JUDGMENT By the Court.—Case has been called out in the revised list. Names of Sri R.C. Shukla and Krishna Agrawal are reflected in the cause list, as counsel for the revenue. Sri Krishna Agrawal alone is present on behalf of the department. We asked him to proceed with the matter. 2. Heard Sri Krishna Agarwal, learned counsel for the revenue and Sri Tanmay Sadh holding brief of Sri Nishant Mishra, learned counsel for the assessee. 3. This appeal has been filed by the department against the order of the Custom, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) dated 30.12.2011 raising following as substantial questions of law : “(i) Whether the head office of the party, not registered with the department under the provisions as envisaged under Notification No. 26/2005-Service Tax dated 7.6.2005 issued in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 69 of the Finance Act, 1994 is eligible to issue any document to pass on the credit to their manufacturing unit and whether on the basis of these documents CENVAT credit be allowed? (ii) Whether a manufacturer is eligible to avail and utilize CENVAT credit on the basis of the documents which are not prescribed under the provisions of Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004? (iii) Whether CENVAT credit be allowed on the basis of documents which do not contain the statutory information as per the provisions of Rule 4A (2) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994?” 4. Admittedly, CENVAT credit had arisen to the assessee at its head office. The dispute pertains to utilization of such credit at one manufacturing unit of the assessee located away from it’s head office (hereinafter referred to as the manufacturing unit). The disputed utilisation of CENVAT credit (details of which were mentioned on a letter issued by the head office to the manufacturing unit of the assessee) occurred at the manufacturing unit of the assessee. It contained details of the invoices including details of the address and registration number of the person who provided the input service; name and address of the “Input Service Distributor”; name and address of the recipient; amount of CENVAT credit arising the amount of CENVAT credit distributed and; the amount of CENVAT that arose against the same, at the head office. Subsequently, upon an internal audit objection being raised, the aforesaid CENVAT credit was withdrawn in view of alleged non-compliance of Rule 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as CENVAT Rules) read with Rule 4A(2) of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as the Service Tax Rules). 5. The audit objection appears to have been to the effect that the head office of the assessee i.e. the “Input Service Distributor” though had sufficient CENVAT credit available with it, it did not issue any invoice or bill or challan to the manufacturing unit (containing the prescribed details). Instead, the head office of the assessee/”Input Service Distributor” merely issued a letter containing such details. Therefore, according to the audit objection, the requirement of the CENVAT Rules and Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules had not been met. Hence, it was alleged, the CENVAT credit had been wrongly availed. The adjudicating authority reversed the credit taken by the assessee. 6. Upon appeal, the Tribunal allowed the assessee’s appeal and held the assessee was entitled to avail the CENVAT credit as claimed. However, the Tribunal further remitted the matter to the Commissioner to verify the correctness of the claim made by the assessee as to the utilisation of CENVAT credit and to allow the assessee’s claim if relevant details were found verified. 7. Hence this appeal by the revenue. Upon the present appeal being filed, an interim order had been granted by which the aforesaid exercise in remand has remained stayed. 8. The only objection raised by the revenue in the present appeal appears to be that the procedure required to be followed for transfer of CENVAT credit has been violated and therefore the assessee was not entitled to avail CENVAT credit at the manufacturing unit. 9. Sri Krishna Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the department submits, Rule 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Rules provide for the “Manner of distribution of credit by “Input Service Distributor” and “Documents and accounts” required for that purpose, respectively. 9. Sri Krishna Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the department submits, Rule 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Rules provide for the “Manner of distribution of credit by “Input Service Distributor” and “Documents and accounts” required for that purpose, respectively. Under Rule 7 the “Input Service Distributor” is required to observe that credit is distributed-against the documents referred; it does not exceed the amount of service tax paid thereon; only that credit of service tax be distributed to a manufacturing unit as may be attributable as input service to that unit; that distribution of service tax amongst various units be made in proportion to their manufacturing activities etc. Under Rule 9, it is provided that CENVAT credit shall be taken by the manufacturer or the provider of each different service or input service distribution on the basis of documents including amongst others invoice issued by the manufacturer etc. 10. Sri Krishna Agrawal submits, under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, CENVAT credit could be transferred by the “Input Credit Distributor” i.e. by the head office of the assessee to it’s manufacturing unit only against invoice or bill or challan contemplated under the said Rule. Since a letter can never qualify as either an invoice, or bill or challan the said Rule was never complied. Therefore, the assessee was not entitled to avail the CENVAT credit. 11. Then, relying on the language of Rule 4A(2) of the Service Tax Rules, Sri Krishna Agarwal submits that the said Rule is mandatory inasmuch as it uses the word ‘shall’ and not ‘may’ while requiring of transfer of CENVAT credit against issue of an invoice or challan or bill. 12. Responding to the above, learned counsel for the assessee submits, all particulars required under Rule 7 and 9 of CENVAT Rules read with Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules had been submitted by the assessee and therefore the assessee had rightly been allowed CENVAT credit by the Tribunal. 13. He submits that the purpose required to be served by issuance of an invoice or bill or challan of the CENVAT credit transferred by the “Input Service Distributor” to its manufacturing unit is to offer for scrutiny, details of the service tax paid and credit that may have arisen as a consequence thereto as also the credit component transferred. 13. He submits that the purpose required to be served by issuance of an invoice or bill or challan of the CENVAT credit transferred by the “Input Service Distributor” to its manufacturing unit is to offer for scrutiny, details of the service tax paid and credit that may have arisen as a consequence thereto as also the credit component transferred. All such details had been disclosed by the assessee though on a letter head duly signed, fulfilled the purpose of the Act by providing all necessary details. 14. Logically, it follows from such a submission that the word ‘shall’ used in Rule 4-A of the Service Tax Rules is directory/non-mandatory and so far as the assessee had disclosed all particulars and details required to be disclosed on such invoice, bill or challan and that the assessee had made substantial compliance with the machinery provision. Therefore, it had rightly availed the credit. 15. At the outset, we note while Rule 7 relates to the manner in which the “Input Service Distributor” may distribute (amongst it’s manufacturing units), CENVAT credit available with it for the purpose of it’s utilisation, Rule 9 prescribes that such CENVAT credit must have arisen at the hands of “Input Service Distributor” against invoices. Also, in the first instance, the aforesaid matters, by very nature are such, as may be complied with by the “Input Service Distributor” while creating credit of CENVAT and again while making distribution of that credit amongst its manufacturing units. There is no dispute in the instant case as to the genuineness or correctness of the CENVAT credit that arose to the head office of the assessee i.e. the “Input Service Distributor”. 16. Then, Rule 4A(2) of the Service Tax Rules appears to be relevant at the second or the later stage of utilisation of CENVAT credit. It provides that an “Input Service Distributor”, at the time of distributing credit on taxable services shall issue an invoice, bill or challan of CENVAT credit distributed to it’s manufacturing unit for utilisation by such manufacturing unit. 17. Then having considered the arguments so advanced by learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, we find that as a fact, the revenue does not dispute that CENVAT credit had correctly arisen in favour of the assessee at its head office/”Input Service Distributor”. 17. Then having considered the arguments so advanced by learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material on record, we find that as a fact, the revenue does not dispute that CENVAT credit had correctly arisen in favour of the assessee at its head office/”Input Service Distributor”. It further does not dispute the correctness of the amount of such CENVAT credit transferred to its manufacturing unit for utilization. It is also not the case of the revenue that the Input Credit Distributor/head office of the assessee had already been utilised or there was any effort on part of the assessee to claim double benefit of such CENVAT credit inasmuch as it is not the case of the revenue that the assessee had earlier utilized the said amount of CENVAT credit in question. 18. Then as to the mode adopted by the assessee to transfer the CENVAT and that contemplated by the Rule, it does appear that issuance of invoice, bill or challan to transfer such credit is the first/preferred mode provided for by the Rule. Admittedly it has not been complied with by the assessee here. 19. In this regard, Rule 4A(2) of the Service Tax Rules, reads as under: “Rule 4A. Taxable service to be provided or credit to be distributed on invoice, bill or challan- (1)...... Admittedly it has not been complied with by the assessee here. 19. In this regard, Rule 4A(2) of the Service Tax Rules, reads as under: “Rule 4A. Taxable service to be provided or credit to be distributed on invoice, bill or challan- (1)...... (2) Every “Input Service Distributor” distributing credit of taxable services shall, in respect of credit distributed, issue an invoice, a bill or, as the case may be, a challan signed by such person or a person authorized by him, for each of the recipient of the credit distributed, and such invoice, bill or, as the case may be, challan shall be serially numbered and shall contain the following namely : (i) the name, address and registration number of the person providing input services and the serial number and date of invoice, bill, or as the case may be, challan issued under sub-rule (1); (ii) the name and address of the said “Input Service Distributor”; (iii) the name and address of the recipient of the credit distributed; (iv) the amount of the credit distributed: Provided that in case the “Input Service Distributor” is an office of a banking company or a financial institution including a non-banking financial company providing service to any person an invoice, a bill or, as the case may be, challan shall include any document, by whatever name called, whether or not serially numbered but containing other information in such documents as required under this sub-rule:” 20. In this background it needs to be examined whether the requirement of Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules read with Rules 7 and 9 of CENVAT Rules is imperative/ mandatory or directory. If the said Rules are found to be mandatory then obviously the assessee did not comply with the same and it would therefore have to be held not entitled to claim transfer of CENVAT credit to its manufacturing unit. Consequently the order reversing the same would be valid. If however, the said Rules are found to be directory, it would further be required to examine if substantial compliance of the same had been found to have been made by the assessee. If substantial compliance is found to have been made and no prejudice is shown to the revenue on that count then, the assessee may be held to have correctly availed the CENVAT credit. 21. If substantial compliance is found to have been made and no prejudice is shown to the revenue on that count then, the assessee may be held to have correctly availed the CENVAT credit. 21. In the case of Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1480 , a purposive approach was adopted by the Supreme Court to interpret the word “shall” appearing in Rules 8 and 8A of the Rules framed under Rajasthan Passengers and Goods Taxation Act and in related notification issued under that Act. They were held to be directory looking at the context or intention of the Rules and notification in which word ‘shall’ was used. The same were harmonized with the language used in Section 4 of the parent Act that used the words “may accept”. It was thus held that while levy itself remained non-mandatory, if imposed, the same was to be computed only in the manner laid down in the Rules. In this regard, the Supreme Court held: “12. It is, however, contended that though the section creates an option, the Rules and the notification make the payment compulsory, and attention is drawn to the word “shall” used both in Rules 8 and 8-A and the notification whereas the words in the two provisos to Section 4 are “may accept”. The word ‘shall’ is ordinarily mandatory, but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands. In In re Lord Thurlow Ex Parte Official Receiver [1895 1 QB 724] Lord Esher, M.R. observed at p. 729 that “the word ‘shall’ is not always obligatory. It may be directory”, and Lopes, L.J. at p. 731 added: “It is clear that the word ‘shall’ is not always used in a mandatory sense. There is abundance of authority to the contrary in cases where it has been held to be directory only.” 13. It was thus that the word “shall” was held to be directory only, in that case, by Coutts Trotter, C.J., in Manikkam Pattar v. Nanchappa Chettiar [(1928) MWN 441] by Russel, J., in In re Rustom [(1901) ILR 26 Bom 396 : (1901) 3 Bom LR 653] by Venkatasubba Rao, J., in Jethaji Peraji Firm v. Krishnayya [(1929) ILR 52 Mad 648, 656] and by the Judicial Committee in Burjore and Bhavani Pershad v. Mussumat Bhagana [(1883) LR II IA 7]. 14. 14. Now, Rules 8 and 8-A and the notification only lay down what lump sum payment has to be in each case, if a lump sum is being paid. The mandatory language is used to fix peremptorily the amount of the lump sum. Rules 8 and 8-A and the notification cannot be said to overreach the section to which they are subordinate and from which they must take their colour and meaning. If the Act creates an option, it cannot be negatived by the Rules. The Act and the Rules must be read harmoniously, and reading them so, it is plain that the apparent mandatory language of the Rules and the notification still retains the permissive character of the section, but only lays down what the amount of the lump sum must be, if lump sum payment is made in lieu of payment of the tax calculated on actual fares and freights. If the two Rules and the notification are read in this way, the mandatory language is limited to the prescribing of the lump sum rates. In our opinion, the two Rules and the notification are not void and contradictory of the Act. 15. It is contended that the power to fix lump sums in lieu of tax has been conferred upon Government without guidance, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. It is also urged that the levy of a lump sum leads to the result that even if passengers or goods are not transported, the tax is still payable. These arguments, in our opinion, cannot be accepted. The learned Advocate-General pointed out that the lump sum rates work out at a very low figure, the minimum being less than Rs 1 per day and the maximum, Rs 1.50 np. per day. The rates are no doubt very reasonable, but this hardly meets the argument of the petitioners. There are, however, good reasons for upholding the fixation of lump sums the payment of the lump sum is not obligatory, and a person can elect to pay tax calculated on actual fares and freights. The fares and freights are fixed by competent authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, and that takes into account the average earnings, and the lump sum is fixed as an average of what tax would be realised if calculated on actual fares and freights. The fares and freights are fixed by competent authority under the Motor Vehicles Act, and that takes into account the average earnings, and the lump sum is fixed as an average of what tax would be realised if calculated on actual fares and freights. There is no compulsion for any operator to elect to pay a lump sum if he does not choose to do so. Nor is the argument that there may be vacant periods when no passengers or goods are transported but the tax is payable, is of any force, because there may be days when the business done might result in tax in excess of the lump sum payable. The lump sum figure is based on averages, and cannot be impeached by reference to a possibility that on some days no business might be done”. 22. Then, in the case of P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, (2003) 8 SCC 498 , the Supreme Court considered the purpose and object of the relevant provision and whether the provision itself was part of a procedural/machinery provision or substantive provision-to interpret whether the word ‘shall’ appearing therein was imperative/mandatory or directory. Further, it was found that procedural provision would not be mandatory despite word ‘shall’ being employed, unless prejudice was caused. 23. In that case a dispute had arisen whether the word ‘shall’ used in Section 23(3) of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950 was imperative/mandatory or merely directory. Under that provision if satisfied, the Electoral Registration Officer shall direct the name of an applicant to be registered in the electoral roll. However that exercise was to be completed before close of time for filing nomination to the election proposed to be held for any constituency. Though, the Supreme Court found that prima facie, due to use of the word ‘shall’ the provision in question was worded as an imperative provision, yet, it did not conclude so on that consideration alone. The purpose and object of the Act and the particular provision were examined and in that light. The Supreme Court found that it was imperative/mandatory for the Electoral Registration Officer to finalise the electoral roll before lapse of time for filing nomination to the election as it had a direct bearing on the elections, their conduct and outcome. Therefore, that provision was held to be mandatory. The Supreme Court found that it was imperative/mandatory for the Electoral Registration Officer to finalise the electoral roll before lapse of time for filing nomination to the election as it had a direct bearing on the elections, their conduct and outcome. Therefore, that provision was held to be mandatory. At the same time publication of the electoral list that was also required to be made within prescribed time was held to be directory for the reason that an electoral list though published after that time did not have any bearing on the rights of the person whose name may have been either included or excluded from that list. It was thus explained: “45. A statute as is well known must be read in the text and context thereof. Whether a statute is directory or mandatory would not be dependent on the user of the words “shall” or “may”. Such a question must be posed and answered having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. 46. ..... 47. The construction of a statute will depend on the purport and object for which the same had been used. In the instant case the 1960 Rules do not fix any time for publication of the electoral rolls. On the other hand Section 23(3) of the 1950 Act categorically mandates that direction can be issued for revision in the electoral roll by way of amendment in inclusion a nd deletion from the electoral roll till the date specified for filing nomination. The electoral roll as revised by reason of such directions can therefore be amended only thereafter. On the basis of direction issued by the competent authority in relation to an application filed for inclusion of a voter’s name, a nomination can be filed. The person concerned, therefore, would not be inconvenienced or in any way be prejudiced only because the revised electoral roll in Form 16 is published a few hours later. The result of filing of such nomination would become known to the parties concerned also after 3:00 p.m. 48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. The result of filing of such nomination would become known to the parties concerned also after 3:00 p.m. 48. Furthermore, even if the statute specifies a time for publication of the electoral roll, the same by itself could not have been held to be mandatory. Such a provision would be directory in nature. It is a well-settled principle of law that where a statutory functionary is asked to perform a statutory duty within the time prescribed therefor, the same would be directory and not mandatory. (See Shiveshwar Prasad Sinha v. District Magistrate of Monghyr [ AIR 1966 Pat 144 : ILR 45 Pat 436 (FB)], Nomita Chowdhury v. State of W.B. [(1999) 2 Cal LJ 21] and Garbari Union Coop. Agricultural Credit Society Ltd. v. Swapan Kumar Jana [ (1997) 1 CHN 189 ].) 49. Furthermore, a provision in a statute which is procedural in nature although employs the word “shall” may not be held to be mandatory if thereby no prejudice is caused. (See Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Board, Rampur [ AIR 1965 SC 895 : (1965) 1 SCR 970 ], State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [ (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], Venkataswamappa v. Special Dy. Commr. (Revenue) [ (1997) 9 SCC 128 ] and Rai Vimal Krishna v. State of Bihar, (2003) 6 SCC 401 .” (emphasis supplied) 24. Then in Dove Investments (P) Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Investment Corpn., (2006) 2 SCC 619 , the Supreme Court again dealt with this issue in the context of the word ‘shall’ appearing in Sections 108 and 111 of the Companies Act. In that case the company Dove Investments had obtained finance of Rs. 4.5 crores from Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation against pledge of 25 lakhs shares. However, when the latter sought to enforce such security, the debtor Dove Investments (P) Ltd. resisted the claim and set up a defence in respect of 22 lakh shares pleading that the creditor could not enforce the security against those shares because the same had not been registered under Section 108 and 111 within two months time stipulated under those sections. It was submitted in view of the word ‘shall’ used in those sections the time stipulation of two months was mandatory. It having not been complied, the security could not be enforced against such shares. The Supreme Court held: 13. It was submitted in view of the word ‘shall’ used in those sections the time stipulation of two months was mandatory. It having not been complied, the security could not be enforced against such shares. The Supreme Court held: 13. Whether a statute would be directory or mandatory will depend upon the scheme thereof. Ordinarily a procedural provision would not be mandatory even if the word “shall” is employed therein unless a prejudice is caused. (See P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir [ (2003) 8 SCC 498 ].) 14. In Chandrakant Uttam Chodankar v. Dayanand Rayu Mandrakar [ (2005) 2 SCC 188 ] this Court observed: (SCC p. 212, paras 74-75). “74. In this case it is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether Section 83 is imperative in character or not inasmuch it is settled law that even where the expression ‘shall’ is used, the same may not be held to be mandatory. Even a mandatory provision having regard to the text and context of the statute may not call for strict construction. 75. In U.P. SEB v. Shiv Mohan Singh [ (2004) 8 SCC 402 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1141] this Court stated the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 440, paras 96-97) ‘96. Ordinarily, although the word ‘shall’ is considered to be imperative in nature but it has to be interpreted as directory if the context or the intention otherwise demands. (See Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan [ (1962) 1 SCR 517 : AIR 1961 SC 1480 ], AIR para 12.) 97. It is important to note that in Crawford on Statutory Construction at p. 539, it is stated: “271. Miscellaneous implied exceptions from the requirements of mandatory statutes, in general.—Even where a statute is clearly mandatory or prohibitory, yet, in many instances, the Courts will regard certain conduct beyond the prohibition of the statute through the use of various devices or principles. Most, if not all of these devices find their jurisdiction in considerations of justice. It is a well-known fact that often to enforce the law to its letter produces manifest injustice, for frequently equitable and humane considerations, and other considerations of a closely related nature, would seem to be of a sufficient caliber to excuse or justify a technical violation of the law.” 15. It is a well-known fact that often to enforce the law to its letter produces manifest injustice, for frequently equitable and humane considerations, and other considerations of a closely related nature, would seem to be of a sufficient caliber to excuse or justify a technical violation of the law.” 15. In Mohan Singh v. International Airport Authority of India [ (1997) 9 SCC 132 ] this Court observed: (SCC p. 144, para 17) “17. The distinction of mandatory compliance or directory effect of the language depends upon the language couched in the statute under consideration and its object, purpose and effect. The distinction reflected in the use of the word ‘shall’ or ‘may’ depends on conferment of power. In the present context, ‘may’ does not always mean may. May is a must for enabling compliance with provision but there are cases in which, for various reasons, as soon as a person who is within the statute is entrusted with the power, it becomes duty to exercise. Where the language of statute creates a duty, the special remedy is prescribed for non-performance of the duty. In Craies on Statute Law (7th Edn.), it is stated that the Court will, as a general rule, presume that the appropriate remedy by common law or mandamus for action was intended to apply. General rule of law is that where a general obligation is created by statute and statutory remedy is provided for violation, statutory remedy is mandatory. The scope and language of the statute and consideration of policy at times may, however, create exception showing that the legislature did not intend a remedy(generality) to be exclusive. Words are the skin of the language. The language is the medium of expressing the intention and the object that particular provision or the Act seeks to achieve. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the intention. The word ‘shall’ is not always decisive. Regard must be had to the context, subject-matter and object of the statutory provision in question in determining whether the same is mandatory or directory. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration.” 16. No universal principle of law could be laid in that behalf as to whether a particular provision or enactment shall be considered mandatory or directory. It is the duty of the Court to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully analysing the whole scope of the statute or section or a phrase under consideration.” 16. Recently, a three-Judge Bench in Kailash v. Nanhku [ (2005) 4 SCC 480 ] while interpreting Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure was of the opinion: (SCC p. 496, para 33) “33. As stated earlier, Order 8 Rule 1 is a provision contained in CPC and hence belongs to the domain of procedural law. Another feature noticeable in the language of Order 8 Rule 1 is that although it appoints a time within which the written statement has to be presented and also restricts the power of the Court by employing language couched in a negative way that the extension of time appointed for filing the written statement was not to be later than 90 days from the date of service of summons yet it does not in itself provide for penal consequences to follow if the time schedule, as laid down, is not observed. From these two features certain consequences follow.” (See also Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (II) v. Union of India [ (2005) 6 SCC 344 ].) 17. However, even if a statute is directory in nature the same should be substantially complied with. What would satisfy the requirements of substantial compliance, however, would depend upon the fact of each case”. (emphasis supplied) 25. In the above background of law laid down by the Supreme Court, we first consider the facts found by the Tribunal. It is not disputed that the assessee had available with it CENVAT credit. This credit would have arisen only against original duty/service tax payment documents such as Excise challan/s, invoice etc. Those would be primary evidence of duty payment made by the assessee giving rise to CENVAT credit. 26. Also, it being a case of transfer of credit only, not involving transfer or movement of any goods or service, the normal procedural requirements attached to clearance of goods were not attracted in the present case inasmuch as admittedly there is no clearance of any goods etc. to be verified or recorded. 27. 26. Also, it being a case of transfer of credit only, not involving transfer or movement of any goods or service, the normal procedural requirements attached to clearance of goods were not attracted in the present case inasmuch as admittedly there is no clearance of any goods etc. to be verified or recorded. 27. Then, the CENVAT Rules read with Service Tax Rules do not prescribe or require primary evidence of CENVAT credit arising to be transmitted by the “Input Service Distributor”/head office to it’s manufacturing unit where such credit is to be utilised. Those Rules only require details of such existing CENVAT credit to be transmitted. Obviously, the eventual utilisation would have to be equal to and reconcile with the exact/correct figures of CENVAT credit available with the “Input Service Distributor” before it’s transfer to the manufacturing unit. However, as noted above, there is no allegation of excess claim made by the assessee. 28. In such a situation, whether through invoice, bill or challan or through a letter, so long as all the details prescribed under the Rules (noted above) were disclosed by the assessee and therefore known to the Revenue, such a reconciliation would always remain possible and in the same manner as it would otherwise be if the “Input Service Distributor” had issued an invoice or bill or challan of such CENVAT credit transferred to it’s manufacturing unit. 29. Merely because the assessee here had provided the details on it’s letter head, it would not entail any further, other or new inquiry mechanism or step to be taken by the revenue to make such reconciliation. It would make no material difference to the revenue. 30. Then, for the purpose of the revenue what appears essential is the requirement to make disclosure of the details mentioned in the Rules and not the form on which those details were required because the process of reconciliation of such credit would require examination of primary documents giving rise to eligible CENVAT credit and such reconciliation would not be completed or proven because the assessee may have issued an invoice or bill or challan under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules. 31. Even an invoice or bill or challan if issued under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules would require verification by the revenue authorities as to the correctness of the facts stated therein. 31. Even an invoice or bill or challan if issued under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules would require verification by the revenue authorities as to the correctness of the facts stated therein. Thus, an invoice if issued may contain details as required under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules giving name of the service provider, service recipient as also the amount of credit. Yet, the same would be required to be verified before it could be said that the credit had correctly had been claimed to have arisen and transferred. In the case of a letter as had been issued by the assessee in the instant case no different or other procedure was required to be followed inasmuch what was primary and essential was the verification of the facts stated therein and not the form of the document. Those forms i.e. Invoice/Bill/Challan do not have a direct revenue implication, especially when there is no dispute as to the CENVAT having arisen and when there is also no allegation of it’s false, wrong or double utilisation made by the assessee. 32. Also, once the utilisation had been made by the manufacturing unit either against an invoice or against the letter it would automatically get reflected in the returns filed thereafter by the assessee and no part of it could be claimed to have escaped the attention or scrutiny of the departmental authorities for reason of transfer of CENVAT credit having been evidenced on a letter and not an invoice or bill or challan. 33. Thus, in so far as it is admitted to the revenue that the CENVAT credit that had been transferred to the manufacturing unit had arisen at its head office, mere non-issuance of the invoice bill/challan while transferring that CENVAT credit to another manufacturing unit (of the same assessee) appears to be a purely technical infringement arising from absence of form rather than absence of substance. 34. 34. Therefore, as to purpose and prejudice, we find that on one hand no prejudice would be caused to the revenue because the invoice or bill or challan had not been issued by the assessee under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules and on the other, upon full details being available (giving reference of the duty payment and it’s consequential effect of CENVAT credit having arisen), the purpose of Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules would be fulfilled inasmuch as the verification and reconciliation would be done of the transactions and documents that are to be mentioned/recorded in the invoice or bill or challan. Verification of such invoice or bill or challan required to be issued under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules itself would not lead to any benefit to the revenue. That exercise did not stand obstructed by issuance of the letter by the assessee. 35. Also, as to consequence of non-compliance of Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules i.e. of non-issuance of invoice, bill or challan, it is seen, other than a general penalty clause incorporated under Section 77(2) of the Finance Act, 1994, learned counsel for the revenue could not point to any specific provision providing for consequence for non-compliance of Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules. Under Section 77(2) of Finance Act, 1994, every contravention of the Service Tax Rules, irrespective of every other fact or circumstance, may be penalised with penalty of Rs. 10,000/-, if such contravention has not been otherwise made subject to penalty. 36. Thus as to consequence of alleged non-compliance of Rule 4A of Service Tax Rules, we find that Section 77 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994 though does provide that every contravention of the Act or the Rules shall be penalized, however, that provision itself is a general and omnibus provision, which it is doubtful can be relied upon by the revenue to plead that the provisions of Rule 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Rules read with Rule 4-A of the Service Tax Rules are mandatory. If such submission were to be accepted, it would result in mandatory penalty being imposed upon all/every infringement irrespective of the fact that it may involve a technical or innocent or involuntary non-compliance of the Act or the Rules. If such submission were to be accepted, it would result in mandatory penalty being imposed upon all/every infringement irrespective of the fact that it may involve a technical or innocent or involuntary non-compliance of the Act or the Rules. Such interpretation may not only be very harsh and therefore unacceptable to hold the provision of Rule 4A mandatory but it may in fact open to challenge Section 77 (2) of the Finance Act, 1994, for that reason alone. 37. Also, as noted above, clearly Rules 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Rules and Rule 4-A of the Service Tax Rules are part of the machinery provisions. These three Rules taken together only provide for the mechanism to avail CENVAT credit that may have arisen. The said Rules do not provide for CENVAT credit to arise and they do not in any manner affect the computation of that credit. The Rules only regulate the manner or method for utilisation of that credit in the situation where such credit may on account of the nature of business operations of an assessee arise at it’s head office but again by virtue of it’s business organisation and structure be required to be utilised at different locations/ manufacturing units. 38. Then, Gujarat High Court in C.C.E. & C., Vadodara-II v. EUPEC-Welspun Pipe Coatings India Ltd., 2010 (260) ELT 381 (Guj), had the occasion to consider whether requirement of Rule 9(2) of CENVAT Rules was satisfied by the assessee in that case though it had instead of endorsing the bill of entry itself, had issued a separate certificate/declaration to the same effect i.e. of payment of duty and utilisation of goods. In this context, it held: “2.1 The Tribunal has further observed that according to proviso to Rule 9(2), the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner can allow CENVAT Credit if he is satisfied that the duty has been paid and goods have been actually used. The Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that all these details are available except the name and address of the factory on the bill of entry. The only omission was that instead of endorsing the bill of entry itself in name of the assessee, the importer has issued separate certificate/ declaration. The Tribunal found, as a matter of fact, that all these details are available except the name and address of the factory on the bill of entry. The only omission was that instead of endorsing the bill of entry itself in name of the assessee, the importer has issued separate certificate/ declaration. The Tribunal, therefore, took the view that the same has to be considered as part of the bill of entry and both of them cannot be segregated and seen in isolation as done by the Department. The Tribunal, on the basis of these materials on record, took the view that credit has to be allowed in view of the provisions of Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules (sic).” 39. That being the position in law, we find that in the first place the provisions of Rules 7 and 9 of the CENVAT Rules read with Rule 4-A of the Service Tax Rules are part of the procedural law only regulating utilisation of CENVAT credit validly arisen and providing the machinery to avail CENVAT credit by one of the manufacturing units of an assessee in whose case CENVAT credit may have arisen at one place/location but may be utilized at another place/location owing to the nature of its manufacturing activity and multiple locations at which such manufacturing activity may be carried out necessitating distribution of CENVAT credit. 40. Then, the purpose of the Rules is to allow the revenue authorities to know how much of the CENVAT credit that had admittedly arisen at the head office or to the “Input Service Distributor” had been transferred to different manufacturing units and the details of the service etc. on which such credit had arisen. Such details are apparently required both for the purpose of CENVAT credit reconciliation and also to ensure that such CENVAT credit utilisation is regulated to ensure it is not mis-utilized or claimed repeatedly. The Rules are thus purely part of machinery provisions. 41. It is the details mentioned on the invoice or bill or challan or a letter that therefore assume primary importance. The Rules are thus purely part of machinery provisions. 41. It is the details mentioned on the invoice or bill or challan or a letter that therefore assume primary importance. Once the details as required by the Rules are disclosed/found mentioned on the document itself-whether on the form of an invoice or on the form of bill or on the form of challan or on the form of a letter as has been done in the instant case, the assessee opened itself to the verification process that the Rules prescribe and which process is necessary to be undertaken in the interest of revenue. 42. Thus, it is the substance and contents of the documents that was relevant to be disclosed in the interest of revenue and not the form on which such details were required to be furnished. For instance, an invoice if issued is either wanting in necessary details or the details that are filled up are wrong, the assessee would not be entitled to any benefit. On the other hand, if all details required by the Rules are disclosed by the assessee though in the shape of the letter and the same are true and complete in every respect, the revenue would not be prejudiced merely because the same had not been issued in the form of an invoice or bill or challan. Therefore, no prejudice appears to have been caused to the revenue merely on account of issuance of the letter by the assessee, as has been done in the instant case. 43. Also, as to consequence of non-compliance of the Rules in question, in view of discussion made above, we do not find any statutory intent to either express or implied that may persuade us to opine that the Rule making body intended to visit their non-compliance of Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules with specific consequence/penalty. Therefore, the provisions are clearly non-imperative or non-mandatory. 44. Further, the Rules in question are purely machinery provisions. Such provisions being directory in nature we do not find any prejudice being caused to the revenue if assessee is allowed to make substantial compliance. Substantial compliance may be established if details furnished by the assessee on the letter are found to be true and complete upon due verification made by the revenue, as directed by the Tribunal. 45. Such provisions being directory in nature we do not find any prejudice being caused to the revenue if assessee is allowed to make substantial compliance. Substantial compliance may be established if details furnished by the assessee on the letter are found to be true and complete upon due verification made by the revenue, as directed by the Tribunal. 45. In view of the a3bove, the questions of law raised by the department is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. The instant appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs.