JUDGMENT : Pradeep Nandrajog, J. The appellant suffered an ex-parte award on 28.01.1998 which was published on 31.08.1998. It filed an application on 07.08.2000 for setting aside of the ex-parte award along with an application seeking delay to be condoned in filing the application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte award. 2. Vide order dated 13.06.2007, finding sufficient cause for delay to be condoned in filing an application seeking setting aside of the ex-parte award and sufficient cause for non appearance, the Labour Court recalled the award. 3. The respondents filed a writ petition challenging the order dated 13.06.2007. 4. Vide impugned order dated 14.08.2008, following the law declared by the Supreme Court in the decision reported as 2005 (9) SCC 331 , Sangham Tape Co. v. Hans Raj, the learned Single Judge has held that once an award was published the Labour Court becomes functus officio, as held by the Supreme Court, and thus could not entertain any application concerning the ex-parte award. 5. Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in the decision reported as 1980 (Supp.) SCC 420, Grindlays Bank Limited v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal. The Court considered Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Rules 22 and 24 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) and Rules 1957 and in paragraph 14 held as under:- "14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore, had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to us. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunal would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. Under Section 17-A of the Act, an award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. The proceedings with regard to a reference under Section 10 of the Act, are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and up to that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte award on 09.12.1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazetted of India dated 25.12.1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte award was filed by Respondent 3, acting on behalf of Respondents 5 to 17 on 19.1.1977 i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal." 6. In Sangham Tape Co. Supra, which has been relied upon by the learned Single Judge, the matter reached the Supreme Court concerning award passed by the Labour Court in the State of Punjab. No rules under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were framed by the State of Punjab. Application for setting aside the ex-parte award was filed 30 days after the award had been published and made enforceable. Noting the decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. and paragraph 14 thereof, highlighting in italic certain portions of paragraph 14, the Supreme Court held that no application for setting aside an ex-parte award could be filed beyond 30 days of the expiry of the publication of the award. 7. While quoting paragraph 14 from the decision in Grindlays Bank Ltd. we have put in italics the portions highlighted in Sangham Tape Co. 8. A contra view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in the decision reported as (2009) 2 SCC 81 , Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Ptael & Anr.. The Supreme Court noted Rules 22 and 24 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules as also Rule 26 (2) of the Bombay Rules. In Para 14 of the decision, the Supreme Court held that as per the decision in Grindlays Bank's case the power to proceed ex-parte as per Rule 22 carried with it the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of the party at the hearing and in case the party was able to show sufficient cause for its non appearance on the date the Court had proceeded ex-parte against it, to re-call the award. The Supreme Court held that what was implicit in Rule 22 of the Central Rules was made explicit by Rule 26 of the Bombay Rules. Explaining paragraph 14 of the decision in Grindlays Bank's case the Supreme Court held that from paragraph 14 it was apparent that Grindlays Bank had moved an application for recall of the ex-parte award within 30 days from the date of publication of the award. The Court opined that in Grindlays Bank's case, the Court did not state that the Industrial Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside the award if made after 30 days of its publication. 9. In the latter part of para 16 and para 17, the Supreme Court held:- "16.....From the above quotation it would appear that Grindlays Bank the recall application was filed within thirty days from the date of publication of the award and hence, the objection raised on the basis of Section 17-A did not arise in this case. In Grindlays Bank this Court did not say that the Industrial Courts would have no jurisdiction to entertain an application for setting aside an award made after thirty days of its publication. Nevertheless, on the basis of the passage marked in italics in the above quotation Ms. Issar strongly contended that that is the true import of the judgment. 17. We are unable to accept. The position is made clear in the later decision in Anil Sood v. Labour Court. In Anil Sood interestingly the Labour Court had rejected the recall application on the very same ground that after making the award it became functus officio in the matter. The order of the Labour Court was challenged before the High Court but the High Court also took the same view. In appeal this Court noted that the award was made on 11.9.1995 and the application for its recall was filed on 6.11.1995. The Court referred to the earlier decision in Grindlays Bank and the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 11 of the Act and in paras 6, 7 and 8 of the decision observed and held as follows: "6. The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11. The aspect that the party against whom award is to be made due opportunity to defend has to be given is a matter of procedure and not that of power in the sense in which the language is adopted in Section 11. When matters are referred to the tribunal or court they have to be decided objectively and the tribunals/courts have to exercise their discretion in a judicial manner without arbitrariness by following the general principles of law and rules of natural justice. 7. The power to proceed ex parte is available under Rule 22 of the Central Rules which also includes the power to inquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing, and if there is sufficient cause shown which prevented a party from appearing, then if the party is visited with an award without a notice which is a nullity and therefore the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to proceed and consequently, it must necessarily have power to set aside the ex parte award. 8. If this be the position in law, both the High Court and the Tribunal (sic Labour Court) fell into an error in stating that the Labour Court had become functus officio after making the award though ex parte. We set aside the order made and the award passed by Labour Court and affirmed by the High Court in this regard, in view of the fact that the learned counsel for the respondent conceded that application filed by the appellant be allowed, set aside the ex parte award and restore the reference." 10. At this stage we need to note to Rajasthan Industrial Disputes Rules, 1958. Rules 22 and 22-A read as under:- "22. Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex parte. If without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceeding before a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator fails to attend or to be represented, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed as if the party had duly attended or had been represented. 22-A. Setting aside ex parte decision- (1) On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part an ex parte decision. 22-A. Setting aside ex parte decision- (1) On an application made within fifteen days of the ex parte decision, the Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may, on sufficient cause being shown after notice to the opposite party set aside either wholly or in part an ex parte decision. (2) The Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or Arbitrator may on an application, extend the time of fifteen days as prescribed in sub-rule (1) on sufficient cause being shown." 11. Suffice it to state that as per Rule 22-A an application has to be filed within 15 days of the ex-parte award and upon sufficient cause being shown the ex-parte decision can be set aside. As per Sub-rule 2 of 22-A, the Labour Court, upon sufficient cause being shown, would be entitled to extend the limitation period of 15 days. Thus, the Rules promulgated in Rajasthan would require this Court to follow the law declared by the Supreme Court in Radhakrishna's Case Supra and not the law declared in Sangham Tape Company's Case Supra. 12. The appeal is allowed. Impugned order dated 14.08.2008 is set aside. The writ petition filed by the respondent is dismissed. 13. Since as result of our decision, the Labour Court would be required to re-decide the issue on merits because the ex-parte award which was set aside by the Labour Court was restored before the learned Single Judge, we would request the Labour Court to expeditiously complete the proceedings and answer the reference preferably within six months from date of receipt of the present order. 14. No costs.