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2017 DIGILAW 2532 (ALL)

ASHOK KUMAR PANDEY v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-11-03

SIDDHARTHA VARMA

body2017
JUDGMENT : Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma,J. The instant case has been filed against the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Sadar), Varanasi dated 9.12.2016 and the order dated 15.9.2017 passed by the Deputy Commissioner (Food), Varanasi Mandal, Varanasi. The petitioner states that the licence to run the fair price shop in question was wrongly cancelled on the ground that his wife had been elected a Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Molnapur. He submits that despite the fact that the Sub-divisional Officer had actually found that there was a decree of divorce by which on 15.9.2006 the marriage of the petitioner and his erstwhile wife had been dissolved, yet he had passed the order dated 9.12.2016. He submits that the view taken by the Sub-divisional Officer that the petitioner could not continue as a dealer as per Government Order dated 18.7.2002 as his ex-wife Smt. Sheela Pandey was living with him was palpably erroneous. He submits that even though the Appellate Court had found that there was a decree dissolving the marriage of the petitioner and his wife Smt. Sheela Pandey and had also found that there was no evidence that they were living together, yet it had wrongly remanded the matter back to the Sub-divisional Magistrate to reassess the evidence as was there before him and pass a fresh order. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that once there was a decree of divorce dated 15.9.2006 in existence by which marriage had been dissolved, the authorities could not go behind the decree and come to any third conclusion. He further submitted that even if the authorities found that the petitioner and his wife were on friendly terms, it could, by no stretch of imagination be concluded that the petitioner was living with Smt. Sheela Pandey as a husband. The learned Standing Counsel however, relying on the Government Order dated 3.7.1990 and the Government Order dated 18.7.2002 stated that if two individuals were living together under one roof and were cooking and messing together, then it would be presumed, as per the above two Government Orders, that they were living together and that the petitioner was prohibited from continuing as a fair price shop dealer. He also relied upon the Full Bench decision in Writ C. No. 24620 of 2013 (Indra Pal Singh vs. State of U.P. and 2 others) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the two orders are erroneous and deserve to be set aside. When there is a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage of the petitioner and his ex-wife Smt. Sheela Pandey, then the authorities could not go behind the decree and give a finding that as the petitioner and Smt. Pandey were living together the decree was brought to nought. The Supreme Court in AIR 2017 SC 1577 (M/s. Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. P.R.Selvam Alagappan has stated that even an executing court cannot go behind a decree. Therefore, if that is the position in law the Sub-divisional Officer definitely could not have gone behind the decree and could not have given its own conclusion. The evidence as has been relied upon by the authorities could never lead to the conclusion that the petitioner and his erstwhile wife were living together or were related to each other in any manner. Evidence should have been such which would have led to only one conclusion and that was that the petitioner and his ex-wife were living as husband and wife. In the absence of such an evidence any finding which the Sub-divisional Officer would arrive at could be only an exercise in futility. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel that even persons acquainted to each other if were messing together and were living under one roof would be covered by the Government Order, in the first blush, appeared to be having some substance but upon delving deeper into the provisions which would be reproduced later on in this judgment one could safely conclude that a friend who had for sometime lived under the same roof or had food along with the fair price shop dealer, would not become his relative and therefore, would not disentitle the fair price shop dealer from continuing to be a fair price shop dealer in the event the friend was elected a Pradhan. The relevant provisions of the Government Orders dated 3.7.1990 and 18.7.2002 are as follows: Government Order dated 3.7.1990 Þxzke iz/kku ;k mi iz/kku ds ifjokj ds lnL;ksa@lacaf/k;ksa ds i{k esa mfpr nj dh nqdku ds vkoaVu dk izLrko ugha fd;k tk;sxkA ifjokj dh ifjHkk"kk fuEufyf[kr ekuh tk;sxh-----------Lo;a] L=h] iq=] vfookfgr iq=h] ekrk] firk] HkkbZ ;k vU; dksbZ lnL; tks lkFk esa jgrk gks rFkk ,d pwYgs dk cuk [kkuk [kkrk gksAß Government Order dated 18.7.2002 Þmi;qZDr fo/k;d 'kklukns'k la0&,e0 3967@29&[k&6&fnukad& 03 tqykbZ] 1990 dk d`i;k lanHkZ xzg.k djsaA 2& bl laca/k esa lE;d fopkjksijkar v/kksgLrk{kjh dks ;g dgus dk funZs'k gqvk gS fd mDr 'kklukns'k ds izLrj&4-7 vfuLrkuqlkj tksM+ fn;k x;k gS%& ;fn fdlh nqdkunkj ;k mlds ifjokj esa fdlh lnL; dks ftldh ifjHkk"kk izLrj&4-7 esa nh xbZ gS iz/kku ;k mi iz/kku pqu fy;k tkrk gS rks mldh nqdku dk vkoaVu fujLr dj fn;k t;sxkA 3& d`i;k mDr 'kklukns'k bl lhek rd la'kksf/kr le>k tk;Aß Here the wife who had been divorced could not be called a relative by any stretch of imagination. The Government Orders have been framed in such a manner so as to prevent a fair price shop dealer from influencing a Pradhan so that he may not take any action against an erring Fair Price Shop Dealer. The presumption is that a Pradhan who is related to a Fair Price Shop Dealer may refrain from taking action against him. In the present case, there is no evidence which would prove that firstly, the ex-wife who had been elected a Pradhan was living and messing with the petitioner and consequently, would show such affection to the fair price shop dealer as a wife would and secondly a divorced wife could never be called a relative (lnL;) under the Government Order dated 3.7.1990. Under such circumstances, the orders dated 9.12.2016 and 15.9.2017 cannot be sustained and, therefore are set aside. The writ petition is allowed.