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2017 DIGILAW 257 (JHR)

Sardar Jogindra Singh S/o Late Sardar Sundar Singh v. State of Bihar

2017-02-07

RONGON MUKHOPADHYAY

body2017
JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Anurag Kashyap, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Pankaj Kumar, learned A.P.P. for the State. 2. This application is directed against the judgment dated 31.08.1999 passed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh in Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 1990 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred against the judgment dated 22.08.1992 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate in G. R. Case No. 2091 of 1982 convicting the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of I.P.C. and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for 3 years has been dismissed and the judgment has been affirmed. 3. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that neither the learned trial court nor the learned appellate court has properly appreciated the materials available on record before convicting the petitioner for the offence punishable under Sections 419 and 420 of I.P.C. It has been stated that the conviction is based on the alleged letter written by the petitioner and the same was on account of threat and coercion and such confession is not admissible in the criminal proceeding. He further submits that the Investigating Officer of the case has not been examined and his non-examination has caused prejudice to the defence. Alternative argument has been put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner that even if this court affirms the order passed by the learned trial court as well as by the learned appellate court, consideration may be made over protracted trial of the case and the period of custody already undergone by the petitioner. 4. Learned A.P.P. for the State opposed the prayer and has supported the impugned judgment. 5. It appears that the FIR was instituted on 21.09.1982 in which it was alleged that the Haryana Government through its Irrigation Department at Ranchi used to purchase coal from the C.C.L. and send the same to the Haryana. It is alleged that the petitioner was made Incharge of Tapin South Colliery for the said purpose and used to receive coal from the colliery on behalf of Haryana Government for which advance payment has been made. It has also been submitted that when Haryana Government claimed refund of remaining amount then it was disclosed that 1651 tonnes of coal has already been supplied to the Haryana Government. It has also been submitted that when Haryana Government claimed refund of remaining amount then it was disclosed that 1651 tonnes of coal has already been supplied to the Haryana Government. On receiving such information, a verification was made from which it transpires that only 911 tonnes was actually sent by the petitioner and so far as the remaining 740 tonnes of coal was concerned, a confession was made by the petitioner that he misappropriated the amount by selling them in the black market. On the basis of aforesaid allegations, G. R. No. 2091 of 1982 was instituted in which upon conducting an investigation and having found the case to be true, charge-sheet was submitted against the petitioner and after cognizance was taken, the case was transferred to the Judicial Magistrate who upon conducting trial was pleased to convict the petitioner vide judgment dated 22.08.1992 for the offence punishable under sections 419, 420 & 120(B) of I.P.C. and further to undergo R.I. for 3 years. An appeal was preferred being Criminal Appeal No. 193 of 1990 which however was dismissed by the II Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh on 31.08.1999 by modifying the conviction of the petitioner so far as Section 120(B) is concerned holding that Section 120(B) is not proved against the petitioner. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised a pertinent question with respect to the admissibility of the documents purported to be the confession made on behalf of the petitioner with respect to the defalcation of the coal supplied by the CCL. The said contention has been properly appreciated by both the learned courts below and it was concluded that the letters written by the petitioner which has been marked as 2 and 2/1 were not under threat or under coercion, as the same were merely letters written to the authorities stating about the misappropriation of the coal loaded in 42 trucks. The letters which have been marked as exhibits were written much prior to the institution of the case or conducting of the inquiry against the petitioner with respect to defalcation of the coal in question. The letter would thus show that the petitioner has a reasonable apprehension that he will be prosecuted for which he has already apologised and had confessed before the authorities for the defalcation committed by him. The letter would thus show that the petitioner has a reasonable apprehension that he will be prosecuted for which he has already apologised and had confessed before the authorities for the defalcation committed by him. Such circumstances therefore belies the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the alleged confession made by the petitioner was under threat, inducement and coercion. 7. So far as the other points are concerned regarding non-examination of I.O., in view of communication made by the petitioner to the authorities and the documentary evidence as well as oral evidence which are on record and which suggests that the petitioner who was to supply the coal from Tapin South Colliery to the Haryana Government had indeed misappropriated 740 tonnes of coal and in such circumstances therefore, the non-examination of I.O. did not at all prejudice the defence. Both the learned courts below have considered the oral and documentary evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution and had rightly come to the conclusion regarding the involvement of the petitioner in the misappropriation of 740 tonnes of coal. 8. In such view of the matter therefore, the judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial court and affirmed by the learned appellate court needs no interference. However, as regards the period of sentence is concerned, it appears that the case was instituted in the year 1982 and the petitioner is facing rigors of prosecution for the last more than 3 decades. The petitioner has remained in custody for some period during trial and after his conviction was affirmed by the learned appellate court, the petitioner has remained for a further period of 15 days in custody. Considering the protracted trial the petitioner has faced and the period he has spent in custody, the sentence awarded to the petitioner is modified to the period already undergone. 9. Accordingly, this application is dismissed with the aforesaid modification in the sentence.