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2017 DIGILAW 2558 (MAD)

Sehu Fathima v. Peer Mohammed

2017-08-10

TEEKAA RAMAN

body2017
ORDER : 1. The plaintiff is the appellant herein. For the sake of convenience, parties are referred to as per the ranking before the trial Court. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit before the Vacation Court, Tirunelveli in O.S. No. 25 of 1990 had been transferred to District Munsif Court, Valliyoor and re-numbered as O.S. No. 189 of 1996 and same has been transferred to District Munsif, Nanguneri. It is re-numbered as O.S. No. 945 of 1996. 2. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for declaration that declaring her property as a lessee or in the alter to enjoy the schedule property by constructing the house has permitted by the Panchayat and injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit property. 3. The brief averments of the plaint that are necessary to decide this appeal are as follows: The plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule properties by virtue of the sale deed executed by S.M. Nagoor Meeran Sahib S/o S. Mohammed Mohideen Tharaganar of Thiruvaranganeri on 17.05.1982 for Rs. 3,000/-. The plaintiff has applied to the Eruvadi Town Panchayat to construct the house with a plan. The plan of the plaintiff was approved by the Panchayat in Building Licence No. 100/86-87, dated 11.03.1987. The suit property is described in revenue records as Natham Poramboke intended for habitation. Rental agreement was executed between the Thirukuraungudi Jeeyar Mutt and S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib on 21.01.1967 for a period of five years on an annual rent of Rs. 12/- . The plaintiffs predecessor S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib is entitled to patta under Section 13 of the Act 30/63 as he was owning the site during the relevant period. Ground rent pattas have been issued to persons like the plaintiff. The village Thiruvaranga was notified under Minor Inam Abolition Act 30/63 which came into force on 15.02.1965. The defendant has no right, interest or title to the suit property. As plaintiff is a woman and as her husband is running a petty shop in Madras the defendant is obstructing the plaintiff from constructing the house with a view to grab at the property. Hence, the plaintiff has brought this suit for declaration and consequential injunction against the defendant. 4. As plaintiff is a woman and as her husband is running a petty shop in Madras the defendant is obstructing the plaintiff from constructing the house with a view to grab at the property. Hence, the plaintiff has brought this suit for declaration and consequential injunction against the defendant. 4. The brief averments of the written statement filed by the defendant that are necessary to decide this appeal are as follows: The plaintiff has filed this suit by suppressing the material facts that this defendant has already filed a suit for declaration as a lessee with regard to the very same property against the plaintiff in O.S. No. 233 of 1990 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Valliyoor and the learned District Munsif was also pleased to grant an ad-interim injunction against the plaintiff herein in I.A. No. 657 of 1990 and the ad-interim injunction is still in force. The plaintiff has not come forward with clean hands. On this ground alone the suit is to be dismissed with compensatory costs. The plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the schedule property by virtue of a sale deed executed by S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib on 17.05.1982 for Rs. 3,000/- is denied as false. The alleged sale deed by the plaintiff with regard to the schedule property on 17.05.1982 is only a sham and nominal document. The said Nagoor Meeran Sahib has no right, interest or title to execute any sale deed with regard to the schedule property. Hence, any claim over the schedule property by the plaintiff through the said Nagoor Meeran Sahib is invalid and untenable under law or on facts. The further allegation by the plaintiff that he applied to Eruvadi Town Panchayat to construct a house with plan and it was approved by the panchayat have neither any evidenciary value nor any relevancy for the case. That will not be binding upon the defendant at any rate of imagination. Infact the plaint schedule property absolutely belongs to Sri Jeeyar Mutt, Thirukkarugudi. The patta stands in the name of the said Mutt till today from 02.03.1970. The defendant took the schedule property on an oral lease from the said Mutt in the year 1972 and from 1972 this defendant has been paying the rent regularly to the said Jeeyar Mutt. Infact the plaint schedule property absolutely belongs to Sri Jeeyar Mutt, Thirukkarugudi. The patta stands in the name of the said Mutt till today from 02.03.1970. The defendant took the schedule property on an oral lease from the said Mutt in the year 1972 and from 1972 this defendant has been paying the rent regularly to the said Jeeyar Mutt. As a dispute regarding the Villagers of Eruvadi and Jeeyar Mutt in the Civil Court, the said Jeeyar Mutt was not inclined to give written lease agreement with regard to the schedule property. The said Civil suit ended in favour of the said Jeeyar Mutt in the year 1990. Hence, on 12.03.1990 a fresh new registered lease agreement was entered into between the said Jeeyar Mutt and this defendant. The alleged predecessors-in-title namely Nagoor Meeran Sahib of the plaintiff is none other than the father of this defendant. He was a lessee of the schedule property under the said Jeeyar Mutt from 1967 to 1972. He did not renew the lease after 1972. So, this defendant became the lessee of the schedule property under the said Jeeyar Mutt from 1972 onwards as stated above. Due to some family problem, misunderstanding arosed between defendant and his father Nagoor Meeran Sahib and number of Civil Suits are pending in Civil Courts between this defendant and his father. Hence, with an ulterior motive and in order to give trouble and hardship to the defendant the said Nagoor Meeran Sahib had created the alleged sale deed on 17.05.1982 in favour of the plaintiff as if the said Nagoor Meeran Sahib had created the alleged sale deed on 17.05.1982 in favour of the plaintiff as if the said Nagoor Meeran Sahib was the absolute owner of the schedule property. The plaintiff ought to have impleaded the Thirukarangudi Jeeyar Mutt as a party to this suit. The said Mutt is a necessary party to this suit. Hence, this suit is bad for non-joinder of neceeary party and plaintiff is not entitled to get any relief and therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed. 5. On the side of the plaintiffs, PW-1 and PW-3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A10 were marked and on the defendants side, DWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked and Advocate Commissioner's report as marked as Ex.C1. 6. 5. On the side of the plaintiffs, PW-1 and PW-3 were examined and Exs.A1 to A10 were marked and on the defendants side, DWs. 1 to 3 were examined and Exs.B1 to B8 were marked and Advocate Commissioner's report as marked as Ex.C1. 6. Based upon the pleadings of the parties and the evidence in both oral and documentary, the Trial Court came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs have proved that they are entitled to the shares in the suit property and hence, decreed the suit. 7. The defendant filed in A.S. No. 197 of 2002 before the Principal Sub-Judge, Tirunelveli, after contest the appeal is allowed and the suit was dismissed, hence, the Second Appeal. 8. At the time of admission, the following substantial questions of law are framed for consideration: (i) When the appellant herself has restricted her right as an lessee under her vendor, whether such a right can be denied simply because as it was averred in the plaint what was conveyed to her was the right of ownership, but not the leasehold right? (ii) When the lessee of the property conveyed his right to the 3rd parties, can the lessor without dispossessing the lessee in accordance with land and under due process of law grant the lease relating to the same property to the 3rd parties? 9. The plaint proceeds on the basis that by virtue of the rental agreement executed between Thirukurungudi Jeeyar and Nagoor Meera Sahib on 21.01.1967 for a period of 5 years on an annual rent. Subsequently, in view of the Minor Inam Abolition and the said Nagoor Meera Sahib was absolute owner of the property. On such right, he has executed on Ex.A1 sale deed on 17.05.1982 and hence, the plaintiff has become the absolute owner of the property and being in possession of the property as the respondent/defendant try to interfere with the possession, she filed the suit for relief. 10. The sum and substance of the written statement filed by the respondent/defendant is that, the plaint schedule property belongs to Jeeyar Mutt of Thirukurungudi. Patta stands in the name of the Jeeyar Mutt till 1970. 10. The sum and substance of the written statement filed by the respondent/defendant is that, the plaint schedule property belongs to Jeeyar Mutt of Thirukurungudi. Patta stands in the name of the Jeeyar Mutt till 1970. In the year 1972, the lease in favour of his father came to be time lapsed and hence, on 12.03.1990, a fresh new registered legal agreement was entered between the Jeeyar Mutt and the defendant and he is in possession of the property paying ground rent to the mutt and therefore, prayed for dismissal of the suit. 11. It is to be stated that the defendant herein also filed in O.S. No. 192 of 1996 on the file of Valliyur District Munsif, Nanguneri. subsequently, on transfer which is re-numbered in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 District Munsif, Nanguneri for a similar prayer against the plaintiff herein in respect of suit schedule property therein and the Jeeyar Mutt is also made as a second defendant therein, for the reasons best known, the trial Court has not conducted the joint trial of the two cases. One filed by the plaintiff herein and other filed by the defendant in respect of the property belonging to the Jeeyar Mutt. However, simultaneous trial as seems to have been conducted and exhibits have been marked in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 and that has been adopted as an independent exhibits in this case also and after conclusion of the trial, the trial Court has delivered judgment on 07.11.2000 on the very same day however by separate judgment. 12. As narrated above, the plaintiff have examined herself as PW-1 and his neighbours has examined PW-2 and PW-3. While, the defendant is examined as DW-1. The Manager of Jeeyar Mutt was examined as DW-2 and the Village Administrative Office was examined as DW-3, John Rajappa. 13. On consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, the trial Court has come to the conclusion that, based upon the Advocate Commissioner's report and the Exhibit A6 has come to the conclusion that the Advocate Commissioner who had inspected the property with assistance of the Village Surveyor have fixed that the dispute property viz., the schedule property is situated in S. No. 17 and for the said Advocate Commissioner's report, the defendant herein has not filed any objection. Accordingly, trial has held that the suit property is situated only in S. No. 17 as contended by the plaintiff and not in S. No. 7/3 as conducted by defendant in the written statement. 14. Further, when the defendant is in the witness box as DW-1 in the cross examination. He has categorically admitted that: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 15. Aggrieved against the said Judgment of the trial Court, the defendant has preferred in A.S. No. 197 of 2002. It remains to be stated that the suit filed by the defendant herein in O.S. No. 190 of 1990, Sub-Court, Tirunelveli i.e. re-numbered as O.S. No. 772 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif, Nanguneri was dismissed by a separate judgment, on the very same day. As against the said dismissal of the suit, the defendant herein (who is the plaintiff therein) has not preferred any appeal. However, he has chosen to file an appeal only against the judgment in O.S. No. 945 of 1996 alone. The Lower Appellate Court after hearing the parties have come to the conclusion that the defendant is in possession of the property by virtue of the rental agreement executed by the Jeeyar Mutt and the plaintiff who has claimed for absolute owner of the property cannot restrict the claim for a mere declaration of lessee and allowed the appeal and hence, the Second Appeal. 16. During pendency of the Second Appeal, the plaintiff has filed application M.P. (MD) No. 3 of 2014 to implead the Jeeyar Mutt as a party/respondent, wherein, this Court has passed following order:- "This petition is filed on the ground that 'Mutt' is a necessary party. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the second respondent is not at all a party to the suit or in the appeal and hence, he is not a necessary party and further, he has submitted that he is not pressing the appeal for non joinder of the second respondent. In view of the above submission, this petition is dismissed as unnecessary." 17. In view of the above submission, this petition is dismissed as unnecessary." 17. Pending consideration of the Second Appeal, when the matter was taken up for filing disposal by an order dated 20.02.2014, this Court after hearing the counsel for the appellant has directed the appellant to get the certified copy of the judgment rendered by the trial Court in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 and to file the same as an additional evidence in this appeal. 18. In obedience to the order passed by this Court on 20.02.2014, as stated supra, the appellant has filed M.P. (MD) No. 2 of 2014 to receive the copy of the plaint and written statement filed in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif, Nanguneri and copy of the notice, dated 20.07.2013 and the reply dated 07.12.2013 as an additional evidence in this case. Another M.P. No. 3/2014 is to receive the certified copies of decree and Judgment dated 07.11.2000 rendered in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 on the file of District Munsif, Nanguneri and copy of the Advocate Commissioner report dated 12.11.1993 filed in I.A. No. 246 of 1991 in O.S. No. 190 of 1990 on the file of Additional Sub-Judge, Tirunelveli as additional evidence in the present Second Appeal. 19. The respondent have filed counter and arguments are heard in the M.Ps. Before discussing with the M.P. this Court have noticed that, in short to say, the trial Court has not conducted the trial in the proper manner either in recording the evidence or in marking the exhibits. 20. As stated supra, two suits have been filed and pending before the same Court. One by the plaintiff against the defendant and another by the defendant against the plaintiff in respect of the land belong to Jeeyar Mutt. The trial Court ought to have taken a joint-trial instead of simultaneous trial. 21. 20. As stated supra, two suits have been filed and pending before the same Court. One by the plaintiff against the defendant and another by the defendant against the plaintiff in respect of the land belong to Jeeyar Mutt. The trial Court ought to have taken a joint-trial instead of simultaneous trial. 21. It is seen from the evidence of the PW-1 to PW-3 and DW-1 to DW-3 and other exhibits in this case from proper recording of evidence and the trial is marred by improper recorded is of deposition of witness and improper of marking of evidence added with to make observation with heavy heart that it is a displeasure in recording as to manner in which a trial has been conducted to make this case as a typical example as to how a trial could not have been conducted. 22. Considering the fact, the suit is of the year 1990 and at this distance of time, this Court is of the considered view that a substantial justice to the party alone will meet the ends of justice. The view that the substantial justice can be done in Second Appeal is approved in the decision reported in Kondireddi Bulliraju alias Achayamma vs. Kondireddi Satyanarayanamurthi, CDJ 1929 MHC 142 : 1930 (1) MLJ 388 : 1930 (31) LW 254, wherein it is held that Substantial justice should not altogether be lost sight of in considering finality of decision and in the decision reported in Durairaj vs. Koyilmani, CDJ 2014 MHC 2063 : 2014 (5) CTC 495, wherein this Court has considered that whether in law is not the second appellate Court exercising the power under Section 100 of C.P.C. empowered to take note of subsequent events with a view to render substantial justice held in affirmative. It is seen from the evidence on record that the PW-1, the plaintiff Sehu Fathima examined as a PW-1 and stated that the suit property is in Survey No. 17 and as the defendant interfered with the possessions, he has filed the suit and in the Chief examination: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 23. While, PW-2 and PW-3 are the neighbours who could be deposed that the PW-1 plaintiff was in possession since after Nagoor Meeran Sahib. The defendant is examined as DW-1 in the cross examination, he had admitted that: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. While, PW-2 and PW-3 are the neighbours who could be deposed that the PW-1 plaintiff was in possession since after Nagoor Meeran Sahib. The defendant is examined as DW-1 in the cross examination, he had admitted that: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 24. The Village Rent Controller of Jeeyar Mutt is examined as DW-2 as stated: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 25. The Village Administrative Officer who examined as DW-3 have stated: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 26. The trial Court relied upon the Advocate Commissioner's report which is marked as Exhibit A5. In his Judgment at Para 5, observing that the map is Exhibit A6 and Advocate Commissioner's report is marked as Exhibit C1 by a Judgment dated 07.11.2000. However, in the order copy, it is seen that as per the Administrative order No. 19, dated 07.07.2004, the Advocate Commissioner's report has been deleted. This Court is unable to understand as to how by Administrative order, the document which is marked during the chief examination without objection has been deleted. Further, the judgment was delivered on 07.11.2000, thereafter in the 2004, by an administrative order, Exhibit C1 was deleted. The same is legally unsustainable. Further, now as directed by this Court in its order dated 20.02.2014 M.P. (MD) No. 3 of 2014 was filed to receive the certified copy of the decree and judgment rendered in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 along with advocate Commissioner's report filed in I.A. No. 246 of 1991 in O.S. No. 190 of 1990 (subsequently re-numbered as 772 of 1996). 27. The learned counsel for the respondent herein relied upon the decision this Court in Murugesan vs. Karuppayee Ammal and Another, 2003 M.L.J. 767 contended that report and plan of Advocate Commissioner in another suit can be marked only by examining that advocate commissioner. It is to be stated that in the decision report in 1995 (1) CTC 47 in C. Kailaschand Jain vs. Mohamed Kasim, this Court has held that report of Advocate Commissioner in one suit cannot form part of the recording in another suit without examination of commissioner and marking the report through him. However, further held that since commissioner's report was marked by consent and the same is admissible in evidence. 28. As stated supra, the Advocate Commissioner's report has been marked as Exhibit A5. However, further held that since commissioner's report was marked by consent and the same is admissible in evidence. 28. As stated supra, the Advocate Commissioner's report has been marked as Exhibit A5. While, PW-1 in the witness box and no objection has been raised and hence, by an administrative order, the trial Court cannot delete the same. Now, as per the direction by this Court on 20.02.2014, the appellant/plaintiff has filed M.P. No. 3 of 2014 to receive the advocate commissioner's report and also the judgment and decrees in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 and hence, in the interest of justice, M.P. No. 3 of 2014 is allowed and those documents are received as additional evidence. The Exhibit A9, A10 and A11 on the side of the plaintiff. 29. The above Second Appeal has been admitted on the above mentioned substantial questions of law. Substantial Question of Law I:- The plaintiff has come forward with specific plea that she had purchased the suit property from one Nagoor Meera Sahib the father of the defendant on 17.05.1992 from the evidence of the DW-2 Ramachandran of the mutt i.e., examined as DW-2. On behalf of the defendant has categorically stated that, during the relevant point of time, the case in Minor Inam Abolition Act was under progress and hence, as per Act 30/1963 which came into force on 5.2.1965. The civil suit in respect of the Minor Inam Abolition Act has been seems to have been held in favour of the Jeeyar Mutt has could be seen from the evidence of DW-2. 30. From the evidence of DW-1 the case of the defendant is that a fresh lease agreement was executed on 12.03.1980 which is marked as Ex.B1. It remains to be stated that from the evidence of the DW-2 Manager of the Mutt that the original lease S.N. Nagoor Meerab Sahib, father of the defendant was not terminated nor the Mutt has taken possession from the said lessee in the manner known to law. Therefore, what was conveyed under the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is only on onerous ownership of over the property. However, the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property on the date of the Ex.A1 sale deed as early as on 1982. Therefore, what was conveyed under the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is only on onerous ownership of over the property. However, the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit property on the date of the Ex.A1 sale deed as early as on 1982. Further, she also filed notice issued by the R.D.O. of the year 1982 and building plan permit issued by the Euruvadi Panchayat Board and tax receipts to show her possession under Ex.A1. Therefore, though the defendant claimed that a lease was executed in his favour as per the suit property is situated only in S. No. 17 not a 7 as claimed by him and hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent/ defendant that the defendant is in possession of the suit property by holding over under the lease agreement dated 12.03.1990 cannot be upheld for more than one reason. 31. Admittedly, the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff, was in possession of the property by holding over of lease deed executed in his favour which he enjoyed have executed a deed under Ex.A1, and on and from that date , plaintiff is in possession of the suit property and she is continuous in possession of the suit property has held by the trial Court as corroborated by PW-2 and 3 and coupled with the fact that the description of the suit property does tally with the suit property which was identified by the Advocate Commissioner as could be seen from the Ex.A5, this Court comes to the conclusion that though she averred that, under Ex.A1 sale deed right of the ownership was conveyed to her and however, in view of subsequent decision in Inam Abolition proceeding, she is restricting her claim as that of the statutory lessee cannot be negatived and hence, the order of the lower Appellate Court is not sustainable in law. 32. Further, on appreciation of documentary evidence, this Court finds that the lower Appellate Court without considering and the without identifying the suit property have erroneously come to the conclusion that the suit property was not described properly. It remains to be stated that as per the plaint, the plaintiffs specifically stated the suit property is in S. No. 17 natham land plan. While, defendant stated as if it is in S. No. 7/3. It remains to be stated that as per the plaint, the plaintiffs specifically stated the suit property is in S. No. 17 natham land plan. While, defendant stated as if it is in S. No. 7/3. While, the Advocate Commissioner, as extracted above has clearly stated that the suit property is situated in S. No. 17 and therefore, the finding of the lower Appellate Court is not supported by the documentary evidence filed in this case and accordingly, the above said finding is erroneous and the same is stands vacated. 33. For the reasons discussed supra, this Court has found that Jeeyar Mutt has given lease of property in Survey No. 17 in favour of S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib, who in turn has conveyed the property to the plaintiff under Ex.A.1 and for the circumstances as narrated above, initially, there was a cloud over the title of the property in view of the civil cases pending before the various Courts and only in the year 1990, the cases under Inam Abolition Act have come to an end i.e. after the Sale Deed in favour of the plaintiff herein. Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff is well within her right to restrict her right as a lessee under the Jeeyar Mutt. Therefore, the appellant/plaintiff is well within to extract her right as a lease lessee under the Jeeyar Mutt. However, as stated supra, before the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court, the jeeyar mutt was not added as a party in the suit. Though, in the suit filed by the defendant herein in O.S. No. 772 of 1996, the jeeyar mutt was a party and as against the dismissal of the suit in O.S. No. 772 of 1996 none of the parties have filed any appeal before the lower Appellate Court also seems significance. However, it appears that during the pendency of the Second Appeal, the Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 721 of 2005 was dismissed on 29.07.2016 wherein it is stated: "This petition is filed on the ground that 'Mutt' is a necessary party. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the second respondent is not at all a party to the suit or in the appeal and hence, he is not a necessary party and further, he has submitted that he is not pressing the appeal for non joinder of the second respondent. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the second respondent is not at all a party to the suit or in the appeal and hence, he is not a necessary party and further, he has submitted that he is not pressing the appeal for non joinder of the second respondent. In view of the above submission, this petition is dismissed as unnecessary." 34. In view of the order passed in the above Civil Miscellaneous Petition as extracted above, this Court expressed is in-ability to give a declaration of leasehold right to the plaintiff. However, the relief sought for in the suit is one for declaration restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession and enjoy the suit property can be considered. Though, the substantial question of law is held to be in affirmative in favour of the appellant. In view of the fact that the jeeyar mutt is not a party before this Court and the M.P. No. 721 of 2005 which was filed to implead the jeeyar mutt as a party has been dismissed as unnecessarily. This Court, is not in a position to grant the relief of declaration of leasehold right. 35. Substantial question of Law II:- T. Ramachandran, Village Rent Controller of Jeeyar Mutt has categorically admitted that: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 36. Based upon Ex.A.1-Lease Deed and Ex.A.2-Sale Deed and admission of DW-2 Manager of the Mutt that the Mutt has not dispossessed the lessee S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib and nor he has surrendered his lease clearly indicates that in the suit property situated in Survey No. 17, S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib only was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property and on the strength of the original lease deed Ex.A.1 in favour of the vendor of the plaintiff, he had conveyed to the present plaintiff and hence, the trial Court has come to a conclusion that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit property by virtue of the conveyance made by the lessee S.M. Nagoor Meera Sahib and thereafter, the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property as she was not evicted by due process of law. It also remains to be stated that based upon the Advocate Commissioner's report which has indicated that the suit property is only situated in Survey No. 17 coupled with the fact that what was given on lease to the defendant is only in Survey No. 7/3, this Court comes to a conclusion that the plaintiff is in possession of the property and no lease was conveyed to the defendant in respect of the suit property since the Jeeyar Mutt cannot convey the property without taking possession from the original lessee or person claiming under him and in this view of the matter, the second substantial question of law is also held in favour of the appellant herein. 37. In the result: (i) This Second Appeal is allowed in part. (ii) The judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court in A.S. No. 197 of 2012 on the file of Principal Sub-Judge, Nanguneri is set aside and the suit in O.S. No. 945 of 1996 on the file of the District Munsif of Nanguneri is decreed-in-part to the limited extent of injunction relief alone and in respect of the declaration relief shall stands negative. (iii) Consequently, O.S. No. 772 of 1996 is decreed in part and there shall be a an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in respect of the property. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.