JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Shri Shashi Nandan, learned senior counsel assisted by Shri Pratap Vikram Singh for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel for the respondents. 2. This writ petition calls in question an order dated 2 November 2017 passed by the Commissioner, Saharanpur acting as the appellate authority under the U.P. Minor Mineral Concession Rules 1963 (1963 Rules). A further writ is sought to restrain the respondents from adopting any coercive measures pursuant to the order referred to above as well as the order dated 19 July 2017. The latter order passed by the District Magistrate, Saharanpur holds the petitioner guilty of having indulged in illegal mining in areas far beyond those which had been leased to them. It has accordingly held the petitioner liable to pay royalty amounting to Rs. 9,84,70,075/-. This order has been admittedly challenged in appeal before the Commissioner, Saharanpur Division who by his order dated 2 November 2017 has rejected the stay application preferred by the petitioner noting that since allegations were prima facie established against the petitioner, the ends of justice would merit them being commanded to deposit the sums as adjudicated and held to be payable by the petitioner in terms of the order of the District Magistrate referred to above. 3. It becomes pertinent to note that taking cognisance of large scale illegal mining in District Saharanpur, the Directorate of Geology and Mining in the Government of Uttar Pradesh appears to have constituted an enquiry committee to scrutinise such complaints and submit a report. This committee submitted a report dated 17 July 2012 holding that 31,62,742 cubic meters of minor mineral had been illegally excavated. The report is stated to have been forwarded to the District Magistrate Saharanpur, by the Directorate under cover of its letter dated 21 December 2012. It is on the basis of the report submitted by the said committee that cognisance was taken by the District Magistrate of the entire episode and the petitioner was put to notice and called upon to show-cause. Upon receipt of the said show-cause notices, the petitioner furnished a reply which however was not found acceptable by the District Magistrate who consequently proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 19 July 2017. Upon receipt of the said show-cause notices, the petitioner furnished a reply which however was not found acceptable by the District Magistrate who consequently proceeded to pass the impugned order dated 19 July 2017. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner has preferred an appeal under Rule 77 of the 1963 Rules and it is the disposal of the stay application moved in this appeal by the Commissioner which has led to the filing of the present writ petition. 4. Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel who has appeared in support of the writ petition has contended that the petitioner had undertaken mining operations in partnership with one Vikas Agarwal. He drew the attention of the Court to an order dated 9 October 2017 passed upon Writ-C No. 46253 of 2017 [Vikas Agarwal v. State of U.P.] Vikas Agarwal to submit that the petitioner is entitled to similar relief. It is relevant to note here that the writ petition aforementioned had been preferred by Vikas Agarwal assailing an order passed by the Commissioner in an independent appeal preferred by him under Rule 77 in which too, the Commissioner has proceeded to reject the stay application. The said writ petition was disposed of by the learned Single Judge with the following operative directions : “Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perusing the entire material on record, the Court finds that the present matter is squarely covered with the judgment in M/s Balaji Stone Crusher, Saharanpur (Supra) and the writ petition is disposed of in the same terms as in M/s Balaji Stone Crusher, Saharanpur (Supra).” 5. Since the order of the learned Single Judge was in turn based upon a decision rendered by him in M/s Balaji Stone Crusher, Saharanpur v. State of U.P. and others, Writ C No. 38339 of 2017, decided on 24 August, 2017, it would be apposite to notice the said judgment also. 6. Balaji Stone Crusher was also directed against an order passed by the Commissioner rejecting the stay application preferred alongwith statutory appeals instituted by a different lease holder. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the said writ petition made the following observations. “11. 6. Balaji Stone Crusher was also directed against an order passed by the Commissioner rejecting the stay application preferred alongwith statutory appeals instituted by a different lease holder. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the said writ petition made the following observations. “11. In view of the aforesaid circumstances once the complaint has been made to this Court that the entire decision making process has been undertaken by the State in arbitrary manner and without providing reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and huge financial liability has been fastened on the shoulder of the petitioners, then definitely this aspect has to be considered by the appellate authority, which has rejected the stay application in cursory manner. 1. Once the appeals in question are pending consideration before the appellate authority, then no useful purpose would be served in keeping the writ petitions pending. 13. In view of the above, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issue and considering the facts and circumstances of the case all the writ petition are disposed of asking the appellate authority to hear and decide the appeals strictly as per law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Ranveer Singh’s case (supra) expeditiously and preferably within two months’ time from the date of production of certified copy of this order and till disposal of the appeal in question no coercive action would be taken against the petitioners. 14. It is made clear that either of the parties will not seek any unnecessary adjournments in the matter.” 7. In view of the said decision rendered by the learned Single Judge, Shri Nandan, submitted that the petitioner was entitled to be accorded similar relief. He also contended that since the partner of the petitioner had already been granted protection by this Court, it would be wholly inequitable if the demand and recovery of alleged mining dues was enforced against the petitioner alone. Shri Nandan also drew our attention to a communication of the then District Magistrate Saharanpur dated 1 September 2015 to submit that it had been categorically found that the petitioner had not indulged in illegal mining and that his conduct and character was above board. 8. Shri Nandan also drew our attention to a communication of the then District Magistrate Saharanpur dated 1 September 2015 to submit that it had been categorically found that the petitioner had not indulged in illegal mining and that his conduct and character was above board. 8. We must at the outset state that it was suggested to the learned Senior Counsel that since a huge liability stood raised against the petitioner, the interest of public revenue merited the petitioner either depositing the whole or part of the demand or at least securitising the liability which stood raised against him, on which Shri Nandan sought time to obtain instructions. When hearing resumed post lunch, Shri Nandan made a statement on instructions that the petitioner would be unable to either deposit any part of the sums claimed against the petitioner or to securitise the demand. In view thereof, he submitted that the petition itself be decided on merits. 9. Before we deal with the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge in the matter of Balaji Stone Crusher and Vikas Agarwal, it would be appropriate to first dispose of the submission of Shri Nandan with respect to interim protection having been accorded to the alleged partner of the petitioner. We must observe and do so that the inter se relationship between the petitioner and his alleged partner is neither of significance nor consequence insofar as the respondents are concerned. It is not disputed by the learned senior counsel that the petitioner was the beneficiary of the lease for excavation of minor minerals and that his liability for all Government dues arising therefrom is inseparable, joint and several. Insofar as the State is concerned, it is not obliged to apportion the liability between the petitioner and his alleged partner. Whether the petitioner would have a claim against his partner in case he deposits the entire sums claimed by the respondents, is not an issue which we are called upon to consider or decide. In view of the above discussion, we find no merit in the submission as advanced by Shri Nandan in this respect. 10. The second submission of Sri Nandan which is based upon a communication of the District Magistrate dated 1 September 2015 also need not be dealt with by this Court at this stage since these and other issues are yet to be examined by the appellate authority. 10. The second submission of Sri Nandan which is based upon a communication of the District Magistrate dated 1 September 2015 also need not be dealt with by this Court at this stage since these and other issues are yet to be examined by the appellate authority. Any finding that the Court may enter at this stage in this respect may cause prejudice to parties and also impact the adjudicatory process which the authority is yet to embark upon. This Court, therefore, does not deem it appropriate to deal with or rule upon this submission at this stage. 11. This then take us to the judgments rendered by the learned Single Judge in Balaji Stone Crusher and Vikas Agarwal. Quite apart from the fact that the said decisions would not bind us sitting in a Division Bench, we are also compelled to note that the two decisions upon which heavy reliance was placed do not formulate or declare any principle of law. The two decisions in Balaji Stone Crusher and Vikas Agarwal have neither dealt with nor do they enter any binding adjudication on an issue of law. Having said so, we are also constrained to enter the following observations in order to underline, why we find ourselves unable to either adopt the course treaded by the learned Single Judge or to reiterate the directions issued in those matters. 12. As is evident from the extract of the observations made by the learned Single Judge in Balaji Stone Crusher, the learned Judge in paragraph 11 noticed the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner therein that the decision making process had been undertaken by the State in an arbitrary manner without providing a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioners and that a huge financial liability had been created. The learned Judge thus proceeded to observe that these aspects would have to be necessarily considered by the appellate authority which had rejected the stay application in a cursory manner. The Learned Judge the proceeded to hold that no useful purpose would be served in keeping the writ petition pending and consequently directed the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal expeditiously and preferably within a period of two months. The operative directions framed then proceeded to provide that till disposal of the appeal in question, no coercive action would be taken against the petitioner. The operative directions framed then proceeded to provide that till disposal of the appeal in question, no coercive action would be taken against the petitioner. This direction has clearly restrained the respondents from effecting any recoveries and a huge liability which is owed to the State respondents has also not been securitised. 13. We find ourselves unable to endorse or subscribe to the line of reasoning on the basis of which the said writ petitions came to be disposed of. If the learned Judge was of the view that the stay application had been cursorily disposed of without taking into consideration certain relevant aspects which were pointed out, the ordinary course to be adopted would have been to remit the matter to the Commissioner [the appellate authority] to consider the stay application afresh. We also find ourselves unable to either agree with or reiterate the blanket order or injunction which the learned Judge proceeded to make. 14. As is evident from the operative directions, the petitioner therein was neither put to terms nor was he called upon to securitise either the whole or even a part of the demand which stood raised against him. We note that the amount claimed against the petitioner therein was more than Rs. 2 crores. In our considered view such a huge liability which was owed to the State or its authority could not have been suspended or stayed without the Court ensuring a balancing of competing interests. While it may be relevant to consider prima facie the contentions that may be advanced on behalf of the assessee, the mere existence or semblance of a prima facie case cannot sanction the grant of blanket interim relief. The liabilities forming subject-matter of these proceedings as also those which formed subject of consideration in Balaji Stone Crusher and Vikas Agarwal came to be crystallised upon conclusion of an adjudicatory exercise undertaken by the respondents which entailed the petitioner being called upon to show case and final orders being passed after obtaining and considering their response. 15. Interim relief couched and granted in such carte blanche terms cannot be countenanced. Grant of interim relief in such term would also clearly fall foul of the binding verdicts of the Supreme Court in this respect. 16. In MCD v. C.L. Batra, 1994 (5) SCC 355 at page 356, the Supreme Court held as follows: “9. 15. Interim relief couched and granted in such carte blanche terms cannot be countenanced. Grant of interim relief in such term would also clearly fall foul of the binding verdicts of the Supreme Court in this respect. 16. In MCD v. C.L. Batra, 1994 (5) SCC 355 at page 356, the Supreme Court held as follows: “9. Thirdly, as early as on 6-1-1984, in the case of Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das [ (1984) 2 SCC 436 : 1984 SCC (Tax) 133 : (1984) 2 SCR 344 ] this Court had vacated an interim order staying recovery of tax. In that case, it was pointed out: (SCC p. 438, para 3). “The Court has to show awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a Municipality cannot function or meet its financial obligations if its source of revenue is blocked by an interim order restraining the Municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that the Municipality has to maintain essential civic services like wafer supply, street lighting and public streets etc., apart from, running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, libraries etc. what is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. The grant of an interlocutory order of this nature would paralyse the administration and dislocate the entire working of the Municipality. It seems that these serious ramifications of the matter were lost sight of while making the impugned order.” 10. In the case of Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, W.B. v. Dunlop India Ltd. [ (1985) 1 SCC 260 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 75 : (1985) 2 SCR 190 ], it was held that interim orders were not to be granted in revenue matters merely because a prima facie case had been shown. It was also emphasised in that case that even assuming that the assessee had established a prima facie case, it was not a sufficient justification for granting the interim orders. It was observed: (SCC p. 264, para 3). “It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But the Court must also have good and sufficient reason to bypass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters.” (emphasis supplied) 17. In United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , the Supreme Court observed : “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad [ AIR 1969 SC 556 ], Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [ (2003) 2 SCC 107 ] and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” (emphasis supplied) 18. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find ourselves unable to accede to the prayer made by the writ petitioner for grant of interim relief without any conditions being imposed or attached thereto. In terms of the order impugned, the petitioner has been held liable to pay a huge sum to the State Government based upon allegations that he had conducted illegal mining in areas outside those which had been leased to him. Bearing in mind the nature of the allegations which stood established in the course of the enquiry conducted by the respondents and the interest of public revenue, we are of the considered view that the Commissioner committed no illegality in refusing interim relief. 19. Bearing in mind the nature of the allegations which stood established in the course of the enquiry conducted by the respondents and the interest of public revenue, we are of the considered view that the Commissioner committed no illegality in refusing interim relief. 19. As noted herein above even at this stage of the proceedings before us due and adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner to either securitise the amounts claimed by the respondents or to deposit the whole or even part of the amounts claimed. However this opportunity was not availed and in fact an unequivocal statement was made before us that the petitioner was unable to consider choosing either of the alternatives suggested. 20. In view of the above, we find no ground to interfere with the orders impugned and leave the appellate authority and the respondents to proceed in the matter in accordance with law. 21. The writ petition stands dismissed.