JUDGMENT : 1. In these appeals common questions of law and facts are involved, hence, they are decided by this common judgment. 2. By way of these appeals, the appellants have assailed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge whereby the learned Single Judge has dismissed the petitions preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order of the Board of Revenue where Board of Revenue has allowed the reference almost after 38 years. 3. The facts of the case are that the appellants/petitioners had purchased a land through registered sale deed in the year 1964. The mutation was opened in favour of the appellants/petitioners. The Additional Collector sent a reference to the Board of Revenue under Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act ignoring the delay and limitation for reference as it was after 38 years of mutation in the name of the petitioners. The Board of Revenue accepted the reference which was then challenged by maintaining special appeal before the Board of Revenue, but it was also dismissed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the additional Collector to make a reference was incompetent as it was after long delay of 38 years. The reference under Section 82 can be made within reasonable time and not with the delay of 38 years. Thus on the aforesaid ground itself, the reference should have been decided holding it to be incompetent but the Board of Revenue answered the reference against the petitioners/appellants in ignorance of the aforesaid. 5. He further contended that the Additional Collector as well as Board of Revenue even failed to consider that one Govind Lal Dev was having khatedari before Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 came in effect. He became khatedar in view of Section 15 of the Act, 1955. In the background, the purchase of land by the petitioners from said Govind Lal Dev through registered sale deed could not have been nullified so as the mutation. Govind Lal Dev was recorded as khatedar even before the Act of 1955 i.e. on 10.07.1953. A challenge to the aforesaid was made but the Board of Revenue affirmed the order followed by challenge through a writ petition but was dismissed. Govind Lal Dev was recorded as khatedar even before the Act of 1955 i.e. on 10.07.1953. A challenge to the aforesaid was made but the Board of Revenue affirmed the order followed by challenge through a writ petition but was dismissed. Once an order was passed favourable to Govind Lal Dev and was upheld upto High Court, the Additional Collector was incompetent to make a reference so as to nullify the earlier judgment of the Board of Revenue, upheld by the High Court. The aforesaid aspect was also ignored by the competent authority not only for making reference but while answering it. The acceptance of the reference under Section 82 resulted in nullifying the earlier order of the Board of Revenue so as the High Court. The right and possession in the land was under Jaipur State Revenue Laws and having adjudicated the dispute by the competent authority should not have been nullified by the Board of Revenue. 6. It is lastly contended that the State has already filed a regular suit before the SDO court thus for the aforesaid reason also, reference was incompetent and otherwise consequence of cancellation of mutation in favour of petitioners/appellants would not result in recording of the land in the name of the State Government but reverted back to the position as was obtaining before purchase of land by the petitioners/appellants. In that eventually, the land would revert back to Govind Lal Dev who has no objection if it stands in the name of petitioners/appellants. 7. Counsel for the appellant Mr. A.K. Sharma Senior Counsel has taken us to the record and contended that the appellants are bona fide purchasers of land in 1964 technically on 25th May 1964 whereas mutation entry was confirmed on 11th October, 1964 after the society was formed and after the dismissal by the Board of Revenue which confirmed the order of 25th January, 1957 and in view of Section 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. 8. 8. He contended that there is a clear bar of reference, even then the Deputy Secretary vide letter dated 16th December, 1995 ignoring the said provision stated as under:- ^^mijksDr fo"k;kUrxZr vkids i=kad la[;k jktLo@53@93@3369 fnuakd 30-05-1995 ds lanHkZ esa funsZ'kkuqlkj ys[k gS fd jktLFkku Hkw&jktLFkku] Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 82 ds izko/kkuksa ds vuqlkj ;fn ekeyk U;kf;d izo`fr dk gS ;k Hkw&izcU/k ls lEcfU/kr gS rks mldk jsQjsUl jkT; ljdkj ds lEcfU/kr vf/kdkjh@U;k;ky; dj ldrk gS fdUrq jktLo e.M+y ds fu.kZ; ds fo:) jkT; ljdkj dks jsQjsUl ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS ;kuh jktLo e.My ds fu.kZ; dk jsQjsUl ugha gks ldrk gS vr% vihy@fjV ;kfpdk vUrxZr vuqPNsn 226 Hkkjrh; lafo/kku is'k fd;k tk ldrk gSA** 9. He further contended that pursuant to the aforesaid letter, the writ petition was preferred and after that a reference was made therefore, even learned Single Judge has seriously committed an error. The original petition was preferred by one Shri Goswami Gopal Lal Deo being Civil Writ No. 49/1957 which is on record which came to be dismissed on 15th April, 1957 against Govind Lal Deo. The present appellant contended that the very basis of the judgment of the learned Single Judge is wrong. 10. Counsel for the appellants has relied on the judgment in the case of Shri Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil and Ors. (2009) 9 SCC 352 , wherein it has been held as under:- "11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time limit for exercise of Revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo moto or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such powers within reasonable time is inherent therein. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to be exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of Revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. 12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to be exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of Revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of Revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of the process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of Tehsildar passed on March 30, 1976 is flawed and legally not correct." 10.1. He has further relied upon the decision in case of Raj narain Sarin v. Laxmi Devi & Ors. - (2002) 10 SCC 501 , wherein it has been held as under:- "The, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that after 40 years a challenge to transfer of land held by sale deed executed by predecessor of plaintiff cannot be sustained." 10.2. He has also relied upon the decision in case of Anand Lal v. State of Rajasthan - 1995 (1) RLC 555, dealing with the reference under Section 232 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and Section 82 of the Act, held in para 24 as under:- "In our opinion, the settled legal position as stated above, would apply to the agricultural land in possession of the tenants/khatedars also once the cases of such tenants/khatedars are decided and their rights have been concluded and pursuant to the same they are in possession of the land. Ordinarily the Revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year from the date of the order sought to be revised. Once a tenant/khatedar acquires tenancy/khatedari rights and continues to be in possession of the land, his rights cannot be called in question after unreasonable delay. Such tenants/khatedars are required to be treated at par, for all practical purposes, with all other tenants/khatedars who acquired tenants/khatedari rights over the land. To permit the exercise of Revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimatur of the courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. To permit the exercise of Revisional power under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and/or under Section 232 of the Act of 1955 after unreasonable delay, would amount to putting imprimatur of the courts on the unreasonable and arbitrary exercise of power. Within a period of one year the tenant/khatedar of the land would have spent money for the improvement of the land, he would have arranged his affairs of life on the basis that he is in occupation of the land, he would have entered into several transactions on this basis and made many commitments. Therefore, ordinarily, Revisional powers under Section 82 of the Act of 1956 and under Section 232 of the Act of 1955, cannot be exercised after a period of one year. If this requirement of reasonable length of time is not read into the aforesaid provisions, the provisions would become unconstitutional. 11. Counsel for the respondents submitted as under:- "1. That there exist a land bearing Khasra No. 300, 301, 302, 303, 304 measuring 602 bigha 18 biswa situated in revenue village Bawadi Gopinath prior to settlement the said land was recorded in the Khatedari of Jagir of "Shri Thakur Ji Shri Gopinath Ji Virajman Deh Purani Basti, Jaipur" and the same was recorded as Jagirdar of said land as per the revenue record of Samvat 2010-2013 and thereafter it was recorded as Government land. It is submitted that the said land was recorded as Kharda land, as in the said land in rainy season rainy water collected and it used for preparing 'Khar', as such the nature of the land was commercial land and it never used as an agriculture land. 2. It is also stated that during settlement proceedings due to mistake or by manipulation of Shri Goswami Govind lal Dev with the officers of present time, the parha khatedari, which is first step for declaring khatedar of any land, was issued in favour of said Shri Goswami Govind Lal Dev on 10.07.1953 but the same was cancelled by the Settlement Department vide order dated 30.04.1955, against which Shri Goswami Govind Lal Dev filed appeals before the Land Settlement Officer and Land Settlement Commissioner but the same were rejected, as such he filed third appeal before the learned Revenue Board of Rajasthan, Ajmer, which was allowed vide order dated 25.1.1957. 3. 3. In the aforesaid appeals, the State Government was not made as party by Shri Goswami Govind Lal Dev, as such these orders cannot be held applicable on the State Government. However, it is submitted that the learned Board of Revenue in its order dated 25.1.1957 clearly mentioned that the land in dispute is non-agriculture land and is being used in preparing papadkhar and other commercial purposes. 4. It is further to be noted that the appellant-petitioner purchased the land in dispute from Shri Goswami Govind Lal Dev on the basis of said parcha Khatedari, which was already rejected by the competent authority. Shri Goswami Govind Lal Dev executed a sale-deed in favour of the appellant-petitioner on the basis of said parcha khatedari and on the basis of sale-deed mutation No. 28 was get opened in his favour, against which an FIR was lodged at Police Station Govindgarh bearing FIR No. 104/2004 under Sections 167,420,467,468,471 and 120-B IPC on 2.6.2004, in which the appellant-petitioner No. 1 is also an accused with others. 5. It is also contended that one another FIR No. 103/2004 also registered under Section 167, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC of the IPC on dated 2.6.2004 in respect of the other Khasra numbers against the appellant-petitioners with others on the basis of the complaint of the Tehsildar chomu. 6. Against the said action, the appellant-petitioners preferred S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5819/2006 praying therein to quash and set aside the impugned orders dated 6.7.2006 and 19.2.2004 of Board of Revenue and order dated 30.12.2002 of Assistant Collector (IV). In the writ petition mainly it was averred that the appellant-petitioners had purchased the land in question through registered sale deed, the mutation was opened in their favour. The Addl. Collector sent a reference to the Board of Revenue under Section 82 of the Land Revenue Act ignoring the delay and limitation for reference. The Board of Revenue accepted the reference which was then challenged by maintaining special appeal before the Board of Revenue, but it was also dismissed. The order of Addl. Collector to make a reference was incompetent as it was after long delay. The reference under Section 82 can be made within reasonable time and not with the delay of 38 years. 7. The order of Addl. Collector to make a reference was incompetent as it was after long delay. The reference under Section 82 can be made within reasonable time and not with the delay of 38 years. 7. It is to be pointed out that after considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-petitioners vide its order dated 7.5.2014 with specific observation that the record and past history of the case show that the land in dispute was originally belonging and recorded in the name of Temple Gopinathji and part of land was thereupon recorded as "Charagah" land. Govind Lal Dev remained unsuccessful to get his name recorded till the year 1964 though an agreement to sale was executed in the year 1962 but sale deed was executed thereupon in May, 1964 and onwards in the name of a Joint Agriculture Cooperative Society in ignorance to the earlier order passed by the Revenue Officer on 8.4.1964. It was nothing but a fraudulent act of the then Sarpanch in doing so. In the background aforesaid, reference was competent. The order of the Revenue Board is elaborate and covers all the issues raised therein and otherwise facts have been detailed out in this judgment. 8. While considering the matter, the learned Single Judge also dealt with the issue of delay and laches in making reference and on the basis of the material available on record observed that the mutation entered in the year 1964 was not in the knowledge of the State Government as land was used for grazing cattle and it came in the knowledge for the first time when discrepancy in the record was found by Settlement Commissioner. The matter was immediately taken up to address the issue and thereupon reference was made. Taking note of the facts aforesaid, the learned Single Judge did not found it to be a case of unexplained delay in making reference and further observed that rather the facts of this case are alarming as to how the record was manipulated. 9. It is stated that the issue of delay of reference was not before the Division Bench of the learned Board of Revenue, as such it was rightly not accepted in the writ jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge. 10. 9. It is stated that the issue of delay of reference was not before the Division Bench of the learned Board of Revenue, as such it was rightly not accepted in the writ jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge. 10. Thus, in the instant matter there is concurrent finding of facts by three Revenue Courts. The Division Bench of the Revenue Board largely referred the order of the Additional Collector for making reference but thereupon specific issues argued before the Division Bench were decided by a detailed order leaving those grounds which were not decided by a detailed order leaving those grounds which were not pressed. 12. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. 12.1 Mr. Virendra Lodha Senior Counsel appearing for the RIICO contended that the land has been obtained by fraud and collusion with the original allottee. The user is the State Government and it has granted the land to RIICO for the industrial purposes, hence, no interference is called for. He has also contended that the first writ petition was filed in the year 1957 which was dismissed. The State Government was not a party in it and therefore, the submissions made by counsel for the appellant is required to be viewed very seriously. It has also been contended that the criminal proceedings are also filed against the appellants. 13. We make it clear that these are proceedings arising out of the reference in revenue proceedings, therefore, while examining the matter, any observations made by this Court will not affect any rights of the parties which are pending before the Civil Court where State Government has filed civil suit against the present appellant. 14. On the first contention which has been raised by the counsel for the appellants regarding the basic error of the learned Single Judge regarding Govind or Gopal who is original petitioner coupled with the fact who has made the entry in the name of Govind from whom. The appellants are prejudiced of the directions made by learned Single Judge in the name of Gopal and there is substance in the contention that the finding is required to be reversed and the same is reversed. 15. On the second count regarding the challenge of 1957 order which has been confirmed by this Court. The appellants are prejudiced of the directions made by learned Single Judge in the name of Gopal and there is substance in the contention that the finding is required to be reversed and the same is reversed. 15. On the second count regarding the challenge of 1957 order which has been confirmed by this Court. In our considered opinion, even State Government has waked up in 1997 and thereafter, making reference after loosing before this Court is required to be viewed very seriously and the reference was made on 30th November, 2002 is contrary to law. 16. In that view of the matter, the reference itself ought to have been rejected in view of the observations made by the Supreme Court and matter referred. 17. On the third count, the petitioner purchased the land in 1965 which is pending before the Civil Court. In that view of the matter, on all counts the learned Single Judge has seriously committed an error. The appeal was by Gopal and not by Govind and the present appellant has purchased from Govind whose title was clear in 1957. He has purchased even after six years of the dismissal of the revision before Board of Revenue. 18. In that view of the matter, the appellant is bona fide purchaser and any proceedings which are pending before Civil Court will not affect his right during pendency of this appeal. 19. In that view of the matter, the appeals deserve to be allowed and the order of learned Single Judge and Board of Revenue are required to be quashed and set aside and the same are set aside. 20. It is made clear that since these proceedings are not arising out of any civil proceedings therefore, we have not examined the title of the parties. 21. The appeals stand allowed.