JUDGMENT : VIJAY BISHNOI, J. Both these writ petitions involve common question of law, there fore, they are being decided together by this common order. 2. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the petitioner-insurance company issued Fire Floater Policy in favour of respondent-applicant - M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics and Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy in favour of respondent-applicant - M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd. The period effective for the policy issued in favour of M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics was from 20.08.2011 to 19.08.2012, whereas the period effective for the policy issued in favour of M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd. was from 27.01.2012 to 26.01.2013. 3. The Fire Floater Policy issued in favour of M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics covers the stock consisting of all types of colour, chemicals, cloths, fabrics, goods, packing materials, gray, dyed, print, semi print, packed, loose goods, goods in printing unit, goods held in trust and/or job work and/or commission based lying in five locations described in the policy. In case of M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd., the policy covers the risk of building, plant, machinery and stock subject to the compliance of standard terms and conditions mentioned in the policy. 4. During the currency of the aforesaid insurance policy issued in favour of M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics, on 01.08.2012, the petitioner-company received an information regarding fire at one of the locations at Junevon-ki-Dhani, near Darbi Textile, Basni 2nd Phase, Jodhpur. 5. In case of M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd. also, the petitioner-company received an information regarding fire at the factory premises on 01.08.2012. In both the cases, it was reported that the fire broke out at the premises and engulfed the huge stock of respondent-applicants and other nearby units. 6. On receiving the said information about the fire, the authorized surveyors and loss assessors were appointed to assess the loss caused to the respondent-applicants on account of fire. After investigation, the surveyor and loss assessor submitted their reports to the petitioner-company, however, the claims submitted by the respondent-applicants have been repudiated by the petitioner-company for the reason that the industrial units of the applicants were running in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land without due permissions. The petitioner-company has repudiated the claim of the respondent-applicant - M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics vide order dated 20.01.2015 and repudiated the claim of the respondent-applicant M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd. on 11.02.2014. The petitioner-company has repudiated the claim of the respondent-applicant - M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics vide order dated 20.01.2015 and repudiated the claim of the respondent-applicant M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd. on 11.02.2014. 7. Being aggrieved with the same, the respondent-applicants preferred applications before the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jodhpur under Section 22B of the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987. The said applications were vehemently contested by the petitioner-company, however, the Parmanent Lok Adalat vide award dated 20.03.2017 allowed the application filed by the respondent-applicant - M/s Divya Laxmi Fabrics directing the petitioner-company to pay compensation of Rs. 82,96,853/- to respondent-applicant along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from 18.04.2016 and also directed to pay cost of Rs. 5000/-. 8. In the case of respondent-applicant - M/s Suncity Holding and Trading Ltd., the Permanent Lok Adalat vide separate award dated 20.03.2017 partly allowed its application and directed the petitioner-company to pay compensation of Rs. 32,48,149/- to it along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of application i.e. 18.04.2016 and also directed to pay cost of Rs. 5000/-. 9. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the petitioner-company has preferred these writ petitions. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner-company has submitted that the learned Permanent Lok Adalat has failed to take into consideration the fact that at the time of issuance of policies, the respondent-applicants did not disclose that their units/factories are running in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land without due permission as required under the law. It is submitted that the said facts are the material facts and the respondent-applicants have intentionally concealed these facts and failed to disclose the same before the petitioner-company. It is further argued that in view of concealment of such material fact and non-disclosure of material particulars, it is well established that there is a breach of principle of utmost good faith on the part of the insured and thus the policies become voidable and the respondent-applicants are not entitled to derive any benefit under the policy, which is obtained by non-disclosure of material facts. 11. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner-company has further submitted that the provisions of Marine Insurance Act, 1963 (for short ‘the Act of 1963’ hereinafter) are equally applicable to all classes of insurance and in view of the expressing provisions of sections 19 and 20 of the Act of 1963, on account of nondisclosure of material facts, the contract of insurance is void and the respondent-applicants are not entitled to claim any benefits thereunder. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner-company has further argued that the learned Permanent Lok Adalat has also grossly erred while holding that running of an industry in a non-conforming area does not amount to breach of the principles of utmost good faith because the petitioner-company issued insurance policies subsequent to the incident of fire and provided insurance cover to the respondent-applicants. It is submitted that the subsequent insurance policies were issued for the subsequent period and for that period it may be considered that the respondent-applicants have not concealed the fact that the industrial units are being run in non-conforming areas but it cannot be presumed that for the previous period also, during which the fire took place, the respondent-applicants disclosed such material facts before the petitioner-company. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner-company has, therefore, argued that the learned Permanent Lok Adalat has illegally passed the impugned awards and, there fore, the same are liable to be set aside. 14. In support of the above contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner-company has placed reliance on decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Sea Lark Fisheries v. United India Insurance Company, (2008) 4 SCC 131 and in Satwant Kaur Sandhu v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., (2009) 8 SCC 316 . 15. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-applicants has vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and argued that there is no illegality in passing of the impugned awards in the facts and circumstances of the case. 16. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 17. It is not in dispute that during the period when the insurance policies were in currency, the fire erupted in the premises of the respondent-applicants. 16. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material available on record. 17. It is not in dispute that during the period when the insurance policies were in currency, the fire erupted in the premises of the respondent-applicants. The only reason given by the petitioner-company for repudiating the claim of the respondent-applicants is that at the time of issuance of the policies, they did not disclose the fact that their units/factories, which were covered under insurance policies, were running in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land without due permission. The petitioner-company is claiming that non-disclosure of the fact that the units/factories are established and running in nonconforming areas is the material fact and on account of nondisclosure of said material fact, the claims of the respondent-applicants have rightly been repudiated. 18. It is also not in dispute that after the incident of fire, the petitioner-company had issued insurance polices in favour of the respondent-applicants for the same premises meaning thereby that while issuing subsequent policies in favour of respondent-applicants, it was within their knowledge that the units/factories of the respondent-applicants are established and running in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land. 19. Now the question comes whether non-disclosure by the respondent-applicants of the fact that their units/factories are established and running in non-conforming areas is a material fact or not. 20. Sections 19 and 20 of the Act of 1963 on which the counsel for the petitioner is placing heavy reliance are reproduced hereunder: “19. Insurance is uberrimae fidei.—A contract of marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and if the utmost good faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other party. 20. Disclosure by assured.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the assured must disclose to the insurer, before the contract is concluded, every material circumstance which, is known to the assured, and the assured is deemed to know every circumstance which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to be known to him. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. (2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. If the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid the contract. (2) Every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. (3) In the absence of inquiry the following circumstances need not be disclosed, namely:— (a) any circumstance which diminishes the risk; (b) any circumstance which is known or presumed to be known to the insurer. The insurer is presumed to know matters of common notoriety or knowledge, and matters which an insurer in the ordinary course of his business as such ought to know; (c) any circumstance as to which information is waived by the insurer; (d) any circumstance which it is superfluous to disclose by reason of any express or implied warranty. (4) Whether any particular circumstance, which is not disclosed, be material or not is, in each case, a question of fact. (5) The term “circumstance” includes any communication made to, or information received by, the assured.” 21. Section 19 of the Act of 1963 provides that if the utmost faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by other party as marine insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith. 22. Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 binds the assured to disclose every material circumstance which is known to assured and the assured is deemed to know to the insurer and if the assured fails to make such disclosure, the insurer may avoid such contract. Whereas, sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 lays down that every circumstance is material which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 describes that certain circumstances need not be disclosed in the absence of the inquiry. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 says that any particular circumstance be material or not is a question of fact. Sub-section (5) includes the communication or information received by the assured in the term “circumstance”. 23. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act of 1963 says that any particular circumstance be material or not is a question of fact. Sub-section (5) includes the communication or information received by the assured in the term “circumstance”. 23. From the above provisions, it can be gathered that the requirement of disclosure of every material circumstance by the assured is provided by the legislature, so that an insurer may decide to take or not to take the risk or he can assess the premium for covering the risk. 24. In the present case, this fact is very important that after knowing this fact that the units/factories of the respondent-applicants are running in the non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land, the insurance company has issued insurance policies for the subsequent period i.e. after the incident of fire. 25. From the above fact, it can only be gathered that even if the petitioner-company knew that the units/factories of the respondent-applicants are running in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land, it would not have refused to issue the insurance policy to the respondent-applicants. It can also be said that the factum of establishment and running of units/factories of the respondent-applicants in non-conforming areas i.e. agriculture land is not a material fact, which would influence the judgment of the petitioner-company for fixing premium or determining whether it will take the risk. 26. The judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner are of no help to the petitioner-company as in case of Satwant Kaur Sandhu v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. (supra) admittedly there was a column in the proposal form and in the said column, the insured has not disclosed all the facts relating to his illness while applying for mediclaim policy and in that situation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the proposer was obliged to disclose about his illness to the insurer particularly while answering questions in the proposal form. 27. In the present case, it is admitted that in the proposal form, there was no column, wherein the respondent-applicants were obliged to disclose about the place where the units/factories are established. 28. 27. In the present case, it is admitted that in the proposal form, there was no column, wherein the respondent-applicants were obliged to disclose about the place where the units/factories are established. 28. In Sea Lark Fisheries v. United India Insurance Company (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has found that several columns which were material for the purpose of entering into a contract of insurance were left blank and, therefore, taking into consideration the said circumstance and other circumstance, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that as the insured has not disclosed all particulars, the insurance company has rightly repudiated its claim. However, in the present case, the petitioner insurance-company has not come up with a case that the respondent-applicants have not disclosed the information in the proposal form. 29. In view of the above discussions, I do not find any illegality in the impugned awards passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat. 30. Consequently, both these writ petitions fail and are hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Stay petitions also stand dismissed.