JUDGMENT & ORDER : 1. A preliminary objection has been raised by the respondents relating to maintainability of the writ petition in terms of the Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India. The respondents state that the charge sheet issued to the petitioner vide memorandum dated 20th December, 2016 was issued from the office of National Council of Teachers Education, New Delhi. The petitioner at the time of issuing charge sheet was holding the post of Deputy Secretary of NCTE, Hans Bhawan New Delhi. The contents of the charge sheet relate to submission of false and fraudulent claim of past service as Principal by the petitioner. Thus, it is submitted that the jurisdiction of this Court does not lie to examine the said memorandum issued by the Chair person, NCTE at New Delhi. 2. Learned Sr. Counsel submits that law relating to territorial jurisdiction has been settled in the case of State of Rajasthan & ors. Vs. M/s Swaika Properties and Anr.- 1985(3)SCC217, which reads as under: “7. Upon these facts , we are satisfied that the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Single Judge had no jurisdiction to issue a rule nisi on the petition filed by the respondents under Art. 226of the Constitution or to make the ad-interim ex-parte prohibitory order restraining the appellants from taking any steps to take possession of the land acquired. Under sub-s. (5) of s. 52 of the Act the appellants were entitled to require the respondents to surrender or deliver possession of the lands acquired forthwith and upon their failure to do so , take immediate steps to secure such possession under sub-s. (6) thereof. 8. The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: "The 'cause of action' means every fact which , if traversed , it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court." In other words , it is a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. The mere service of notice under s. 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B , Brabourne Road , Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal , could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under s. 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the question whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Art. 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The notification dated February 8 , 1984 issued by the State Government under s. 52(1) of the Act became effective the moment it was published in the official Gazette as thereupon the notified land became vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances. It was not necessary for the respondents to plead the service of notice on them by the Special Officer , Town Planning Department , Jaipur under s. 52(2) for the grant of an appropriate writ , direction or order under Art. 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notification issued by the State Government under s. 52(1) of the Act. If the respondents felt aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under s. 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution , the remedy of the respondents of the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court , Jaipur Bench , where the cause of action wholly or in part arose.” 3. He relies on judgment passed in Kusam Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Another” reported in 2004(6)SCC254, wherein the Court observed as under: “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. Union of India & Another” reported in 2004(6)SCC254, wherein the Court observed as under: “6. Cause of action implies a right to sue. The material facts which are imperative for the suitor to allege and prove constitutes the cause of action. Cause of action is not defined in any statute. It has, however, been judicially interpreted inter alia to mean that every fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Negatively put, it would mean that everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, would be part of cause of action. Its importance is beyond any doubt. For every action, there has to be a cause of action, if not, the plaint or the writ petition, as the case may be, shall be rejected summarily. 7. Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India reads thus: "(2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." 18. The facts pleaded in the writ petition must have a nexus on the basis whereof a prayer can be granted. Those facts which have nothing to do with the prayer made therein cannot be said to give rise to a cause of action which would confer jurisdiction on the court. 22. The court must have the requisite territorial jurisdiction. An order passed on writ petition questioning the constitutionality of a Parliamentary Act whether interim or final keeping in view the provisions contained in Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, will have effect throughout the territory of India subject of course to the applicability of the Act. 30 We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. 30 We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens.” The same view was expressed in the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Eastern Coalfields Ltd. & Others Vs. Kalyan Banerjee - 2008(3)SCC456. 4. Per contra, Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the matter and in support he relies on judgment of the Apex Court in Om Prakash Srivastava Vs. Union of India & Another – 2006(6)SCC207, wherein the Apex Court held as under: “11. It is settled law that "cause of action" consists of bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a court of law. In other words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action would possibly accrue or would arise. 12. The expression "cause of action" has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense "cause of action" means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". 13. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in "cause of action". 13. The expression "cause of action" has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit. 14. The expression "cause of action" is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person. (See Black's Law Dictionary). In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary a "cause of action" is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In "Words and Phrases" (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase "cause of action" in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.” 5. He also relies on law laid down by the Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India & Ors.: 2014(9)SCC329 wherein the Supreme Court held as under: “16. Regard being had to the discussion made hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.” 6. Heard both the counsels. 7. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.” 6. Heard both the counsels. 7. This Court while following the observations of the Apex Court finds that in all the aforesaid judgments the issue which culls out is that for examining territorial jurisdiction each and every case has to be examined on its own facts and the High Court, where the petition is preferred, would be required to examine whether the cause of action arises wholly or in part within the jurisdiction of that High Court. This would mean that even if a small fraction of cause of action which gives the petitioner the right to sue accrues within the territories of the said High Court, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction to decide the matter. 8. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Rajendra Chingaravelu Vs. R.K. Mishra, Additional Commissioner of Income Tax & Ors. reported in 2010(1)SCC457 wherein, it has been held as under: “9. The first question that arises for consideration is whether the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that as the seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the appellant could not maintain the writ petition before it. The High Court did not examine whether any part of cause of action arose in Andhra Pradesh. Clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear that the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action arises wholly or in part, will have jurisdiction. This would mean that even if a small fraction of the cause of action (that bundle of facts which gives a petitioner, a right to sue) accrued within the territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of that State will have jurisdiction. 10. In this case, the genesis for the entire episode of search, seizure and detention was the action of the security/intelligence officials at Hyderabad Airport (in Andhra Pradesh) who having inspected the cash carried by him, alerted their counterparts at the Chennai Airport that appellant was carrying a huge sum of money, and required to be intercepted and questioned. A part of the cause of action therefore clearly arose in Hyderabad. A part of the cause of action therefore clearly arose in Hyderabad. It is also to be noticed that the consequential income tax proceedings against him, which he challenged in the writ petition, were also initiated at Hyderabad. Therefore, his writ petition ought not to have been rejected on the ground of want of jurisdiction.” 9. In Om Prakash(supra) the Supreme Court observed as under: “18. In the instant case the High Court has not dealt with the question as to whether it had jurisdiction to deal with the writ petition. It only observed that the Delhi High Court may have jurisdiction, but the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of U.P. can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. As noted supra, there were two grievances by the appellant. But only one of them i.e. the alleged lack of medical facilities has been referred to by the High Court. It was open to the Delhi High Court to say that no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The High Court in the impugned order does not say so. On the contrary, it says that jurisdiction may be there, but the Allahabad High Court can deal with the matter more effectively. That is not certainly a correct way to deal with the writ petition. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and remit the matter to it for fresh hearing on merits. A prayer has been made for release of the appellant on parole for the reasons indicated in the application. We are not inclined to pass any order on the said application. The same is rejected.” 10. Having noted above, on examining the facts of the present case, it is seen that earlier the petitioner was engaged in litigation before this Court relating to his qualification for the post of Regional Director and one S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1465/1999 was preferred by the petitioner while he was holding the post of Regional Director at Jaipur and Single Bench of this Court held him eligible and entitled to retain the job of Regional Director for which he was recruited in accordance with the advertisement. 11. 11. In D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.430/2001, wherein challenge was made by the NCTE to the aforesaid order, the Division Bench passed the order dated 2.11.2001 wherein the counsel for the NCTE sought permission of the court to permit the NCTE to fill up the post of Regional Director as the petitioner had already made representation which was acceded to and he had been posted as Deputy Secretary at New Delhi. Acceding to the request of the counsel for the NCTE, Division Bench passed following order: “Mr. Gk Garg, learned counsel for the contesting respondents submits that the permission to fill up the post of Regional Director, NRC, NCTE, Jaipur may be granted to the appellant without prejudice to his rights and contentions of the respondent in continuing on the post of Deputy Secretary at New-Delhi, where the respondent is presently working. Shri Garg again submitted that since the respondent has already been posted on the post of Dy. Secretary at New Delhi, his appointment may not be disturbed. The statement made by Shri Garg is placed on record. The respondent is permitted to discharge his functions on the post of Dy. Secretary at New-Delhi and the appellant is shall also be at liberty to fill up the post of Regional Director, NRC, NCTE, Jaipur in accordance with law. The other directions passed by the learned Single Judge vide its judgment dated 31.05.2001 shall be complied with.” Thus, the issue relating to posting of the petitioner as Deputy Secretary and Regional Director was settled. 12. In the present case, however, the issue is relating to memorandum charge sheet issued to the petitioner, while holding the post of Deputy Secretary at New Delhi regarding allegations of submitting false and fraudulent claim of past service as Principal, the allegations is that he has never worked as Principal of Swami Purnavanand Mahavidhlaya, Chatarpur (MP) in the pay scale 3700-5700 during the period of 1.7.1986 to 22.6.1993 as claimed by him. Thus, the respondents have challenged the very basis on which the petitioner was selected and recruited as Regional Director and Deputy Secretary. Thus, the respondents have challenged the very basis on which the petitioner was selected and recruited as Regional Director and Deputy Secretary. Counsel for the petitioner submits that since the right had already been claimed and finalized by this Court in the earlier writ proceedings relating to the petitioner holding the post of Deputy Secretary, in view of the law laid down in Nawal Kishore Sharma(supra), this Court would continue to have jurisdiction to examine whether the said legal right has been taken away or not. 13. In my considered view, the issue involved in the present writ petition relating to the charge sheet cannot be said to be the same subject matter or cause of action in continuation of the writ proceedings which were undertaken earlier. The cause of action relating to charge sheet and the contents thereof are completely separable and distinguishable from the judgment which has been rendered earlier by this Court. As the petitioner is posted in Delhi and the charge sheet has also been issued from Delhi, the jurisdiction to examine the veracity and legality of the departmental proceedings would therefore not lie within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 14. In view of the law as noted above, the writ petition is held to be not maintainable in terms of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and is accordingly dismissed.