JUDGMENT : Janak Raj Kotwal, J. 1. Heard learned counsel for the parties. In the complaint under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act filed by the respondent before the trial court, it is alleged that in lieu of the payment of Rs. 10,000,00/- borrowed by the petitioner from the respondent, petitioner had issued a cheque dated 5.5.2015 in favour of the respondent. It has been contended by the respondent that later the petitioner changed the date of issue of the cheque from 5.5.2015 to 5.5.2016 by altering the figure 5' to 6' therein. 2. Petitioner seeks quashment of the complaint and proceedings commenced by the learned trial court because of the aforementioned alteration in the cheque. Reliance is placed on the judgment dated 24th November, 2000 of Madras High Court in 'T. Kalavathy v. Veera Exports', where the following has been observed in para-13:- "13. Furthermore, in this case the so called alterations were not admittedly made during the permissible period of six months, namely, the period of validity, but those were made in January 1996 that is after two months on expiry of the period of validity. Thus, it is clear that surgery of alteration was made after the cheque became a dead letter and as such, this alteration or correction cannot be construed to be a surgery, but it is nothing but post-mortem. Surgery can be only on the body of living person and not on the dead body. Operation on the dead body is not a surgery, but a postmortem and it will not given life to the dead person." 3. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 'Veera Exports v. Kalavathy', AIR 2002 SC 38 . In this case the Supreme Court in para-10 has held:- "10. It is held by the High Court that a change of date is a material alteration which affected the interests of the respondent. It is held that the respondent not being a willing party to the said alteration, the cheques were void as contemplated by section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. At this stage, there is no basis for arriving at such a conclusion. In the earlier part of the impugned judgment, it has been correctly held that this is a question of fact. At this stage, there is no basis for arriving at such a conclusion. In the earlier part of the impugned judgment, it has been correctly held that this is a question of fact. This is a fact which will have to be established on evidence during trial. At this stage, the High Court could not have quashed the complaint merely on the basis of an assertion in the reply." 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also raised various other contentions in regard to the fairness of the aforementioned alteration in the date of issue of the cheque. This, however, is a question of fact, which can be raised before the learned trial court. 5. High Court in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A of the Code (sec. 482 of the Central Code) is vested with power to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked to seek quashing of FIR and investigation by the police or any criminal proceedings pending in any Court if it is shown to the satisfaction of the Court that such proceedings is the abuse of process of that Court or tends to cause miscarriage of justice or the quashing is otherwise required to secure the ends of justice. (See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 ). Legal position being clear too no case for exercise of inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A Cr.P.C. is made out and therefore, for this petition is dismissed.