JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ajit Kumar, J.—This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Mathura in Civil Appeal No. 16 of 1978 and the 4th Additional Munsif,Mathura in O.S. No. 416 of 1973. The appeal was admitted by this Court on 8.5 1979 on following substantial questions of law, which read as under: “1. Whether the order date4d 27.11.1972 passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura declaring the shop as vacant under Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 could be challenged in the Civil Court in view of Section 37(1) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ? 2. Whether the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to set aside the findings of facts recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declaring the vacancy of the shop in dispute under Section 12 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. 3. Whether the plaintiff’s suit could be decreed without referring and considering the documents and evidence adduced by the defendant ?” 2. Lower Court record has been received and with the consent of the parties, appeal is being finally heard and decided. 3. The plaintiff instituted a suit against the order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura declaring vacancy of shop in question exercising power under Section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. (hereinafter referred to as “Act 1972”). Challenge to the vacancy order is that shop in question was not vacant on the date of order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura. Shop was being occupied by one Sriniwas and that he had never sublet the shop to Chhote Lal and, therefore, finding given by the Rent Control Authority to the effect that Sriniwas was no more tenant and the shop was vacant, was incorrect. Further plea was taken that order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer was without jurisdiction and illegal and hence suit against the order declaring vacancy dated 27.11.1972 was fully maintainable. 4. Further plea was taken that order passed by Rent Control and Eviction Officer was without jurisdiction and illegal and hence suit against the order declaring vacancy dated 27.11.1972 was fully maintainable. 4. The defendant on the other hand contested the suit on the ground that there was sufficient evidence on record to demonstrate that Sriniwas was no more tenant and he illegally sublet shop to Chhote Lal and it is Chhote Lal who had not only contested the suit but had also questioned the order declaring vacancy by filing revision. 5. The trial Court framed number of issues, in which issue No. 1 was with regard to the jurisdiction and issue No. 2 was as to whether Chhote Lal who was employee of defendant in suit was subletee. After examining the records and statements made before the trial Court, the trial Court concluded that shop was not vacant and that Chhote Lal was not sublatee nor Shikmi and so the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura had no jurisdiction to declare the shop as vacant and hence the order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was liable to held illegal and deserved to be cancelled. 6. The appeal was filed by defendant/appellant taking the plea of Section 37(1) of Act No. 13 of 1972 creating a bar to civil suit questioning the order of vacancy passed by Rent Control and eviction Officer under Section 12 of the said Act. Learned IInd Additional District Judge, Mathura while considering the merit of the case on the question of findings recorded by the trial Court challenged in appeal confirmed the findings of the trial Court. However, he further proceeded to deal with question of bar raised by appellant in view of Section 37(1) of the Act, 13 of 1972 and held that this question having not been taken and argued before the trial Court, it was not open for the appellant to raise this question at this stage of appeal. It was however, further observed that since order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura was without jurisdiction sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 will not come into play to create bar as far as civil suit was concerned. 7. It was however, further observed that since order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura was without jurisdiction sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 will not come into play to create bar as far as civil suit was concerned. 7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, I find it necessary to go into details of the factual aspect involved in the case in order to appreciate as to whether order of Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura was absolutely without jurisdiction or it is a question of determination of the vacancy which was really in issue and having that decided whether the Rent and Control and Eviction Officer committed no manifest error of law as scrutiny of facts to determine vacancy is well within his authority and suit was barred under Sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the Act No. 13 of 1972. 8. It is admitted fact to all the parties that Sriniwas was original tenant of the shop in question and Sriniwas has also admitted that he had entered into partnership with defendant Chhote Lal in respect of the shop in question. The partnership agreement that has been admitted by Sriniwas himself clearly states that hence onwards the entire business of partnership will be taken care of by Chhote Lal, he will manage the accounts and it is Chhote Lal who would be responsible for purchase and sale. It was also laid down in the partnership agreement that all the furnitures will be removed by Sriniwas and new furnitures will be arranged by Chhote Lal. It was also provided that partnership at any time can be revoked by notice and in case of revocation of partnership, it is the 2nd party who can also get the shop allotted to him by the competent authority. Second party to the agreement was admittedly Chhote Lal and when investigation was got conducted about possession of the shop by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, it was found that it was Chhote Lal who was carrying business in shop and he was also himself sitting in the shop. In view of these facts, vacancy order was passed by competent officer on 27.11.1972. In view of these facts, vacancy order was passed by competent officer on 27.11.1972. What is very interesting to know that at this stage Sriniwas who claimed to be the original tenant did not file any revision against order and it is Chhote Lal who had been contesting the case. It is his revision which came to be ultimately dismissed on 18.2.1973 and order of vacancy was held to be correct and justified order. 9. In view of above facts, it may very safely be discerned that original tenant Sriniwas did not show any interest in contesting vacancy order and once partnership is admitted by Sriniwas and Chhote Lal even this could not be said that Chhote Lal would have never informed about vacancy order to Sriniwas and therefore, it cannot be said that Sriniwas did know the vacancy order and so could not contest the vacancy order. On the other hand one can arrive to a conclusion from above facts and circumstances that Sriniwas himself did not claim any tenancy and it is after vacancy order was passed that present suit was instituted by Sriniwas under the influence of Chhote Lal. Another important aspect of the matter is that while deciding issue Nos. 1 and 2, trial Court very strangely held that there was no evidence. Trial Court further held that the theory of subletting as claimed was absolutely baseless and could not be accepted. The order or Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Mathura which was sought to be challenged in the suit was very much on record, but it is very strange that findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in the order directing vacancy and subsequent order which was passed in revision of Chhote Lal was also available on record, but strangely enough skipped close consideration and appreciation of facts by the trial Court as it failed to appreciate before concluding that Chhote Lal had claimed that Sriniwas continued tenant of shop in question. There is no material brought on record by the plaintiff to vitiate findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer inasmuch as no such oral evidence has been led so as to hold that findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer were perverse. Chhote Lal having contested the order of vacancy unsuccessfully in revision got the suit filed. Chhote Lal having contested the order of vacancy unsuccessfully in revision got the suit filed. Thus, findings recorded by the trial Court on issue No. 1 and 2 are not correct findings of fact and liable to be reversed. So far as judgment of the Court below in appeal is concerned, learned appellate Court has though affirmed the findings of the trial Court but completely failed to consider points of determination raised in appeal as per Order 41 Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “Civil P.C.”) 10. The law is settled that this provision (Supra) is mandatory and while dealing with question of jurisdiction and recording finding of fact on the issue of jurisdiction, the Court below should have atleast summarily stated what issues were raised in appeal for consideration. Besides above, I find that Court of appeal has strangely enough held that plea of jurisdiction was not taken in the written statement. 11. On the contrary, I find that specific plea was taken in para 7, 8 and 9 of written statement that defendant No. 1 Rent Control and Eviction Officer was absolutely legal and that such order cannot be called in question in Civil Court. This plea has further been raised in appeal also. Apart from this, statute itself creates a bar in sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the Act No. 13 of 1972. A specific statutory bar if created with regard to jurisdiction of the Civil Court, then jurisdiction of the Civil Court stands ousted by virtue of Section 9 of Civil P.C. 12. For reference Sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the Act No. 13 of 1972 is quoted hereunder: “(2) Where an order purports to have been made and signed by authority in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act, a Court shall, unless the contrary is proved, presume that such order was so made by that authority.” 13. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court is also quoted hereunder: “Section 9 Courts to try all civil suits unless barred : The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all Suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation 1.—A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation Il—For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.” 14. Now after going through the two provisions (Supra) it is clear that jurisdiction of the Civil Court can either by ousted by the specific provision or impliedly. Thus bar is either expressly or impliedly. Sub-section 1 of Section 37 of Act No. 13 of 1972 has been noticed a number of times by this Court. However, instead of loathing the judgment with huge number of cases it would be sufficient to refer two such authorities on Suleman v. Prescribed Authority 4th Additional Judge and others, 1997 (1) ARC 46 and Jai Prakash v. Smt. Krishna Devi and others, ARC 96(2) 453. 15. In Suleman case, this Court in para 9 has held as under: “9. From the aforesaid provisions it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the matters in regard to the enforceability of the orders passed by the competent authority as provided for under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1972 is of a very limited nature and infact should be treated to be confined to only those cases where it can be established that the order is a nullity having been passed without jurisdiction or in excess of the jurisdiction. However, once the order is passed by the Competent Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction contemplated under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Act 13 of 1972 after taking into consideration, the evidence and the materials on the record in that case, the Civil Court could not be deemed to be competent to pass any such order assuming any purported jurisdiction, which has the effect of interfering with the findings recorded by such an authority. It is not open to the Civil Court to got into the question of the correctness or the propriety of such findings which are recorded on an appraisal of evidence in the exercise of the exclusive jurisdiction secured in favour of the competent authority under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Act No. 13 of 1972, Uttar Pradesh Ubran Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.” 16. Similar view was taken in the case Jai Prakash (Supra) and it was held that “In view of above legal position and the fact that Rent Control and Eviction Officer is fully empowered under the Act No. 13 of 1972 to go into the question of vacany on the burden that both specific question of law framed by this Court which arise in this case and are hereby held in favour of appellant to dismiss the suit of the plaintiff and respondent. 17. The ‘jurisdiction’ is a mixed question of law and facts. The Court below has gone on to hold that once there was no vacancy, the rent control and eviction officer had no jurisdiction to hold so and therefore, the same could have been questioned in civil suit. If this analogy is accepted then every order of authority can be questioned in civil suit bereft of the provision creating bar in the specifically enacted law. It is to be born in mind that special law overrides the general law. Ordinarily a civil suit can always be instituted when there is no specific or implied bar. A special enactment is brought only to deal with issues involved in the subject-matter for which enactment has been brought into force. It lays down not only special procedure but provides special forum to exclusively deal with the subject-matter and to facilitate speedy and in hand adjudication as compared to proceedings in ordinary law. Dispensation of quick justice is always in mind of legislature while enacting special laws to deal with special subject-matter. Act No. 13 of 1972 is one of such special Acts dealing with landlord tenant relationships, allotment of vacant house and shops. When question arises to determine as to whether there exist a vacancy or not it is well with the authority of the Prescribed Authority created under law to go into the facts, order investigation and enquiry and record findings as to the issue of vacancy. When question arises to determine as to whether there exist a vacancy or not it is well with the authority of the Prescribed Authority created under law to go into the facts, order investigation and enquiry and record findings as to the issue of vacancy. Once it determines vacancy, it becomes an order duly passed in purported exercise of power under Section 9 of the Act, 1972 and cannot be called in question in a civil suit. 18. The very purpose to bring special enactments to deal with special subject-matter will be defeated if in the name of jurisdiction Civil Court is permitted to interfere. Jurisdiction/Authority to deal with, is specific to a Tribunal/Prescribed Authority created under an enacment. This is especially meant to oust jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Court. This interpretation not only appeals to reason but germane to the very object behind such special enactments. 19. In view of the above discussions and exposition of law, I hold that all the three substantial questions of law are decided in favour of the defendant appellant to set aside the judgment and decree of the Courts below both on account of lack of jurisdiction and also findings of facts being perverse as against the evidence on record. The Courts below manifestly erred in law as well as on facts not only in entertaining the suit which was otherwise barred in law but in cancelling the order of vacancy without appreciating the findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and Revising Authority. 20. This appeal is accordingly allowed with cost throughout. The judgments and decrees of the Courts below are set aside and suit is dismissed.