JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTHA CHATTOPADHYAY, J. 1. The appellant has questioned the correctness of the judgment and order of conviction rendered by the trial court in Sessions Trial Court No. 05(01) of 2012, holding the appellant guilty of committing murder of his wife. 2. Sieving the unnecessary details, the prosecution case in a nutshell is as follows:- In the evening of 30.06.1990 the victim and the accused came to the house of the de facto complainant to attend a 'shardh ceremony'. Initially, there was an altercation between the accused and his wife (victim) and thereafter they went back to their house. After a little while, the victim came back to her parents' house. The accused also came back to his in-laws' house thereafter and, in the presence of the family members of the victim, attacked her by a sword (kata) and took to his heels. The victim breathed her last instantaneously. Disclosing this illepisode, the de facto complainant lodged the F.I.R. saying that he also came to know that the accused himself surrendered before the police station and confessed his guilt. 3. Pursuant to the charge-sheet submitted by P.W. 8 (Investigating Officer of this case) the accused faced the trial. 4. Observing the legal formalities, the learned trial court framed the charge under Section 302 of I.P.C. (which was read over to the accused), recorded evidence of the prosecution witnesses, examined the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and after hearing arguments of both sides convicted the accused for having committed an offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. 5. Local witnesses, namely P.W. 4 and P.W. 5, turned hostile to the prosecution. The evidence of P.W. 2, P.W. 3, P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 are not relevant so far as the involvement of the accused in the commission of crime is concerned. P.W. 2 and P.W. 6 were witnesses to the seizure-list prepared by the Investigating Officer. P.W. 7 was the officer-in-charge of the police station, who had prepared the formal F.I.R. and put his endorsement on the written complaint. 6. The principal witnesses in this case were P.W. 1 and the Investigating Officer. 7. At the very outset, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that except P.W. 1 there was no witness on whom the court could rely. He added that it would be unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of P.W. 1 to found the conviction. 7. At the very outset, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant argued that except P.W. 1 there was no witness on whom the court could rely. He added that it would be unsafe to rely on the sole testimony of P.W. 1 to found the conviction. 8. Let us have a look at the oral evidence of this witness. In his examination-in-chief, the complainant clearly spelt out the prosecution case. His testimony was challenged by the defence, while in the box, by suggesting to him that he had lost his eye-sight and could not have seen the alleged incident. In reply, he stated that he could see well with the help of his left eye, which was in order at the time. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the trial court accepting that such witness had seen the incident. This apart, in his evidence-in-chief, he specifically stated that at the time of sunset the accused came to his father in-law's house and attacked the victim with a hansua. There was no cross-examination, if the appellant came to the spot after the sunset or not. Therefore, if we look at his evidence in its entirety, we find there is no obscurity. This witness, when he deposed, was 70 years of age and he belongs to a tribal community. The place of occurrence is in the remotest part of rural Bengal. He is an unlettered and a rustic person. Therefore, some sort of latitude has to be given to him as far as his perception about the actual time of occurrence is concerned. 9. Learned Counsel also argued that in cross-examination this P.W. 1 stated that for the first time he came before the Court to narrate the incident. Referring to such part of his evidence, it was argued that the fact that such incident was not disclosed by this witness to anybody went to suggest that his evidence was not creditworthy. We are in respectful disagreement with him on two counts. First, the Investigating Officer usually does not examine the de facto complainant if such person's version is evident from the written complaint. Secondly, this P.W. 1 was not asked to give any under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate by the Investigating Officer. Naturally, he did not have any opportunity to disclose the incident of the murder before prior to being summoned by the Court as a witness. Secondly, this P.W. 1 was not asked to give any under Section 164 Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate by the Investigating Officer. Naturally, he did not have any opportunity to disclose the incident of the murder before prior to being summoned by the Court as a witness. It was also argued that P.W. was not a local witness and his version should be disbelieved. Learned Counsel also referred to the part of his cross-examination (recorded on 10.09.2003), wherein P.W. 1 categorically admitted that he lived in a different para. According to learned Counsel, P.W. gave an exaggerated version. It is trite law that the evidence has to be scrutinised as a whole and credibility of a testimony is tested on the basis of the entire evidence and not on isolated scrutiny. In his cross-examination, P.W. 1 stated that his residential home was at a distance of ten "rashis" away from the house of his sister. In rural Bengal one "rashi" means about eighty cubits or 120 ft. Therefore, the house of P.W. 1 was at a distance of just 400 yards from the place of occurrence. In his cross-examination he stated that the Investigating Officer came to the place of occurrence on the day following the incident and asked him to come there. P.W. 1 testified that he went to the place of occurrence and claimed that it was his first visit to the place of occurrence when asked by the Investigating Officer. Highlighting this part of the evidence, learned Counsel argued that prior to the occurrence this P.W. 1 had never gone to the place of occurrence. His such argument is not tenable on the ground that after lodging the written complaint, the police started investigation and at that time he was asked by the police to come to the spot and then he responded to the call of the police. His "first visit" meant his first visit after the incident and after the investigation started. He did not mean to say that he had never been to the place of occurrence prior thereto. It is not permissible to focus on a word or a sentence from a testimony and twist it out of context. In his cross-examination, he candidly stated that he found the victim lying on the ground in a pool of blood and at that time the accused was there. It is not permissible to focus on a word or a sentence from a testimony and twist it out of context. In his cross-examination, he candidly stated that he found the victim lying on the ground in a pool of blood and at that time the accused was there. A suggestion was given to him that the accused did not commit the murder, which he ruled out. It was also suggested to this witness that the victim was not the wife of the appellant and he denied the same. This part of the incriminating evidence was put to the appellant vide question no. 4 in course of the appellant's examination under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and he simply stated "I am innocent". He did not say that he was not the husband of the victim. 10. Learned Counsel also tried to emphasise on the fact that the autopsy surgeon was not been examined. In the context of such contention, he referred to a decision reported in 1984 Cr.L.J. page 559 (Goffur Sk. v. State of West Bengal). On perusal of the L.C.R., it appears to us that the learned trial Court had taken all the possible measures to ensure the presence of the autopsy surgeon before him. Order no. 101 dated 25.02.2013 reveals the court issued summons to the autopsy surgeon. Order no. 102 dated 05.03.2013 shows that autopsy surgeon Dr D.P. Chatterjee refused to accept the summons, for which the learned trial court issued a bailable warrant of arrest against him. The said autopsy surgeon did not attend on 14.03.2013, 18.03.2013, 19.03.2013. But on 19.03.2013, learned Public Prosecutor in-charge by filed an application before the court prayed for exemption of the presence of Dr D.P. Chatterjee on the ground that the said witness resided in Bagnan, District of Howrah and the witness was suffering from physical disability. The learned trial court had considered the post-mortem report and marked it as an exhibit. It is not correct to say that the learned trial court did not take any steps for ensuring the presence of the autopsy surgeon. This apart, the purpose of a post-mortem examination is to see as to how the death was caused. When the cause of death can be well ascertained from the very nature of the crime, the contents of the post-mortem report are inconsequential. 11. This apart, the purpose of a post-mortem examination is to see as to how the death was caused. When the cause of death can be well ascertained from the very nature of the crime, the contents of the post-mortem report are inconsequential. 11. The prosecution case was such that the appellant attacked the victim with a sword (kata) and cut the throat of the victim and as a result the victim died. The Investigating Officer in course of his evidence stated that he collected the post-mortem report of the victim from the SD Hospital Malda, and since it was a public document collected by the Investigating Officer in the official course of business, the learned trial court marked it as Ext. 9. At the time of cross-examination of this Investigating Officer on 16.01.2013 and 19.03.2013, the defence did not take any plea regarding the veracity or authenticity of the said post-mortem report. Apart from this, Section 35 of Evidence Act speaks of the relevancy of an entry in any public record made in performance of duty. It would be profitable to quote the relevant provision: "An entry in any public or other official book, register or (record or an electronic record) stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or (record or an electronic record) is kept, itself a relevant fact." 12. The post-mortem report is a public document. The said report consists of some specified columns and those are duly filled in by a doctor after conducting the autopsy. The doctor's opinion is also recorded in the relevant column. The Investigating Officer, in course of his official duty, collected that public document from the custody of the hospital authority for the purpose of conclusion of his investigation work. In our view, there is a substantial compliance of Section 35 of the Evidence Act. 13. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant further argued that due to the delay in completing the session's case, the appellant has been highly prejudiced and if the trial could have been concluded within the shortest possible period in that case the presence of the autopsy surgeon could be ensured. 13. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant further argued that due to the delay in completing the session's case, the appellant has been highly prejudiced and if the trial could have been concluded within the shortest possible period in that case the presence of the autopsy surgeon could be ensured. This argument cannot be countenanced because of the conduct of the appellant. The appellant was absconding since 01.11.2003 and he was ultimately apprehended on 06.09.2012. This goes to show that the accused was singularly responsible for causing the delay of about nine years. It further appears from the records that there was a confessional statement given by the accused himself. The said confessional statement is marked Ext. 10. At the time of argument, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that the said alleged confessional statement has been retracted by the accused himself in course of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. He pointed out that the Judicial Magistrate concerned was not summoned to adduce evidence. The trial court relied on Section 80 of the Evidence Act as the confessional statement was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate and there was no scope for questioning its veracity. The recording was done by the Magistrate after observing all legal formalities and the appellant was given sufficient time for reflection. In spite of that he had made such confessional statement before the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate did not have any axe to grind nor had any adumberated rancour against the appellant. 14. Learned Counsel also vehemently argued that the offending article was not seized by the Investigating Officer in course of the investigation. But it appears from the seizure list which was marked Ext. 5 that the said hansua (offending article) was seized on 01.07.2009 at 08:25 hours. This requires discussion on the ground that after committing murder the accused himself went to police station with the said blood-stained Hansua and produced the said offending article before the police station. Admittedly the F.I.R. was lodged thereafter. It was submitted from the Bar that the accused person's presence before the police station was doubtful. The Investigating Officer stated that the accused went to the police station on 01.07.1990 and a G.D. entry was made bearing No. 09 dated 01.07.1990. Admittedly the F.I.R. was lodged thereafter. It was submitted from the Bar that the accused person's presence before the police station was doubtful. The Investigating Officer stated that the accused went to the police station on 01.07.1990 and a G.D. entry was made bearing No. 09 dated 01.07.1990. The said G.D. entry records that the accused went to the police station with the bloodstained hansua and claimed to have killed the victim. The F.I.R. also speaks of that. The said G.D. entry is marked as an exhibit. Therefore, the presence of the accused before the police station cannot be ruled out. 15. Finally, learned Counsel argued that there was no local witness, i.e. adjacent house-owners, who came to depose in favour of the prosecution. It appears from the rough sketch-map prepared by the Investigating Officer that the adjacent house-owners were Bijay Besra, Madan Tudu, and Gupin Hansda. It appears from order no. 94 dated 15.01.2013 that these persons died during the pendency of the trial and so they were not summoned by the learned trial court. It is true that during the trial, prosecution mainly relied on the evidence of P.W. 1 and P.W. 8 (Investigating Officer) and the Section 164 statement of the appellant. We have scrutinised the legal position and the factual circumstances. The defence could not shake the deposition of the P.W. 1. There is no legal canon that conviction cannot be given on the basis of a sole testimony. The law emphasises on the quality of the evidence and not the quantity. If the evidence of a solitary witnesses appears acceptable on the touchstone of credibility, in that case there is no legal embargo to base the decision on such evidence. 16. Learned Counsel on behalf of the State has referred to a decision reported in 1988 Cr.L.J. page 24 (Photic Chandra Gogui v. State of Assam). Paragraph 5 of the report observes that a retracted version is required to be examined and considered carefully to see if it was voluntary and if it was true; and, if it is broadly in harmony with the prosecution case, it can be acted upon and can be the basis for conviction. Once again, at the risk of repetition, we cannot help mentioning that as per the F.I.R. the victim's throat was slit by a kata (a sharp cutting weapon). Once again, at the risk of repetition, we cannot help mentioning that as per the F.I.R. the victim's throat was slit by a kata (a sharp cutting weapon). The F.I.R. records that the accused himself went to police station with the offending weapon. The G.D. entry records that the accused went to the police station with the offending weapon. P.W. 1's statement remains unshaken in cross-examination. The post-mortem report reveals that the death was due to injuries mentioned in the said report. The inquest report also suggests that the victim suffered a cut injury in the neck. Therefore, the evidence and documents are in sufficient harmony as far as the involvement the appellant is concerned. 17. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the materials on record, we are of the opinion that the learned trial court has meticulously scrutinised the evidence in its proper perspective and had passed a well-reasoned judgment, which does not call for any interference. Accordingly, the C.R.A. 657 of 2013 is dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of the learned trial court are hereby affirmed. 18. Let a copy of this order and L.C.R. be sent to the learned Court below for information and taking necessary action in accordance with law. 19. Urgent certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. Sanjib Banerjee, J. - I agree. Appeal dismissed.