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2017 DIGILAW 26 (ORI)

State of Orissa v. Amulya Kumar Champatiray

2017-01-03

SANJU PANDA, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

body2017
JUDGMENT S.N.PRASAD, J. - The State of Orissa and its functionaries being aggrieved with the order dated 17.1.2013 passed by the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in O.A. No. 384(C) of 2012 are before this Court by way of this writ petition, whereby and whereunder the order of dismissal of the sole opposite party has been quashed with a liberty to the disciplinary authority to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceeding against the applicant-sole opposite party and finalize the same as per law, rules and executive orders in vogue within a reasonable period. 2. The brief fact of the case is that the sole opposite party filed an original application before the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack being O.A. No. 384(C) of 2012 challenging the order passed by the Director General and Inspector General of Police, Odisha, Cuttack by which he has been dismissed from service in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. His dismissal of service was based on the allegation of inaction in the matter of dealing with the case of atrocity on an 18 years old girl of village Arjunagoda under Pipili Police Station. It has been alleged against the sole opposite party that while he was posted as Inspector in-charge of Pipili Police Station in the district of Puri, one Sri Babuli Behera has submitted a written report to Sri Amulya Champatiray, the sole opposite party herein, mentioning that on 29.11.2011 at about 7 A.M. his daughter Kumari Babina Behera, aged 18 years had gone outside their house to attend to the call of nature. After some time, she was found lying naked in the field in an unconscious state struggling for her life, with marks on her throat. The local people had immediately shifted the girl to Pipili Government Hospital from where she was referred to Capital Hospital, Bhubaneswar and subsequently to S.C.B. Medical College & Hospital, Cuttack for treatment. The girl was in a state of comma. Babuli Behera had also complained that as he belongs to scheduled caste community the doctors are not paying adequate attention to his daughter. The allegation against the sole opposite party is that he even knowing the fact that the alleged commission of offence is a cognizable one that too against a scheduled caste girl, he neither did register the case nor made any station diary entry. The allegation against the sole opposite party is that he even knowing the fact that the alleged commission of offence is a cognizable one that too against a scheduled caste girl, he neither did register the case nor made any station diary entry. He also did not make any formal enquiry/investigation into the incident, he failed to inform the senior officials about the occurrence and as such, there was severe public outcry due to the inaction of the police in taking legal action in the matter, which was reported widely in media. After abnormal delay, when there was severe adverse media report, the SDPO, Pipili visited the victim girl and met her father and finally on the report of Sri Amulya Kumar Behera, son of Babuli Behera, the brother of the victim a case was registered vide Pipili P.S. Case No. 10 dated 9.1.2012 under Sections 341, 307,376, 506/34, IPC read with Section 3(1) of the S.C. & S.T. (P.A.) Act. The State Government has directed the Crime Branch to take up the investigation vide order passed in this regard on 10.1.2012. The Superintendent of Police, Puri had also submitted an inquiry report on 13.1.2012 after visiting the crime spot and examining the mother of the victim and other witnesses. He also examined the sole opposite party and submitted a report that in spite of the inquiries, the sole opposite party did neither register a case and make any station diary entry nor take any legal action. Thereafter, the sole opposite party was put under suspension vide office order No. 63/Exe dated 13.1.2012 for his gross negligence and dereliction in duty. The Crime Branch had started investigation of the case and arrested four accused persons and they have been remanded to the judicial custody. The Superintendent of Police, Puri had also submitted another report on 22.1.2012 which revealed that the complainant had gone to Pipili Police Station three times and requested the Inspector in-charge to take action, but however to no effect and as such, it has been treated to be gross negligence of duty and hence, the competent authority in exercise of powers conferred under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India read with the provision of Rule 828 and read with Appendix 49(12)(c) of the Orissa Police Manual has passed an order on 24.1.2012 dismissing the sole opposite party from service with immediate effect. The said order was challenged by the sole opposite party before the learned Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack mainly on the ground that he has not been provided with any opportunity of being heard and by exercising the powers conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India read with the provision of Rule 828 and Appendix 49(12)(c) of the Orissa Police Manual, has been dismissed from service with immediate effect, which is highly illegal, arbitrary and unreasonable for the reason that the mandatory requirement as provided under the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has not been followed, which requires that a reason has to be recorded in writing to the effect that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry. According to him, in the order dated 24.1.2012, no such reason has been assigned invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India and as such, the said order is absolutely illegal and is nto sustainable in the eye of law. His further ground was that the provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India have been exercised read with the provision of Rule 828 and read with Appendix 49(12)(c) of the Orissa Police Manual, which mandates that major punishment would not be passed until and unless a regular departmental proceeding as provided under the Public Enquiries Act, 1850 is initiated and as such, the order dated 24.1.2012 is without any application of mind. He further submits that the entire exercise has been initiated for imposing the capital punishment of dismissal from service merely on the ground of the complaint made by the father of the victim girl, namely, Babuli Behera, who has alleged that he had gone to the police station on 13.11.2011, but the sole opposite party being in charge of the police Station has not entertained his complaint, but according to him, the same needs to be proved as to whether the said Babuli Behera had ever gone to the police station for institution the F.I.R. and without getting this fact proved, the allegation of dereliction of duty has been inflicted upon him, which is highly illegal and unreasonable. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal after taking into consideration all these aspects of the matter has quashed the order of dismissal with a liberty to the disciplinary authority to initiate a fresh departmental proceeding and to conclude it within a reasonable period, which has been challenged by the State of Orissa through its functionaries mainly on the ground that it is a fit case in which the power conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked. 3. It has been submitted by Mr. J.P. Patnaik, learned Counsel representing the State of Orissa that it is due to the inaction on the part of the sole opposite party the faith of the people in police is sacking and as such, it is necessary for the higher officials to take action against him and that is the reason the requirement during the relevant time was to take immediate action so that the faith of the people in maintaining law and order vested upon the police administration be maintained and keeping this fact into consideration, the provisions as contained under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has been invoked and hence, there is no illegality in the same. He submits that the victim belongs to Scheduled Caste category, the nature of allegation is very serious and if the police officer like the sole opposite party will be left scot-free, the entire faith of the people on the police administration will end. He further submits that the requirement as contained under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has been followed as would be evident from the order dated 24.1.2012 wherein reason has been assigned for not going in detail enquiry as provided under the Public Enquires Act, 1850 and the discipline and appeal rule applicable to the sole opposite party. It has been asserted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal needs to be interfered with. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. Before going to the merits of the case, we thought it proper to discuss the relevant provision applicable to the delinquent employee serving under the State of Orissa. 5. 4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. Before going to the merits of the case, we thought it proper to discuss the relevant provision applicable to the delinquent employee serving under the State of Orissa. 5. The State of Odisha has formulated a rule known as Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, having been enshrined under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, which deals with the discipline and appeal rules of the public servants serving in the civil side of the State while provision has been made to deal with the discipline and appeal rule under the Police Manual. We are concerned here with the provision of the Police Manual since the matter relates to the disciplinary action taken against the police officer working under the State of Odisha in the capacity of Inspector in-charge of a police station in the district of Puri. The Odisha Police Rule contains a provision to deal with the provision to take disciplinary action against its officers and the officers are being categorized into two categories, the first category contains with the heading “Superior Officers”, the hierarchy of which starts from Deputy Superintendent of Police and goes to the higher rank in the police administration, i.e. to the post of Director General and Inspector General of Police, while the other category under the heading of “ other officers”, which starts from Constable and goes to Reserve Inspector. 6. Departmental punishments have been discussed under Chapter XXV. Under Rule 824 of the Orissa Police Rules, the list of punishments has been provided. The punishment of dismissal being a major punishment, is to be inflicted departmentally on a police officer. Rule 825 provides the authority on the officers empowered to impose punishments. Since we are concerned here with the Inspector in-charge, who can either in the rank of Sub-Inspector or Inspector, and power has been vested upon the higher authority to impose punishment, but ultimate power has been conferred upon the Inspector General, who has been authorized to award punishment to any police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police any one or more of the punishments in Rule 824. Rule 828 provides the procedure to inflict major punishments, which contains a provision that without prejudice to the provisions of the Police Servants Inquires Act, 1950, no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on any police officer (other than an order based on facts which have led to his conviction in a Criminal Court) unless he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is proposed to take action, and has been afforded an adequate opportunity or defending himself. It is evident from the statutory provision as contained in the Orissa Police Rules that it is mandatory on the part of the competent authority to inflict the order of punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction only after affording adequate opportunity of defending himself. The provision as contained in Rule 828 of the Orissa Police Rule is paramateria to the provisions as contained under Article 311(1) of the Constitution of India while sub-clause (2) of Article 311 contains exception i.e. (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct, which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority is empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such enquiry. 7. It is evident from the constitutional provision as contained under Article 311 that the order of dismissal or removal can only be passed after providing adequate and sufficient opportunity of being heard to the delinquent employee subject to some exception, one of such exception is that the order of dismissal or removal can be recorded in writing to show that the enquiry is not reasonably practicable. We are concerned with this proviso since it is the subject matter of issue raised by the parties in the instant writ petition. 8. The proviso to Article 311(2) is attracted when the authority is satisfied from the materials placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry. We are concerned with this proviso since it is the subject matter of issue raised by the parties in the instant writ petition. 8. The proviso to Article 311(2) is attracted when the authority is satisfied from the materials placed before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold a departmental inquiry. That decision to do so cannot rest solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. It is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of whim and caprice. There must be independent material to justify the dispensing with the inquiry envisaged by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The authority empowered to dismiss etc. must record his reason in writing for denying the opportunity under Clause 2 before making the order of dismissal etc. and the reasons recorded must ex facie show that it was not reasonably practicable to hold a disciplinary enquiry. 9. We have also taken note of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416 , wherein in paragraphs 130 and 133, their Lordships have been pleased to hold as follows: “130. The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable” but not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry. Xxx “ “133. The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional.” 10. We have taken note of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 362 = AIR 1991 SC 385 , wherein their Lordships in paragraph 5 have been pleased to hold as follows: “The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law. It is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.” 11. In Reena Rani v. State of Haryana, (2012) 10 SCC 215 , after referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court ruled that when reasons are not ascribed, the order is vitiated. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent decision reported in AIR 2014 SC 2922 (Risal Singh v. State of Haryana and others) while discussing the issue relating to applicability of the provision under Article 311 (2) b) of the Constitution of India has held as follows: “ 7. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the recent decision reported in AIR 2014 SC 2922 (Risal Singh v. State of Haryana and others) while discussing the issue relating to applicability of the provision under Article 311 (2) b) of the Constitution of India has held as follows: “ 7. X x x x A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the department’s case against the Government servant is weak and must fail” The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer.” 13. On perusal of the said provision, it is apparent that a safeguard against the misuse of provisions of Article 311 (2)(b) has been provided as it is specifically required that before summarily dismissing a person, the disciplinary authority must record the reasons for dispensing with the holding of an enquiry. 14. We, in the light of this proposition, have examined the case in hand. The fact, which has been argued before us, is that the incident took place on 29.11.2011 at about 7.00 A.M. as per the complaint made by the father of the victim, namely, Babuli Behera, who had submitted a written report on 30.11.2011 alleging therein that the mis-happening has been done with his daughter aged about 18 years while she had gone outside their house to attend to the call of nature, after some time she was found lying naked in the field in an unconscious state struggling for her life, with marks on her throat. The allegation has been levelled against the sole opposite party that he being the Inspector – in –charge of the concerned police station, has not discharged his duty by not entertaining the complaint, made by Babuli Behera on 30.11.2011, which is in gorss negligence in official duty. The allegation has been levelled against the sole opposite party that he being the Inspector – in –charge of the concerned police station, has not discharged his duty by not entertaining the complaint, made by Babuli Behera on 30.11.2011, which is in gorss negligence in official duty. When question has been raised upon the functioning of the police administration, the Superintendent of Police, Puri has been directed to conduct inquiry, who had submitted reports that the sole opposite party has neglected in discharging his duty and the F.I.R. has only been registered on 9.12.2011, hence, he is not fit to retain in service. It is also for the reason that when the Hon’ble Apex Court has set out a principle that in case of occurrence of any cognizable offence, the concerned police authority is supposed to institute F.I.R. but even without caring to the direction of the Hon’ble apex Court in this regard as laid down in the case of Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 , appropriate disciplinary action is required to be taken against him. In the backdrop of these factual aspects, the highest authority of the police administration in the State has acted upon on the reports of the Superintendent of Police dated 13.1.2012 and subsequently on 22.1.2012 recommending to take exemplary and immediate action against the Inspector in-charge, who has been put under suspension on the ground of dereliction in duty. The Director General and Inspector General of Police after taking into consideration the report and resorting to the provisions under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India read with Rule 828 and read with Appendix 49(12)(c) of the Orissa Police Manual, has dismissed the sole opposite party. 15. The question raised by the learned counsel representing the State of Orissa that there is no illegality in the order since the situation during the relevant time had warranted for immediate dismissal and that is the reason the provision of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, has been resorted to by assigning reason. 15. The question raised by the learned counsel representing the State of Orissa that there is no illegality in the order since the situation during the relevant time had warranted for immediate dismissal and that is the reason the provision of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, has been resorted to by assigning reason. While on the other hand, learned counsel representing the sole opposite party refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the State has submitted that the mandatory requirements as laid down under Article 311(2) (b) of the Constitution of India have not been complied with since no reason has been assigned and a proper opportunity to defend himself has been given. 16. We have appreciated the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and found from the record that allegations have been levelled by Babuli Behera, the father of the victim that following the date of occurrence, i.e. on 30.11.2011, he had gone to the concerned police station, which was under the charge of the sole opposite party in the capacity of Inspector-in-charge, but he has refused to entertain the F.I.R. even not entered the complaint in the station diary and when the public hue and cry had been made, then only it is at the behest of the higher police authority, the F.I.R. has been instituted on 9.12.2011 and subsequently, investigation has been handed over to the Crime Branch of the State. 17. We have also gone through the record of the case and made specific query to the learned counsel representing the State of Orissa that what is the piece of evidence, which led the authority to come to the conclusion that Babuli Behera had gone to the police station on 30.11.2011 for making complaint and the same has not been entertained by the sole opposite party being the in-charge of the concerned police station in the capacity of Inspector in-charge, but he has failed to answer in affirmative and only shown a copy of the complaint made by Babuli Behera on 30.11.2011. When this Court has put another query that even assuming that the concerned officer in-charge has not entertained the F.I.R. whether any higher authorities have been informed about this by Sri Babuli Behera or if the same has been published in the media widely, huge hue and cry was there during the relevant time, why the higher officials like the SDPO and Superintendent of Police under whose control the concerned police station is there, has not instituted F.I.R. but he has failed to give any positive answer. 18. In the present case, the extraordinary powers provided under Article 311(2)(b) have been invoked but the essential requirements of the Article qua recording of the reasons for invoking the said provisions have not been complied with. Simply it cannot be said that formal inquiry may not be reasonably practicable in prevailing circumstances as has been narrated in the order dated 24.1.2012 assigning reasons for invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India whereas it is well settled proposition of law that due reasons are necessary to be recorded as to why it was not practicably possible to conduct an enquiry or how it was not convenient to the authority to conduct an enquiry to invoke clause 2(b) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The said provisions are attracted by exercising extraordinary powers under the extraordinary circumstances. The absence of extraordinary circumstances to invoke provisions of Article 311(2)(b) can be termed as misuse of power and therefore, such an action is not sustainable in the eyes of law. There are two contradictory versions regarding the incident and which one of the two versions was correct cannot be ascertained without conducting any enquiry. The impugned order is based on the reports of the Superintendent, of Police, Puri wherein the sole opposite party has never been provided with the opportunity to put forward his case. It is further relevant to state here that when the Superintendent of Police, Puri could conduct two enquiries by recording the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, who can depose in the preliminary enquiry, then why they could not depose in a formal enquiry, has not been satisfactorily explained by the learned counsel representing the State of Orissa. It is further relevant to state here that when the Superintendent of Police, Puri could conduct two enquiries by recording the statements of the complainant and other witnesses, who can depose in the preliminary enquiry, then why they could not depose in a formal enquiry, has not been satisfactorily explained by the learned counsel representing the State of Orissa. In the case of Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 581 their Lordships of the Supreme Court had held that if a preliminary enquiry could be conducted, there was no reason as to why formal departmental enquiry could not be initiated against the delinquent. We have found from the record that the F.I.R. has been instituted on 9.12.2011 by the concerned police station. In such situation when there is negligence of duty on the part of the other officials also hence not providing opportunity of being heard and by not resorting to the regular proceeding as provided under Rule 828 of the Orissa Police Rule, invoking the power conferred under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, seems not justified. 19. It is also for the reason that the provision of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India mandates that a reason is to be recorded while depriving the delinquent employee to participate in a full-fledged inquiry, but we have found that no such reason has been reflected in the order of dismissal dated 24.1.2012, rather only one line has been written that “conducting a formal inquiry may not be reasonable and practicable in the prevailing circumstances”, but why the inquiry was not reasonable and practicable and what was the prevailing circumstances in not conducting such inquiry, that has not been discussed at all when the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provision of Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India has clearly mandates that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry as contemplated by Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India. This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. (Para 133 of the judgment in the case of Tulsirma Patel (supra)). 20. This is a Constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. (Para 133 of the judgment in the case of Tulsirma Patel (supra)). 20. The Hon’ble Apex Court while dealing with this issue in the case of Risal Singh v. State of Harayan (supra) has after taking note of the judgment rendered in the case of Tulasirama Patel (supra) at para 133, has held therein that the decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the concerned authority is questioned in a Court of law, it is incumbent on those who support the order to show that the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned officer. 21. We on the basis of the settled proposition of law as has been discussed herein above and after going through the order impugned before the learned Tribunal dated 24.01.2012, have found that the mandatory requirement as laid down under Article 311 (2)(b) of the Constitution of India, has not been followed. 22. We in the light of the pleas and contentions made, have found that the petitioners have failed to show any material or disclose any such fact on the basis of which subjective satisfaction had been arrived at, based upon objective criteria that holding regular departmental enquiry was not reasonably possible during the relevant time, even though preliminary enquiry has been conducted twice by an officer in the rank of Superintendent of Police. 23. We have also clearly scrutinized given by the learned Tribunal and have found that the learned Tribunal has not erred in passing the order by quashing the order of dismissal. Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the same. 24. We have perused the observation given by the learned Tribunal granting liberty to the authority to initiate disciplinary proceeding. 23. We have also clearly scrutinized given by the learned Tribunal and have found that the learned Tribunal has not erred in passing the order by quashing the order of dismissal. Accordingly, we decline to interfere with the same. 24. We have perused the observation given by the learned Tribunal granting liberty to the authority to initiate disciplinary proceeding. Accordingly, we thought it proper to observe that the inquiry is to be made regarding dereliction in duty on the part of the officials in maintaining law and order problem and as such, we reiterate that the State authorities are at liberty to initiate appropriate disciplinary proceeding in accordance with law against the sole opposite party and finalize the same as per law, rules and executive orders in vogue within a reasonable period preferably within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. This order is being passed considering the fact that the nature of duty of the police officer is to maintain faith upon the people and to maintain law and order problem in the society. 25. Before parting with order, the State Government is directed to look into the negligence and dereliction in duty, if any, on the part of the other police officials and proceed departmentally against such officials so that in future the same be not repeated. 26. With the aforesaid observation and direction, the writ petition stands disposed of. Petition disposed of.