JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has filed this appeal against the judgment and order acquittal dated 12th April, 2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Rajkot, in Sessions Case No. 50 of 2004. 2. The brief facts leading to the rise of the complaint which ultimately culminating into Sessions Case read as under: 2.1 It is the case of the prosecution that daughter of the complainant named Ruchi has been married with the respondent accused prior to about two years from the date of incident. After her marriage, deceased Ruchi and accused were living together and during two years of their marriage life, accused demanded dowry and cash amount of Rs. 80,000/- along with other things. Moreover, though his demand of Rs. 80,000/- was fulfilled, he had again asked for Rs. 50,000/- more. Thus, by making these demands, accused meted out unbearable mental and physical cruelty to the deceased Ruchi and, therefore, Ruchi had no other alternative but to end her life and, therefore, on 30.1.2004 Ruchi jumped from the terrace of a ten storied building known as "Sukhsagar Apartment" in Rajkot and committed suicide along with her one year old daughter Tanu. Both Ruchi and Tanu died because of the impact of hitting the ground and thus Ruchi had committed suicide due to cruelty meted out to her by her husband and, therefore, a complaint against the accused was given by father of the deceased Ruchi on 24.1.2004. 2.2 The investigating officer after recording statements of witnesses found that there was sufficient evidence against the respondent and hence, charge sheet was filed in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate for the offence under sections 304(B), 306, 498(A) of IPC and as the offence committed by the accused is absolutely triable by the learned Sessions Judge, the same was committed to the Court of Sessions for trial under section 209 of Cr.P.C. where the accused has not pleaded guilty for the charge levelled against him and claimed to be tried. Before the trial court, the prosecution has examined oral witnesses which are enlisted hereinafter: PW No. Name of witness Exhibit No. 1 Ranjanben Maheshbhai Dhuleshiya 33 2 Jagdishbhai Babulal 35 3 Dr. Before the trial court, the prosecution has examined oral witnesses which are enlisted hereinafter: PW No. Name of witness Exhibit No. 1 Ranjanben Maheshbhai Dhuleshiya 33 2 Jagdishbhai Babulal 35 3 Dr. Jagdishchandra Devrajbhai Tank 42 4 Deviben Alabhai Odedara 60 5 Ajay Niranjanbhai Oza 61 6 Shantilal Bhagwanjibhai Solanki 62 7 Pravinbhai Manilal Joshi 63 8 Rajkumar Municipal Madrasi 64 9 Rinaben Kirankumar Patel 65 10 Narmadaben Parshottumbhai Vara 66 11 Damyantiben Pravinbhai Patel 67 12 Dr. Jagdishchandra Devrajbhai Tank 42 4 Deviben Alabhai Odedara 60 5 Ajay Niranjanbhai Oza 61 6 Shantilal Bhagwanjibhai Solanki 62 7 Pravinbhai Manilal Joshi 63 8 Rajkumar Municipal Madrasi 64 9 Rinaben Kirankumar Patel 65 10 Narmadaben Parshottumbhai Vara 66 11 Damyantiben Pravinbhai Patel 67 12 Dr. Premchand Shri Shyamlal Sharma 111 13 Ushaben Premchand 113 14 Prakash Babulal Ganeshlal Sharma 114 15 Motibhai Vicchiybhai Damor 118 16 Babubhai Gabrubhai Solanki 120 The prosecution has also led the following documentary evidences which are also enlisted hereinafter:- Description Exhibit No. Inquest panchnama 34 Panchnama 36 Letter of deceased Ruchiben 37 Letter of deceased Ruchiben 38 Panchnama pf place of offence 39 Police yadi for post mortem 43 Inquest panchnama 44 Police report for post mortem of Ruchiben 45 Police report for post mortem of Tanuben 46 PM note of Ruchiben 47 PM note of Tanuben 48 PM Note of Tanuben 49 MLC paper 50 MLC paper 51 Receipt of handing over dead body of Ruchiben 52 Receipt of handing over dead body of Ruchiben 53 Complaint 112 Panchnama 115 Forwarding letter of police 119 List of mobile phone calls 121 Letter of scientific officer 122 MLC paper 123 Station diary entries 124 A.D. Entry No. 6/2004 125 Station Diary Entry No. 8/2004 126 Station Diary Entry No. 18/2004 127 Letter of Gandhigram Police Station 128 Special Report 129 Serious Crime Report 130 Letter to Executive magistrate for PM 131 Cause of death certificate of Ruchiben 132 Cause of death certificate of Tanuben 133 Arrest memo 134 Letter of ACP to add section of Dowry Act 135 Request letter to JMFC seeking permission to add sections 3 and 7 of Dowry Prohibition Act 136 Permission letter for going out of State for investigation 137 Letter to Reliance India Mobile for bills 138 Letter to Hutch Mobile for information 139 Permission letter for going out of State for investigation 140 List of wealth of woman 141 Station diary and log sheet 142 2.3 After the evidence being led, a closing pursis was given by the prosecution and further statement of the accused under Sec. 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure came to be recorded where he has denied to have committed any offence. Upon affording opportunity of hearing to the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties, the impugned judgment and order dated 12th April, 2006 was passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Rajkot, in Sessions Case No. 50 of 2004 whereby the present respondent original accused person came to be acquitted of the charges levelled against him. It is against this judgment and order that the State has preferred the present appeal. 3. Learned APP, Ms. Hansa Punani appearing for the State, has contended that the respondent accused was tried for serious offences punishable under sections 306, 304-B read with section 498-A of IPC and despite the fact that statutory presumption was available, the learned trial Judge has passed an order of acquittal which, in no circumstance, is sustainable in the eye of law. Ms. Punani while drawing the attention to the suicide note at Exh. 36 has contended that though in the said suicide note there is no reference of any responsible person but there is definitely a reference of amount of Rs. 80,000/- which was requested to be returned back to the parents as her last wish and from this circumstance reflecting from the suicide note which is recovered during the course of investigation, there is definitely an inference possible to be drawn and having not done so, a serious error is committed by the learned trial Judge. Ms. Punani has further contended that simply because independent witnesses have turned hostile, the case cannot be said to have not been established by the prosecution. It is a settled position of law as contended by Ms. Punani that evidence of hostile witness can be taken into consideration in so far it supports the case of the prosecution and the learned trial Judge therefore has committed an error to conclude that the respondent accused deserves an acquittal and, therefore, this error committed by the learned trial Judge is required to be corrected by quashing the impugned judgment and order. Ms. Punani has further contended that there is enough material available on record to point a specific finger towards the respondent accused and this is getting substantiated from the evidence of investigating officer. It was also found that though it was pleaded that the respondent accused was out of station, they were found inside the house when the incident has taken place. Ms. It was also found that though it was pleaded that the respondent accused was out of station, they were found inside the house when the incident has taken place. Ms. Punani has further contended that it has been established by the prosecution that the chit has been written by the victim herself and her handwritings were never in question during the course of adjudication and the said chit having a specific reference to an amount of Rs. 80,000/- payable back to her parents is sufficient enough to connect the link and, therefore, Ms. Punani has contended that the learned trial Judge has not appreciated the overall material on record in its proper perspective. Ms. Punani has further drawn the attention to the call details which were gathered during the course of investigation and has contended that these call details which are made available on record by the prosecution are sufficiently linking the respondent accused to commission of crime as, at one corner in the evidence, there was an assertion that respondent husband was having an affair with a lady. These call details were obtained for that very purpose and since it is substantiating the case of the prosecution and linking circumstances are very much available on record, it was not open for the learned trial Judge to discard said evidence for the reasons which are not at all digestible. Ms. Punani has further contended that father of the victim has though turned hostile but his evidence is sufficiently indicating that he has referred the circumstance related to dowry in his cross-examination and for that purpose, the victim has made a reference to P.W. No. 12-Dr. Premchand Shri Shyamlal Sharma who has also been examined at Exh. 111. Ms. Punani has further drawn the attention to the compromise pursis placed on record at page 292 of the paper book compilation and has stated that simply because the case has been compromised, the evidence cannot be discarded as these are offences against the society and, therefore, they are to be dealt with in the manner in which the learned trial Judge has dealt with. On the contrary, Mrs. On the contrary, Mrs. Punani has submitted that looking to the overall material on record, even investigating officer has found that case of dowry is culled out and, therefore, by specific application, a request was made before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class at the relevant point of time to add the charge of sections 3 and 7 of Dowry Prohibition Act and, therefore, when these circumstances are prevailing on record, in such a serious and heinous crime, the learned trial Judge ought not to have passed the order of acquittal. Ms. Punani has further contended that there is sufficient material connecting the accused to the guilt and the learned trial Judge ought not to have entertained the stand taken by the defence more particularly when a young lady with infant child has died on account of ill-treatment and harassment meted out by the husband as specifically alleged and the factum of ill-treatment is sufficiently emerged from the record which ought not to have been ignored by the learned trial Judge. On the contrary, keeping relation with another lady is itself a circumstance of mental torture to the legally wedded wife and, therefore, Mrs. Punani has submitted that this is not a case in which a clear acquittal can be allowed to be operated. Ms. Punani has further submitted that while passing an order impugned in the appeal, the reasons which are assigned are not sufficient and cogent enough to substantiate the conclusion of acquittal and the conclusion which has been arrived at are perverse to the record and, therefore, considering the overall set of circumstances, Mrs. Punani has requested the Court to allow this appeal filed by the State. 4. As against this, Mr. P.M. Lakhani appearing for the respondent accused, has submitted before the Court that case is entirely based on circumstantial evidence and has contended that in view of settled position of law, when the case is based on circumstantial evidence, each and every fact related to chain of events must be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. According to him, here the chain is not completing and, therefore, in the absence of any connecting link so cogently available on record, the order of acquittal does not deserve to be interfered with. Mr. According to him, here the chain is not completing and, therefore, in the absence of any connecting link so cogently available on record, the order of acquittal does not deserve to be interfered with. Mr. Lakhani has submitted that on the contrary, from the evidence on record, it is found that the husband was not there at the place of incident and the incident has taken place at a different place where the victim was not residing and, therefore, when the circumstances are not sufficiently corroborating the version of the prosecution, the order of acquittal is justifiably passed. Mr. Lakhani has further submitted that based upon the bare assertion not supported by any material, even call details have been called for by the prosecution and the call details though were available on record, the prosecution has miserably failed in establishing the link in connection with the offence against the respondent accused and, therefore, it is desirable in the interest of justice not to allow the appeal filed by the State. Mr. Lakhani has further submitted that looking to the overall material on record and looking to the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge, there appears to be no cogent circumstance which may allow a different view than what has been taken by the learned trial Judge. Mr. Lakhani has submitted that if the learned trial Judge has not dealt with the evidence at all, the order would have been completely misreading the evidence and in that circumstances only, the perversity can be inferred. In the case on hand, each and every evidence which has been led by the prosecution was dealt with by the learned trial Judge and, therefore, simply because another plausible view is possible, the same solitary circumstance cannot be utilised to dislodge the finding or reverse the order of acquittal in view of the settled position of law and, therefore, under such set of circumstances, he has submitted not to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Judge. 5. Having gone through the evidence on record and having perused the order passed by the learned trial Judge, following disturbing circumstances are emerging: 5.1 Though there is a specific reference about Rs. 5. Having gone through the evidence on record and having perused the order passed by the learned trial Judge, following disturbing circumstances are emerging: 5.1 Though there is a specific reference about Rs. 80,000/- to be payable back to the parents of the victim, whether this amount is the amount related to dowry or not is not getting clear from the chit which has been recovered by the prosecution. 5.2 In addition to this, in the suicide note which said to have been written by the victim, the handwriting of the same are not disputable. In the very suicide note, there is no reference attributing anything on the respondent accused despite the fact that there is some reference about money. 5.3 It is also emerging from the record that all independent persons who were to be relied upon by the prosecution have turned hostile. The evidence of Deviben Alabhai Odedara, P.W. No. 4, who has been examined at Exh. 60, is not throwing any light and on the contrary, she has conveyed merely that the deceased and the child were not the resident of Sukhsagar Apartment and there is no further examination of this witness. Similarly, one Ajay Niranjanbhai Oza, P.W. No. 5 examined at Exh. 61 along with Shantilal Bhagwanjibhai Solanki, P.W. No. 6 examined at Exh. 62 and other witnesses namely, Pravinbhai Manilal Joshi, P.W. No. 7 examined at Exh. 63 are also not indicating anything or pointing finger to the guilt of the respondent accused and, therefore, independent evidence is not corroborating in any manner to the guilt of the respondent accused. Yet another witness namely, P.W. No. 8, Rajkumar Munabhai Madrasi examined at Exh. 64 and another lady, who is neighbour and known to the deceased namely, Rinaben Kirankumar Patel, P.W. No. 9 examined at Exh. 65 has also turned hostile and her overall version is also not supporting the case of the prosecution as is clearly visible from page 156 of the paper book compilation. 5.4 Similar is the case prevailing with respect to other witnesses namely, Narmadaben Parshottumbhai Vara, P.W. No. 10 examined at Exh. 66 and Damyantiben Pravinbhai Patel, P.W. No. 11 examined at Exh. 5.4 Similar is the case prevailing with respect to other witnesses namely, Narmadaben Parshottumbhai Vara, P.W. No. 10 examined at Exh. 66 and Damyantiben Pravinbhai Patel, P.W. No. 11 examined at Exh. 67, who have not supported the case of the prosecution in any manner and, therefore, practically it is the fact that this is a serious case of crime, but surprisingly, all witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. 5.5 One another disturbing circumstance which is emerging from the record is the deposition and the evidence of father of the victim, Dr. Premchand Shri Shyamlal Sharma, who was examined as P.W. No. 12 at Exh. 111 and who turned hostile and on the contrary, a reference is coming out that he has denied that there is some sort of compromise took place during the trial with the respondent accused but this witness though father is surprisingly not supporting the case of the prosecution. Similar is the position with respect to evidence of mother of the victim i.e. Ushaben Premchand examined as P.W. No. 13 at Exh. 113. Though she is mother, she has also not supported the case of the prosecution. On the contrary, the evidence of parents is also not reflecting any stand which can remotely come to the assistance to the case of the prosecution. Though it is a non-compoundable offence, the compromise pursis has been placed on record at Exh. 16 and, therefore, this unfortunate scenario is emerging from the record of the case. 6. In such a heinous crime, nobody under normal circumstance can even infer that without any genuine cause, a young lady with a child can jump from the terrace in a short marriage span. But then ultimately, to hold the culprit responsible, some sufficient material must be available on record. The Court cannot act on the conjectures, surmises and mere inference without any support from the evidence. This unfortunate circumstance is prevailing on record that though the crime is serious in nature, nobody including the parents has supported the case of the prosecution. 7. But then ultimately, to hold the culprit responsible, some sufficient material must be available on record. The Court cannot act on the conjectures, surmises and mere inference without any support from the evidence. This unfortunate circumstance is prevailing on record that though the crime is serious in nature, nobody including the parents has supported the case of the prosecution. 7. We are in anguish when we refer to further record to find out whether any linking circumstance connecting the respondent accused is available on record but then we unfortunately could not find, so much so that the call details were called for by the prosecution from the relevant companies namely, Reliance Mobile Company and Hutch Mobile Company and though there are applications which are submitted by investigating officer on 5.2.2004 reflecting on pages 346 and 347 of the paper book compilation vide Exhs. 138 and 139 respectively in which the details have been called for the period commencing from 1.10.2003 to 25.1.2004, no doubt, the companies have provided the details but surprisingly upto 21.1.2004 only as is reflecting from page 323 of the paper book compilation. Though call details of the crucial dates i.e. 22nd January and 23rd January, 2004 were not provided, still the investigating machinery has not taken any steps. Neither the prosecution has made any attempt to call for these further details nor any action is initiated nor any steps have been taken in this regard and thereafter, this lack of details appear to have led the learned trial Judge to take plausible view and thereby acquitted the respondent accused. 8. Though the witnesses namely, the parents, have obviously supported the case of the prosecution but then merely on the basis of parents' evidence, no order of conviction normally can be passed more particularly when in the present case, the investigating officer himself has not vigilantly and promptly and with full conviction has tried to take any step despite the fact that inadequate particulars have been brought on record of those mobile companies. No attempt appears to have been made and the case is left as it is by the prosecution. 9. The aforesaid circumstances which are prevailing on record lead to one conclusion only that the case is based upon circumstantial evidence but then the connecting links in the form of chain are not getting completed. No attempt appears to have been made and the case is left as it is by the prosecution. 9. The aforesaid circumstances which are prevailing on record lead to one conclusion only that the case is based upon circumstantial evidence but then the connecting links in the form of chain are not getting completed. There are several missing links prevailing on the record and, therefore, it is difficulty to dislodge the finding arrived at by the learned trial Judge which is based upon the very same material. Had it been the case that no material is examined or material examined is in a total different perspective, the Court would have a leverage to intervene but on the basis of material on record, the learned trial Judge has arrived at a specific conclusion. The learned trial Judge appears to have examined the witnesses who were pressed into service and examined suicide note at Exhs. 37 and 38 and has also dealt with the same and the evidence which is attempted to have been taken in aid by the prosecution but then since none of the witnesses have supported the case of the prosecution, it appears that the learned trial Judge was dragged to such a situation where he was left with no other alternative but to pass an order of acquittal. 10. Evidence on record on the contrary suggests that suicide note is not making the respondent accused as guilty nor any specific attribution is made by the victim. In addition thereto, the reference which has been made of Rs. 80,000/- which the defense side has cross-examined and the same was in the form of loan offered to the respondent accused and, therefore, looking to the definition of dowry, this Rs. 80,000/- appears to not have been dealt with as a dowry. On the contrary, the learned trial Judge has concluded that the said amount of Rs. 80,000/- is a loan and the counsel during the course of hearing of this appeal has stated that when the respondent accused was released on bail, the said amount of Rs. 80,000/- appears to not have been dealt with as a dowry. On the contrary, the learned trial Judge has concluded that the said amount of Rs. 80,000/- is a loan and the counsel during the course of hearing of this appeal has stated that when the respondent accused was released on bail, the said amount of Rs. 80,000/- was already returned to the complainant and, therefore, in absence of any report being available on record, to connect the link of the respondent accused with the actual commission of crime or the circumstances which led the victim to commit suicide, the offence has not been found by the learned trial Judge to have been proved by the prosecution. The reasons which are assigned are possible to be assigned when one would look at the evidence on record and, therefore, from the overall material on record, we are of the considered opinion that there is no extra-ordinary circumstances available on record which may permit us to take a different specific view to hold the respondent accused guilty of offence. 11. No doubt, the powers of the appellate court are wide enough to disturb or interfere with an order of acquittal but at the same time, while taking a different view, there must be some cogent and concrete materials which must have lost sight of by the learned trial Judge and we find no such circumstances and, therefore, we are unable to take a different view than what has been taken by the learned trial Judge. While taking such a view, we are mindful of the following proposition of law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court which are required to be referred hereinafter: 11.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 11.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 11.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii)The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii)This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994." 11.4 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, 2014(2) SCC (Cri) 497. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision as under: "(15). In this context, yet another caution struck by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 would also be relevant. "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 11.5 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2014(8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "(17). In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731 this Court observed; "21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 11.6 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, re-appreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, re-appreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside"." 11.7 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. Xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 11.8 The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 242, has held in Para 6, 7 and 8 as under: "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that; "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 11.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 12. Considering the overall materials on record and upon examination of the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge and even on re-appreciation of evidence also, we found nothing extra-ordinary which would compel us to substitute our findings and accordingly, considering aforesaid proposition of law laid down on the issue of power of interference in acquittal appeal by the Hon'ble Apex Court, we hereby refrain ourselves from interfering in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge. Thus, the appeal filed by the State is required to be dismissed. 13. We have noticed that in this case the investigating machinery has not tried to go to the root of the offence to bring the real culprit to book. Thus, a shady and untrustful investigation has been done by the investigating machinery in the present case and therefore, we express our deep anguish and condemnation in no uncertain terms about such an investigation. The present day challenge of the society is to provide impartial and trustful investigation at the hands of police authorities. Since the acquittal in the present case is as a consequence of shady and untrustful investigation at the hands of police machineries resulting in disrespect to the most basic principles of fair trial, it is expected of the competent authorities of the Police Department to inquire into the matter so as to see that the slanted and biased investigating officer is left unpunished for unfair investigation. 14. The appeal being found meritless is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 12th April, 2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Rajkot, in Sessions Case No. 50 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. 14. The appeal being found meritless is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 12th April, 2006 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 1, Rajkot, in Sessions Case No. 50 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings shall be sent back forthwith to the trial court.