JUDGMENT : Ramchandra Singh Jhala, J. This second appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendants against the judgment and decree dated 22.11.2005 passed by learned District Judge, Sirohi in Civil Appeal No. 29/99 whereby the first appeal preferred by the appellant-defendants against the judgment and decree dated 30.7.1999 in Civil Original Suit No. 65/93 was dismissed and the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sirohi has been upheld. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiffs No. 1 to 4 filed a suit for mandatory and perpetual prohibitory injunction against the appellant-defendants. The mandatory injunction was sought by the respondent-plaintiffs against the appellant-defendants for removal of their cabin installed at the disputed land claiming to be a public chowk by the respondent-plaintiffs and perpetual prohibitory injunction was sought against the defendant-Municipal Board, Sirohi not to sale and transfer the said land to any other person and not to create any obstructions on the public way. It was alleged that at the suit land the cabin of the appellant-defendants has been installed by them on some part of the public way. It is averred in the plaint that the respondent-plaintiffs are residing in their houses since 1966 and also carrying on their business. It is mentioned in the plaint that all the houses of the respondent-plaintiffs are facing towards northern side whereas the shop is facing towards market in the Western side on the main road and the chowk in dispute meets the main road of the market. It is alleged that the appellant-defendants had installed their cabin on the land which forms part of the chowk and public way and thus created obstruction in public way. 3. After serving notice of the suit upon the appellant-defendants, they filed written statement before the learned trial court wherein they denied all the contentions raised in the plaint. It was stated that the cabin was installed by the appellant-defendants under a licence issued by the respondent-defendant-Board and the defendants have not encroached upon any land which is claimed to be chowk or a public way by the respondent-plaintiffs. 4. It is further averred that the appellant-defendants are carrying on their business in the cabin for last 35 years and the respondent-plaintiffs have started living much after the installation of the cabin by the appellant-defendants. 4. It is further averred that the appellant-defendants are carrying on their business in the cabin for last 35 years and the respondent-plaintiffs have started living much after the installation of the cabin by the appellant-defendants. It was also stated that the appellant-defendants are paying rent to the respondent-defendant-Board regularly and the land on which cabin has been installed is an open place and it does not forms part of any public way or chowk. It is also averred by the appellant-defendants that the open land claimed by the appellant-defendants to be a chowk or a public way is away from the cabin and the land where the cabin had been installed has never been a part of the way. It was stated that the respondent-plaintiffs have not been able to explain as to how after a lapse of about 35 years, all of a sudden the cabin of the defendant is creating nuisance. It was further averred that only few years back, a hand-pump has been installed on the open land in question which also does not create any obstruction and nobody objected to it. It was averred by the defendants that suit has been filed merely on account of the fact that towards the back of the defendants' cabin the plaintiffs were opening the ventilator about which the defendants raised objection and so as to take revenge, the suit has been filed without there being any cause of action. 5. A written statement was also filed on behalf of the respondent-defendant-Board wherein it was stated that the map produced by the respondent-plaintiffs showing the position of the house is correct, but the measurement shown in the map is not correct. It was stated that the respondent-plaintiffs started living in their house after the allotment of disputed land and installation of cabin by the defendants. It was stated that the open land is used as a way to the main road but the same is not part of the public road and the land which is beneath the cabin has never been used as way by the plaintiffs. It was specifically denied that the disputed chowk is a public way. It was also averred in the written statement that under the license the defendant has installed the cabin 35 years back and has not created any nuisance. It was specifically denied that the disputed chowk is a public way. It was also averred in the written statement that under the license the defendant has installed the cabin 35 years back and has not created any nuisance. It was categorically stated that the defendant Board is not intending to sell the land in question to defendants No. 1 to 3. 6. On the basis of pleading of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:— ^^1- D;k ekufp= esa vafdr Hkwfe , ch ;w Mh bZ ,Q th ,p pkSd vke jkLrk gS\ oknh 2- D;k mDr , ch ;w Mh b ,Q th ,p vke jkLrs dh iw.kZ yEckbZ pkSM+kbZ dk jkLrs ds :i es mi;ksx djus dk oknhx.k o tu lk/kkj.k dks vf/kdkj gS\ 3- D;k izfroknh la[;k pkj mDr jkLrk pkSd dh Hkwfe esa deh djus esa o mlesa ls , vkj , Vh Hkwfe dks izfroknhx.k la[;k , rk rhu dks dsfcu j[kus ds fy;s nsus esa l{ke gS\ izfroknh 4- D;k mDr dsfcu ls oknhx.k dks muds edkukr esa vkus tkus esa vojks/k gqvk gS vkSj gks jgk gS vkSj mudks fujUrj mirki dj jgk gS\ oknh 5- D;k mDr dsfcu ls , ch ;w Mh bZ ,Q th ,p pkSd vke jkLrs esa vojks/k gqvk gS vkSj og yksd mirki gVok;s tkus ds oknhx.k vf/kdkjh gS\ oknhx.k 6- D;k oknhx.k dsfcu gVokus gsrq vkKkid O;kns'k ,oa , ch ;w Mh b ,Q th ,p ds laca/k esa pkSd vke jkLrs ds :i esa LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk O;kns'k izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gS\ oknh 7- D;k izfroknhx.k la[;k ,d rk rhu ds tokcnkos ds in la[;k 11 esa ntZ dFku ds vuqlkj okn U;k;ky; ds Jo.kf/kdkj esa ugha gS\ izfroknh 8- i{kdkjku~ D;k izfrQy izkfIr ds vf/kdkjh gS\^^ 7. The learned trial court decided the issues No. 1 to 6 in favour of the plaintiffs and issue No. 7 against the defendants No. 1 to 3. 8. The learned trial court after hearing the parties vide order dated 30.7.1999 decreed the suit in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs for mandatory injunction so also the perpetual injunctions. 9. The learned first appellate court vide its judgment and decree dated 22.11.2005 dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant-defendants and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. 10. 9. The learned first appellate court vide its judgment and decree dated 22.11.2005 dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant-defendants and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. 10. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid judgments of both the courts below, the present appellant-defendants have preferred the present second appeal before this Court. 11. This Court while admitting the present second appeal vide order dated 10.3.2006 framed the following substantial questions of law:— (i) Whether the property recorded as way in the government record and admitted to have been recorded as so but has been put to different use about 40 years ago and putting a small obstruction in the enjoyment of property can be a ground of grievance to those plaintiffs who have filed the suit for removal of the said obstruction after more than 20 years and having full knowledge of the obstruction since last 20 years? (ii) Whether the courts below failed to appreciate that the width of public chowk as given in the documents placed on record by the plaintiffs themselves show more width than the width which will be available after removal of the appellants' cabin and what is its effect? (iii) Whether the first appellate court committed serious error in rejecting the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C? 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has contended that both the courts below have committed a grave error of law and facts in passing the impugned judgments and decrees. The learned courts below have ignored the material evidence on record. The learned trial court has also failed to appreciate the correct position of law. The findings arrived at by the learned courts below are ex-facie contrary to facts and law and perverse. 14. It is further contended that it is an admitted fact on record that the defendants were put in possession of the cabin as licensee of the defendant Board 35 years back even prior to the respondent-plaintiffs started living in their houses in question. 14. It is further contended that it is an admitted fact on record that the defendants were put in possession of the cabin as licensee of the defendant Board 35 years back even prior to the respondent-plaintiffs started living in their houses in question. Suffice it to say that the defendants were in continuous possession of the land in question as a licensee and not as a trespasser, therefore, the suit for mandatory injunction against the defendants could not even be maintained in the manner, the same was filed by the plaintiffs in absence of challenge to the license of the appellant-defendants and prayer for its cancellation. It is contended that so as to maintain the relief of mandatory injunction, the respondent-plaintiffs were required to seek the relief for cancellation of the license. It is also submitted that since the appellants are holding the land as licensee under the valid license issued by the defendant Board which has never been revoked, therefore, without the cancellation of license in accordance with law, the mandatory injunction for removal of the cabin could not have been granted by the learned trial court. 15. It is further contended that it was an admitted fact on record that the defendants were in possession of the cabin as licensee of the defendant Board and were carrying on business there for last 35 years. It was contended that the cabin of the respondent-defendants installed on the land in question is creating obstruction and amounts interference in the right of the appellant-plaintiffs to use the chowk as way to their houses. But according to the respondent-plaintiffs, they are also residing in their houses since 1966, however, the existence of the cabin did not create any obstruction or obstacle to use the chowk as way for all these years, then how all of a sudden, the said cabin has become an obstruction in use as the chowk as a way. There was absolutely no explanation whatsoever on record in this regard. As a matter of fact, had there been any obstruction or obstacle to use of the way then certain the suit in the nature filed by the respondent-plaintiffs should have been filed at the earlier occasion to seek the injunction against the appellant-defendants. 16. There was absolutely no explanation whatsoever on record in this regard. As a matter of fact, had there been any obstruction or obstacle to use of the way then certain the suit in the nature filed by the respondent-plaintiffs should have been filed at the earlier occasion to seek the injunction against the appellant-defendants. 16. It is further contended that a bare perusal of the map produced by the plaintiff and so also the defendants along with this appeal manifestly shows that the no obstruction whatsoever is being caused on account of the cabin installed by the appellant-defendants under the license issued by the defendant Board. The fact that the land beneath the cabin has never been used and cannot be used as a way is also apparent on the face of record. 17. It is also further contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendants that the averments made in the plaint reveals that the suit preferred by the respondent-plaintiffs in their individual capacity was as a matter of fact, the representative suit and the same not preferred in conformity with the provisions of Order 1 Rule 8 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. Before filing the suit in the representative capacity, no permission was sought by the respondent-plaintiffs from the learned trial court and the procedure laid down for maintaining the representative suit was simply not followed. Thus the suit was not properly instituted. 18. It is contended that in the written statement the appellant-defendants so also the defendant-Board disputed the correctness of the map produced by the plaintiffs and specifically averred that the land beneath the cabin was never used as chowk or as a public way. In these circumstances, an application under Order 18 Rule 18 of the Civil Procedure Code was preferred by the defendants for inspection of the site in dispute by the Court so that the exact position of the cabin and the alleged obstructions could have come on record before passing the judgment and decree by the learned trial court. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants submits that no prejudice was going to be caused on such prayer being granted to the plaintiffs. On the contrary, the true and correct facts would have come on record so as to enable the learned trial court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties in effective and just manner. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants submits that no prejudice was going to be caused on such prayer being granted to the plaintiffs. On the contrary, the true and correct facts would have come on record so as to enable the learned trial court to adjudicate the dispute between the parties in effective and just manner. It is contended that the learned trial court has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred by the defendants in a mechanical manner. The learned appellate court has also erred in rejecting the contentions raised on behalf of the appellant-defendants. The learned trial court so also the learned appellate court have seriously erred in holding that the position explained in the map produced by the plaintiffs has been accepted by the appellant-defendants in the written statement whereas the appellant-defendants so also the defendant-Board has not accepted the map produced by the plaintiff along with the plaint. It is further contended that the learned courts below have seriously erred in holding that the land beneath the cabin is part of the chowk or a public way. It was simply not proved that on account of the cabin, any obstructions or nuisance is created. The learned trial court has seriously erred in holding that so as to make the respondent plaintiffs entitled to claim the relief of mandatory and prohibitory injunction, it was not necessary to prove any individual or special damage. 19. It is also contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendants that learned trial court has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred by the plaintiffs under Order 6 Rule 17 of C.P.C seeking amendment in the written statement. 20. The amendment sought was based on the subsequent events and having direct bearing on the matter in dispute, therefore, the learned trial court ought to have allowed the application preferred by the appellant-defendants. The learned first appellate court has also erred in affirming the order rejecting the application passed by the learned trial court. The learned first appellate court has also erred in rejecting the application preferred by the plaintiffs before it under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C 21. The learned first appellate court has also erred in affirming the order rejecting the application passed by the learned trial court. The learned first appellate court has also erred in rejecting the application preferred by the plaintiffs before it under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C 21. It is further contended that the learned trial court has seriously erred in rejecting the application preferred by the appellant for producing additional evidence on record with regard to the fact that the plaintiff Shafi Mohammad submitted an application before the defendant Board for a new gate towards the western side of his shop. The permission was granted by the defendant Board with the condition that he can open gate 3 ft. away from the cabin of the appellant-defendants. However, he opened the gate violating the condition incorporated in the sanction granted and consequently, the defendant-Board ordered for the closure of the gate against which the plaintiff Shafi Mohd. preferred a writ petition before the this Court which was also dismissed. The receipt issued by the defendant-Board to the appellant-defendants on the payment of the rent from 1960 onwards were also the document germane to the matter in dispute and for the reasons mentioned in the application the same rightly could not be produced by the defendants before the learned trial court. It is contended that in the interest of justice, the learned appellate court ought to have allowed the application preferred by the appellant-defendants for producing the additional evidence on record. 22. It is further contended that the learned trial court has seriously erred in drawing inference against the defendants on the ground that the defendant Board has not deliberately produced the map of the Sirohi State and other record before the Court. If the respondent-plaintiffs have not been able to prove the fact by producing cogent evidence on record that the land beneath the cabin is part of the public way and if the defendant Board has not produced any evidence which could have helped the Court in adjudicating the dispute effectively, then for this reason the appellant-defendants simply cannot be made to suffer for no fault on their part. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has relied upon the following judgments:— (i) (1976) 1 SCC 496 : AIR 1975 SC 2238 - The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram wadke of bombay. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendants has relied upon the following judgments:— (i) (1976) 1 SCC 496 : AIR 1975 SC 2238 - The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlekar Shantaram wadke of bombay. (ii) (1989) 4 SCC 155 : AIR 1989 SC 1988 - Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee (iii) (2009) 3 ALD 104 Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Bal Mukund Bairwa, (iv) Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Roop Singh - S.B Civil Revision Petition No. 74/12 decided by Jaipur Bench of this Court on 10.02.2014 24. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant-defendants and has supported the impugned judgments and has submitted that there is concurrent finding of both the learned courts below, therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second appeal. It is also submitted that no error has been committed by learned first appeal court as well as learned trial court while passing the impugned judgments and decrees as the same have been passed after appreciating and scrutinizing the material evidence available on record. Therefore, it is prayed that the present second appeal may be dismissed. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs has relied upon the following judgments:— (i) 1999 (1) RCR (Rent) 3 - Rafiq Mohammed v. Nisar Mohammed; (ii) 2014 (3) CDR 1721 (Raj) - Usha Soni v. LRs of Dev Kishan (iii) 2005 (5) RLW 742 - Takhat Singh @ Norat Mal v. The Municipal Council, ajmer through its Administrator (iv) RLW 1992 (2) 229 - Mst. Parwati Bai v. Bheekam Chand (v) RLW 1972 (1) 51 - Pyarelal Satpal v. Santlal (vi) RLR 1991 (1) 84 - Nizamuddin v. The Boardd of Revenue and; (vii) 2009 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 1025 - Munna Lal v. State of Rajasthan. 26. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments and material available on record. 27. 26. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments and material available on record. 27. Upon perusal of record it is proved that cabin is situated in public way/chowk but the case of the appellants is that they are paying rent to the Municipal Board and Municipal Board had given the said land to them on rent and Municipal Board has also admitted this fact, but upon perusal of Exhibits 12 and 13 it is clear that in the year 1967 the respondent Municipal Board also feels that due to installation of said cabin now it is creating nuisance and obstruction to the public, therefore, the Municipal Board has given notices Exhibits 12 and 13 to the appellants to remove their Cabin. 28. The Municipal Board had terminated the tenancy of appellant-defendants vide notice Ex.12 dated 22.11.1967 which reads as under:— ^^dk;kZy; uxj ikfydk] fljksgh] jktLFkku fljksgh Øekad% 4154 fnukad 22-11-67 izfr % flU/kh vklu nkl ykypUnth] lnj cktkj] fljksghA fo"k; % VsEijsjh tehu fdjk;s vkidks blds }kjk lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkidks lnj cktkj esa tks tehu fdjk, ij 6x4=24 QqV dsfcu j[kus gsrqa VsEijsjh rkSj ij nh xbZ gSA ;g fnuakd 1-4-68 ls vkidks fdjk, ij uxjikfydk }kjk ugha nh tk ldsxhA D;ksafd cktkj esa HkhM+ c<+us ls ;krk;kr esa fnDdRk jgrh gSA lks lwfpr gksA fnuakd % 21-11-67 v/;{k] uxjikfydk] fljksgh^^ 29. The Municipal Board had treated the appellant-defendants trespassers vide notice Ex.13 dated 22.6.1968, which reads as under: ^^dk;kZy; uxj ikfydk] fljksgh Øaekd % 518 fljksgh] fnuakd % 22@6@68 uksfVl izfr % flU/kh vklunkl] lnj cktkj vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkius fcuk btktr uxjikfydk] fljksgh dh Hkwfe ij dsfcu j[kdj vfrØe.k dj j[kk gS tks dkuwu ds fo:) gSA vr% bl uksfVl ds }kjk vkidks lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd ;g uksfVl feyrs gh rqjUr mDr Hkwfe dks [kkyh dj bl dk;kZy; es fyf[kr :i esa lwpuk nksA vU;Fkk vkids fo:) jktLFkku uxjikfydk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 203 ds varxZr dk;Zokgh dh tkosxhA fnukad% vf/k'kklh vf/kdkjh] uxjikfydk] fljksgh^^ 30. Upon perusal of evidence produced by the parties, it is proved that due to installation of said cabin, obstruction and nuisance is caused to the plaintiff-respondents and public also. 31. Upon perusal of evidence produced by the parties, it is proved that due to installation of said cabin, obstruction and nuisance is caused to the plaintiff-respondents and public also. 31. Now the question is that “whether the Municipal Board, Sirohi was competent to give a part of public way or public chowk on rent for installation of such cabin or not?” 32. This Court in the case of Takhat Singh @ Norat Mal v. The Municipal Council, Ajmer through its Administrator reported as 2005 (5) RLW 742 has held that:— “(11) So far as questions of law involved in the present case, as formulated by this court on 19.12.1984 and reproduced above, are concerned, I find that although the above formulated questions are also involved in the present case but the main question, in my opinion, which is involved in the present case, is as under:— “Whether the Municipal Council, Ajmer, was competent to give permission for raising construction or to regularize the construction already made, on the land, which is part of public way, or not?” (12) My answer to the above question is that Municipal Council was not competent to give permission for raising construction or to regularize the construction already made, on the land which is part of public way. The land of public way vest in public or it is dedicated to public at large, therefore, Municipal Council had no jurisdiction to regularize the unauthorized construction raised by appellant by charging compensation of Rs. 50/-. The order passed by Municipal Council regularizing the illegal construction of appellant itself was without authority of law, therefore, Municipal Council was justified in issuing another order asking the plaintiff to remove construction raised on public land.” 33. This Court in the case of Pyarelal Satpal v. Santlal reported as 1972 RLW page 51 has held as under:— (a) - Municipalities - Bikaner Municipal Act, 1923, Sec.51, 113 and 114 - Letting road sites for construction of stalls - Sections do not permit municipalities to let such land. All the property of the nature specified in Sec.51 vests in the Municipality and is under its control on the specific condition that it shall be held and applied by it for the purpose of the Act. It is not open to the Municipality to convert a part of a public highway into a bazar. All the property of the nature specified in Sec.51 vests in the Municipality and is under its control on the specific condition that it shall be held and applied by it for the purpose of the Act. It is not open to the Municipality to convert a part of a public highway into a bazar. Under Sec.113(b) it is open to the board to discontinue or close permanently any public street, but that can only be done for the purposes of the Act. This provision also does not entitle the Municipality to let out a part of a public highway to a private person for setting up stalls for carrying on business. Sec.114 also does not authorise letting out a part of a highway for getting up a stall for carrying on business. The purpose for which permission may be granted to occupy any part of a street temporarily are specified in it. They envisage permission to be granted to those constructing buildings abutting public streets or public lands so that people may be able to dig foundations and erect scaffolding on the public street. When the Act did not give any power to the Municipality to let out portions of a public highway for putting up stalls for carrying on business this could not be done by framing any bye-laws. Sec. 129 of the Act which provides for framing bye-laws does not contain any clause specifically empowering the Municipality to frame bye-laws about letting out parts of public highways on Tehbazari.” 34. This Court in Noor Mohammad v. Nagar Nigam, Jaipur reported as AIR 1996 Rajasthan 68 has held that:— “7. I am further of the opinion that some employees of the respondent-Board were in league with the petitioner in getting the sale deed registered which is a public place which forms part of public thoroughfare since otherwise there was no question of granting any permission by the Municipal Board earlier for allotment of the land to the petitioner which was subsequently cancelled. I am further of the opinion that the sale deed dated 26-3-92 is itself an illegal document which cannot be given any effect to and no permission should be granted to the petitioner for raising any construction over the land in question. I am further of the opinion that the sale deed dated 26-3-92 is itself an illegal document which cannot be given any effect to and no permission should be granted to the petitioner for raising any construction over the land in question. If any such construction is raised by the petitioner in near future he shall be doing the same at his own risk as to costs and consequences and the Municipal Board will be fully empowered to demolish the construction if it is raised by the petitioner and the said action of the Municipal Board shall not be open to question before any Court or authority.” 35. This Court in case of Laduram v. Municipal board, Ganganagar reported as RLW 1967 page 255 has held that:— “(d) Civil P.C, Sec.91(2)- Infringement of right of easy access to public road being infringement of private right, person entitled to sue without consent of Advocate General. Sub-Sec.(2) of Sec.91 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any special right on a private individual to maintain a suit in respect of a public nuisance. That right exists independently of the section. The reason is that if a person has an individual or special interest in a public right and has sustained particular damage, there is no reason he should be driven to the necessity of approaching the Advocate General for the purpose of channelising his claim, as the right which he seeks to exercise is a private right and not a public right. The plaintiffs' shops or ‘nohras’ about on the public ways and are being used, or are capable of use, as business premises. It is admitted that there are doors in those premises which open on the public ways. The site plan shows that, to say the least, the plaintiffs would have to take a longer route to reach the main road every time they desired to leave their premises and reach the centre of the road (which alone is available for traffic at present) or its opposite extremity. They are therefore justified in pleading that the obstructions deprived them of the use of the full width of the roads for the free and full enjoyment of their properties. They are therefore justified in pleading that the obstructions deprived them of the use of the full width of the roads for the free and full enjoyment of their properties. For instance, the rows of stalls would prevent easy and convenient access to the plaintiffs and their customers, the passage of the vehicles on a narrow strip of 2 or 3 feet is out of the question and, as is obvious, the premises have become less prominent from the centre of the public roads because of the intervening stalls. So when the plaintiffs are shown to suffer direct and substantial particular or special damage beyond the suffered by the general public, there is no reason why they should not be entitled to maintain their suits without the consent of the Advocate General. They should in fact be deemed to have suffered special loss without specific proof thereof in the facts and circumstances of these cases.” 36. In the present case, upon perusal of evidence produced by the parties it is proved that due to installation of cabin, nuisance and obstruction are caused to the plaintiffs and public also. Both the courts below have concurrently found that said cabin is situated on a part of public way/chowk and there is obstruction and nuisance to the plaintiffs and public at large is also facing difficulty due to installation of said cabin. 37. In my considered view the courts below deeply appreciated evidence available on record and has rightly appreciated the correct proposition of law and rightly decided the issues No. 1 to 6 in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. 38. Upon perusal of Ex.12 dated 22.11.1967, it is proved that Municipal Board had also terminated tenancy of appellant-defendants from 1.4.1968 and upon perusal of Ex.13 dated 22.6.1968, the Municipal Board had also found that the appellant-defendants are trespassers over the suit land. In these circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-defendants that the appellant-defendants are licencee and plaintiff-respondents have no right to dispossess them is not tenable. 39. It is settled proposition of law that the Municipal Board has no right to give permission to anybody to install a cabin in a piece of public way or chowk. In these circumstances, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant-defendants that the appellant-defendants are licencee and plaintiff-respondents have no right to dispossess them is not tenable. 39. It is settled proposition of law that the Municipal Board has no right to give permission to anybody to install a cabin in a piece of public way or chowk. In these circumstances, the permission given by the Municipal board to install the cabin to the appellant-defendants is void ab-initio and the appellant-defendants have no right to make their continuous possession over a piece of public way and they have no right to raise any demand for regularisation of the possession over a piece of public way or chowk because first of all the permission given by the Municipal Board is void ab-initio and secondly, according to the notice Ex.12, the Municipal Board had terminated the tenancy and according to the notice Ex.13 the Municipal Board also treated the appellant-defendants as trespassers. 40. In view of above discussions, the findings given by the courts below are based on material available on record. Both the courts below have neither misread the evidence available on record nor overlooked any material available on record and have given sound reasoning about their findings and also discussed all the relevant laws and judgments. 41. Upon perusal of record, it is also clear that the learned first appellate court has rightly rejected the applications filed by the appellant-defendants under Order 6 Rule 17 C.P.C and under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C Learned first appellate court has given cogent and justified reasons in rejecting the aforesaid applications, therefore, no case is made out for interference in the said orders and the judgments. Therefore, all the substantial questions of law framed by this Court while admitting this appeal on 10.3.2006 are liable to be decided against the appellants and, therefore, the present appeal is liable to be dismissed. 42. In view of above discussions, no case for interference is made out by this Court in this second appeal, hence, the same fails and is hereby dismissed. 43. No order as to costs.