JUDGMENT : 1. These revisional applications are directed against the two different orders originating from the same suit rejecting the applications filed by the defendant for re-examination of the first witness of the defendant and the issuance of summons upon the witnesses proposed to be cited on its behalf. 2. In order to avoid the prolixity of the repetition of the facts, these two revisional applications are taken up together and is decided by a common order. 3. The plaintiff/opposite party filed Title Suit No. 179 of 2012 for recovery of price of the goods sold and delivered to the defendant no. 1, the petitioner herein. The plain case proceeds that the petitioner who carries on the business of sale and distribution of the consumer products regularly purchased the gold coins from the plaintiff/opposite party in bulk from time to time for the purpose of various incentives and the gifts offered to its valuable customers. In course of such dealing an order was placed upon the plaintiff/opposite party for purchase of those gold coins to the value of Rs. 59,89,698/- which was delivered but no payment was made. Subsequently, the petitioner refused to honour such commitments leaving the plaintiff/opposite party with no option but to approach the Court for realisation of the price of such goods with interest. 4. The petitioner is contesting the said suit by filing the written statement. The salient features of the written statement are that the petitioner never issued the purported purchase orders to the plaintiff/opposite party and, therefore, not liable to pay the price as claimed in the said suit. It appears that the second defendant was an employee of the petitioner and the entire allegation is shouldered upon him in acting in derogation with the authority of the petitioner. The defence case further proceeds that the second defendant was never authorized and empowered to issue any purchase orders in his capacity as those were entrusted upon a particular officer stationed at Mumbai. It is further stated therein that immediately upon coming to know of the facts that the second defendant have indulged in such illegal and malpractices and have wrongfully and illegally exercised his authorities in creating a forged and fabricated purchase orders, the criminal proceeding had been initiated and pending. It is further stated therein that immediately upon coming to know of the facts that the second defendant have indulged in such illegal and malpractices and have wrongfully and illegally exercised his authorities in creating a forged and fabricated purchase orders, the criminal proceeding had been initiated and pending. The other startling facts which are disclosed in the written statement is that the second defendant attempted to suicide by leaving a suicide note admitting all his wrong acts and subsequently several E-mails were retrieved through the investigating agencies which corroborates the action of the second defendant and, therefore, the petitioner is not liable to pay the price of those goods. 5. On the strength of the aforesaid facts, the matter went to trial and it is not in dispute that the plaintiff’s evidence is complete in all respect. The first witness of the defendant filed affidavit as to examination-in-chief and tendered the same by standing in the witness box with the relevant documents some of which were received in evidence and marked as exhibits. The plaintiff/opposite party cross-examined the said witness on several dates and ultimately the Court discharged the said witness which would be apparent from the order dated 24.8.2016. 6. The said order would reveal that the examination of the said witness was closed and further date was fixed for evidence of the defendant. Subsequently the petitioner took out an application for re-examination of the first witness in order to dispel and/or remove the discrepancies in the cross-examination and to offer further explanation in this regard. Along with the same, the petitioner further took out an application for issuance of summons upon several banks through whom the alleged payments were made by the second defendant to the plaintiff/opposite party for alleged purchase of the gold coins in order to prove that those bank accounts were never opened by the petitioner. 7. The Trial Court rejected both the applications which are impugned in the instant revisional applications. 8. 7. The Trial Court rejected both the applications which are impugned in the instant revisional applications. 8. The application for re-examination of the first witness of the defendant is rejected by the Court on two fold grounds, firstly, there is no provision for the reexamination of the witness after the completion of the cross-examination, and secondly, Order 18 Rule 17 of the code of Civil Procedure does not confer any inchoate right upon a party to recall the witness either to fill up the lacuna or the defects in the evidence nor can be stretched to destroy the benefits and advantages gained by the other side in the cross-examination. 9. So far as the application for issuance of the summons upon the bank officials are concerned, it appears that the Court refused to issue summons as those were not included in the list of the witnesses after the settlement of the issues as required under Order 16 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The other applications which were filed by the petitioner relates to a direction upon the second defendant to appear before the Court and lead an evidence and till such time the suit shall remain stayed which is also dismissed by the Trial Court. 10. Mr. Mookherjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner advanced his argument on the above two applications, namely, an application for re-examination of the first witness of the defendant and the refusal to issue their summons on the bank officials. It is submitted by Mr. Mookherjee that Section 138 of the Evidence Act permits the re-examination of the witness after the cross-examination if any explanation or clarification is required to remove the discrepancies or to give further explanation to the statements made during the cross-examination so much so to give a clear picture to the statements. In support of the aforesaid contention a reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Rammi Alies Rameshwar Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1999 SC 3544. 11. According to Mr. Mookherjee the right of re-examination is a vested right which cannot be curtailed and/or abridged by a judicial order and, therefore, the Trial Court acted illegally in refusing to re-examine the first witness of the defendant. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in A.I.R. 1999 SC 3544. 11. According to Mr. Mookherjee the right of re-examination is a vested right which cannot be curtailed and/or abridged by a judicial order and, therefore, the Trial Court acted illegally in refusing to re-examine the first witness of the defendant. He further submits that there is no fetter on the part of the Court under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure in recalling the witness for the purpose of explanation to the statements made in the cross-examination. According to him, the statements made in the cross-examination as indicated in the said application may invite some confusion for which the explanation is necessary and, therefore, there was no fetter on the part of the Court to exercise its power enshrined under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. 12. On the issuance of the summons to the bank officials, Mr. Mookherjee submits that the provisions contained under Order 16 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be said to be mandatory so as to deny a party to bring a witness to adduce evidence if the said witness appears to be material and relevant and may throw light on the issues. Mr. Mookherjee therefore submits that the Court can permit any person to adduce evidence provided the said person is found to have knowledge of the relevant facts or the documents which have the material bearing on the issues involved in the suit. 13. On the other hand, the learned advocate for the plaintiff/opposite party submits that Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure though confers power on the Court to recall the witness but the witness should not be recalled to fill up the lacuna or to produce further evidence unless the Court thinks it necessary. It is thus submitted that the powers enshrined under the said provision is a discretionary one and if the Court refuses to exercise such discretion, the revisional Court should not interfere with such discretionary order. 14. According to the learned advocate for the plaintiff/opposite party, the witness can only be recalled to clarify any issue or the doubt which can not by any stretch of imagination be construed to have blessed such party with any vested right to seek recall except under a mitigating circumstances. 15. 14. According to the learned advocate for the plaintiff/opposite party, the witness can only be recalled to clarify any issue or the doubt which can not by any stretch of imagination be construed to have blessed such party with any vested right to seek recall except under a mitigating circumstances. 15. On the scope of Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) Through LRs. Vs. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate reported in (2009) 4 SCC 410 and K.K. Velusamy Vs. N. Palanisamy reported in (2011) 11 SCC 275 . The plea of re-examination of the said witness is lost once the Court closed the evidence of the said witness and discharged him. On the other application it is submitted that since no list of witnesses were filed by the defendant and if the Court does not find those witnesses to be material and refused to exercise the discretion, the revisional Court should be slow and circumspect in interfering with such discretionary order. 16. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts and the submissions advanced before this Court the point which hinges for consideration is whether the right of re-examination is a vested right which cannot be taken away upon closure of the evidence. The other point, which requires consideration is whether the Court is denuded a power to issue summons to the witness if they are not included in the list of the witnesses in view of provisions contained under Order 16 Rule 1 of the Code. 17. On the first point this Court feels that it would be apposite to reproduce the provisions contained in Section 138 of the Evidence Act before proceeding to deal with the same. 18. Section 138 of the Evidence Act is reproduced as under: “138. Order of examinations. – Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) reexamined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. Direction of re-examination. Order of examinations. – Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then (if the party calling him so desires) reexamined. The examination and cross-examination must relate to relevant facts, but the cross-examination need not be confined to the facts to which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief. Direction of re-examination. – The re-examination shall be directed to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination; and, if new matter is, by permission of the Court, introduced in re-examination, the adverse party may further cross-examine upon that matter.” 19. The aforesaid provision, in my view, cannot be read in isolation to a preceding section of the Evidence Act, which elaborately defines the examination-in-chief, cross- examination and re-examination. Section 137 of the Evidence Act is quoted hereunder : “137. Examination-in-chief.- The examination of a witness by the party who calls him shall be called his examination-in-chief. Cross-examination. – The examination of a witness by the adverse party shall be called his cross-examination. Re-examination.- The examination of a witness, subsequent to the cross-examination by the party who called him, shall be called his re-examination.” 20. On the conjoint reading of the aforesaid Sections there is no hesitation in my mind that a witness called by the party, the examination shall be treated as the examination-in-chief whereas the examination by the other party of the said witness is termed as cross-examination. The re-examination may only arise after the cross-examination and the same can be done by the party who call such witness. 21. Section 138 of the Act safeguarded the abuse and misuse of right of reexamination and restricted such re-examination for the purpose of explanation of matters referred to in the cross-examination. Simultaneously, the legislatures have not imposed such blanket restrictions when the circumstances may warrant the introduction of any new matter and the same was also permitted to be introduced in re-examination subject to the permission of the Court and if such permission is granted, a right is conferred upon the adversary to cross-examination touching the new matter. In the same line the Code of Civil Procedure contains the specific provision in this regard under Order 18 Rule 4 thereof. In the same line the Code of Civil Procedure contains the specific provision in this regard under Order 18 Rule 4 thereof. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure manifest the legislative intent that the evidence in the form of cross-examination and reexamination of the witness shall be recorded on its attendance and the examination-in-chief shall be in the form of an affidavit. It is apparent from the aforesaid provision that the right of re-examination is vested upon the party calling the said witness but such re-examination should be restricted on the explanation of the matters referred in the cross-examination and if any new matter is required to be produced, the permission of the Court is to be obtained first. 22. In case of Rammi Alies Rameshwar (Supra), the Apex Court held that the re-examination is not confined to a clarification or the clarification of any ambiguities in the cross-examination but can also be applied in case of an explanation if the occasion so arises in the following words: “17. There is an erroneous impression that re-examination should be confined to clarification of ambiguities which have been brought down in cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be resolved through re-examination. But that is not the only function of the re-examiner. If the party who called the witness feels that explanation is required for any matter referred to in cross-examination he has the liberty to put any question in re-examination to get the explanation. The Public Prosecutor should formulate his questions for that purpose. Explanation may be required either when ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited during cross-examination or even otherwise. If the Public Prosecutor feels that certain answers require more elucidation from the witness he has the freedom and the right to put such questions as he deems necessary for that purpose, subject of course to the control of the Court in accordance with the other provisions. But the Court cannot direct him to confine his questions to ambiguities alone which arose in cross-examination." 23. Much before the above noted decision the three Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar Vs. State of Gujrat reported in AIR 1964 SC 1563 recognized the three tier system of recording the evidence of the witness as envisaged under Section 137 of the Act. Much before the above noted decision the three Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar Vs. State of Gujrat reported in AIR 1964 SC 1563 recognized the three tier system of recording the evidence of the witness as envisaged under Section 137 of the Act. It has been succinctly held that there is no fetter on the part of the Court in permitting the re-examination of the witness after the cross-examination is concluded to put such questions as the adverse party would be permitted a chance to cross-examine. It would be relevant and apt to quote the observations recorded in paragraph 8 of the said judgement which runs thus : “8. Now we come to the merits of the case. Ordinarily this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution accepts the findings of fact arrived at by the High Court. But, after having gone through the judgments of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court, we are satisfied that this is an exceptional case to depart from the said practice. The learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected the evidence of the prosecution witnesses on the ground that their version was a subsequent development designed to help the accused. The learned Judges of the High Court accepted their evidence for two different reasons. Raju, J., held that a court can permit a party calling a witness to put questions under Section 154 of the Evidence Act only in the examination in chief of the witness; for this conclusion, he has given the following two reasons: (1) the wording of Sections 137 and 154 of the Evidence Act indicates it, and (2) if he is permitted to put questions in the nature of cross-examination at the stage of reexamination by the adverse party, the adverse party will have no chance of cross-examining the witness with reference to the answers given to the said questions. Neither of the two reasons, in our view, is tenable. Section 137 of the Evidence Act gives only the three stages in the examination of a witness, namely, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. This is a routine sequence in the examination of a witness. Neither of the two reasons, in our view, is tenable. Section 137 of the Evidence Act gives only the three stages in the examination of a witness, namely, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. This is a routine sequence in the examination of a witness. This has no relevance to the question when a party calling a witness can be permitted to put to him questions under Section 154 of the Evidence Act: that is governed by the provisions of Section 154 of the said Act, which confers a discretionary power on the court to permit a person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 154 does not in terms, or by necessary implication confine the exercise of the power by the court before the examination-in-chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the examination of the witness. It is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to the court to exercise the power when the circumstances demand. To confine this power to the stage of examination-in-chief is to make it ineffective in practice. A clever witness in his examination in-chief faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the police or in the committing court, but in the cross-examination introduces statements in a subtle way contradicting in effect what he stated in the examination-in-chief. If his design is obvious, we do not see why the court cannot, during the course of his cross-examination, permit the person calling him as a witness to put questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. To confine the operation of Section 154 of the Evidence Act to a particular stage in the examination of a witness is to read words in the section which are not there. We cannot also agree with the High Court that if a party calling a witness is permitted to put such questions to the witness after he has been cross-examined by the adverse party, the adverse party will not have any opportunity to further cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such questions. In such an event the court certainly, in exercise of its discretion, will permit the adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by such questions. In such an event the court certainly, in exercise of its discretion, will permit the adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by such questions. The court, therefore, can permit a person, who calls a witness, to put questions to him which might be put in the cross-examination at any stage of the examination of the witness, provided it takes care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine him on the answers elicited which do not find place in the examination-in-chief. In the present case what happened was that some of the witnesses faithfully repeated what they had stated before the police in the examination-in-chief, but in the cross-examination they came out with the story of insanity of the accused. The court, at the request of the advocate for the prosecution, permitted him to cross-examine the said witnesses. It is not suggested that the advocate appearing for the accused asked for a further opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and was denied of it by the court. The procedure followed by the learned Judge does not conflict with the express provisions of Section 154 of the Evidence Act. Mehta, J., accepted the evidence of the witnesses on the ground that the earlier statements made by them before the police did not contradict their evidence in the court, as the non-mention of the mental state of the accused in the earlier statements was only an omission. This reason given by the learned Judge is also not sound. This Court in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. laid down the following test for ascertaining under what circumstances an alleged omission can be relied upon to contradict the positive evidence in court: “... (3) though a particular statement is not expressly recorded, a statement that can be deemed to be part of that expressly recorded can be used for contradiction, not because it is an omission strictly so-called but because it is deemed to form part of the recorded statement; (4) such a fiction is permissible by construction only in the following three cases: (i) when a recital is necessarily implied from the recital or recitals found in the statement ...; (ii) a negative aspect of a positive recital in a statement ….; and (iii) when the statement before the police and that before the Court cannot stand together”. Broadly stated, the position in the present case is that the witnesses in their statements before the police attributed a clear intention to the accused to commit murder, but before the court they stated that the accused was insane and, therefore, he committed the murder. In the circumstances it was necessarily implied in the previous statements of the witnesses before the police that the accused was not insane at the time he committed the murder. In this view the previous statements of the witnesses before the police can be used to contradict their version in the court. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in relying upon some of the important prosecution witnesses was vitiated by the said errors of law. We would, therefore, proceed to consider the entire evidence for ourselves.” 24. In case of Anil Sharma & Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand reported in (2004) 5 SCC 679 the provisions of Section 138 should not be construed subjectively but objectively. 25. The aforesaid principles have further been fortified in another decision of the Supreme Court rendered in case of Pannayar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police reported in (2009) 9 SCC 152 and it is held that the purpose of re-examination is only to get the clarification of some doubts created in the cross-examination and is never intended to supplement the examination-in-chief by way of a re-examination. 26. The Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case of Raghu Nath Biswas Vs. Rabi Ram Chandra Jaladhar & Ors. reported in (2008) 2 CHN 709 was poised with the similar question and held that the right to re-examination is an absolute right so long it is restricted to the explanation of the matters referred to in the cross-examination. The relevant excerpts from the said judgement is quoted hereinbelow : “10. In my view the learned Court below has failed to take note of the relevant provisions of section 137 and section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and also the scheme of the said provisions of law. Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act was considered by this High Court in a judgment rendered in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Arunesh Pathak & Ors. reported in 2000 Cr.LJ 1039. Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act was considered by this High Court in a judgment rendered in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Arunesh Pathak & Ors. reported in 2000 Cr.LJ 1039. This Court while considering section 138 of the Evidence Act, 1872 observed as follows:- “The right to re-examination appears to be absolute so far as it is directed to the explanation of matters referred to in the cross-examination. The question of taking the permission of the Court would arise only if new matter is introduced in re-examination and if the occasion so arises for seeking such permission and if new matter is, by the permission of the Court, introduced during re-examination, then the adverse party gets a right to further cross-examine the witness upon the matter which is introduced at the stage of re-examination….” 11. This Court in the said judgement further observed as follows:- “There is nothing in section 138 of the Evidence Act to indicate that a party entitled to recall his witness for re-examination is required to spell out in advance to the Court the particular questions which it would be putting to the witness during such re-examination. Indeed, Section 138 gives a statutory right to the party calling a witness to re-examine him after the cross-examination. Such right is however not unlimited. It is qualified to the extent that the re-examination is required to be confined only to the explanation of matters referred to in cross-examination and if new matter is however required to be introduced in re-examination, the party does not have the absolute right to do so. It has to seek the permission of the Court for introducing new matter and if it is allowed, to be introduced by the Court, the adverse party has the right to further cross-examine that witness upon that matter. Section 136 of the Evidence Act empowers the Judge to allow only such evidence to be given as in his opinion, relevant and admissible and in order to ascertain the relevancy of the evidence which a party proposes to give be it during the examination-in-chief or cross-examination or even re-examination, the Judge may ask the party proposing to give such evidence in what manner the alleged fact, if proved, would be relevant and it would then be the duty of the Judge to decide as to its admissibility. 12. 12. Another judgement referred to by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner may be worthwhile to be looked into. The said judgment of the Patna High Court rendered in the case of Hafiz Abdul Halim & Ors., reported in AIR 1941 Patna 362 also takes into consideration inter alia Section 138 of the Evidence Act. The Hon’ble Patna High Court in the said judgement observed as follows:- “the Statute however does not contemplate placing any such restriction on the right of re-examination which is conferred by Section 138, Evidence Act, and which it was not in law open to the learned Judge to take away….” 27. Upon reading the ratios laid down in the above noted decisions it emerges that the rule of evidence permits three tiers of examination to the witness and the last tier is restrictive in the sense that it must relate to an explanation of the matter referred to in the cross-examination or to clarify any ambiguity therein. If the party is desirous of bringing a new matter in re-examination, it can only be done with the permission of the Court and, therefore, the discretion is to be exercised in the facts and circumstances of each case. Though the right of cross-examination and the re-examination is an absolute right to the extent indicated herein above but there is no fetter on the wisdom of the parties to waive and/or abandon such right. The adverse party may decline to cross-examine the witness if in his wisdom the examination-in-chief is sufficient enough to be interpreted in his favour so the right of re-examination. 28. In the instant case after the completion of the cross- examination, the Court concluded the evidence and discharged the said witness which necessarily implies the abandonment and/or waiver of a right to re-examination. 29. This Court does not see another restriction in the way of such party to apply for recall of the witness after the closure of the evidence under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Once such provision is activated the Court decides the same within the four corners of the aforesaid provisions and there is no hesitation that if the power to recall the witness is vested in the statute, it automatically confers power upon the authority to refuse it. Once such provision is activated the Court decides the same within the four corners of the aforesaid provisions and there is no hesitation that if the power to recall the witness is vested in the statute, it automatically confers power upon the authority to refuse it. It is no doubt a discretion of the Court and such discretion should be exercised judicially, rationally and on the sound judicial principles as opposed to whimsical, irrational and unreasonable discretion of powers. The higher Court should seldom interfere with the discretionary order unless it is manifest and patent that such discretion has been exercised beyond the legal sphere and causes immense hardship to the aggrieved party. 30. I am not oblivion of the proposition of law that the nomenclature of an application is not the sole factor in dispensation of justice. The Court is required to look into the substance of the application even if the same is captioned under the wrong provisions. Though the application filed by the petitioner was under the different provisions of the Evidence Act read with invocation of inherent powers yet this Court can safely proceeds to treat such application to have been made under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code in order to ascertain whether it is a fit case where the first witness of the defendant can be recalled for the purpose of clarification or explanation as indicated therein. The power of the Court to recall the witness is well recognized and conferred under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. The casual exercise of such power in a routine manner would frustrate the legislative intent behind incorporation of the said provision. 31. It is no longer res integra that the aforesaid provision can be pressed in action either suo motu by the Court or an application of any of the parties to the proceeding. The object and purpose behind the exercise of such discretionary power is to clarify any doubts and never intended to fill up the lacuna or omission in the evidence. In this regard the reliance can be safely placed upon Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) Through LRs. (Supra) reported in (2009) 4 SCC 410 wherein it is held: “25. The object and purpose behind the exercise of such discretionary power is to clarify any doubts and never intended to fill up the lacuna or omission in the evidence. In this regard the reliance can be safely placed upon Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar (Dead) Through LRs. (Supra) reported in (2009) 4 SCC 410 wherein it is held: “25. In our view, though the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 CPC have been interpreted to include applications to be filed by the parties for recall of witnesses, the main purpose of the said Rule is to enable the court, while trying a suit, to clarify any doubts which it may have with regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said provisions are not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. 29. It is now well settled that the power to recall any witness under Order 18 Rule 17 CPC can be exercised by the court either on its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to the suit, but as indicated hereinabove, such power is to be invoked not to fill up the lacunae in the evidence of the witness which has already been recorded but to clear any ambiguity that may have arisen during the course of his examination.” 32. In case of K.K. Velusamy (Supra), the Apex Court elaborately discussed the provisions under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code in the light and tune of the judgment rendered in Vadiraj (supra) and held: 9. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code enables the court, at any stage of a suit, to recall any witness who has been examined (subject to the law of evidence for the time being in force) and put such questions to him as it thinks fit. The power to recall any witness under Order 18 Rule 17 can be exercised by the court either on its own motion or on an application filed by any of the parties to the suit requesting the court to exercise the said power. The power is discretionary and should be used sparingly in appropriate cases to enable the court to clarify any doubts it may have in regard to the evidence led by the parties. The power is discretionary and should be used sparingly in appropriate cases to enable the court to clarify any doubts it may have in regard to the evidence led by the parties. The said power is not intended to be used to fill up omissions in the evidence of a witness who has already been examined. (Vide Vadiraj Naggappa Vernekar v. Sharadchandra Prabhakar Gogate.) 10. Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code is not a provision intended to enable the parties to recall any witnesses for their further examination-in-chief or cross-examination or to place additional material or evidence which could not be produced when the evidence was being recorded. Order 18 Rule 17 is primarily a provision enabling the court to clarify any issue or doubt, by recalling any witness either suo motu, or at the request of any party, so that the court itself can put questions and elicit answers. Once a witness is recalled for purposes of such clarification, it may, of course, permit the parties to assist it by putting some questions. 11. There is no specific provision in the Code enabling the parties to reopen the evidence for the purpose of further examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Section 151 of the Code provides that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent powers of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the court. In the absence of any provision providing for reopening of evidence or recall of any witness for further examination or cross-examination, for purposes other than securing clarification required by the court, the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, subject to its limitations, can be invoked in appropriate cases to reopen the evidence and/or recall witnesses for further examination. This inherent power of the court is not affected by the express power conferred upon the court under Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code to recall any witness to enable the court to put such question to elicit any clarifications. 12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. 12. The respondent contended that Section 151 cannot be used for reopening evidence or for recalling witnesses. We are not able to accept the said submission as an absolute proposition. We however agree that Section 151 of the Code cannot be routinely invoked for reopening evidence or recalling witnesses. The scope of Section 151 has been explained by this Court in several decisions [see Padam Sen v. State of U.P., Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth Hiralal, Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava, Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee, Newabganj Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, Jaipur Mineral Development Syndicate v. CIT, National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. C. Parameshwara and Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj]. We may summarise them as follows: (a) Section 151 is not a substantive provision which creates or confers any power or jurisdiction on courts. It merely recognises the discretionary power inherent in every court as a necessary corollary for rendering justice in accordance with law, to do what is “right” and undo what is “wrong”, that is, to do all things necessary to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its process. (b) As the provisions of the Code are not exhaustive, Section 151 recognises and confirms that if the Code does not expressly or impliedly cover any particular procedural aspect, the inherent power can be used to deal with such situation or aspect, if the ends of justice warrant it. The breadth of such power is coextensive with the need to exercise such power on the facts and circumstances. (c) A court has no power to do that which is prohibited by law or the Code, by purported exercise of its inherent powers. If the Code contains provisions dealing with a particular topic or aspect, and such provisions either expressly or by necessary implication exhaust the scope of the power of the court or the jurisdiction that may be exercised in relation to that matter, the inherent power cannot be invoked in order to cut across the powers conferred by the Code or in a manner inconsistent with such provisions. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. In other words the court cannot make use of the special provisions of Section 151 of the Code, where the remedy or procedure is provided in the Code. (d) The inherent powers of the court being complementary to the powers specifically conferred, a court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the matter is not covered by any specific provision in the Code and the exercise of those powers would not in any way be in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or be against the intention of the legislature. (e) While exercising the inherent power, the court will be doubly cautious, as there is no legislative guidance to deal with the procedural situation and the exercise of power depends upon the discretion and wisdom of the court, and in the facts and circumstances of the case. The absence of an express provision in the Code and the recognition and saving of the inherent power of a court, should not however be treated as a carte blanche to grant any relief. (f) The power under Section 151 will have to be used with circumspection and care, only where it is absolutely necessary, when there is no provision in the Code governing the matter, when the bona fides of the applicant cannot be doubted, when such exercise is to meet the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process of court. 13. The Code earlier had a specific provision in Order 18 Rule 17-A for production of evidence not previously known or the evidence which could not be produced despite due diligence. It enabled the court to permit a party to produce any evidence even at a late stage, after the conclusion of his evidence if he satisfied the court that even after the exercise of due diligence, the evidence was not within his knowledge and could not be produced by him when he was leading the evidence. That provision was deleted with effect from 1-7-2002. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. The deletion of the said provision does not mean that no evidence can be received at all, after a party closes his evidence. It only means that the amended structure of the Code found no need for such a provision, as the amended Code contemplated little or no time gap between completion of evidence and commencement and conclusion of arguments. Another reason for its deletion was the misuse thereof by the parties to prolong the proceedings under the pretext of discovery of new evidence.” 33. Upon meaningful reading of the cross-examination of the first witness of the defendant and the incidents recorded in paragraph 5 of the said application this Court does not find that the same warrants invocation of Order 18 Rule 17 of the Code. Furthermore, the Trial Court refused to exercise the discretion being in seisin of the trial which cannot be said to be irrational and against the legal parameters. 34. This Court, therefore, does not find any infirmity and/or illegality in the order by which the application filed by the petitioner to re-examine the first witness calls for any interference. 35. So far as the application for issuance of the summons upon the bank officials are concerned, this Court does not find that the reasons recorded by the Trial Court is proper and in consonance with the law. Though Rule 1 (1) of Order 16 requires that the parties shall present a list of witnesses whom they proposed to call either to give evidence or produce documents to obtain summons for their attendance in the Court but sub-rule (3) thereof empowers the Court to permit a party to call any witness other than those whose names are not appearing in the said list obviously upon recording reasons. 36. Rule 7 of Order 16 further empowers the Court to recall any person present in the Court to give evidence or to produce documents then and there if the same is found in possession. Even Under Rule 14 of the Code the Court may examine any person stranger to the suit and not called as the witness by a party if such witness is found to be material and possess any document relevant to determine the issues involved therein. 37. Even Under Rule 14 of the Code the Court may examine any person stranger to the suit and not called as the witness by a party if such witness is found to be material and possess any document relevant to determine the issues involved therein. 37. It is therefore, not mandatory that the Court will refuse to issue summons to the witnesses unless their names are included in the list of the witness furnished under Rule 1 of Order 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 38. This Court, therefore, does not concur with the decision of the Trial Court in refusing to issue summons to the bank officials to produce the relevant record and give evidence in support of the defence taken in the written statement. The aforesaid observation is made for simple reason that the petitioner has categorically denied to have opened those bank accounts with these banks. 39. The Trial Court is directed to issue summons upon the witnesses being the bank officials immediately upon the communication of this order and shall see that the same is served through Court and shall proceed to record the evidence of those witnesses after permitting the other party a right to cross-examine. The entire exercise should be completed within three months from the date of communication of this order. 40. The Trial Court is further requested to make efforts to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and preferably within six months from the date in accordance with law. 41. Both the revisional applications are disposed of. 42. However, there shall be no order as to costs.