to 8, the other Defendants who are ready for the development of their property, are waiting since the year 1994. The learned District Judge has not considered this aspect of the matter at all. Even if the discretion is vested in the Courts, the discretion has to be judiciously exercised and in the present case, the view taken by the learned District Judge in reversing the order of injunction, is entirely perverse. 33. Lastly, it was sought to be contended by Mr. Kantak that since there are several structures that were constructed by Defendant nos. 1 to 8 during the pendency of the suit, the Plaintiffs cannot anyway carry out the construction unless they are removed. 33. Lastly, it was sought to be contended by Mr. Kantak that since there are several structures that were constructed by Defendant nos. 1 to 8 during the pendency of the suit, the Plaintiffs cannot anyway carry out the construction unless they are removed. It was contended that the learned Civil Judge has refused relief to the Plaintiffs to remove these structures, against which no appeal or cross-objections were filed by the Plaintiffs, and therefore learned District Judge was right in passing the order. The submission is without merit. The learned Civil Judge had granted temporary injunction. The question arose for consideration before the learned Civil Judge whether the prayer for mandatory injunction to remove this shed or cabin like structure, which had come up after the grant of temporary injunction, should be granted. The learned Civil Judge had come to the conclusion that this relief could be granted because the Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate the physical location of the structure. However, the stand of the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 is very material. They had categorically refused that they had constructed any such structure in violation of the order of temporary injunction. They had taken this stand because allegation was made against them that they had breached the order of this Court. Having taken the stand that they have not constructed any structure in violation of the order of the Court, they cannot take contrary stand. Mr. Lotlikar rightly points out that once the main relief of injunction to restrain the Defendants from interfering with the construction in the eastern portion of the property is granted, then the said relief will encompass within its fold the removal of these additional structures. Therefore if the injunction granted by the trial court of restraining the Defendants from interfering with the construction of the eastern portion of the suit property is upheld, then it is not necessary that there should be a separate order for demolition of shed and cabin like structure came up during the pending of suit. Therefore, even on this ground, the finding of the learned District Judge is incorrect in law. 34. As a consequence of this discussion, it is to be held that though the plans were not produced on record, the permissions in respect of the plans were produced, coupled with the mention of the same in the Agreement between the parties. Therefore, even on this ground, the finding of the learned District Judge is incorrect in law. 34. As a consequence of this discussion, it is to be held that though the plans were not produced on record, the permissions in respect of the plans were produced, coupled with the mention of the same in the Agreement between the parties. Further, the evidence of the witnesses examined by the Plaintiffs, clearly showed that the FAR related to the area of the entire plot admeasuring 2317.97 sq.mts had to be availed for the purpose of construction. For the construction, development of the entire plot was necessary which required demolition of the structures. This fact was clearly established by the Plaintiffs by examining the witnesses. Therefore, the questions of 35. In the circumstances, the Judgment and Decree dated 5 May 2004 passed by the learned District Judge, North Goa, Panaji in Regular Civil Appeal no.65 of 2002 is liable to be quashed and set aside and it is, accordingly, quashed and set aside. Consequently, the Judgment and Order passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Ponda in Regular Civil Suit no 55/95/D dated 30 March 2002, stands restored to file. No costs. 36. At this stage, learned Counsel for the Defendant nos. 1 to 8 states that the grant of injunction be made effective after a particular date in case the Plaintiffs wishes to challenge the order further. Considering the fact that the Appeal is allowed and order of the learned District Judge is reversed, to give some breathing time to the Plaintiffs, it is directed that the order of injunction will become effective from the period of six weeks from the date the order is uploaded. The Defendant nos. 1 to 8 will maintain status quo in respect of the structure in question and will not create any third party rights or part with possession in any manner whatsoever.