ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. Heard petitioner present in person and the Counsel for the Bank. 2. The petitioner by way of this writ petition challenges the order dated 04.06.2015 passed by the Bank whereby, after having acquitted in the criminal case which was pending against him on 16.06.2014, he has been granted promotion in MMG Scale-II to JMG Scale-1 for the year 1999-2000. The benefit of promotion has been given notionally from 1.9.2000. The petitioner's grievance is with regard to not granting arrears for the intervening period from 1.9.2000 till the date of acquittal i.e. 16.06.2014 and of not granting any consequential promotion. 3. Petitioner present in person submits that once he had been acquitted, he was entitled for monetary benefits upon sealed cover having been opened and also for consideration for further promotion. It is also stated by him that he retired on 30.08.2014 and he has not been given any benefits by the respondents prior to acquittal by the competent Court in the criminal case. It is stated that the criminal case was registered frivolously and he is not in any manner involved with the allegations. The competent Court has not found him guilty of the charges. 4. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank submits that the sealed cover procedure as adopted by the bank was strictly followed and as soon as the petitioner was acquitted on account of being given benefit of doubt, his sealed cover was opened and he was granted promotion notionally from 1.9.2000 and considering the principles of 'no work no pay' on the higher post, the petitioner was not granted pay, allowances of the higher post upto to 15.06.2014. As regards consequential promotion, it is stated that the consequential promotion could not have been granted as the petitioner had retired. 5. Learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank relies on the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. K.V. Janki Raman ( AIR 1991 SC 2010 ). He also relies on the law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in following cases :- (1) JT 2008 (1) SC 77; Union of India v. B.M. Jha; (2) (1989) 2 Supreme Court Cases 557; Bansidhar & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.'; (3) JT 2006(12) SC 331; Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsen Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.'; (3) JT 2006(12) SC 331; Union of India & Anr. v. Tarsen Lal & Ors. (4) (2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 238 ; A.K.Soumini v. State Bank of Travancore & Anr. (5) (1996) 7 Supreme Court Cases 533; State of Haryana & Ors. v. O.P.Gupta & Ors. (6) JT 2006 (12) SC 334; National Highways Authority of India & Anr. v. Bumihiway DDB Ltd. (JV) & Ors. (6) RLW 2004 (3) 1415; Union of India & Ors. v. CAT & Ors. (7) (1996) 7 Supreme Court Cases 533; State of Haryana & Ors. v. O.P.Gupta & Ors. (8) RLW 2004(3) Raj. Page 1414; Union of India & Ors. v. C.A.T. & Ors. He further submits that the principle of 'no work no pay' can be applied in cases where sealed cover is opened after acquittal of a Government servant and there is no right accrued to an employee to receive actual benefits of salary for the intervening period. Counsel further submits that the petitioner has been acquitted by giving him benefit of doubt and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a clean acquittal relying on the observations made by Supreme Court in the case of K.V. Janki Raman (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has made the following observations : - "We are, therefore, broadly in agreement with the finding of the Tribunal that when an employee is completely exonerated meaning thereby that he is not 'found blameworthy in the least and is not visited with the penalty even of censure, he has to be given the benefit of the salary of the higher post along with the other benefits from the date on which he would have normally been promoted but for the disciplinary/criminal proceedings. However, there may be cases' where the proceedings, whether disciplinary or criminal, are, for example, delayed at the instance of the employee or the clearance in the disciplinary proceedings or acquittal in the criminal proceedings is with benefit of doubt or on account of non-availability of evidence due to the acts attributable to the employee etc. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. In such circumstances, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it. Life being complex, it is not possible to anticipate and enumerate exhaustively all the circumstances under which such consideration may become necessary. To ignore however, such circumstances when they exist and lay down' an inflexible rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated in disciplinary/criminal proceedings he should be entitled to all salary for the intervening period is to undermine discipline in the administration and jeopardise public interests. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Tribunal that to deny the salary to an employee would in all circumstances be illegal. While, therefore, we do not approve of the said last sentence in the first subparagraph after clause (iii) of paragraph 3 of the said Memorandum, viz.. "but no arrears of pay shall be payable to him for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion", we direct that in place of the said sentence the following sentence be read in the Memorandum: "However, whether the officer concerned will be entitled to any arrears of pay for the period of notional promotion preceding the date of actual promotion, and if so to what extent, will be decided by the concerned authority by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the disciplinary proceeding/criminal prosecution. Where the authority denies arrears of salary or part of it, it will record its reasons for doing so." To this extent we set aside the conclusion of the Tribunal on the said point." Hence, the petitioner was rightly given only notional benefits. 6. I have heard both the parties and find that the petitioner was one of the accused in the criminal case registered by CBI bearing No. 9 of 1998; State through CBI v. R.P. Sharma & Ors.. The petitioner has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him. However, the Court has observed that the acquittal is by granting benefit of doubt and no case of offence under Sections 420, 120B IPC has been made out. Accordingly, he has been acquitted. The petitioner has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him. However, the Court has observed that the acquittal is by granting benefit of doubt and no case of offence under Sections 420, 120B IPC has been made out. Accordingly, he has been acquitted. On having been acquitted on 16.06.2014, the Bank has passed an order on 04.06.2015 granting him benefit of promotion notionally from JMG Scale 1 to MMG Sc II against the year 1999-2000 (mainstream) w.e.f. 1.9.2000. The notional benefits have been directed to be released but arrears for the period 1.9.2000 to 15.06.2014 have been directed not to be paid. However, no consequential promotion was directed to be given. 7. This Court finds that the law as pointed out by learned Counsel for the Bank covers the first issue with regard to nonpayment of actual arrears for the intervening period. The Bank has absolute right to decide in the given circumstances whether to release actual salary or not for the intervening period. I do not find any error in the decision taken by the Bank. Taking into consideration the fact that the judgment does not acquit the petitioner cleanly but by only giving him benefit of doubt. 8. However, it is noted that while the monetary benefits would not accrue for the period from 1.9.2000 to 15.06.2014, since the petitioner retired on 30.08.2014, his pay and allowances were required to be revised after 15.6.2014 by actually fixing pay thereafter and pay him accordingly. Also, he was to be considered for further consequential promotion after 15.6.2014 which has not been granted to him. The exercise relating to consequential promotion could not have been denied as there is no provision for denying the same in view of the fact that the case of the petitioner was kept in sealed cover on account of the pendency of the criminal case. Benefit of further promotion which has been granted to persons juniors to him was required to be given to him as per his record which was available with the Bank. The said denial for the intervening period is unjustified. Thus, after having notionally promoted petitioner as MMG Scale-II, the right of consideration of the petitioner has to be recognized for further promotion. The said denial for the intervening period is unjustified. Thus, after having notionally promoted petitioner as MMG Scale-II, the right of consideration of the petitioner has to be recognized for further promotion. The Bank would, therefore, require to conduct the exercise accordingly and if the record of the petitioner is found equal to the persons who have been given promotion, the notional and actual benefits after 15th June, 2014 shall also be accorded. Accordingly, higher benefits as given to his juniors will be calculated and released at the time of his retirement. 9. With the said observations, the writ petition is disposed of.