JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. N.N. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The second has been filed under Section 100 C.P.C. against the judgment and decree dated 30.8.2011 passed in Civil Appeal No. 60 of 2010 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 14.6.2010 passed in Regular Suit No. 393 of 1983; Sukhdev Prasad & others Vs. Sukhnandan (dead)and others. 3. As per the given facts, the respondents/plaintiffs had filed a suit for permanent injunction claiming the right of possession on the basis of ownership over half of the land in dispute bearing Plot no.1227 ka measuring 08 biswa and 10 dhur and 1228 kha measuring 02 biswa and 10 dhur situated at village Baswahi, Pargana Bihar, Tehsil Kunda, District Pratapgarh which was purchased on the basis of a sale deed dated 8.4.1983. The respondents had contested the suit by filing written statements. The trial court after considering the evidence on record and submissions made by the parties had dismissed the suit on 14.6.2010. The respondents/plaintiffs feeling aggrieved had thereafter filed the appeal before the lower appellate court. The lower appellate court had allowed the appeal by reversing the findings of the trial court by the impugned judgment dated 30.8.2011. The appellants/defendants have filed the instant second appeal thereafter. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the findings of the lower appellate court are perverse and contrary to the records. The trial court has considered the evidence on record and has rightly come to the conclusion that the respondents/plaintiffs have no right to claim possession over the land in question. The lower appellate court without properly appreciating the evidence on record has reversed the findings of the trial court and has allowed the appeal and thereby decreed the suit. 5. Submission is that the findings recorded by the lower appellate court are perverse and are not sustainable in the eyes of law. 6. Mr. N.N. Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellants further submits that in fact the impugned judgment passed by the lower appellate court is not sustainable in the eyes of law as it suffers from manifest illegality. The lower appellate court has not formulated the points of determination and has not made compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. while deciding the appeal. 7. The lower appellate court has not formulated the points of determination and has not made compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. while deciding the appeal. 7. Submission is that the compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. is mandatory in view of the law laid down by this Court in a recent judgment in the case of Smt. Jaggo and others Vs. Ram Chandra Sahu in Second Appeal No. 37 of 2007 dated 31.10.2017. 8. Mr. Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the lower appellate court has considered each and every issue involved in this case and has discussed the issues framed by the trial court. It has given its own reasons and has recorded its findings which are based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. 9. It is submitted that the lower appellate court has rightly decreed the suit in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 10. I have considered the submissions made by the parties' counsel and gone through the records. 11. This Court while admitting the appeal vide order 22.11.2011 had framed certain substantial question of law which is reproduced below:- "Whether the judgment and decree passed by the trial court has been illegally reversed by the lower appellate court on the basis of perverse findings recorded by it?" 12. This Court vide order dated 3.11.2017 had framed additional substantial question of law which reads as under:- "Whether the lower appellate court has committed any manifest illegality in deciding the appeal preferred by the respondents-plaintiffs in not formulating the points of determination and thereby not complying the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C.?" 13. I am of the view that I have to first consider the substantial question of law as to whether the lower appellate court has committed any manifest illegality in deciding the appeal preferred by the respondents/plaintiffs in not formulating the points of determination and thereby not complying the requirements of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. 14. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is reproduced below:- "31. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC is reproduced below:- "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment-The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state— (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 15. In the case of Kuldeep Saxena Vs. Smt. Archana Saxena & others; Second Appeal No. 309 of 2016, dated 21st August, 2017, the Court has considered various judgments on this point and has also taken into consideration the latest judgment of Apex Court in the case of A.M. Sangappa @ Sangappa Vs. Sangondeppa & Anr; 2014 (102) ALR 274, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "In a series of decisions, this Court has highlighted how a regular first appeal is to be disposed of, particularly, in the light of Order 41 Rule 31 Code of Civil Procedure. It mandates that the appellate Court has to frame points for determination, decision thereon, reasons for the decision and where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the Appellant is entitled. Such recourse has not been followed by the High Court, while disposing of the regular first appeal. It is not in dispute that the first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. Accordingly, the judgment of the appellate Court must reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth by both the sides. These principles have been reiterated in B.V. Nagesh and Anr. v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 ." 16. In the case of Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the earlier judgment given by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B.V. Nagesh and another vs. H. V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 , Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. In the case of Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391 , Hon'ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the earlier judgment given by Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of B.V. Nagesh and another vs. H. V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13 SCC 530 , Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by Lrs. (2001) 3 SCC 179 has held as under :- "Being the first appellate court, it was the duty of the High Court to have decided the first appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 ibid mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done, thereby, resulting in causing prejudice to the appellant whose valuable right to prosecute in the first appeal on facts and law was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived him of a hearing in the appeal in accordance with law. It is for this reason, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court." 17. This Court while pronouncing the judgment in the case of Kuldeep Saxena Vs. Smt. Archana Saxena & 6 others (supra) has also taken into consideration various judgments of this court as well as Apex Court on this point as well as the judgment of full bench of this Court in the case of Gopal Krishna Vs. 5th Additional District Judge, Kanpur and others; AIR 1981 Allahabad 300, wherein it has been held as under:- "The Supreme Court has dealt with the binding nature of its pronouncements in a number of decisions. It is not necessary to refer to those cases. In a case where a High Court finds any conflict between views expressed by larger and smaller Benches of the Supreme Court. the Supreme Court said that proper course for such a High Court is to follow the opinion expressed by larger Benches of the Supreme Court in preference to those expressed by smaller Benches of the Court (See State of U. P. v. Ram Chandra. AIR 1976 SC 2547 . The difficulty, however, before us is slightly different. and is not covered by the authority cited above. We are faced with a situation where there are conflicts between the two decisions of the Supreme Court given by Judges of equal strength. We are not concerned here with reasons which led to these conflicts. AIR 1976 SC 2547 . The difficulty, however, before us is slightly different. and is not covered by the authority cited above. We are faced with a situation where there are conflicts between the two decisions of the Supreme Court given by Judges of equal strength. We are not concerned here with reasons which led to these conflicts. To the same effect is the view taken by a Full Bench of Karnataka High Court in Govindanaik G. Kalghatagi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. AIR 1980 Kant 92 and by Calcutta High Court in M/s. Sovachand Mulchand v. Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs AIR 1968 Cal 174 . Thus, what follows is that in the event of there being clear conflict, the decision of such latter Bench would be binding on us. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that since in Ram Swarup Rai's case (1980 ALL LJ 651) (SC) the earlier decision given in Ratan Lal Singhal's case AIR 1980 SC 635 had not been cited, the decision being in ignorance of a case which was binding on the Court is per in-curiam. Counsel urged that Ram Swarup Rai's decision does not have a binding authority. We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur AIR 1970 SC 1002 , the Supreme Court held that a Supreme Court's judgment is binding on High Court and it cannot be ignored on ground that relevant provision was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. To us, it appears that it is only in cases of decision of concurrent Courts that the doctrine of per incuriam can be applied. Thus, the law declared by the Supreme Court cannot be ignored on that basis. A failure to cite authority of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court before it is not sufficient to render its latter decision per incuriam. Overruling a similar argument made in Ambika Prasad Misra v. State of U. P. AIR 1980 SC 1762 Krishna Iyer. J., agreed with the following observations made in Salmond 'Jurisprudence', page 215 (11th edition):-- "A decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued. inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned." We, therefore, cannot ignore the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court on the basis of the same being per incuriam. J., agreed with the following observations made in Salmond 'Jurisprudence', page 215 (11th edition):-- "A decision does not lose its authority merely because it was badly argued. inadequately considered and fallaciously reasoned." We, therefore, cannot ignore the subsequent decision of the Supreme Court on the basis of the same being per incuriam. To the same effect is the law laid down by Jassel M. R. in Baker v. White (1877) 5 Ch D 183(7). We do not wish to express opinion on this aspect of the matter. We would only content ourselves by saying that since we are bound by the latter decision of the Supreme Court, we must follow the same. To us, it appears that the latter decision has impliedly overruled the earlier." 18. There is no reason to disagree with the view taken by this Court in the case of Kuldeep Saxena Vs. Smt. Archana Saxena & 6 others (supra). 19. In view of above, I am of the considered view that it is mandatory for the first appellate court to have framed points of determination while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 CPC. In the present case since the said requirement of law has not been fulfilled, as such, the first appellate court has committed illegality in not making compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 C.P.C. As such, the impugned judgment is not sustainable in the eyes of law. 20. Since I have come to conclusion that the lower appellate court has not made compliance of mandatory provisions of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC and the impugned judgment on that score is not sustainable in the eyes of law, as such, there is no need to decide the other substantial questions of law which have been framed in this appeal. 21. The second appeal is allowed. 22. The matter is remanded back to the lower appellate court to decide the appeal afresh making compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in accordance with law expeditiously, as early as possible. Since the impugned judgment relates to the appeal filed in the year 2010, I hereby direct the lower appellate court to decide the appeal as observed above within a period of six months from the date certified copy of this order is produced before the Court concerned. Since the impugned judgment relates to the appeal filed in the year 2010, I hereby direct the lower appellate court to decide the appeal as observed above within a period of six months from the date certified copy of this order is produced before the Court concerned. In case the Court is vacant the learned District Judge shall pass appropriate order for transfer of appeal to some other competent Court, where it may be decided in terms of the directions issued above. 23. After pronouncement of the judgment, learned counsel for the respondents has made a request that since there was an interim order operating in this appeal, as such the interest of the parties may be protected by providing that no construction may be raised by either of the parties during pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate court. 24. It would be appropriate that the respondents may move appropriate application for the interim relief before the lower appellate court after the matter is remanded back to the Court concerned and in case any such application is moved that may be considered and appropriate order may be passed after hearing the parties concerned expeditiously.