JUDGMENT : Mr. Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. 1. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner prays to set aside the punishment order dated 30.10.1999 passed by the Superintendent of Police, Dholpur and the order dated 18.5.2001 passed by the DIG (Police), Bharatpur Range, whereby the petitioner was removed from service and thereafter his appeal was rejected. 2. The short conspectus of the entire case is that the petitioner was holding the post of constable in Police Department and had been appointed in the year 1990. An F.I.R. No.153 of 98 came to be registered against him at Police Station Kanchanpur for offence under Section 363 & 366 IPC and later on offence under Section 376 IPC was also added. The complainant Shakina alleged that her daughter had been abducted by the petitioner and he was last seen talking with her. It was stated that her daughter Guddi was minor and her age was 16 years at that time. On the basis of the said F.I.R., the petitioner was arrested and remained in custody for 111 days. Challan was filed by the police and the petitioner was tried for the offences of 363, 366 and 376 IPC by the Sessions Judge, Dholpur in Sessions Case No.173/98. In the statement recorded before the Court, the complainant and the abducted lady Guddi as well as all other witnesses of the prosecution completely denied the prosecution story and therefore learned Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 10.3.99 honourably acquitted the petitioner from the charge for offence under Section 363, 366 and 376 IPC. 3. With regard to the same charges Departmental inquiry was initiated by the Appellate Authority after the suspending the petitioner on 11.8.1998, and served charge-sheet under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules on 22.1.1999. 4. Two charges were levelled against the petitioner, firstly that while he was posted as a constable at Police Station Kanchanpur, he abducted lady Guddi on the night of 7/8.8.99 and kept her at his Lakhanpur Hotel Badi, Room No. 104 and also committed her rape and the SHO found him with lady Guddi and arrested him and other charge was that the case was registered against him under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC for which he was arrested and remained in jail for 116 days and was released on bail on 3.1.1999. The charge-sheet was filed against him on 22.1.1999 and in this manner he had committed indiscipline and misconduct. The Additional SP Dholpur appointed an Inquiry Officer who conducted the inquiry and recorded evidence of witnesses. The petitioner in his defence submitted the judgment passed by the Sessions Judge dated 10.3.1999. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report on 22.9.1999 and held the petitioner guilty of charges on the basis of statements recorded by the complainant and her daughter under 161 Cr.P.C. in the criminal case. 5. On the basis of the Inquiry Report, the petitioner was held guilty of the charges and was removed from service by the order impugned dated 30.10.1999. 6. The counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that in the course of departmental inquiry, said complainant Shakina and her daughter lady Guddi appeared before the Inquiry Officer and both of them clearly stated that the petitioner was not involved in the incident nor the petitioner had committed any rape of her daughter Miss Guddi. It was also stated by girl and as well as her mother that the petitioner had not abducted her and the mother of the girl also stated that the girl used to go to the market and it was under wrong impression that she had filed the complaint. The other witnesses who came in the Departmental Inquiry also did not support the prosecution case and in spite of that, the Inquiry Officer held the petitioner guilty and did not take into consideration the compromise arrived at between the complainant and the petitioner. The petitioner has submitted that the entire case set up in the Departmental Inquiry was only to support the investigation which was wrongfully done against the petitioner by the concerned SHO who was having a personal bias against him. It was pointed out before the Departmental Inquiry Officer that SHO was inimical to the petitioner and had falsely set up the case without there being any evidence against him. Even the complainant and the concerned girl stated there signatures were taken on blank paper but with a view to favour concerned officer, the petitioner was held guilty in the departmental proceedings. 7. Even the complainant and the concerned girl stated there signatures were taken on blank paper but with a view to favour concerned officer, the petitioner was held guilty in the departmental proceedings. 7. The counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat reported in [ 2006 (5) SCC 446 ] and judgment passed by this court in a case of Bahadur Ram v. State of Rajasthan reported in [2008 (2) WLC 327]. 8. After having gone through the aforesaid facts and after examining the record, it is seen that this is a case of no evidence and there is no iota of evidence against the petitioner to hold the petitioner guilty of having committed the said offence of abduction and rape as alleged in the departmental proceedings. A judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial. The witnesses were examined who had deposed before the Sessions Judge in the criminal trial and none of them has supported their version. In view thereof a different finding could not have been arrived at by the Inquiry Officer and such finding arrived at is clearly perverse as he has relied upon the statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. which were rejected in the criminal proceedings. 9. It is a settled principle of law that the power to proceed with the departmental proceedings simultaneously with criminal case may go on. In the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr. reported in [ 1999 (3) SCC 679 ], it was held in para 34 as under:- There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, 'the raid conducted at the appellant's residence and recovery of incriminating articles there from.' The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 10. In the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur & Anr. v. Ramchandra & Ors. reported in [ 1981 (2) SCC 714 ], it was held in para 6 as under:- The other question that remains is if the respondents are acquitted in the criminal case whether or not the departmental inquiry pending against the respondents would have to continue. This is a matter which is to be decided by the department after considering the nature of the findings given by the criminal court. Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered. However, as quite some time has elapsed since the departmental inquiry had started the authority concerned will taken into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worth while to continue the departmental inquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the authority feels that there is sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the inquiry, it can certainly do so. In case the respondents are acquitted we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry. Mr. In case the respondents are acquitted we direct that the order of suspension shall be revoked and the respondents will be reinstated and allowed full salary thereafter even though the authority chooses to proceed with the inquiry. Mr. Sanghi states that if it is decided to continue the inquiry, as only arguments have to be heard and orders to be passed, he will see that the inquiry is concluded within two months from the date of the decision of the criminal court. If the respondents are convicted, then the legal consequences under the rules will automatically follow. 11. In the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in [ 2006 (5) SCC 446 ], it was held as under:- 30. The judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents are not distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a Departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the Criminal Court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and in the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles there from. The Investigating Officer, Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the Enquiry Officer who by relying upon their statement came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by his judicial pronouncement with the finding that the charge has not been proved. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. It is also to be noticed the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand. 31. In our opinion, such facts and evidence in the department as well as criminal proceedings were the same without there being any iota of difference, the appellant should succeed. The distinction which is usually proved between the departmental and criminal proceedings on the basis of the approach and burden of proof would not be applicable in the instant case. Though finding recorded in the domestic enquiry was found to be valid by the Courts below, when there was an honourable acquittal of the employee during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the dismissal, the same requires to be taken note of and the decision in Paul Anthony's case (supra) will apply. We, therefore, hold that the appeal filed by the appellant deserves to be allowed. 12. In the case of Bahadur Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in [RLW 2008 (2) Raj 998], this court followed the law laid down in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (Supra) In the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr. v. S. Samuthiram reported in [ 2013 (1) SCC 598 ], it was held as under:- 23. We are of the view that the mere acquittal of an employee by a criminal court has no impact on the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Department. The respondent, it may be noted, is a member of a disciplined force and non examination of two key witnesses before the criminal court that is Adiyodi and Peter, in our view, was a serious flaw in the conduct of the criminal case by the Prosecution. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the possibility of winning over P.Ws. 1 and 2 in the criminal case cannot be ruled out. We fail to see, why the Prosecution had not examined Head Constables 1368 Adiyodi and 1079 Peter of Tenkasi Police Station. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2, husband and wife, to the Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. It was these two Head Constables who took the respondent from the scene of occurrence along with P.Ws. 1 and 2, husband and wife, to the Tenkasi Police Station and it is in their presence that the complaint was registered. In fact, the criminal court has also opined that the signature of PW 1 (husband – complainant) is found in Ex.P1 – Complaint. Further, the Doctor P.W.8 has also clearly stated before the Enquiry Officer that the respondent was under the influence of liquor and that he had refused to undergo blood and urine tests. That being the factual situation, we are of the view that the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court, but only due to the fact that PW 1 and PW 2 turned hostile and other prosecution witnesses were not examined. Honourable Acquittal 24. The meaning of the expression 'honourable acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 . In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions 'honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame', 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. 13. In view of above, the court found that result may vary from case to case and factual aspects may vary from the above position of law. In the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. [reported in 1999 (2) SCC 10 ], it was held in para 6 and para 8 as under:- 6. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. [reported in 1999 (2) SCC 10 ], it was held in para 6 and para 8 as under:- 6. The Court cannot sit in appeal over those findings and assume the role of the Appellate Authority. But this does not mean that in no circumstance can the Court interfere. The power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under the Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached by an ordinary prudent man or the findings were perverse or made at the dictate of the superior authority. 8. The findings, recorded in a domestic enquiry, can be characterised as perverse if it is shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence on record or is not based on the evidence adduced by the parties or no reasonable person could have come to those findings on the basis of the that evidence. This principle was laid down by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Rao., in which the question was whether the High Court, under Article 226, could interfere with the findings recorded at the departmental enquiry. This decision was followed in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Prakash Chand Jain, and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel. In Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, it was laid down that where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no reasonable man could come, the findings can be rejected as perverse. It was also laid down that where a quasi-judicial tribunal records findings based on no legal evidence and the findings are his mere ipse dixit or based on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the additional infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. 14. It is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between case of honourable acquittal and the case where there is a technical acquittal. 14. It is clear that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between case of honourable acquittal and the case where there is a technical acquittal. In the present case, it is a case of no evidence and it appears that the petitioner had been falsely implicated for the charge under Sections 363, 366 and 376 since the so called complainant as well as the girl who has said to be abducted and raped had refuted the allegations as in the criminal case. Even the other witnesses who were produced by the prosecution in criminal case did not support the charge and therefore it has to be held that the petitioner was honourably acquitted. 15. Two different conclusions could not have been drawn on the same set of the evidence in a departmental enquiry as it was a case of no evidence. 16. In view of above, the enquiry proceedings are set aside and the order of dismissal from service dated 30.10.1999 and order dated 18.5.2001 passed against the petitioner is quashed with all consequential benefits. The benefits shall be released to the petitioner within the period of 3 months from the date of submission of certified copy. 17. It goes without saying that if the order is not complied, the petitioner shall be free to initiate contempt proceedings without further notice. 18. The writ petition is accordingly allowed.