Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2017 DIGILAW 2581 (ALL)

MUKTAKAR SINGH v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-11-08

AJAY BHANOT, TARUN AGARWALA

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajay Bhanot, J.—The petitioner sat in the National Eligibility-Cum-Interest Examination-2017, (hereafter referred to as ‘NEET’) for admission to post graduate courses in medical science for the academic session 2017-18. The petitioner was declared successful in the written examination result of NEET, 2017, which was published on 21.1.2017. The petitioner thus qualified for the next competitive phase of the admission process which was the common counselling. The counselling was conducted in three separate phases namely, the first round of counselling, the second round of counselling and the MOP-UP Round. The MOP-UP Round was held on 29.5.2017. 2. At the end of the MOP-UP Round, the petitioner was issued the allotment/admission letter by the Chairman, Counselling Board, U.P. NEET-2017 on 29.5.2017. The petitioner was allotted a seat in the MD course in Subharthi Medical College (hereinafter the college). 3. The admission letter provided to the petitioner was addressed to the Principal/Dean, Director/Registrar, Subharti Medical College, Meerut. The aforesaid admission letter contained the advisory for completing the formalities of admission. The admission letter mentioned that the petitioner had deposited Rs. 1 lac towards security money at the time of confirmation of the seat. The receipt of such deposit was to be produced by the petitioner before the college authorities at the time of his admission. 4. At the date and time appointed in the admission letter, i.e., on 30.5.17, the petitioner attended before the college authorities with bank drafts of different amounts to defray the various expenses towards tuition fee, accommodation/hostel fee, refundable security. As advised, the petitioner tendered the aforesaid bank-draft No. 503894 for Rs. 15,94,700/- and Bank-draft No. 503893 for Rs.13,50,000/- dated 30.5.2017 from ICIC Bank, Bareilly to the Subharti Medical College, Meerut. The amounts manifested in the bank-drafts were sufficient to defray the tuition fee as well as the refundable security deposit and hostel expenses and hostel security. 5. The college authorities of Subharti Medical College, Meerut including the Principal-Dr. D.K. Asthana declined to receive the said drafts and refused to grant formal admission to the petitioner. On the contrary, the aforesaid staff and Principal-Dr. D.K. Asthana of Subharti Medical College, Meerut raised an additional demand of Rs. 31,89,400/- (Rupees Thirty One Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand and Four Hundred only) in the form of bank guarantee. This amount was required to be deposited by the petitioner within an hour on 30.5.17. On the contrary, the aforesaid staff and Principal-Dr. D.K. Asthana of Subharti Medical College, Meerut raised an additional demand of Rs. 31,89,400/- (Rupees Thirty One Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand and Four Hundred only) in the form of bank guarantee. This amount was required to be deposited by the petitioner within an hour on 30.5.17. Further, the petitioner was also informed by the Principal, Subharti Medical College, Meerut that failure to deposit the bank guarantee in the suggested time frame would entail cancellation of the candidature of the petitioner. 6. The petitioner was not informed of such requirement at the counselling. The petitioner was taken by surprise by this demand. The petitioner pleaded with the authorities to enlarge the time frame for producing the bank guarantee of the requisite amount. The pleadings of the petitioner before the college authorities were of no avail. The petitioner could not tender the bank guarantee of the said amount in the prescribed time period on 30.5.2017. The petitioner was denied admission on account of his failure to deposit the bank guarantee of the said amount to the college authorities on 30.5.2017. 7. The petitioner ran from pillar to post to register his grievances and obtain redressal. The petitioner sent an e-mail to the Director General, Medical Education and Training U.P. Lucknow on 31.5.2017, and also to the Principal of Subharti Medical College, Meerut on 2.6.2017. These efforts did not yield any results. The petitioner was informed that the rejection of his admission was irrevocable. 8. We have heard Sri Kaushlesh Pratap Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned Standing Counsel for the Principal Secretary, Medical Education and Training, Lucknow, Sri Mahendra Pratap, the learned counsel for Director General Medical Education and Training, U.P. Lucknow, Sri Avanish Mishra, the learned counsel for the Medical Council of India, New Delhi and Sri Anurag Khanna, the learned Senior Counsel alongwith Sri Nipun Singh and Shri Raghav Dev Garg, Advocates for the private educational institution-respondent No. 3/college. 9. Shri Kaushlesh Pratap Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner based on the aforesaid case set out in the writ petition submitted that the respondents had arbitrarily and unjustly denied admission to the petitioner and blighted his academic career. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the claim of the petitioner to admission was based on the merit of his candidature. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the claim of the petitioner to admission was based on the merit of his candidature. After his selection in the MOP-UP Round and issuance of the allotment/admission letter, he was ready and willing to deposit the tuition fee amount, hostel expenses and security and all other dues advised to him in the counselling. There was no legal basis for the demand of bank guarantee and denial of admission. Learned counsel for the petitioner also drew the attention of the Court to the impersonal attitude and callous inaction of the Director General of Medical Education and Training, U.P. Lucknow. The petitioner had in good time duly intimated the D.G.M.E.T., about the high-handed action and unjust demand of bank guarantee raised to the petitioner by the college, and the consequent denial of admission. The Director General, Medical Education and Training failed to discharge the duty attached to his office by not intervening in the matter and ensuring admission to the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Pranay Kumar Podder v. State of Tripura and others in Special Appeal No. 4393 of 2017 submitted that he was entitled to admission in the post graduate course in the academic year 2017-18. In the alternative, the petitioner could be admitted in the post graduate course in the Subharti Medical College, Meerut for the academic session 2018-19 and the seat quota in the said college for the said year be reduced by one seat. 10. Shri Anurag Khanna, learned Senior Counsel alongwith Shri Nipun Singh and Shri Raghav Dev Garg, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 admitted to the demand of bank guarantee by the college from the petitioner. However, he defended the same on the ground that the said demand was a security amount required by the college to safeguard itself from financial stress caused when students leave the academic session in mid-stream. He also submitted that at the counselling centre the bank guarantee demand was prominently displayed at the kiosks. Lastly it was contended that, some students had asked for a dispensation from the college authorities to waive the deposit of bank guarantee and it was granted. The petitioner did not ask for a waiver of this demand and consequently, the same was insisted upon. Lastly it was contended that, some students had asked for a dispensation from the college authorities to waive the deposit of bank guarantee and it was granted. The petitioner did not ask for a waiver of this demand and consequently, the same was insisted upon. The petitioner could not make good the demand hence his admission was cancelled. Shri Khanna, learned senior counsel, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others, 2002 (8) SCC 481 and the case of Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, 2003 (6) SCC 697 . Para-8 of the Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (supra) was specifically relied upon by the learned Senior counsel to justify the demand of the bank guarantee. 11. Shri Mahendra Pratap, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2-Director General, Medical Education and Training, U.P. Lucknow submitted that the fees to be charged by the private medical colleges is fixed by the fee regulatory committee appointed by the Government of U.P. After the fee was fixed by the fee regulatory committee a G.O. dated 7.4.2017 was taken out. The Government Order dated 7.4.2017 contained the fee schedule prescribed by the fee regulatory committee. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Director General, Medical Education and Training unequivocally asserts that the private medical colleges are only entitled to charge the tuition fees prescribed by the fee regulatory committee and duly communicated in the G.O. dated 7.4.2017. The private medical colleges should scrupulously and strictly adhere to the fee schedule prescribed by the fee regulatory committee and the Government Order dated 7.4.2017. Relying on the stand taken by the Director General, Medical Education and Training, U.P. Lucknow, hereinafter referred to as (‘DGMET’) in the counter-affidavit, Shri Mahendra Pratap contended that there is no provision for demand of bank guarantee by any private medical college. Any such demand is unjustified and has no lawful basis. 12. Interestingly, the said counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the D.G.M.E.T., respondent No. 2 admits to receipt of the e-mail send by the petitioner on 31.5.2017. As per the admission schedule, the last date of admission was 31.5.2017. 13. From the pleadings in the record and the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the following facts have been established beyond all doubt. 14. As per the admission schedule, the last date of admission was 31.5.2017. 13. From the pleadings in the record and the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties, the following facts have been established beyond all doubt. 14. The petitioner had qualified for grant of admission in the post graduate course in Subharti Medical College, Meerut for the academic session 2017-18, on the strength of his merit in the competitive examination. The petitioner presented himself before the college authorities to complete the admission formalities and tendered the fee amount as advised to him in the counselling session. The bank draft tendered by the petitioner towards the fee was of the like amount prescribed in the Government order dated 7.4.2017. 15. The college authorities raised a demand for deposit of a bank guarantee to the tune of Rs. 31,89,400/- (Rupees Thirty One Lacs Eighty Nine Thousand and Four Hundred only) on 30.5.2015 to the petitioner. The petitioner could not deposit the bank guarantee in the short time frame insisted upon by the college authorities. Consequently, the college authorities cancelled the admission of the petitioner. 16. Though, the D.G.M.E.T. was duly informed about the aforesaid action of the college authorities of demanding a bank draft of the said amount, on the last date of admission, the D.G.M.E.T. failed to act and provide redress. 17. The questions, which arise for determination are whether the demand of bank guarantee raised by the college authorities was lawful? Whether denial of admission upon failure to meet the demand was justified in law or not? Whether the action of the D.G.M.E.T. in failing to intervene in a timely and effective manner despite knowledge of the facts of the case amounts to a failure to carry out its duties contemplated by law? Finally, the relief to which the petitioner is entitled? 18. An educated populace and qualified professionals form the most enduring foundation of democracy and are a lasting source of national greatness and prosperity. 19. The growth of population over the years far outstripped the resources at the hands of the State. The disparity between the demands of an ever increasing population for education and the limited resources of the State Government, ensured that the state monopoly over higher education was unsustainable. Private players and private educational institutions introduced themselves to fill the gap. 20. The growth of population over the years far outstripped the resources at the hands of the State. The disparity between the demands of an ever increasing population for education and the limited resources of the State Government, ensured that the state monopoly over higher education was unsustainable. Private players and private educational institutions introduced themselves to fill the gap. 20. Higher education serves high purpose but equally presents possibilities of crass profiteering. The field of higher education was largely unregulated, causing exploitation of students and parents alike at the hands of many private colleges. Little or no restraint was exhibited by such private college managements’ in regard to transparency in admission process and the demands of exorbitant fee. This anomalous situation generated litigation which spiralled up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 21. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a series of authoritative pronouncements starting from T.M.A. Pai and others v. State of Karnataka and others, (2002) 8 SCC 481 and Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, 2003 (6) SCC 697 and P.A. Inamdar and others v. State Of Maharashtra and others, 2005 (6) SCC 537 , created a comprehensive frame work of higher education in consonance with the constitutional ideals. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments provided for a comprehensive scheme for running of institutions of higher education by private managements. The Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly set its face against commercialization of education, profiteering and exploitation of students. In the aforesaid scheme, the fixation of fee was to be done by an expert committee. The committee while fixing the fee would factor in the relevant criteria to ensure that the private colleges of higher education retained the financial autonomy to be self sustaining institutions of excellence but also excluded possibilities of commercialization of education and exploitation of students. 23. The state legislatures and the state Governments acted upon the said judgments. They undertook legislative measures and passed executive orders to create an environment for private educational institutions to flourish but at the same time prohibited the commercialization of education and exploitation of vulnerable students. 24. The private institutions of higher learning are to be centres of academic achievements and moral excellence. The vision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court ensured that education was not priced out of the reach of merit and knowledge was not beyond the grasp of questing souls. 25. 24. The private institutions of higher learning are to be centres of academic achievements and moral excellence. The vision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court ensured that education was not priced out of the reach of merit and knowledge was not beyond the grasp of questing souls. 25. In the case at hand, the petitioner was granted admission on the strength of his merit. The petitioner had admittedly tendered the bank draft to defray the fee expenses as prescribed by the fee regulatory committee and specified in the consequential Government order dated 7.4.2017. 26. The law clearly prohibits the private medical colleges from charging anything or any amount in any form or pretext beyond the fee prescribed by the fee regulatory committee. 27. In the instant case, the demand by the college of the bank guarantee to the extent of Rs. 31,89,400/-was blatantly made by the college authority. It was also insisted upon as a pre-condition for completion of admission formalities. The demand for the said bank guarantee and the denial of admission to the petitioner upon failure to fulfill such demand, was in the teeth of the prohibition laid down by the Government Order and the recommendation of the fee regulatory committee. 28. In the petitioner’s quest for higher learning, the respondent No. 3 saw an immediate opportunity of high profit. The college authorities approached the opportunity of nation building with the mind of a dishonest broker. The respondent No. 3 drove a hard bargain, which the petitioner could not meet leading to his ouster from the post graduate medical course. The actions of the college authorities are manifestly, arbitrary and illegal. 29. Such actions also show complete disregard to the repeated concerns and pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court mentioned earlier. 30. The judgment relied upon by Shri Anurag Khanna in the cases of T.M.A. Pai (supra) and Islamic Academy (supra) does not come to his rescue and does not support his submissions. 31. The private negotiations between the college authorities and other students leading to waiver of the bank guarantee demands, cannot rationalize such demands. In fact such private negotiations, initiated by the college with students are the bane of the system. It is the precise evil in the system which needs to be purged. 32. 31. The private negotiations between the college authorities and other students leading to waiver of the bank guarantee demands, cannot rationalize such demands. In fact such private negotiations, initiated by the college with students are the bane of the system. It is the precise evil in the system which needs to be purged. 32. Further, the contention of the college that the bank guarantee demands were duly advertised at the admission kiosks, shows a failure of the system of accountability and represents a breakdown of the regulatory frame work of the State. 33. The next point of consideration is the inaction on the part of the D.G.M.E.T. and failure to intervene in a timely fashion and effective manner to remedy the situation. Admittedly, the D.G.M.E.T. had information about the aforesaid arbitrary and high-handed actions of the respondent college, in good time. The D.G.M.E.T. in the facts of the situation had the time and the power to save the situation and retrieve the future academic prospects of the petitioner. However, the failure of D.G.M.E.T. to faithfully discharge its obligations to law are writ large on the face of the record. 34. Whether the D.G.M.E.T. had acted out of habitual inertia or was in collusion with the respondent No. 3 is a matter, upon which, a responsible pronouncement can be made only after due enquiry. Equally dismal is the failure of the D.G.M.E.T. to impose penalty upon the errant college and bring it to justice. It represents failure of governance at the highest level. 35. When fundamental rights are in issue, arbitrary action and callous inaction stand on the same footing. Both will invite judicial censure and interdict in equal measure. 36. While the Courts have the final word, it is not the duty of the Courts alone, but an obligation of all institutions of governance to cherish and to protect, to exalt and to uphold the fundamental rights of citizens. 37. If the rule of law is to become a reality, all organs of governance have to contribute and remain true and alert to their obligations to law. 38. Shri Kaushlesh Pratap Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner finally prayed for grant of admission to the petitioner in the M.D. course for the academic year 2017-18. 37. If the rule of law is to become a reality, all organs of governance have to contribute and remain true and alert to their obligations to law. 38. Shri Kaushlesh Pratap Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner finally prayed for grant of admission to the petitioner in the M.D. course for the academic year 2017-18. In the alternative, he submitted that the petitioner may be granted admission in the M.D. course in the next academic year 2018-19, in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Pranay Kumar Poddar (supra). 39. Admittedly, the current academic session 2017-18 is past the half way mark. The mid-term admissions to medical courses have been specifically prohibited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in successive pronouncements. Reference may profitably made in this regard to the consistent line of judicial precedents laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the cases of: 1. Dr. Subodh Nautiyal v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1991 SC 1131 , 2. State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, etc., AIR 1992 SC 932 , 3. T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others, 2002 (8) SCC 481 , 4. Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh and others, (2002) 7 SCC 258 5. Mridul Dhar (minor) and another v. Union of India and others, (2005) 2 SCC 65 . 40. In the case of Dr. Subodh Nautiyal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to permit mid term admission and held as under: “3. Even according to Mr. Pandey the course has started in September for the session. This is a technical course and to admit a student four mouths after the commencement would not at all be correct. We accordingly reject the application” 41. While in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Anupam Gupta, etc. (supra), the Hon’ble Surpeme Court reiterated the aforesaid proposition of law by holding as under: “14. Considering from this point of view, to maintain excellence the courses have to be commenced on schedule and to be completed within the schedule, so that the students would have full opportunity to study full course to reach their excellence and come at par excellence. Admission in the midstream would disturb the courses and also works as handicap to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Admission in the midstream would disturb the courses and also works as handicap to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as a ground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained.” 42. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh and others (supra) articulated the law in the paragraphs extracted hereunder: “18. In State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Anupam Gupta and others (1993 Supp (1) SCC 594), the view in Dr. Subodh’s case (supra) was re-iterated. It was observed as under: “It is next contended by Shri Yogeshwar Prasad that the courses were started from October 30, 1990 and in terms of the orders of this Court it shall be deemed to have been commenced from May 2, 1990, the direction as given in the impugned judgments for admission after more than a year, is illegal. To maintain excellence in the academic courses, the delay defeats the claim for admission, though posts are vacant. In Pramod Kumar Joshi v. Medical Council of India ( 1991 (2) SCC 179 ) this Court held that the course for the year 1991 is almost completed and it would not be proper to allow admission belatedly. In Dr. Subodh Nautiyal v. State of U.P. there was a delay of four months in giving admission, and this Court held that, “even according to Mr. Pandey the course has started in September for the session. This is technical course and to admit a student four months after the commencement would not at all be correct.” (underlined for emphasis) In para 14, the desirability of commencing the course on schedule and completing the same within the schedule was stressed in the following words: “Considering from this point of view, to maintain excellence the courses have to be commenced on schedule and be completed within the schedule so that the students would have full opportunity to study full course to reach their excellence and come at par excellence. Admission in the mid- stream would disturb the courses and also work as a handicap to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Admission in the mid- stream would disturb the courses and also work as a handicap to the candidates themselves to achieve excellence. Considering from this pragmatic point of view we are of the considered opinion that vacancies of the seats would not be taken as a ground to give admission and direction by the High Court to admit the candidates into those vacant seats cannot be sustained.” 19. In State of Punjab and others v. Renuka Singla and others ( 1994 (1) SCC 175 ), this Court disapproved the course adopted by several High Courts directing students to be admitted much after the course had commenced. Though that case was for admissions under the Dentists Act, 1948 (in short the ‘Dentists Act’), identical provisions were under consideration. In para 8, it was noted as under: “The admission in medical course throughout India is governed by different statutory provisions, including regulations framed under different Acts. During last several years efforts have been made to regulate the admissions to the different medical institutions, in order to achieve academic excellence. But, at the same time, a counter- attempt is also apparent and discernible, by which the candidates, who are not able to get admissions against the seats fixed by different statutory authorities, file writ applications and interim or final directions are given to admit such petitioners. We fail to appreciate as to how the High Court or this Court can be generous or liberal in issuing such directions which in substance amount to directing the authorities concerned to violate their own statutory rules and regulations, in respect of admissions of students. It cannot be disputed that technical education, including medical education, requires infrastructure to cope with the requirement of giving proper education to the students, who are admitted. Taking into consideration the infrastructure, equipment, staff, the limit of the number of admissions is fixed either by the Medical Council of India or Dental Council of India. The High Court cannot disturb that balance between the capacity of the institution and number of admissions, on “compassionate ground”. The High Court should be conscious of the fact that in this process they are affecting the education of the students who have already been admitted, against the fixed seats, after a very tough competitive examination. The High Court cannot disturb that balance between the capacity of the institution and number of admissions, on “compassionate ground”. The High Court should be conscious of the fact that in this process they are affecting the education of the students who have already been admitted, against the fixed seats, after a very tough competitive examination. According to us, there does not appear to be any justification on the part of the High Court, in the present case, to direct admission of respondent 1 on “compassionate ground” and to issue a fiat to create an additional seat which amounts to a direction to violate Section 10-A and Section 10-B(3) of the Dentists Act referred to above.” 43. In the case of Mridul Dhar (minor) and another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the time schedule for admission to post graduate and superspeciality courses was required to be strictly adhered to and mid session admissions were impermissible. The following observations in the Mridul Dhar (minor) and another (supra) are of particular relevance: “31. The time schedule for post-graduate and superspeciality course admissions may also be noted as under: “TIME SCHEDULE FOR POSTGRADUATE AND SUPERSPECIALITY COURSES ADMISSIONS Schedule for admission Postgraduate Courses Courses Super-speciality Schedule for admission Postgraduate Courses Courses Super-speciality All India Quota State Quota Conduct of entrance examination 2nd Sunday of January Mid-Jan Mid - Feb. May-June Declaration of result of qualifying exam. 3rd week of Feb By 28th February By 30th June 1st round of counseling/ admissions 5th March to 22nd March To be over by 25th April To be over by 25th July Last date for joining the allotted college and course 7th April 1st May 31st July 2nd round of counseling or allotment of seats from waiting list No 2nd counseling No 2nd counseling No 2nd counseling Last date for joining for candidates allotted seats in 2nd round of counseling or from the waiting list After 7th April vacant seats will stand surrendered back to the states/colleges Not applicable Not applicable Commencement of academic session 2nd May 1st August Last date up to which students can be admitted against vacancies arising due to any reason 31st May 30th September 32. Having regard to the professional courses into consideration, it deserves to be emphasized that all concerned including Governments, State and Central both, MCI/DCI, colleges, new or old, students, Boards, universities, examining authorities etc. Having regard to the professional courses into consideration, it deserves to be emphasized that all concerned including Governments, State and Central both, MCI/DCI, colleges, new or old, students, Boards, universities, examining authorities etc. are required to strictly adhere to time schedule wherever provided for; there should not be mid-stream admission (emphasis added); admission should not be in excess of sanctioned intake capacity or in excess of quota of any one, whether Stare or Management. The carrying forward of any unfilled seats of one academic year to next academic year is also not permissible 35. Having regard to the aforesaid, we issue the following directions : 1. All participating States and Union Territories, Board of Secondary Education shall declare 10 + 2 result by 10th June of every year and make available the marksheet to the students by 15th June. The aforesaid condition would not apply to West Bengal for the year 2005. As already noticed, the West Bengal would make available to the concerned students the marksheets by 15th June, 2005 Heads of Boards would be personally liable to ensure compliance. 2. The time table mentioned in Notification dated 25th February, 2004 shall be strictly adhered to by all concerned including States and Union Territories and results of State Medical/Dental Entrance Examination shall be declared before 15th of June. 3. The States/Union Territories shall complete the admission process of first round of State Level Medical/Dental College admission by 25th July i.e. a week before start of second round counseling or allotment of seats under All India Quota. The correct vacancy position shall be intimated by the Chief Secretary to the DGHS by 26th July. It shall be verified by the Head of the Institution/or Head of the Medical Institution/Health Department in the State. 4. It shall be the responsibility of all concerned including Chief Secretaries of each State/Union Territories and/or Health Secretaries to ensure compliance of the directions of this Court and requisite time schedule as laid down in the Regulations and non- compliance would make them liable for requisite penal consequences. 5. All seats in All India Quota must be fully disclosed giving details of the date of recognition/renewal to DGHS before a date to be notified by DGHS and the same shall be duly published. 6. 5. All seats in All India Quota must be fully disclosed giving details of the date of recognition/renewal to DGHS before a date to be notified by DGHS and the same shall be duly published. 6. By 31st October, the State through Chief Secretaries/Health Secretaries shall file a report in regard to admissions with the DGHS giving details about the adherence to a time schedule and admission granted as per the prescribed quota. The recalcitrant States, particularly officers personally will have to face consequences for violation. 7. The DGHS shall file by 31st January, 2005 report in regard to feasibility of conducting counseling through the process of video conferencing. 8. The DGHS shall file report within three months on the aspect of Section 10-A seats being subjected to 15 per cent All India Quota and about the increase of the quota from 15 per cent to 20 per cent. 9. The DGHS shall also file a report within three months on the aspect of constitution of high-power Committee/Ombudsman. 10. The seats allotted upto 15th July, shall also be subjected to respective State Quotas. 11. If any private medical college in a given academic year for any reason grants admission in its management quota in excess of its prescribed quota, the management quota for the next academic year shall stand reduced so as to set off the effect of excess admission in the management quota in the previous academic year. 12. The time schedule for grant of admission to postgraduate courses shall also be adhered to. 13. For granting admission, the merit determined by competitive examination shall not be tinkered with by making a provision like grant of marks by mode of interview or any other mode. 14. time schedule for establishment of new college or to increase intake in existing college, shall be adhered to strictly by all concerned. 15. Time schedule provided in Regulations shall be strictly adhered to by all concerned failing which defaulting party would be liable to be personally proceeded with. 16. Copy of the judgment shall be sent to Chief Secretaries of all States/Union Territories for compliance.” 44. In view of the aforesaid embargo in law against mid term admission and inviolability of the admission schedule, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot be granted admission in the current academic session. 45. 16. Copy of the judgment shall be sent to Chief Secretaries of all States/Union Territories for compliance.” 44. In view of the aforesaid embargo in law against mid term admission and inviolability of the admission schedule, we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot be granted admission in the current academic session. 45. The alternative prayer for grant of admission in the subsequent academic session 2018-19 in the light of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shri Pranay Kumar Poddar, (supra) in the first instance makes a compelling case. However, a closer reading of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pranay Kumar Poddar (supra) shows that it is distinguishable on facts and is a judgment passed under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. 46. In this view of the matter, the judgment of Pranay Kumar Poddar (supra) cannot come to the aid of the petitioner. The relief sought in the alternative also has to be rejected. 47. Once violation of fundamental rights has been proven to the satisfaction of the Court and the failure of authorities to perform public functions is established, it should be the endeavour of the Court to restore the parties to their original position. The unfair advantage derived from illegal actions should be recalled and disadvantage accruing from denial of rights should be undone. 48. There are occasions, though, as in the instant case, where the passage of time, occurrence of subsequent events and law laid down by the Supreme Court may lead to denial of relief, which is prayed for. But the same cannot disentitle the claim of the petitioner for justice. 49. In such cases the Courts will not stand by and abdicate their constitutional role of upholding the law and dispensing justice. The Courts will stand up for and intervene to uphold fundamental rights and the rule of law. 50. Fait accompli is a counsel of despair and cannot be elevated to a doctrine of law. The rule of law is founded on a premise of unquenchable hope and optimism that the arms of law are long enough to reach out to injustice and strong enough to redress it. The rule of moulding of relief by Courts, is an expression of this assurance. The rule of law is founded on a premise of unquenchable hope and optimism that the arms of law are long enough to reach out to injustice and strong enough to redress it. The rule of moulding of relief by Courts, is an expression of this assurance. In such cases, if Courts are constrained by law to grant the relief prayed for in the petition, the Courts are obligated to mould the relief. Moulding of relief by Courts means grant of relief that is not specifically prayed for. 51. Law insists on observance of procedure. Justice demands that there should be no servitude to procedure. 52. The doctrine of moulding of relief by Courts is an indispensable tool in the administration of justice. The facts of this case require that the relief be moulded, to redeem the injustice and secure the ends of rule of law. 53. Cases with congruent facts, where unjust denial of admission was paired with the inadmissibility of grant of relief of mid session admission fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 54. The judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bonnie Anna George v. Medical Council of India and another, (2014) 10 SCC 767 and in the case of S. Nihaal Ahamed v. Dean. Velammal Medical College Hospital and Research Institute and others, (2016) 1 SCC 662 , provide the most clear and reliable guide to judicial action in such cases. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in these matters granted appropriate compensation and or public law damages to the wronged students. 55. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bonnie Anna George v. Medical Council of India and another, (2014) 10 SCC 767 , held as under: “32. Having regard to our above conclusions, we are convinced that depriving the petitioner of the opportunity to opt for the available NRI seat in MD General Medicine during the third counselling was wholly unjustified. Having reached the above conclusion when we come to the question of grant of relief as prayed for by the petitioner in this writ petition, the petitioner seeks for mandamus to direct the second respondent to permit her to shift her PG course from MD Pathology to MD General Medicine in the available vacant seat. Having reached the above conclusion when we come to the question of grant of relief as prayed for by the petitioner in this writ petition, the petitioner seeks for mandamus to direct the second respondent to permit her to shift her PG course from MD Pathology to MD General Medicine in the available vacant seat. Though, we have found that the second respondent was wholly unjustified in not making available the said vacant seat to the petitioner, as the admission schedule fixed by Medical Council of India and this Court is being scrupulously followed, we do not find any extraordinary situation to violate the said schedule fixed by us. We have held in various decisions that the time schedule should be strictly adhered to and no midstream admission should be allowed. We are, therefore, not inclined to give such a direction as prayed for by the petitioner. However, taking into account the grave injustice caused to the petitioner for which the entire responsibility lies on the second respondent, we are convinced that the second respondent should be mulcted with the liability of payment of appropriate compensation to the petitioner for having snatched away her valuable right. Though, we would have been fully justified in directing exemplary amount by way of compensation, we feel it appropriate to fix it in a sum of Rs 5,00,000 (Rupees five lakhs only). The second respondent is, therefore, directed to pay the said sum of Rs 5,00,000 apart from refunding the sum of Rs 13,000 which the petitioner had to pay for her readmission to the very same PG course of MD Pathology. We are confident that since the petitioner was only fighting for her lawful rights, the same should not have any reflection in the approach of the second respondent either directly or indirectly which would cause any disruption in her studies or in the completion of her course. It will always be open for the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum or for that matter even this Court to seek for the redressal of her grievances, if any on that score. The compensation of Rs 5,00,000 shall be paid to the petitioner within two weeks from the date of production of copy of this order.” 56. While in the case of S. Nihaal Ahamed (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the law in the following terms. “6. The compensation of Rs 5,00,000 shall be paid to the petitioner within two weeks from the date of production of copy of this order.” 56. While in the case of S. Nihaal Ahamed (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the law in the following terms. “6. After having culled out the broad principles from the previous decisions, this Court in the decision in Chandigarh Admn. v. Jasmine Kaur, (2014) 10 SCC 521 held as follows: (SCC p. 539, para 33) “33.3. If a candidate is not selected during a particular academic year due to the fault of the institutions/authorities and in this process if the seats are filled up and the scope for granting admission is lost due to eclipse of time schedule, then under such circumstances, the candidate should not be victimised for no fault of his/hers and the Court may consider grant of appropriate compensation to offset the loss caused, if any.” The appellants herein though placed in the merit list could not secure admission due to the fault of the respondent Medical College. As rightly held by the High Court they are not entitled to the relief of admission sought for by them in the writ petition due to lapse of time. 7. Reliance was placed by the appellants on the order of this Court dated 2-9-2014 in Krina Ajay Shah v. Assn. of Management of Unaided Private Medical and Dental Colleges, (2016) 1 SCC 666 . The said bunch of SLPs was filed in 2013 and the petitioners therein were students who appeared for the entrance examination conducted by the Association of Private Medical Colleges and Dental Colleges, Maharashtra and the petitioners were heard together and this Court held that in spite of the pendency of the SLPs for over a year, the State of Maharashtra never thought it fit to file any affidavit explaining its stand in the matter and the grievance of the petitioners was fully justified but the petitioners cannot be granted admission in view of the long lapse of time but they are entitled to public law damages and awarded a sum of Rs 20 lakhs to each one of the petitioners as public law damages. In the present case the learned Single Judge after elaborately considering the facts and circumstances held that the appellant-writ petitioners are entitled to a sum of Rs 3 lakhs each as compensation payable by the respondent Medical College and directed to pay within a period of 8 weeks. The said direction has been erroneously reversed by the Division Bench. In our view the order of the learned Single Judge has to be restored. 8. In the result the appeals are partly allowed and the impugned judgment insofar as setting aside the order of the Single Judge awarding compensation to the appellants is concerned, is set aside and the order of the Single Judge awarding compensation of Rs 3 lakhs to each of the appellants is restored alongwith time schedule for payment.” 57. The said judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court apply to the facts of the instant case. We accordingly mould the relief in consonance with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 58. We hold that the petitioner is entitled to compensation of Rs. Five Lakhs from the respondent No. 3-college. 59. We dismiss the writ petition with regard to the reliefs prayed for therein. We issue a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to carry into execution and accomplish the following directions. 1. The petitioner is entitled to compensation from the respondent No. 3-college. The respondent No. 3-college is directed to pay a sum of Rs. Five Lakhs to the petitioner by bank draft within three months from today. 2. The Principal Secretary, Medical Education & Training, Lucknow, U.P.-respondent No. 1 shall institute an enquiry into the conduct of D.G.M.E.T. and or the concerned officials, fix responsibility and impose penalty. The Principal Secretary, Medical Education shall also hold an enquiry into the demand of the bank guarantee made by the respondent No. 3-college and take appropriate action against the college, which will deter such conduct in future. The exercise shall be completed within five months from today. 3. (a) The Principal Secretary, Medical Education & Training, Lucknow, U.P.-respondent No. 1 will issue appropriate orders and guidelines to create a system consistent with the observations made in the judgment, which is sensitive and responsive to the interests, welfare and grievances of the students. The exercise shall be completed within five months from today. 3. (a) The Principal Secretary, Medical Education & Training, Lucknow, U.P.-respondent No. 1 will issue appropriate orders and guidelines to create a system consistent with the observations made in the judgment, which is sensitive and responsive to the interests, welfare and grievances of the students. The exercise will be completed before the next academic session; (b) The Principal Secretary, Medical Education & Training, Lucknow, U.P.-respondent No. 1 shall allocate responsibility for redressal of students’ grievances to specific officials who can be held accountable. Designations and contact details of such officials shall be published in the admission brochures in the next academic session; (c) The Principal Secretary, Medical Education & Training, Lucknow, U.P.-respondent No. 1 in consultation with Medical Council of India shall issue directions against demand of such bank guarantees by colleges and provide for penalties against deviant colleges. These guidelines shall be clearly indicated in the terms and conditions for admission from the next academic session.