ORDER : Rule. 2. Mr. N. Shankaranarayana Bhat, learned counsel appears for the respondent and waives notice of rule. 3. With the consent of learned Advocates appearing for both the sides, the present petition is finally heard. 4. The present petition is directed against the order dated 04.09.2015 passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’ for the sake of brevity), whereby, the Tribunal for the reasons recorded in the order has interfered with the punishment, having found too harsh and set aside the punishment and directed for payment of all consequential benefits. 5. As such, the facts are not much in dispute inasmuch as there were various charges in the enquiry held against the respondent, but out of all four charges, one charge of non-obtaining of the prior permission of the competent authority before the acquisition of the property namely, the land by mother and wife, who were dependent members of the respondent family. It is true that at the later stage in the declaration form, such properties were shown, but the charge of not obtaining prior permission of the competent authority was proved. The Lokayuktha had recommended for punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. However, the Government imposed the punishment of reduction in the pay scale by one stage down for a period of one year without cumulative effect. The aforesaid order passed by the Government dated 21.02.2005 vide Annexure-A8 was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not interfere with the finding of the Enquiry Officer but only observed that the Government ought not to have gone by the recommendation made by the Lokayuktha. Be as it may, the Tribunal found that the impugned order of imposing penalty is too harsh and the Tribunal also found that the order suffers from infirmities and set aside the same. Under the circumstances, the present petition before this court. 6. We have heard Mr. D. Nagaraj learned AGA appearing for the petitioners and Mr. N. Shankaranarayana Bhat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 7. If we consider the reasons recorded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal has exercised the power as if that of the appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority in the departmental proceedings. 6. We have heard Mr. D. Nagaraj learned AGA appearing for the petitioners and Mr. N. Shankaranarayana Bhat, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent. 7. If we consider the reasons recorded by the Tribunal, the Tribunal has exercised the power as if that of the appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority in the departmental proceedings. It is now well settled that judicial scrutiny will be available against the disciplinary proceedings only on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice or ex-facie perversity in the finding or punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charges proved. None of the said circumstances are found by the Tribunal. But on the contrary, the Tribunal has recorded the aspect of not obtaining prior permission is not disputed and the another aspect which has been considered by the Tribunal is that the punishment could not be considered on the basis of the recommendation made by the Lokayuktha. 8. We have perused the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority i.e., the Government. The perusal thereof shows that the Lokayuktha did recommend for the major penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect and the Government did record that such punishment cannot be imposed since the Delinquent Officer has already reached to the maximum pay-scale. After having applied the mind that the punishment so recommended by Lokayukta cannot be imposed, the Government has further considered to examine the aspects of punishment and has decided to impose punishment of reducing pay by one stage for a period of one year without cumulative effect. Under the circumstances, the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the impugned order suffers from infirmities is erroneous on the face of it. The second basis of the order by the Tribunal is that the punishment is too harsh and cannot be sustained. Such in our view would not meet with the test of inference with the quantum of punishment unless the Tribunal records the finding that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the charge proved. It appears to us that the Tribunal has exceeded in the exercise of the power for setting aside of the punishment on the ground that the punishment was too harsh that too without recording the finding that if the charges were proved, the punishment imposed could be said as shockingly disproportionate. 9. It appears to us that the Tribunal has exceeded in the exercise of the power for setting aside of the punishment on the ground that the punishment was too harsh that too without recording the finding that if the charges were proved, the punishment imposed could be said as shockingly disproportionate. 9. If the matter is considered in the light of the punishment proposed by the Lokayuktha and the punishment actually imposed by the Government, leniency is already shown. The Tribunal had no power as if that of a Court of appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority for re-appreciation of the evidence nor it had the power to sit in appeal over the punishment imposed save and except the judicial review on the limited ground as referred to hereinabove. 10. In our view, none of the conditions for interference with the impugned order were satisfied. Hence, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and the same is set aside. 11. In view of the above, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. Petition is allowed to the aforesaid extent. Rule made absolute accordingly. Considering the facts and circumstances, no order as to costs.