JUDGMENT ORDER K.S. Jhaveri, J. - Since in both the appeals similar question in relation to predeposit of 75% of the award amount is involved and arise out of 2 identical writ petitions decided by one judgment by the learned Single Judge, the same are heard together and are being decided by this common order. 2. By way of these two appeals, appellant seeks to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge dated 11th September, 2017 whereby the two writ petitions filed by the appellant have been dismissed as per the view taken by the learned Single Judge in SB writ petition No. 14207/2017. By the order dated 11th September, 2017 passed in the writ petition the learned Single Judge has taken the following view:- "The objection of Mr. Agarwal with regard to misjoinder of causes of action in this petition is valid. A challenge to an order dismissing the objections filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 to an award cannot lie along with an order passed on an application for execution of the said award. The proceedings though related are different and fall in distinct jurisdictions. Further a challenge to an order dismissing objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is appealable under Section 37 thereof. That challenge in this petition thereto has to be dismissed on ground of availability of alternative remedy. Even otherwise on merits, the petitioner-Board has no case. Section 19 of the Act of 2006 is peremptory in nature and provides that no application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it 75% of the award amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, in the manner directed by such court. The Apex Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra) has albeit addressing the question of pre-deposit under Section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (hereafter ''Act of 1993'') while considering a challenge to an award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and deciding the issue of predeposit in favour of the awardee, noticed the Act of 2006 and with reference to the more explicit languaged Section 19 thereof held that the question of pre-deposit for consideration of objection under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was a non sequitur. The predeposit had to be made (see para 58) . I am of the considered view that on its plain language Section 19 of the Act of 2006 would definitely apply to proceedings taken by way of the objections under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 against the statutory award passed by the Council under Section 18(3) of the Act of 2006. Objections to 3 the award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be available only on redeposit of 75% of the award amount as required by Section 19 of the Act of 2006. This conclusion is buttressed by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra). Admittedly the Board did not deposit the 75% of the award amount with the Addl. District Judge No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan before whom it had laid a challenge by way of objections to the award dated 30.1.2013 passed by the Council. The impugned order dated 18.7.2016 passed by Addl. District and Sessions Judge No. 2, Jaipur Metropolitan cannot thus be faulted. In this view of the matter, other challenges in the petition also fall". 3. Thus the learned Single Judge has taken the view that provisions of sections 19 and 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 are applicable to the proceedings taken by way of the objection. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that as per the provisions of Section 19 of the Act predeposit of 75% of the awarded amount was not needed to be deposited as the award dated 30.1.2013 is prima facie illegal. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that as per the provisions of Section 19 of the Act predeposit of 75% of the awarded amount was not needed to be deposited as the award dated 30.1.2013 is prima facie illegal. He has also taken to us to Section 34 of the Act of 1996, which reads as under:- "34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. - (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-(a) the party making the application furnishes proof that- (i) a party was under some incapacity, or (ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or (iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or (iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration: Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or (v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the 4 parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or (b) the Court finds that- (i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or (ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India. Explanation. Explanation. -Without prejudice to the generality of sub-clause (ii) it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81. (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (4) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award" 5. He has further contended that in view judgment of the Supreme Court in Laxmi Rattan Engineering Works Ltd. vs. Asstt. Commr. Sales Tax, Kanpur and anr. (1968) 1 SCR 505 , the appeal is required to be entertained. "The word ''entertain'' is explained by a Divisional Bench of the Allahabad High Court as denoting the point of time at which an application to set aside the sale is heard by the court. The expression ''entertain'', it is stated. does not mean. the same thing as the filing of the application or admission of the application by the court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Jain vs. Chamanlal Gupta and anr., AIR 1962 Allahabad 543 in which the learned Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression ''entertain''. does not mean. the same thing as the filing of the application or admission of the application by the court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom Chand Jain vs. Chamanlal Gupta and anr., AIR 1962 Allahabad 543 in which the learned Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression ''entertain''. It is observed by Dwivedi J. that the word ''entertain'' in its application bears the meaning ''admitting to consideration'', and therefore when the court cannot refuse to take an application which is backed by deposit or security, it cannot refuse judicially to consider it. In a single bench decision of the same court reported in Bawan Ram and anr. vs. Kunj Beharilal one of us (Bhargava, J.) bad to consider the same rule. There the deposit had not been made within the period of limitation and the question had arisen whether the court could entertain the application or not. It was decided that the application could not be entertained because proviso (b) debarred the court from entertaining an objection unless the requirement of depositing the amount or furnishing security was complied with within the time prescribed. In that case the word 5 'entertain'' is not interpreted but it is held that the Court cannot proceed to consider the application in the absence of deposit made within the time allowed by law. This case turned on the fact that the deposit was made out of time. In yet another case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Haji Rahim Bux and Sons and ors. vs. Firm Samiullah and Sons a division bench consisting of Cheif Justice Desai and Mr. Justice S. D. Singh interpreted the words of Order 21, Rule 90, by saying that the word ''entertain'' meant not"receive'' or ''accept'' but ''proceed to consider on merits'' or ''adjudicate upon''. In our opinion these cases have taken a correct view of the word ''entertain'' which according to dictionary also means ''admit to consideration''. It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to section 9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for, the first time. It would therefore appear that the direction to the court in the proviso to section 9 is that the court shall not proceed to admit to consideration an appeal which is not accompanied by satisfactory proof of the payment of the admitted tax. This will be when the case is taken up by the court for, the first time. In the decision on which the Assistant Commissioner relied, the learned Chief Justice (Desai C.J.) holds that the words ''accompanied by'' showed that something tangible had to accompany the memorandum of appeal. If the memorandum of appeal had to be accompanied by satisfactory proof, it had to be in the shape of something tangible, because no intangible thing can accompany a document like the memorandum of appeal. In our opinion, making ''an appeal'' the equivalent of the memorandum of appeal is not sound. Even under O. 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the expressions "appeal" and "memorandum of appeal" are used to denote two distinct things. In Wharton''s Law Lexicon, the word "appeal" is defined as the judicial examination of the decisions by a hi-her Court of the decision of an inferior court. The appeal is the judicial examination; the memorandum of appeal contains the rounds on which the judicial examination is invited. For purposes of limitation and for purposes of the rules of the Court it is required that a written memorandum of appeal shall be filed. When the proviso speaks of the entertainment of the appeal, it means that the appeal such as was filed will not be admitted to consideration unless there is satisfactory proof available of the making of the deposit of admitted tax. 6. He has further placed reliance on paragraph No. 4 of the judgment of Hon''ble the Supreme Court in Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. vs. Punnu Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives 1971 (3) SCC 124 wherein the Supreme Court held as under:- "4. Before the High Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant and that contention was repeated in this Court, that Clause (b) of the proviso did not govern the present proceedings as the application in question had been filed several months before that clause was added to the proviso. It is the contention of the appellant that the expression. Before the High Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant and that contention was repeated in this Court, that Clause (b) of the proviso did not govern the present proceedings as the application in question had been filed several months before that clause was added to the proviso. It is the contention of the appellant that the expression. "entertain" found in the proviso refers to the initiation of the proceedings and not to the stage when the court takes up, the application for consideration. This; contention was rejected by the High Court relying on the decision of that court in Kundan Lal vs. Jagan Nath Sharma AIR 1982 Allahabad 547 . The same view had been taken by the said High Court in Dhoom Chand Jain vs. Chaman-lal Gupta AIR 1962 Allahabad 543 and Haji Rahim Bux and 6 Sons vs. Firm Samiullah and Sons and again in Mahavir Singh vs. Gauri Shankar. These decisions have interpreted the expression "entertain" as meaning ''adjudicate upon'' or ''proceed to consider on merits''. This view of the High Court has been accepted as correct by this Court in Lakshmi-ratan Engineering Works Ltd. vs. Asst Commr., Sales Tax, Kanpur . We are bound by that decision and as such we are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that Clause (b) of the proviso did not apply to the present proceedings. Paragraphs Nos. 11 and 12 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Goodyear India Limited vs. Norton Intech Rubbers Private Limited and another (2012) 6 SCC 345 wherein it was held as under:- "11. Having considered the submissions made, both on behalf of the petitioner and on behalf of the respondents, we do not see any reason to interfere with the views expressed, both by the learned Single Judge, as also the Division Bench with regard to Section 19 of the 2006 Act. It may not be out of place to mention that the provisions of section 19 of the 2006 act, had been challenged before the Kerala High Court in Kerala SRTC vs. Union of India (2010) 1 KLT 65 , where the same submissions were negated and, subsequently, the matter also came up to this Court, when the special leave petitions were dismissed, with leave to make the predeposit in the cases involved, within an extended period of ten weeks. We may also indicate that the expression "in the manner directed by such court" would, in our view, indicate the discretion given to the court to allow the predeposit to be made, if felt necessary, in instalments. 12. Having regard to the above, we are not inclined to entertain the special leave petitions filed by M/s. Goodyear India Ltd. and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in keeping with the other decisions rendered in these cases, we extend the time for predeposit by the petitioner, by a further period of twelve weeks. If such deposit is made, the appeal shall be treated to be in order and, thereafter, the same may be proceeded with. 7. He has also placed reliance on paragraphs Nos. 17 and 18, of the judgment of learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in E-Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd. Pune vs. K.K. Dani Consultants and Engineers 2013(3) Mh. L.J. 23 wherein it was held as under:- "17. In so far as the next submission of the learned counsel of respondent that in view of non deposit of 75% under section 19 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 by the appellant admittedly, the Learned District Judge could not have entertained the petition is concerned, in my 7 view, there is bar under section 19 from entertaining the petition under section 34 for non deposit of 75% but there is no bar from filing an application under section 34 of the Act. The stage of entertaining the petition would arise only after it is filed before the District Court. In my view such objection of non deposit of 75% could have been entertained by the learned District Judge only if he would have allowed the application for condonation of delay in filing section 34 application. Since the application for condonation of delay itself was rejected, that stage did not arise. 18. In my view, as limitation for filing application under section 34 did not commence for want of service of signed copy of the award upon the appellant by the Arbitral Tribunal (Council), there was no delay in filing application under section 34." And paragraphs Nos. 18. In my view, as limitation for filing application under section 34 did not commence for want of service of signed copy of the award upon the appellant by the Arbitral Tribunal (Council), there was no delay in filing application under section 34." And paragraphs Nos. 11, 12, 15, 22, 24, 25, 33, 37, 39, 40, 43 and 44 of another judgment of Bombay High Court in Ravindranath GE Medicated Associate Pvt. Ltd. Chennai vs. Clean Coats Pvt. Ltd. Ambernath 2016(6) Mh.L.J. 49 which are as follow:- 11. Learned senior counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. vs. Punnu Sahu (Dead) through legal representatives, reported in 1971 (3) SCC 124. Supreme Court has interpreted the term "entertain" and has held that the term "entertain" would mean "adjudicate upon" or "proceed to consider on merits." 12. Learned senior counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of E-Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd., Pune vs. K.K. Dani Consultants and Engineers Pvt. Ltd., Pune, reported in 2013 (3) Mh. L.J. 24 and in particular paragraph 17 interpreting Section 19 of the said MSMED Act. He submits that this Court has held that under Section 19 of the said MSMED Act, there is a bar from entertaining the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration Act for nondeposit of 75%, but there is no bar from filing an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. The stage of entertaining the petition would arise only after it is filed before the District Court. It is held that such objection of non-deposit of 75% could have been entertained by the learned District Judge only if he would have allowed the application for condonation of delay in filing Section 34 application. 15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant fairly invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 34 and more particularly paragraphs 12, 13, 42 and 59 thereof. 15. Learned senior counsel for the appellant fairly invited my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 34 and more particularly paragraphs 12, 13, 42 and 59 thereof. He submits that issue before the Supreme Court in the said judgment was whether the expression "appeal" appearing in Section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, 8 includes an application to set aside the arbitral award filed under section 34 of the Arbitration Act. He submits that observation made by the Supreme Court in the said judgment that proviso to Section 19 which requires the deposit to be made before an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is filed, is not a ratio, but such observation was made in the context of the issue raised before the Supreme Court. He submits that the said judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited (supra) is clearly distinguishable. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in case of Goodyear India Limited vs. Norton Intech Rubbers (P) Ltd. and another decided on 15th March, 2012 in S.L.A.(Civil) Nos.16919-16920 of 2011 and in particular paragraphs 11 to 13 and would submit that the said judgment would assist the case of the respondent. Reliance is also placed on judgment of Madras High Court in case of Goodyear India Ltd. vs. Nortan Intec Rubber (P) Ltd. and another 2013(5) CTC 25 and more particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 16. He submits that the Madras High Court has taken a view that the pre-deposit of the 75% of the awarded sum was to be made alongwith application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act and if no such deposit was made alongwith such application, the petition could not be entertained by the Court in view of the bar under section 19. 24. Learned senior counsel submits that the Supreme Court in case of Goodyear India Limited (supra) has already dealt with this issue and has held that the expression ''in the manner directed by such court'' would indicate the discretion given to the court to allow the pre-deposit to be made, if felt necessary in installment. 24. Learned senior counsel submits that the Supreme Court in case of Goodyear India Limited (supra) has already dealt with this issue and has held that the expression ''in the manner directed by such court'' would indicate the discretion given to the court to allow the pre-deposit to be made, if felt necessary in installment. He submits that the Supreme Court had also extended the time for pre-deposit to the petitioner in that matter and had made it clear that if such deposit was made within the extended period, the appeal shall be treated to be in order and to be proceeded with. He submits that the said judgment of the Supreme Court was after interpreting its earlier judgment in case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited (supra). 25. Learned senior counsel also placed reliance on the order passed by this court on 15th April, 2016 in Arbitration Petition No. 1559 of 2015 in case of M/s. Amartara Pvt. Ltd. vs. M/s. Clean Coats Pvt. Ltd. 33. This court in case of E-Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd., Pune (supra) has already interpreted the expression ''entertain'' and has held that the said expression does not indicate that the deposit of 75% was required to be made at the stage of filing an application under section 34 but would indicate that the application would not be entertained at the time of hearing. In my view the judgment of this court in case of E.Square Leisure Pvt.Ltd., Pune (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgment. 37. In my view, section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 does not provide for any period of limitation in filing the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The said provision does not indicate that if the amount of 75% of the awarded sum is not deposited along with the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the limitation in filing such application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would not stop. 39. The said provision does not indicate that if the amount of 75% of the awarded sum is not deposited along with the application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the limitation in filing such application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would not stop. 39. The Supreme Court in case of Laxmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd. (supra) and in case of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. (supra) has interpreted the term "entertain" and has held that the term "entertain" would mean first occasion on which the Court takes up the matter for consideration which may be at the admission stage or if by rules of that tribunal, the appeals are automatically admitted, it will be at the time of hearing of the appeal. It is held that on the first occasion, when the Court takes up the matter for consideration, satisfactory proof must be presented that tax was paid within the period of limitation available for the appeal. 40. In my view, the appellant was thus not required to deposit 75% of the awarded sum along with the application filed under section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 before the learned Principal District Judge, Thane and such amount of deposit could be made when the said application was ultimately entertained by the learned Principal District Judge, Thane, who could even consider grant of installments of the said amount and also the mode and manner in which the said amount could be deposited. In my view, the judgment of this Court in case of E. Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd., Pune (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgments. 43. In my view, the judgment of this Court in case of E. Square Leisure Pvt. Ltd., Pune (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am respectfully bound by the said judgments. 43. In my view, the impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Thane refusing to entertain the arbitration application though the applicant had agreed to deposit 75% of the awarded sum and had filed an application for seeking permission to deposit the said amount on the ground that the said amount of 75% of the awarded sum not having deposited along with the arbitration application was not maintainable or in any event was barred by law of limitation is totally contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court and this Court in the judgments referred to aforesaid and is also contrary to sections 18 and 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 and thus deserves to be set aside. 44. I therefore, pass the following order :- a) Arbitration Appeal (Stamp) No. 18470 of 2016 filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Thane on 13th June, 2016 allowing the application Exhibit-11 filed by the respondent raising a preliminary objection on the maintainability of the arbitration application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is set aside. The application (Exhibit 11) filed by the respondent is dismissed. The impugned order dismissing the 10 original application being Civil Misc. Application No. 236 of 2015 filed by the appellant is set aside. The Civil Misc. Application No. 236 of 2015 is restored to file. b) The appellant is granted two weeks time to deposit 75% of the awarded sum in the Court of Principal District Judge, Thane in Civil Misc. Application No. 236 of 2015. If the amount of 75% of the awarded sum is deposited by the appellant within the time prescribed, the said application shall be treated in order and shall heard and disposed off by the learned Principal District Judge, Thane on its own merits expeditiously. c) In view of disposal of the appeal, civil application does not survive and is accordingly disposed of. d) There shall be no order as to costs. 8. c) In view of disposal of the appeal, civil application does not survive and is accordingly disposed of. d) There shall be no order as to costs. 8. He has also invited our attention towards paragraph No. 11 of the judgment of this Court dated 17th October, 2014 in DB Special Appeal Writ No. 889 of 2014, M/s. Narmada Transmission Private Ltd. vs. Rajasthan Rajya Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. and anr. wherein a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:- "11. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the Special Appeal, and set aside the order passed by learned Single Judge dated 15.02.2012 as well as the order dated 28.04.2014. As observed earlier, it will be open to the respondents to file an appeal under section 34 of the Arbitration Act, subject to limitation, and after deposit of 75% of the amount, as awarded by the Facilitation Council." Learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Agarwal contended that in the view taken by the Single Judge no interference is called for as a plain reading of Section 19 of the Act would go to show that predeposit of 75% amount is mandatory and the same has not been deposited by the appellants. He has placed reliance on paragraphs Nos. 22, 36 and 49 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (2010) 13 SCC 34 :- "22. The contention of the appellant company that while interpreting a statutory provision, its context and the object behind the same cannot be lost view of, is no doubt, correct. At the same time, the contention of the respondents that when a term appearing in the Statute is clear and unambiguous, only the literal rule of interpretation will apply, must also be accepted. What then has to be seen is whether the term ''appeal'' is one of clear and definite meaning. If it is so, that meaning shall be given effect to irrespective of the consequences of such construction. If, on the other hand, the meaning of the ''appeal'' is ambiguous, the interpretation that advances the object and purpose of the legislation, shall be accepted. 36. If it is so, that meaning shall be given effect to irrespective of the consequences of such construction. If, on the other hand, the meaning of the ''appeal'' is ambiguous, the interpretation that advances the object and purpose of the legislation, shall be accepted. 36. On a perusal of the plethora of decisions aforementioned, we are of the view that ''appeal'' is a term that carries a wide range of connotations with it and that appellate jurisdiction can be exercised in a variety of forms. It is not necessary that the exercise of appellate jurisdiction will always involve re-agitation of entire matrix of facts and law. We have already seen in the case of Abhayankar (supra) that even an order passed by virtue of limited power of revision under Section 115 of the Code is treated as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, though under that provision, the Court cannot go into the questions of facts. Given the weight of authorities in favour of giving such a wide meaning to the term ''appeal'', we are constrained to disagree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent corporation that appeal shall mean only a challenge to a decree or order where the entire matrix of law and fact can be reagitated with respect to the impugned order/decree. There is no quarrel that Section 34 envisages only limited grounds of challenge to an award; however, we see no reason why that alone should take out an application under Section 34 outside the ambit of an appeal especially when even a power of revision is treated as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction by this Court and the Privy Council." "49. We have already stated that the term ''appeal'' does not always indicate a process where all questions of fact and law can be re-agitated. We have already seen that various Courts have held even a revision petition to be an ''appeal'', keeping in mind the object of the legislation." 9. He has further contended that the learned Single Judge while taking into consideration the merits of the case concluded as under:" Even otherwise on merits, the petitioner-Board has no case. We have already seen that various Courts have held even a revision petition to be an ''appeal'', keeping in mind the object of the legislation." 9. He has further contended that the learned Single Judge while taking into consideration the merits of the case concluded as under:" Even otherwise on merits, the petitioner-Board has no case. Section 19 of the Act of 2006 is peremptory in nature and provides that no application for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the council itself or by any institution or centre providing alternate dispute resolution services to which a reference is made by the Council, shall be entertained by any court unless the appellant (not being a supplier) has deposited with it 75% of the award amount in terms of the decree, award or, as the case may be, in the manner directed by such court. The Apex Court in the case of Snehadeep Structures Private Limited vs. Maharashtra Small Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited (supra) has 12 albeit addressing the question of pre-deposit under Section 7 of the Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 (hereafter ''Act of 1993'') while considering a challenge to an award under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 and deciding the issue of pre-deposit in favour of the awardee, noticed the Act of 2006 and with reference to the more explicit language Section 19 thereof held that the question of pre-deposit for consideration of objection under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 was a non sequitur. The predeposit had to be made," 10. He has also contended that in view of the preliminary objection raised by the respondents, provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked by the appellants by filing the intra court appeal. In support of his contention, Shri Agarwal, learned Sr. Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Kishan Fauji vs. State of Haryana (2017) 5 SCC 533 para No. 41 which reads as follows"- "41. In support of his contention, Shri Agarwal, learned Sr. Counsel relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Ram Kishan Fauji vs. State of Haryana (2017) 5 SCC 533 para No. 41 which reads as follows"- "41. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil court can only be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution and from such challenge, no intra-court appeal would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other factors as have been enumerated therein." 11. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Jogendrasinghji Vijaysinghji vs. State of Gujarat (2015) 9 SCC 1 learned counsel for the respondents contended that the appeal should not be entertained. To contend that appeal should not be entertained, Shri Agarwal has also placed reliance on paragraph 31 from the judgment of the Apex Court in Rajkumar Shivhare vs. Directorate of enforcement (2010) 4 SCC 772 wherein it was held as under:- "31. When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievance and that too in a fiscal Statute, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. In this case High Court is a statutory forum of appeal on a question of law. That should not be abdicated and given a go bye by a litigant for invoking the forum of judicial review of the High Court under writ jurisdiction. The High Court, with great respect, fell into a manifest error by not appreciating the aspect 13 of the matter. It has however dismissed the writ petition on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction." 12. Without entering into the merits of the case we believe that a plain reading of Section 19 of the Act of 1996 and proviso thereto no doubt, requires the deposit to be made before an application under section 34 of the Arbitration Act is filed. 13. Sofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the appellants should have been given opportunity to deposit the predeposit 75% amount in installments is concerned, no such application was made by the appellants. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents in para No. 3 contended that the appellants have refused to deposit the required amount on the ground that they are not bound to deposit the said amount. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents in para No. 3 contended that the appellants have refused to deposit the required amount on the ground that they are not bound to deposit the said amount. Now the contention that 100% of the awarded amount has been deposited by the appellants, therefore, this appeal should be entertained and heard on merits. We are not impressed by this argument because of the reason that such amount has been deposited due to the order passed in execution proceedings and till then no such amount has been deposited by the appellants. 14. In view of the above, no interference is required to be called for in the order passed by the learned Single Judge and both the appeals are dismissed.