JUDGMENT : 1. A suit for specific performance of an agreement came to be filed by the plaintiff (ancestor of Respondents No. 1 to 3), on the premise of the facts that the plaintiff and defendant No.1 had mutually partitioned their ancestral house, vide a family settlement dated 31.12.2000; whereafter, the plaintiff and defendant No.1 entered into a mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001, vide which, the defendant No.1 had agreed to sell the shop to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.12,00,000/-, in which, the defendant No.2 (the present petitioner) had been carrying on business in the name of ‘Mahila Suhag Bhandar’. Pursuant to the said mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001, the defendant No.1 was paid a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- on 08.08.2001, in acknowledgment thereof, a receipt of even date in favour of the plaintiff came to be issued. 2. All the three documents were made the basis of the suit and were marked as Exhibit-1, Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-3 respectively. By way of the written statement, the defendant No.1 raised an objection in relation to the admissibility of the two documents, namely, the family settlements dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 for which, a specific issue in the form of issue No. 8 was framed by the Trial Court, which reads thus:- ^^8- vk;k oknh o izfroknh la[;k & 1 ds e/; fu’ikfnr ikfjokfjd le>kSrk 31-12-2000 o la”kksf/kr vkilh le>kSrk 10-4-01 lk{; esa xzkg~; ugha gS \ & izfr- la[;k 2** 3. During the course of proceedings, the defendant No.1 moved an application under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, requiring the Trial Court to decide the above issue as a Preliminary Issue. The said issue No. 8 came to be decided by the Trial Court as a Preliminary Issue, vide its order dated 23.10.2008 whereby the Court below had held that the mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001 is neither duly stamped nor registered; for which, it is not admissible in evidence. The said issue No. 8 came to be decided by the Trial Court as a Preliminary Issue, vide its order dated 23.10.2008 whereby the Court below had held that the mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001 is neither duly stamped nor registered; for which, it is not admissible in evidence. It will not be out of place to reproduce the findings recorded by the Trial Court, which reads thus:- ^^8- mijksDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij oknh }kjk izLrqr vkilh caVokjk fnu- 10-04-01 i;kZIr LVkai ij ugha gS u gh jftLVMZ gS o vkilh la”kks/ku i= u rks LVkai ij gS u jftLVMZ gS tks fd dkuquu jftLVMZ o LVkai ij gksuk vko”;d gS ftlds vHkko esa mDr nksuksa nLrkost lk{; esa xzkg~; ugha gSA QyLo:i ;g rudh izfroknh ds i{k esa r; dh tkrh gSA** 4. Against the above referred order dated 23.10.2008 deciding the issue No.8, the plaintiff preferred a writ petition, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 9895/2008 (Hukam Singh Mehta Vs. LRs of Late Nathu Singh & Ors.), which came to be allowed by this Court, vide its order dated 16.05.2013. While deciding the above writ petition, this Court relied upon proviso to Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and held that for the suit in question, which is a suit for specific performance, the documents dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 are admissible in evidence. It will not be out of place to reproduce the reasoning and findings recorded by this Court, while allowing the aforesaid writ petition, vide its judgment and order dated 16.05.2013:- “In view of the provisions of section 49 of the Indian Registration Act and particularly in view of the second part of section 49, this Court feels difficulty in holding that unregistered documents affecting the immovable property is admissible in evidence in a suit for specific performance. It is also observed that the respondent No.1 himself has relied upon the memorandum of partition/partition-deed while selling the shop falling in his share as per the said partition-deed. It is also observed that the respondent No.1 himself has relied upon the memorandum of partition/partition-deed while selling the shop falling in his share as per the said partition-deed. In the case in hand, the petitioner has filed the suit for specific performance of contract and therefore, the documents dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 produced by the petitioner along with his affidavit ipso facto, cannot be held to be inadmissible in evidence only for the reason that the same are not registered as required by section 17 of the Indian Registration Act or by any provision of Transfer of Properties Act, 1882. Nature of the document is to be taken into consideration and the provisions of section 49 of the Indian Registration Act are also to be taken into consideration while dealing with such documents in a suit for specific performance of contract. The fact that the respondent No.1 himself has relied upon the said documents is important fact and the learned trial court has not appreciated the said fact in right perspective. In view of the discussions, this petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 23.10.2008 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Udaipur is set aside and the learned trial court is directed to take into consideration the documents dated 30.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 produced by the petitioner along with his affidavit as admissible in evidence in accordance with law.” 5. When the proceedings before the Trial Court commenced after the judgment aforesaid, the petitioner-defendant No.2 moved another application on 20.04.2015 contending, inter alia, that the three documents, namely, family settlement (Exhibit-1), mutual settlement/agreement (Exhibit-2), and Receipt (Exhibit-3) are not admissible in evidence, as the same are not properly stamped. 6. The aforesaid application dated 20.04.2015 filed by the defendant No.2-petitioner was seriously opposed by the plaintiff and a detailed reply in response thereto was filed on 30.05.2015. 7. The learned Trial Court, after due discussion, has rejected the above referred application dated 20.04.2015 filed by the defendant No.2, vide its order dated 19.08.2016. While rejecting the said application, the Court below has found the petitioner’s application frivolous and barred by the principles of res judicata in light of the judgment dated 16.05.2013 passed by this Court. 7. The learned Trial Court, after due discussion, has rejected the above referred application dated 20.04.2015 filed by the defendant No.2, vide its order dated 19.08.2016. While rejecting the said application, the Court below has found the petitioner’s application frivolous and barred by the principles of res judicata in light of the judgment dated 16.05.2013 passed by this Court. While rejecting the petitioner’s application, the learned Trial Court has observed that the objection in relation to the family settlement dated 31.12.2000 and mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001 has already been decided by the Trial Court and both the documents have been held to be admissible in evidence by the High Court, vide its order dated 16.05.2013 and hence the same cannot be re-agitated. 8. The petitioner, the purchaser of the contentious shop, has laid challenge to the aforesaid order dated 19.08.2016 by way of filing the present writ petition. The basic ground questioning the admissibility of the documents is the payment of proper stamp duty. The contention of the petitioner has been that this Court had allowed the aforesaid writ petition filed by the plaintiff, vide its order dated 16.05.2013 only on the count of registration and has held that the documents in question do not require registration, whereas there was no adjudication on their leviability of the stamp duty on these documents. 9. Mr. Sandeep Sarupariya, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-defendant No.2, submitted that all the documents namely, family settlement dated 31.12.2000, memorandum of settlement or mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001 and the agreement dated 09.08.2001 amount to transfer of immovable property for which, stamp duty under the provisions of Rajasthan Stamp Act, 1998 is payable. Mr. Sarupariya, inviting attention of this Court towards the pleadings of the plaintiff particularly, para-15 and prayer ‘o’, submitted that according to the plaintiff’s own assertion, the document dated 10.04.2001 and 09.08.2001 were agreement to sell for which, appropriate stamp duty was payable as per the provisions of the Stamp Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited Court’s attention towards Clause (21) of the Schedule appended with the Stamp Act to contend that the document in question, being agreement to sell, is required to be duly stamped without which, the same cannot be admitted in evidence. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited Court’s attention towards Clause (21) of the Schedule appended with the Stamp Act to contend that the document in question, being agreement to sell, is required to be duly stamped without which, the same cannot be admitted in evidence. 10. Learned counsel submitted that though a first look at the judgment dated 16.05.2013 rendered by this Court in the earlier round of litigation gives an impression that this Court has held both the documents namely, family settlement dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 admissible in evidence, but a close look thereat reveals that the High Court had neither considered applicability of the stamp duty nor had it given any finding in this regard. 11. In the alternative, and without prejudice to other submissions, he argued that even if the judgment dated 16.05.2013 is considered to be a road-block in petitioner’s way, the document Exhibit-3, namely, the admissibility of document dated 09.08.2001, which has been claimed as an agreement to sell by the plaintiff himself, had neither been considered by this Court nor by the Trial Court, during the earlier round of litigation. He added that the earlier litigation emanated from application under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure deciding issue No.8, which was confined to the documents dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 only. Mr. Sarupariya summarised that the document Exhibit-3, the agreement to sell dated 09.08.2001, is required to be duly stamped and the learned Court below has committed an error of law in rejecting petitioner’s application, vide its order dated 19.08.2016, feeling bound by the judgment of this Court dated 16.05.2013. 12. Mr. Muktesh Maheshwari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-plaintiffs vehemently contended that the arguments advanced by Mr. Sarupariya are beyond the petitioner’s own case before the Trial Court. Mr. Maheshwari invited attention of this Court towards the contents of the said application dated 20.04.2015 and urged that the stand of the petitioner-defendant No.2 before the Trial Court has been inappropriate rather scandalous. He submitted that the entire application dated 20.04.2015 is misconceived and is an attempt to mislead the Trial Court and even this Court. He pointed out that the plaintiff has sought to lay challenge to the finding and observations made by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation. He submitted that the entire application dated 20.04.2015 is misconceived and is an attempt to mislead the Trial Court and even this Court. He pointed out that the plaintiff has sought to lay challenge to the finding and observations made by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner has tried to open the debate of the very same issues which have been held by this Court against him, vide its order dated 16.05.2013. 13. Mr. Maheshwari submitted that the arguments advanced by Mr. Sarupariya are way beyond the pleadings of the petitioner and contrary to her stand before the Trial Court. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that as far as documents, Exhibit-1 & 2, being the family settlement dated 31.12.2000 and the mutual agreement dated 10.04.2001 are concerned, the same have been held to be admissible by this Court, while deciding the issue No. 8 in favour of the plaintiff; and that Exhibit-3, i.e., the document dated 09.08.2001 is not an independent agreement to sell but is a mere receipt. He explained that it is true that at two or three places, the plaintiff has branded the receipt dated 09.08.2001 to be an agreement to sell, but the same is apparently a typographical error or misconception. He contended that in para-15 and prayer ‘ o ’, in place of document dated 09.08.2001, the correct reference ought to have been of the document dated ‘10.04.2001’ which is evident from a careful and contextual reading of the plaint. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that the document Exhibit-3 is simply a receipt and it does not create any separate rights, independent of the basic agreement dated 10.04.2001. At last, he submitted that issue No. 8 as framed by the Trial Court dealt with the admissibility of the documents and while deciding the said issue No.8, vide its earlier order dated 23.10.2008, the Trial Court had held the documents to be inadmissible in evidence, on both the counts; namely, for want of proper stamp duty and registration, which order has been over turned by this Court, vide its judgment dated 16.05.2013. According to him, this Court was conscious of the fact that the document had been held to be inadmissible on both the counts, as is evident from perusal of opening paragraph of the judgment dated 16.05.2013, vide which this Court had narrated the facts as under:- “By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 23.10.2008 passed by the Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No.2, Udaipur (for short ‘the learned court below’ hereinafter) in Civil Original Suit NO.376/2003, whereby the learned court below has decided the Issue No.8 in favour of the respondent and against the petitioner has held that the memorandum of partition deed dated 10.4.2001 is not properly stamped and registered and, therefore, not admissible in evidence.” 15. While reading the opening paragraphs of the judgment dated 16.05.2013, learned counsel for the respondents, argued that though there is no separate adjudication about the applicability and leviability of the stamp duty, yet these documents will be admissible in evidence, on the principles of constructive res judicata. “The petitioner cannot resurrect the challenge to their admissibility on the ground of payment of stamp duty, in the facts of the present case”, he concluded. 16. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record. 17. In considered opinion of this Court, the issue No. 8 has attained finality pursuant to the judgment dated 16.05.2013 passed by this Court, inasmuch as, the Trial Court had decided issue No. 8 as a ‘Preliminary Issue’, pursuant to an application filed under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Trial Court, vide its order dated 23.10.2008 had held that the two documents, namely, family settlement dated 31.12.2000 and memorandum of settlement dated 10.04.2001 are inadmissible in evidence, as the same are neither registered nor properly stamped. In the writ petition where-against filed by the plaintiff, this Court had overturned the said order dated 23.10.2008 and had held that the documents in question dated 31.12.2000 and 10.04.2001 are admissible in evidence. 18. Technically speaking the contention of the petitioner may be right that this Court has perhaps not considered the aspect of payment of stamp duty, as there is no apparent discussion in relation to the requirement and payment of stamp duty, but the remedy then lies somewhere else. 18. Technically speaking the contention of the petitioner may be right that this Court has perhaps not considered the aspect of payment of stamp duty, as there is no apparent discussion in relation to the requirement and payment of stamp duty, but the remedy then lies somewhere else. Instead of re-agitating the said issue before the Trial Court by submitting another application dated 20.04.2015, the petitioner-defendant No.2 ought to have found her remedies somewhere else. The Trial Court cannot sit over the judgment dated 16.05.2013 passed by this Court, as attempted to by the petitioner. A reading of the application dated 20.04.2015 filed by the petitioner reveals that it is an amalgam of confusion and obfuscation besides being a concoction of incorrect facts and outrageous allegations. The defendant No.2-applicant has tried to re-agitate even the issue of registration, which had attained finality, vide order dated 16.05.2013, passed by this Court in the Writ Petition No. 9895/2008, in which the petitioner had chosen to remain unrepresented. 19. This Court is reminded of a scholarly and celebrated Judgment of this Court rendered in case of Maghraj Calla Vs. Kajodi Mal, reported in AIR 1994 Raj 11 , in which case, culling out the principles of ‘res judicata’, this Court has held as infra:- “20. The another well settled fact of applicability of general principle of res-judicata, which is not restrictive in the scope I of its operation by the technical rules circumscribing the applicability of the provisions of Section 11, C.P.C., is that subject matter of grant of reliefs or the nature of proceedings, in two proceedings need not be same, that is to say, even if the subject matter and the relief sought are not the same, yet if there is a final decision on an issue, arising in the former proceedings, and the same issue arises in the subsequent proceedings, may be as an ancillary of main relief, which was not the subject-matter of earlier proceedings; still, the findings on issue in the former proceeding will operate as res judicata, so far as the decision on that particular issue is concerned in the subsequent proceedings. The principle was succinctly expressed in Duchess of Kingstone case (supra). The principle was succinctly expressed in Duchess of Kingstone case (supra). As is apparent from the passage quoted above, that judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly on the point, is in the like manner conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in another court for a different purpose. Tjhe same vew appears to be clear from Halsbury’s Law of England, as quoted above, wherein it was stated that the doctrine applies equally in all courts and it is immaterial in what court the former proceeding takes place, provided only that it was a court of competent jurisdiction, or what form the proceedings took; provided further that it was really for the same cause.” 21. The exposition of this principle, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vo. 50 (Judgments), p.603 has been drawn as follows: “The doctrine of estoppel by judgment does not rest on any superior authority of the court rendering the judgment, and a judgment of one court is a bar to action between the same parties for the same cause in the same court or in another court, whether the later has concurrent or other jurisdiction (emphasis supplied…...” 22. Neither in the application, nor during the course of arguments before the Trial Court, there was any assertion on behalf of the petitioner, to segregate the document Exhibit-3 dated 09.08.2001 from other two documents. In other words, this Court does not find argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner to the effect that the document Exhibit-3 is an independent agreement to sell, as claimed by the plaintiff, so as to require payment of stamp duty. The dispute regarding the third document Exhibit-3 seems to have been raised for the first time before this Court. Suffice it to observe that this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would confine its decision and pronounce upon the correctness of an order based on the contentions raised and arguments advanced before the Court below noticed in the order under challenge. It would not venture into adjudicating and deciding an issue raised by the counsel at this stage, without it being raised before the Court below. 23. It would not venture into adjudicating and deciding an issue raised by the counsel at this stage, without it being raised before the Court below. 23. The ingenuity of the petitioner’s counsel before this Court in pointing out petitioner’s pleadings in para-15 and prayer ‘o’ of the plaint to contend that the document dated 09.08.2001 is a separate agreement to sell; and that there had been no adjudication about its admissibility either by the Trial Court or by the High Court in the earlier round of litigation, thus does not warrant consideration. 24. However, since these arguments were advanced, and pressed by the petitioner, this Court is constrained to record a finding that such assertion or contention of the petitioner too is fallacious, if not false. 25. A careful reading of the entire plaint leaves no room for ambiguity that while referring to the date of the document claiming it to be an agreement to sell, the plaintiff has mentioned the date as ‘09.08.2001’ which, as a matter of fact should have been ‘10.04.2001’. This Court has expressed its opinion after comprehensive and complete reading of the plaint particularly para-5 thereof, in which, the plaintiff has narrated the relevant facts. A perusal of para-5 of the plaint reveals that the plaintiff has used the word ^^Vhi^^ which in common parlance means ‘receipt’ or ‘entry’. As against this, qua the document dated 10.04.2001, in para-3 and para-5, the plaintiff has used the expression ^^vkilh le>kSrk^^ or ‘mutual agreement’. After a simple look at the document dated 09.08.2001, this Court is sure and certain about its nature and hold that the same is undisputedly a receipt. It will not be out of place to reproduce the contents of the document Exhibit-3, which reads thus:- ^^vkt fn- 09-08-2001 eSa ukFkq flag firk euksgj flag esgrk fumn; iqj vki Jh gqdeflag th firk euksgj flag th esgrk fu- flU/kh cktkj mn;iqj ¼HkkbZ½ ls fn- 10-04-2001 dks vkilh la”kks/ku le>kSrkuqlkj nqdku tks eghyk tqgk.k ds ikl fd esa iV~Vs tks vkids fgLls esa nsdj ftlds isVs vki ls 12]00]000@& ckjg yk[k ysus gS ftlds isVs eSaus vkils vkt fnu- 08-08-2001 dks 2]00]000@& nks yk[k :i;s udn izkIr fd;sA ;g nqdku fn- 26-08-2001 rd ,d eghuk lqgku ls [kkyh djok 5]00]000@& ikap yk[k :i;s izkIr dj dCtk ns&nqaxk rFkk ckdh] 5]00]000@& fnikoyh esa izkIr dj ywxkA** 26. In considered opinion of this Court, it may be true that the plaintiff has treated the writing/note/entry dated 09.08.2001 as a separate document and has marked the same as a separate exhibit (Exhibit-3), but notwithstanding the same, it is nothing more than a receipt, rightly expressed as ^^Vhi^^ /entry in para-5 of the Plaint. In this view of the matter, by virtue of this document, the property in dispute has not changed hands. In other words, the document/receipt dated 09.08.2001 does not involve transfer or alienation of any immovable property, for which, it can be brought within the confines of ‘conveyance’ or ‘instrument’ requiring registration of payment of stamp duty. 27. In view of the discussion aforesaid, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the writeup/noting dated 09.08.2001 is simply a receipt and the same is part and parcel of the mutual settlement dated 10.04.2001. It simply evinces receipt of payment of Rs.2,00,000/- for which, neither registration is required, nor stamp duty is attracted. 28. As far as the other two documents, namely, the family settlement dated 31.12.2000 and memorandum of settlement or mutual agreement dated 10.04.2001 are concerned, the same have been held to be admissible in evidence by this Court, vide its judgment dated 16.05.2013, vide which, issue No. 8 has been conclusively decided in favour of the plaintiff. The petitioner’s endeavor to unsettle the findings, which have attained finality, is impermissible in law, being hit by the principles of res judicata/constructive res judicata. Extraction of the discussion : “No substance in the Petition”; Conclusion : “Dismissal of the Petition”.