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2017 DIGILAW 256 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Mahmad Salim Vajir Shaikh

2017-02-01

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed this appeal against the judgment and order acquittal dated 17th October, 2005 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Valsad, in Sessions Case No. 31 of 2004. 2. The present case is encircled around the fact that one Manoj Shitalprasad Rajput, a person originally belonging to Uttar Pradesh, came to Umargam since about eight years and was staying with his parents. The complainant Manoj Shitalprasad used to ply tempo and out of the earnings was feeding his family. On 30.11.2003 at Railway Station Road, one Mr. Jayeshbhai Patel had arranged 'Satyanarayan pooja' where the complainant Manoj Shitalprasad went along with his friends and at about 7.30 p.m. when 'pooja' ceremony got over, they took 'prasad' and thereafter met several persons over there. Amongst them, there were persons named Ketan, who was working in Umargam factory, Kushal, who was residing at Daheri and was working in Boiler factory and Jay @ Guddu, who was residing at Dalwad. Kushal, who originally belonged to Bombay and running a Gymkhana outside the Swapnalok Society came with his brother-Tanaji. It is further asserted by the complainant that Tanaji informed Kushal that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were headstrong persons and were refusing their customers to park their vehicle who are coming daily in Gymkhana and therefore, Tanaji requested his friend to persuade these accused to allow their clients to park the vehicle and therefore, all four i.e. complainant, Kushal, Ketan and Jay went to Gymkhana where three Muslim boys, accused No. 1 and his brother Naresh Kodi were present. At that time, issue regarding parking of vehicle was deliberated and suddenly Salim and Mohmad got enraged and started quarreling by using rough language resultantly one Surya Chacha, who was residing near Janakpuri came there along with other three persons and requested these persons not to quarrel and leave the place. At that time, issue regarding parking of vehicle was deliberated and suddenly Salim and Mohmad got enraged and started quarreling by using rough language resultantly one Surya Chacha, who was residing near Janakpuri came there along with other three persons and requested these persons not to quarrel and leave the place. While leaving the place, Salim gave threat that they would take revenge but the complainant and other persons did not seriously notice such threat and parked the motor cycle near the flat of Surya Chacha and they went to the shop of Chiku Kota at about 8 P.m. The complainant further asserted that at about 10 p.m., while he was going on his bullet motor cycle and reached to the ground floor of Swapnalok Society, Surya Chacha was taking his food where the complainant did not take the food and thereafter left the place. Since there was a desire to smoke, he was smoking at about 10.45 p.m. and at that time, on southern side, some 4-5 persons were talking. At that time, Salim and his brother Mohmed, Naresh and three other Muslim boys came with iron rod, sticks, knife and sword and they proceeded to the place of Surya Chacha and assaulted him with knife and sword. They also inflicted him pipe blows and stick blows. The persons standing nearby the Society and vicinity ran away from the scene of offence and Surya Chacha shouted for help to intercept and to save Surya Chacha. The present complainant has specifically asserted in the complaint that Muslim boys, who came there with iron pipes, attacked and caused serious injuries to Surya Chacha who ultimately succumbed to the injuries. On account of this incident, a complaint came to be filed before Umargam Police Station which was registered as C.R. No. I-281 of 2003 for the offence punishable under sections 143, 147, 149 and 302 of IPC. 2.1 This complaint which came to be lodged at Umargam Police Station was investigated by Investigating Officer, who collected all relevant materials, drew panchnamas which were necessary and recorded statements of witnesses and accordingly, after taking every step required for investigation and upon finding a prima facie material against the accused, a charge sheet came to be filed. 2.1 This complaint which came to be lodged at Umargam Police Station was investigated by Investigating Officer, who collected all relevant materials, drew panchnamas which were necessary and recorded statements of witnesses and accordingly, after taking every step required for investigation and upon finding a prima facie material against the accused, a charge sheet came to be filed. 2.2 Since the case was triable by Sessions Court, it appears that learned Magistrate has committed the case to the Court of Sessions and the same was registered as Sessions Case No. 31 of 2004 before the learned Presiding Officer, 2nd Fast Track Court, Valsad. 2.3 Pursuant to the committal of the case, the charge came to be framed at Exh. 4 which was read over to the accused persons but they have denied the offence being committed and therefore, the case was put up for trial. 2.4 To prove the case against the respondents accused, the prosecution has led the evidence in detail in the form of oral as well as documentary evidences. 4 which was read over to the accused persons but they have denied the offence being committed and therefore, the case was put up for trial. 2.4 To prove the case against the respondents accused, the prosecution has led the evidence in detail in the form of oral as well as documentary evidences. Following are the oral evidence of the witnesses:- P.W. No. Name of witness Exhibit No. 1 Dineshkumar Buburav 33 2 Manoj Shitalprasad 35 3 Furkan Fakurq Nargolia 37 4 Hemantbhai Sumanbhai Nayak 39 5 Ashokbhai Chimanbhai 42 6 Rajkumar Ramubhai 44 7 Upendrasinh Umashankar 45 8 Rakesh Ramanlal Patel 47 9 Dr.Bhagvatiprasad Ramdayal 48 10 Jaykumar @ Guddu 55 11 Upendra Umashankar 56 12 Amrutbhai Lallubhai Desai 60 13 Mangalbhai Kabaibhai 62 14 Kaushikkumar Amrutlal Patel 66 The prosecution has also led the following documentary evidences which are enlisted hereinafter:- Description Exhibit No. Inquest panchnama 19 Panchnama of seizure of clothes found on the body of the deceased after P.M. 20 Panchnama of place of offence 34 Complaint 36 Panchnama of seizure of clothes and body of accused 38 Panchnama drawn at the place where recovery of clothes and weapon used in the commission of offence 41 Panchanama of seizure of motor cycle 43 Police yadi 49 Cause of death certificate 50 P.M. Note of the deceased 51 Inquiry report regarding death 52 FSL forwarding letter 67 FSL opinion 68 Serological report 69 2.5 After the evidence being led, a closing pursis was given by the prosecution and further statements of the accused under Sec. 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure came to be recorded and after framing the issues, the evidence on record and the materials came to be examined by the learned Presiding Officer after conducting the trial and after considering the relevant materials and examination of evidence, the learned Presiding Officer, 2nd Fast Track Court, on 17th October, 2005 was pleased to exercise jurisdiction under section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. and by giving benefit of doubt, the respondents accused came to be acquitted for the offence punishable under sections 143, 147, 149 read with section 302 of IPC and it is this judgment and order which is the subject matter of present appeal filed by the State. 3. Learned APP, Mr. 3. Learned APP, Mr. Chintan Dave, representing the State has vehemently contended that the respondents accused have committed a gruesome murder of Surya Chacha and he died on account of injuries having been caused by these respondents accused and therefore, since the offence has been committed by all the respondents accused in connivance with each other, the order of acquittal deserves to be interfered with. Mr. Dave has further contended that there is a specific role attributed to each of the accused, so much so that these accused persons have been identified by the injured witness. Salim was identified with sword, Mohmed was identified with knife and Naresh and accused No. 4 were identified with iron rods and all these persons have played a specific role in the commission of crime and therefore, Mr. Dave has contended that there is a serious error committed by the learned trial Judge in acquitting the accused persons. Mr. Dave has further drawn the attention to evidence of some of the witnesses who have deposed before the Court and submitted that two things have been found from the place of incident namely, iron rod and chappal and the panch witness Mr. Dinesh has also specifically established the recovery. Mr. Dave has pointed out that as per the medical evidence, injuries were sufficient enough to cause death and therefore, the offence is clearly made out against all the respondents accused and resultantly the order of acquittal is required to be corrected. Mr. Dave has drawn the attention to the evidence of panch witness Hemant Nayak who has been a party to the recovery of weapons and a specific panchnama has also been drawn and has indicated that who has made the discovery of what and therefore, when this account of specific evidence is available on record, it was not open for the learned trial Judge not to appreciate such evidence which is cogently substantiating the case of the prosecution. Mr. Mr. Dave has further drawn the attention that the recovery which has been effected has not only been established but serological report/FSL report has suggested that bloodstains, which have also been found on the weapons, are of the blood group of the deceased and therefore, when FSL report co-relates the case of the prosecution which has indicated that weapons, which have been used, have been found with bloodstains, there was hardly any circumstance available to give a benefit of doubt to the respondents accused. Mr. Dave has further pointed out that the complainant himself is an eye witness and therefore, his version normally is to be given weightage over other evidence. In these background of facts, Mr. Dave has pointed out that the order suffers from non-application of mind rather it can be said to be a perverse to the record and therefore, the conclusion of granting benefit of doubt is required to be dislodged and by reversing the same, appropriate punishment is to be inflicted upon. Mr. Dave has further pointed out that these 4-5 persons, who were named and identified, were residing in the nearby vicinity and more particularly when the incident has occurred, the lights were on and therefore, there was hardly any circumstance which may lead to a doubt about the identity of these witnesses and therefore, when every material on record is connecting the link with the respondents accused to the commission of crime, the order of acquittal is not just and proper. Mr. Dave has then invited the attention of this Court to the post mortem report coupled with the cause of death and thereby submitted that injuries which are reflected on the record are co-related to the case of the prosecution and therefore, the finding arrived at by the learned trial Judge is perverse to the record. It has also been pointed out that when Salim, Mohmad and Naresh residing in nearby vicinity have been identified, there was hardly any need for test identification parade and therefore, simply because test identification parade was not conducted by investigating machinery, no reasonable doubt can be given to the accused persons and therefore, considering these overall circumstances available on record, the order passed by the learned trial Judge deserves to be interfered with and requires to be reversed. He has then pointed out by referring to the circumstances narrated in paragraph No. 11 of the judgment and has submitted that crucial eye witness even if solitary witness when supporting the case of the prosecution, a careful consideration ought to have been given by the learned trial Judge and having not done so, it is desirable in the interest of justice not to allow this order to be sustainable in the eye of law and ultimately requested this Court to allow this appeal filed by the State by reversing an order of acquittal and inflict appropriate punishment so as to meet with the ends of justice. 4. To oppose this stand of the learned APP representing the State, learned advocates, who are representing the respondents accused have vehemently opposed. Learned advocates for the accused namely, Ms. Meena Vyas representing respondent-original accused No. 1, Mr. N.R. Kodekar representing the respondent-original accused No. 2 and Mr. Pratik Barot representing respondent-original accused No. 4 have inter se decided that learned advocate, Mr. Pratik Barot may lead the matter for assisting the Court. The main contention, which has been canvassed by Mr. Pratik Barot for and on behalf of all the original accused is that no test identification parade was conducted. It has been contended that the relevant witnesses, who can throw some light to the case of the prosecution have not been examined. Though there is a specific reference of witness Mr. Tanaji during course of adjudication, Jayesh Patel and Jay Gudda all were relevant persons who ought to have been examined by the prosecution and therefore, the independent version has not come out as these relevant witnesses have not been conveniently examined by the prosecution. It has also been contended that a well reasoned order, which has considered every material aspect which is available on record, under normal circumstance, is not to be disturbed. He has further contended that there is no extra ordinary circumstances available on record which can dislodge the finding and the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge and therefore, in the absence of any perversity, in extra ordinary circumstances, no different opinion even if plausible can be taken sitting in an appellate jurisdiction more particularly while dealing with an acquittal appeal. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Barot has then contended that apart from all these circumstances which are prevailing on record which can go to the root of the matter, one another most material aspect is that entire case of the prosecution substantially is related and based upon the sole witness and this sole eye witness Mr. Manoj Shitalprasad, P.W. No. 2, is not to be believed as his version was not found credible. Mr. Barot has further contended that on account of various circumstances, this witness cannot be relied upon by the prosecution and it has rightly not been relied upon by the learned trial Judge while passing the order of acquittal since credibility of this witness is completely at stake. Mr. Barot has further contended that he is a chance witness. The entire narration of his version is not generating any confidence and first of all, he is not belonging to the locality where the incident in question has occurred. Mr. Barot has further contended that conduct of this witness is also very suspicious because when these respondents accused as per the case of the prosecution came and beat Surya Chacha and ran away, this witness has not initiated any step nor has intercepted nor has made any effort to bring any help immediately from the surrounding people or to salvage the situation. This witness whose version is reflecting on page No. 281 of paper book compilation is not sounding proper and his conduct is not a natural conduct and therefore, credibility of this witness is at stake. Upon the conduct of this witness, Mr. Barot has relied upon one of the decisions delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Razak and Others v. State of Karnataka represented by Station House Officer, Hutti Police Station reported in (2015) 6 SCC 282 , which will be dealt with at an appropriate stage in the present judgment. Ultimately, he has contended that this witness is not a believable witness. 6. Mr. Barot has further contended that this sole witness is not only a chance witness but a witness who has given an exaggerated version. As per this witness which is reflecting on page 291 of paper book compilation, there were several persons surrounded but no independent person is examined and surprisingly the prosecution has chosen to rely upon this sole witness as an independent witness. As per this witness which is reflecting on page 291 of paper book compilation, there were several persons surrounded but no independent person is examined and surprisingly the prosecution has chosen to rely upon this sole witness as an independent witness. This witness has narrated the story which is an exaggerated version. Surprisingly, the incident is stated to have occurred at about 10.45 at night, still, he is recognizing every person with a specific role minutely. He is also deposing that in which hand which weapon was held by the respondents accused and therefore, this specific version is also giving a serious doubt about the credibility of this witness. Surprisingly, it is also coming out from the version of this witness that this witness is not citing himself as an eye witness but it appears that his statement came to be recorded on 1.12.2003 whereas incident has taken place on 30.11.2003. Therefore, his version has come out after almost a period of two days and therefore, on this count also, this sole witness is not possible to be relied upon and rightly has not been relied upon by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Barot has further contended that the learned trial Judge had an opportunity to see the demeanor of this witness and upon seeing that demeanor of witness, the learned trial Judge has rightly not relied upon and has not given any due weightage and therefore, looking to this position which is reflecting on page 283 of paper book compilation, it cannot be said that any error has been committed by the learned trial Judge and for this purpose, Mr. Barot has tried to rely upon another decision delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Satveer and others reported in (2015) 9 SCC 44 more particularly paragraphs 10 to 14 and thereby has contended that the order cannot be said to be erroneous. Mr. Barot has further contended that apart from the fact that this sole witness is not possible to be relied upon, even the prosecution has not examined other independent witnesses though it is stated and coming out from the material that some 3-4 persons were present on the spot but none of them have been examined and therefore, Mr. Barot has contended that no case is made out against the respondents accused. 7. Mr. Barot has contended that no case is made out against the respondents accused. 7. Mr. Barot has further contended that from overall materials on record, not only the case is not establishing against accused persons, at least against accused No. 4 Naresh, there is no specific case established beyond reasonable doubt. Mr. Barot has contended and drawn the attention of the Court to the evidence collected by investigating machinery and stated that this accused person i.e. accused No. 4 Naresh is stated to have inflicted blow on deceased with an iron rod as can be seen from page 289 of paper book compilation but when this allegation is to be found from other independent material, first of all, there is no recovery of iron rod at the instance of present respondent No. 4 Naresh. Secondly, no injuries have been found on the body of Surya Chacha i.e. deceased which has been caused with an iron rod and if the entire evidence is to be seen, the medical evidence is not suggesting any such role for this accused which is alleged to have committed and therefore, Mr. Barot has contended that in the background of these facts and circumstances, it cannot be said in any way that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Judge is erroneous. 8. Mr. Barot has further contended that the Court sitting in an appeal has a self-imposed limitation and by referring to these two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court, he has contended that the learned trial Judge has considered everything which is submitted by the prosecution to establish the case. Not only there is well reasoned judgment but there appears to be no infirmity nor any perversity and whatever analysis is coming out from the evidence of this sole witness was thoroughly justified in view of the fact that the learned trial Judge had an opportunity and occasion to see the demeanor of this witness while he was being examined and therefore, Mr. Barot has requested not to interfere with an order of acquittal even if there is another plausible view reflecting from the material. For this purpose, he has relied upon two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court namely, Globar Hussain and others v. State of Assam and another reported in (2015)11 SCC 242 and Raj Singh v. State of Haryana and others reported in (2015)6 SCC 268 . For this purpose, he has relied upon two decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court namely, Globar Hussain and others v. State of Assam and another reported in (2015)11 SCC 242 and Raj Singh v. State of Haryana and others reported in (2015)6 SCC 268 . By referring to these decisions and the propositions laid down therein, Mr. Barot has requested not to allow the appeal and appeal being meritless be dismissed by confirming the order of acquittal. 9. For a limited purpose, while adopting the substantial arguments of Mr. Barot, learned advocate, Ms. Meena Vyas, who is representing accused No. 1 i.e. Mohmad Salim Shaikh, has contended that the only charge which is levelled against her client is that of section 149 of IPC. Ms. Vyas has stated before the Court that from the entire material on record, it is found that neither any weapon used in the commission of crime has been recovered nor any recovery has been effected nor any specific role is attributed to this accused and in the absence of any role being played and recovery being effected from him, there is hardly any circumstance which would connect him to the commission of crime and therefore, Ms. Vyas has contended that her client has no role to play in the prosecution and therefore, he has rightly been acquitted. Ms. Vyas has further contended that muddamal knife which has been recovered is not at the instance of her client but the same was at the instance of Vasantiben and not even by accused No. 2 and therefore, since no connecting link is established by the prosecution, there is hardly any circumstance which would warrant interference at the hands of this Court and ultimately requested to consider the submissions and confirm the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Judge. 10. Similar is the stand taken by another learned advocate, Mr. N.R. Vaghela, representing original accused No. 2. He has submitted that there is no recovery of muddamal at the instance of original accused No. 2 and on the contrary, the panch witness is indicating that Vasantiben has discovered the knife which is said to have been used in the commission of crime and therefore, no discovery is made at the instance of accused No. 2 and his role cannot be said to be connecting with the case of the prosecution. Mr. Mr. Vaghela has further contended that this so-called discovery of weapon is almost after a period of more than one month and this discovery is not supported by any independent material and therefore, even if some bloodstains are found on the knife, the said circumstance cannot directly connect the link of accused No. 1 with the commission of crime. The injuries which are reflecting on inquest panchnama and post mortem note are not co-related by this witness and therefore, accused No. 2 cannot be said to be guilty of any offence and therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly discarded the case of the prosecution. Mr. Vaghela has contended that the witness who is reflecting on page 419 of paper book compilation namely, Mangalbhai Kabaibhai, P.W. No. 13 examined at Exh. 62 who is the panch witness to the panchnama under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and if chronology and the sequence of events are seen, the discovery is not possible to be relied upon. On 25.12.2003, it is stated that Umargam Police Inspector, Mr. R.R. Patel has brought and arrested the accused. Thereafter, on 26.12.2003, after arrest of accused persons, they have been taken to the place where muddamal was hide by them and then on 26.12.2003, a remand application was made by the police and eight days' police remand was obtained and therefore, it can be seen that this discovery might have happened not before 28.12.2003 and therefore, the reference of 27.12.2003 on which date, the weapons used in the commission of crime said to have been recovered or discovered and the panchnama even if drawn cannot be said to be a discovery panchnama looking to the provisions contained under section 27 of Indian Evidence Act. In addition thereto, Mr. Vaghela has also contended that even if blood was found, there is no explanation coming out from the entire evidence of 'B' group blood which was of the deceased and therefore, to connect the link of these accused persons to actual commission of crime, serious information are lacking which are not possible to connect directly these accused persons to the commission of crime and therefore, by submitting and drawing attention to various pieces of evidence, a request is made ultimately to dismiss the appeal filed by the State. 11. 11. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the evidence on record coupled with the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge, following aspects are emerging: 11.1 While passing the judgment and order, it appears that each and every evidence is dealt with by the learned trial Judge in its proper perspective and thereafter arrived at a conclusion and therefore, on the basis of material on record and the reasons assigned, it cannot be said that any evidence which was available on record was not dealt with. 11.2 In addition thereto, it has appeared from the record that so far as accused No. 4 is concerned i.e. Naresh, the story of prosecution is that he gave a blow with iron rod to the deceased but then inquest panchnama and the injuries which are reflecting on post mortem note are not co-relating with the allegation that iron rode is used by the accused. 11.3 Apart from that, the independent version is not coming out. The prosecution has chosen not to examine any independent witness though very much available at the scene of offence and therefore, there is no earthly reason why the prosecution has chosen not to examine any independent witness. 11.4 From the entire material on record and the case of the prosecution, it is also emerging that Tanaji who is frequently being referred to, Jayesh Patel and Mr. Jay @ Guddu, who can throw some light as witnesses have chosen not to be examined to prove the case of the prosecution and therefore, these circumstances which are unexplained appearing on record indicate that it goes against the case of the prosecution. 11.5 It is also emerging from the record that sole testimony of witness is also not generating any confidence in view of the narration of his deposition and there appears to be every infirmity in connecting the respondents accused on the basis of this testimony. Time and again, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the sole witness if to be relied upon, his or her evidence is to be considered with great caution and after testing against other material as well and considering this proposition also, it appears that exaggerated version of sole witness is not generating any confidence in the case of the prosecution. 11.6 So far as other accused i.e. accused Nos. 11.6 So far as other accused i.e. accused Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, since they have adopted the main contentions of Mr. Barot about the sole witness how not to be believed, no further consideration is to be given to their contentions except the fact that it is clearly emerging from the record that no recovery of weapon is at the instance of accused No. 1 and further, the discovery of weapon cannot be believed as discovery in consonance with section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. 11.7 It is also emerging from the record that from the blood which has been found on the articles which have been recovered, there is no explanation of whatsoever nature whether it was 'B' group which was belonging to the deceased or not and therefore, there appears to be no direct connecting link so cogent enough to connect the respondents accused and therefore, considering this overall set of circumstances and considering the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge, we find no distinguishable extra ordinary circumstances which permit us to take a plausible view to dislodge the findings and therefore, we are of the considered opinion that no interference is required in the background of this peculiar facts and circumstances. 12. Now coming to the decisions which have been pressed into service by learned advocate, Mr. Barot, first of all, dealing with the conduct of prosecution witnesses, recently in case of Abdul Razak(supra) a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the conduct of prosecution witness and ultimately found that his conduct does not inspire any confidence. Now almost similar set of circumstances is on the present case on hand as well. The sole witness which is tried to be relied upon has neither intervened to salvage the situation and to save the deceased from being assaulted and practically this witness has not taken any step to immediately save the situation and therefore, the conduct of this sole witness has rightly not been considered which is not inspiring any confidence and therefore, by referring to paragraph No. 10 of the decision rendered in Abdul Razak(supra), Mr. Barot has successfully contended that the testimony of sole witness is not that much to be given weightage to reverse the order of acquittal. Reference is made to paragraph No. 10 of the said decision which reads as under: "10. Barot has successfully contended that the testimony of sole witness is not that much to be given weightage to reverse the order of acquittal. Reference is made to paragraph No. 10 of the said decision which reads as under: "10. The Trial Court was, in our opinion perfectly justified in taking that view. The conduct of the prosecution witnesses does not inspire confidence not only because they did not intervene when Basavaraj was being assaulted but also because post the event, the witnesses did practically nothing to help the unfortunate soul, who was left to die with his hands tied for over 4 hours without any succor coming from any quarter. The High Court has made light of these aspects and thereby fallen in an error." 12.1 Yet in another decision, which is referred to by learned advocate, Mr. Barot, in the case of Raj Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded the scope of interference in the finding of fact and the law arrived at by the learned trial Judge. By referring to several decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court in paragraph No. 22, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held like this which is required to be referred to. The Hon'ble Apex Court would interfere with an order of acquittal only when the Court ignores or overlooks the important circumstances and proved the fact and misapplies the principle of criminal jurisprudence and tries to gloss over them. Only in this kind of circumstances, the interference is warranted. A reference which has been made to paragraph No. 22 in the said decision is reproduced hereinafter:- "23. So far as acquittal of Rishi Pal and Rajpal is concerned, concurrent findings were recorded by both the trial court as well as the High Court for acquitting them. The appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when the court below ignores or overlooks important circumstances and proved facts and misapplies the principles of criminal jurisprudence or tries to gloss over them. The appellate court would interfere with the order of acquittal only when the court below ignores or overlooks important circumstances and proved facts and misapplies the principles of criminal jurisprudence or tries to gloss over them. In the case in hand, it cannot be said that the reasonings recorded by the courts below for acquittal of Rishipal and Raj Pal are unreasonable warranting interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and this appeal is liable to be dismissed." 12.2 Yet in another decision in the case of Golbar Hussain and Others (supra), when the issue which has been dealt with while dealing with the powers of appellate court, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that reasonable and probable view of the trial court normally cannot be interfered with because trial court had an advantage of looking at the demeanor of witnesses and therefore, even if any plausible view is possible and when two views are probable, the High Court should not interfere and that is what the Apex Court has held and the acquittal order came to be restored. Relevant extract of the said paragraph made in para 9 is reproduced hereinafter:- "In our view, the above mentioned are certain cardinal rules to be kept in mind in appeals against acquittal. In our view the Trial Court has given a reasoned decision after careful and thorough analysis of the evidence produced by the parties. The Trial Court also had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of the witnesses, and was correct in granting the benefit of doubt to the accused and acquitting them. The High Court erred in presuming a version against the accused as the view which is favourable to the accused should be taken in cases where two views are probable." 12.3 While coming to this conclusion and passing the order, another decision of the recent time, delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Satveer and others (supra), is to be referred to. While dealing with the testimony of sole witness, what considerations are to be applied have been clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court and therefore, in the present case, the same are very relevant. Extract of the said decision made in paragraphs 11 and 12 are reproduced hereinafter: "11. It is the case of the prosecution that the victim was last seen in the company of the respondents. Extract of the said decision made in paragraphs 11 and 12 are reproduced hereinafter: "11. It is the case of the prosecution that the victim was last seen in the company of the respondents. The "last seen" theory in the present case has two facets, (i) in terms of proximity of time and (ii) as regards the place itself, as the dead body of Ashok was found from the very same place where the victim was seen to have been taken by the respondents. The law on the point is summed up by this Court in State of U.P. v. Satish as under: SCC P.123, para 22). "22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time-gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible." 12. The last seen theory in the present case having dimensions in terms of time as well place, would certainly clinch the matter if the testimony of PW2 Mewa Ram is accepted. Everything hinges on his testimony. He is the sole witness. It was stated by this Court in Joseph v. State of Kerala that where there is a sole witness his evidence has to be accepted with an amount of caution and after testing it on the touchstone of other material on record. Further, in State of Haryana v. Inder Singh it was laid down that the testimony of a sole witness must be confidence inspiring and beyond suspicion, thus, leaving no doubt in the mind of the Court. Noticing these two Judgments this Court in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh summed up the principles as under: (SCC pp. 270-71 para 27) "27. The principles stated in these judgments are indisputable. None of these judgments say that the testimony of the sole eye-witness cannot be relied upon or conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the statement of the sole eye-witness to the crime. 270-71 para 27) "27. The principles stated in these judgments are indisputable. None of these judgments say that the testimony of the sole eye-witness cannot be relied upon or conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the statement of the sole eye-witness to the crime. All that is needed is that the statement of the sole eye-witness should be reliable, should not leave any doubt in the mind of the Court and has to be corroborated by other evidence produced by the prosecution in relation to commission of the crime and involvement of the accused in committing such a crime." The evidence of the sole witness thus needs to be considered with caution and after testing it against other material and further, such evidence must inspire confidence and ought to be beyond suspicion." 13. In view of the aforesaid position prevailing, here on the case on hand, the prosecution has heavily relied upon the decision of sole witness which in view of aforesaid narrated circumstances can hardly have any credential and therefore, when the learned trial Judge has examined every aspect of the matter and has considered the evidence in detail prevailing on record, the conclusion in view of the aforesaid circumstances is not possible to be interfered with. The reasonable and probable view taken by the learned trial Judge in the absence of any extra ordinary distinguishable circumstances is not be interfered with. 14. The powers of the appellate court are wide enough to disturb or interfere with an order of acquittal but at the same time, while taking a different view, there must be some cogent and concrete materials which must have lost sight of by the learned trial Judge and we find no such circumstances and, therefore, we are unable to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned trial Judge. While taking such a view, we are mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court which are required to be referred hereinafter: 14.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 14.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 14.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para. 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:- (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994." 14.4 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014(2) SCC (Cri) 497. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision as under: "15. In this context, yet another caution struck by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 would also be relevant. "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 14.5 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014(8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "17. In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731 this Court observed; "21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 14.6 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner:- "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, re-appreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 14.7 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 14.8 The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., reported in (2015) 11 SCC 242 , has held in Para. 6, 7 and 8 as under: "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 14.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124 , the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 15. Considering the overall materials on record and upon examination of the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge and even on re-appreciation of evidence also, we found nothing extra-ordinary which would compel us to substitute our findings and accordingly, considering aforesaid proposition of law laid down on the issue of power of interference in acquittal appeal by the Hon'ble Apex Court, we hereby refrain ourselves from interfering in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge. Thus, the appeal filed by the State is required to be dismissed. 16. The appeal being found meritless is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order dated 17th October, 2005 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 2, Valsad, in Sessions Case No. 31 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings shall be sent back forthwith to the trial court. Appeal Dismissed.