JUDGMENT : The petitioner before this Court is a practicing lawyer of this Court, who has filed this writ petition with a plea that since the Government of Uttarakhand is not following the guidelines as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & another Vs. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal & another, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 1 , and since these guidelines are of a general nature which lay down a procedure for selection and appointment of Law Officers in the High Courts, a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued to the Government to follow the guidelines given in the above judgment. 2. Counter affidavit has already been filed and the case is being heard finally, considering its urgent nature. 3. Before this Court deals with the main issue raised in the petition, a preliminary objection made by the learned Advocate General of the State, as well as by the intervener, must be dealt with. The objection is that as the petitioner is not a “person aggrieved” and therefore this writ petition is not maintainable. In other words, the petitioner has no locus standi to file this writ petition. 4. Learned Advocate General for the State submits that this is admittedly not a PIL where the Rules of locus standi can be relaxed. Moreover, in the writ petition the main prayer of the petitioner is for a direction in the nature of mandamus to command the respondents to comply with the guidelines given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab & another Vs. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal & another, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 1 (from hereinafter referred to as Brijesh Singh Chahal case), hence, locus standi of the petitioner has to be strictly examined, particularly as he has not come before this Court as a “person aggrieved”. The other objection of the learned Advocate General for the State is that not only the petitioner does not have any locus but the writ petition is as of now is not maintainable for another reason as there has been no “demand and its refusal” as yet, which is necessary before a writ of mandamus can be granted. The other objection of the learned Advocate General for the State is that not only the petitioner does not have any locus but the writ petition is as of now is not maintainable for another reason as there has been no “demand and its refusal” as yet, which is necessary before a writ of mandamus can be granted. The petition, hence is premature as it is not the case of the petitioner that he had applied for a Law Officer and his application has been rejected or not considered. Admittedly, the petitioner is not an applicant for the assignment of a Law Officer of the State. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, would argue that the petitioner is admittedly a practicing lawyer of this Court and has a genuine and bona fide interest in the proper functioning of the Court, being himself an officer of the Court. Considering that all he seeks is the implementation of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court as conditions exist in Uttarakhand which demand that the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court be implemented, the State should not even oppose such a prayer, much less oppose it on a technicality of locus. 6. After hearing both the parties on this objection, this Court has absolutely no doubt that this petition cannot be rejected on the aspect of locus standi. Petitioner is before this Court in a writ jurisdiction. The powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are extremely wide. These powers are not merely for enforcement of a fundamental right, but for other rights as well. To be precise, the powers are for issuance of an appropriate writ, including a writ of mandamus for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights as well as “for any other purpose”. 7. Ultimately, what the petitioner has raised before this Court is a question of great public importance. He is concerned with the lack of transparency in appointment of Law Officers by the State Government, which he alleges is the state of affairs in Uttarakhand. Since this question stands settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment, which has been referred above, the petitioner merely seeks the implementation of the directions given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment. Since this question stands settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a recent judgment, which has been referred above, the petitioner merely seeks the implementation of the directions given by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment. Whether it can be done is another matter, it has to be examined, but can the petition be dismissed at the threshold on a technicality. 8. In my respectful opinion the aspect of locus standi has to be examined, inter alia, in the context of the subject or in context of the issues raised by him before this Court. The undisputable fact before this Court is that the petitioner is a practicing lawyer before this Court. He has relied upon a decision of the Apex Court where the Court has given general directions (to which we will refer shortly), for setting a procedure in place for appointment of Law Officers, a procedure which is fair and transparent. Can it be said that the petitioner has no right to seek this relief and this writ petition should hence be dismissed on ground of locus standi! In my humble opinion, this Court would be failing in its duty if it does that. Not only the matter is too important to be dismissed at the threshold, on a technicality, but this Court also has no doubt in its mind that the petitioner would come within the settled parameters of a “person aggrieved”. Moreover, the rules of procedure are but a handmaid of justice. 9. A lawyer does not have a legal right to be appointed as a Government Counsel, or a Law Officer. Nevertheless, when a lawyer offers himself for appointment or reappointment as a Law Officer, his claim must be considered on its merit by the Government, without any extraneous considerations. To that extent, every lawyer has a right, and logically therefore he has a remedy too. When this is not being done the only remedy for a lawyer is to file a writ petition before this Court. A lawyer practicing before this Court has a legitimate expectation that when lawyers are appointed as Law Officers before this Court, the State being a trustee of the people will act in a fair and just manner. Is this too much of an expectation? He is not a stranger to the cause he has espoused, when he does that! A lawyer practicing before this Court has a legitimate expectation that when lawyers are appointed as Law Officers before this Court, the State being a trustee of the people will act in a fair and just manner. Is this too much of an expectation? He is not a stranger to the cause he has espoused, when he does that! He is not a busy body or an interloper. He is definitely a “person aggrieved”. A person who has a personal or individual right in the subject matter of the petition, is a person aggrieved. Even when an action or inaction on the part of a State or its instrumentality prejudicially affects a person, he becomes a “person aggrieved” and can, therefore, seek a writ of mandamus from this Court. 10. A Full Bench of Kerala High Court, as far back as in 1969 had considered the aspect of “locus standi’ in a writ petition, where the wide concept of “person aggrieved” was discussed. It relied upon a decision of Privy Council, in Attorney-General of the Gambia v. N’Jie, 1961-2 All ER 504 at p. 511, which emphasized the wide scope of the words “person aggrieved”, as under : “The words ‘person aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a restrictive interpretation. They do not include, of course, a mere busy-body who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but they do include a person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.” 11. Indeed, when a person seeks a writ of mandamus, the aspect of locus gets confined, as compared to other writs such as Habeas Corpus, Quo Warranto or even Certiorari; yet considering that a practicing lawyer of this Court who is concerned with the manner of selection and appointment of Law Officers of the State has come before this Court as the petitioner, it cannot be said that the action or inaction on the part of the State does not prejudicially affect his interest, in case the procedure for selection is not fair and transparent, as it is alleged. In such a case a lawyer can come before this Court, ex debito justitiae; as a matter of right! 12. The second objection is regarding the petition being premature as there is no demand and its refusal. This objection again is unacceptable. In such a case a lawyer can come before this Court, ex debito justitiae; as a matter of right! 12. The second objection is regarding the petition being premature as there is no demand and its refusal. This objection again is unacceptable. It is unquestionably an important rule that there must be a demand and its subsequent refusal, before a person invokes a writ of mandamus, yet this is again not an inflexible rule. It would not apply in a case where the demand is a mere formality or an eyewash. As per the petitioner, there is no fair and transparent method by which Law Officers are to be selected. The process is opaque and is hardly known even to the practicing lawyers, hence, there is no question of an application for appointment, since appointments, according to the petitioner, are not being made on merit or on any objective assessment, but it is simply a distribution of State largesse, a favour to be given to some chosen few. The claim of the petitioner indeed will be seen on its merit, but the petition must at lease be heard, and it cannot be dismissed on ground that there is no demand and refusal as yet. 13. The petitioner before this Court seeks a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent no.1 to comply with the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Brijesh Singh Chahal. Since everything depends on the interpretation and directions contained in the judgment relied upon by the petitioner, let us examine what has been said by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above judgment. 14. This Court was reminded time and again by the learned Advocate General that the judgment given by the Apex Court in Brijesh Singh Chahal, relates to a given set of facts, which did exist in the State of Haryana and State of Punjab, but the same facts do not exist in Uttarakhand. 14. This Court was reminded time and again by the learned Advocate General that the judgment given by the Apex Court in Brijesh Singh Chahal, relates to a given set of facts, which did exist in the State of Haryana and State of Punjab, but the same facts do not exist in Uttarakhand. It has been stated by the learned Advocate General that in Punjab as well as in Haryana, no procedure was being followed for selecting practicing Advocates for appointment as Law Officers and, hence, the Apex Court was constrained to give the directions as have been given in that case and for this reason the directions which have been given by the Apex Court will be seen to be confined to Punjab and Haryana. Moreover, since the facts as they exist in Uttarakhand are entirely different, inasmuch as there is already a procedure in place by the Government of Uttarakhand, by which Law Officers are appointed for the High Court, a procedure which is both fair and transparent (to which we will refer in a while), the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court has no bearing to the facts of the case here in Uttarakhand. 15. Let us examine the precise questions, which were there before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above case. This is reflected from para 1 of the judgment itself, which reads as under: “…..This appeal and the accompanying transferred petition raise a question of considerable public importance. The question precisely is whether appointment of Law Officers by the State Governments can be questioned or the process by which such appointments are made, can be assailed on the ground that the same are arbitrary, hence, violative of the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India……” 16. The very formulation of above question shows that though the facts as were there before the Apex Court may be specific for one State or two States, but the question was also of general importance. 17. This is again reflected in para 51.6 of the said judgment, which reads as under:- “51.6. The very formulation of above question shows that though the facts as were there before the Apex Court may be specific for one State or two States, but the question was also of general importance. 17. This is again reflected in para 51.6 of the said judgment, which reads as under:- “51.6. We further clarify that although we are primarily concerned with the procedure regarding selection and appointment of Law Officers in the States of Punjab and Haryana and although we have confined our directions to the said two States only yet other States would do well to reform their system of selection and appointment to make the same more transparent, fair and objective, if necessary, by amending the relevant LR Manuals/Rules and Regulations on the subject.” (emphasis supplied) 18. In Brijesh Singh Chahal reliance was placed on a catena of earlier judgments, such as S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 , E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 4 SCC 3 , Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 , Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489 , D.S. Nakara v. Union of India (1983) 3 SCC 305, etc., The principle laid down in all the above cases, each being a celebrated case of the Hon’ble Apex Court, was that the Government is a trustee of the power vested in it, and is the custodian of public interest, it must therefore discharge that trust in the best possible manner. 19. The State being the custodian of public interest must make selection of the Law Officers in a fair, transparent and nondiscriminatory manner. This is so as the appointment of Law Officers by the State Government is not just a matter of professional engagement but it has a public element attached to it as well. Reliance was placed by the Apex Court on three earlier decisions, first being the case of Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 , second being State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers’ Association. (1994) 2 SCC 204 and the third being State of U.P. v. Johri Mal reported in (2004) SCC 714. 20. Reliance was placed by the Apex Court on three earlier decisions, first being the case of Srilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212 , second being State of U.P. v. U.P. State Law Officers’ Association. (1994) 2 SCC 204 and the third being State of U.P. v. Johri Mal reported in (2004) SCC 714. 20. The observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Srilekha Vidyarthi (referred by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bijesh Singh Chahal’s case), are as under:- “….Non-arbitrariness, being an necessary concomitant of the rule of law, it is imperative that all actions of every public functionary, in whatever sphere, must be guided by reason and not humour, whim, caprice or personal predilections of the persons entrusted with the task on behalf of the State and exercise of all power must be for public good instead of being an abuse of the power.” 21. Similarly, the observation made by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of U.P. State Law Officers Association (and relied upon in Brijesh Singh Chahal) are as under:- “18. The mode of appointment of lawyers for the public bodies, therefore, has to be in conformity with the obligation cast on them to select the most meritorious. An open invitation to the lawyers to compete for the posts is by far the best mode of such selection. But sometimes the best may not compare or a competent candidate may not be available from among the competitions. In such circumstances, the public bodies may resort to other methods such as inviting and appointing the best available, although he may not have applied for the post. Whatever the method adopted, it must be shown that the search for the meritorious was undertaken and the appointments were made only on the basis of merit and not for any other consideration.” 22. In the State of U.P. v. Johri Mal reported in (2004) SCC 714, it was again reiterated as under: “44. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The State while appointing the Public Prosecutors must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration of justice is imperative which in turn would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The State while appointing the Public Prosecutors must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration of justice is imperative which in turn would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. No appointment of Public Prosecutors or District Counsel should, thus, be made either for pursuing a political purpose of for giving some undue advantage to a section of the people. Retention of its counsel by the State must be weighted on the scale of public interest. The State should replace an efficient, honest and competent lawyer, inter alia, when it is in a position to appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a good performance by a lawyer may not be of much importance.” 23. The importance of a fair, reasonable and non discriminatory mechanism for selection of the lawyers for the State was then emphasized in para 40 of Brijesh Singh Chahal as under: “40. The question whether a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory method of selection should or should not be adopted can be viewed from another angle also equally if not more important than the need for preventing any infringement of Article 14. The State Counsel appears for the State Government or for public bodies who together constitute the single largest litigant in our court system. Statistics show that nearly 80% of litigation pending in the courts today has State or one of its instrumentalities as a party to it. The State Counsel/counsel appointed by public bodies thus represent the largest single litigant or group engaged in litigation. It is also undeniable that for a fair, quick and satisfactory adjudication of a cause, the assistance which the court gets from the Bar is extremely important. It is at times said that the quality of judgment or justice administered by the courts is directly proportionate to the quality of assistant that the courts get from the counsel appearing in a case. Our system of administration of justice is so modeled that the ability of the lawyers appearing in the cause to present the cases of their respective clients assumes considerable importance. Our system of administration of justice is so modeled that the ability of the lawyers appearing in the cause to present the cases of their respective clients assumes considerable importance. Poor assistance at the Bar by counsel who are either not sufficiently equipped in scholarship, experience or commitment is bound to adversely affect the task of administration of justice by the court. Apart from adversely affecting the public interest which State Counsel are supposed to protect, poor quality of assistance rendered to the courts by the State Counsel can affect the higher value of justice itself. A fair, reasonable or non-discriminatory process of appointment of State Counsel is not thus demanded only by the rule of law and its intolerance towards arbitrariness but also by reason of the compelling need for doing complete justice which the courts are obliged to do in each and every cause. The States cannot in the discharge of their public duty and power to select and appoint State Counsel disregard either the guarantee contained in Article 14 against non-arbitrariness or the duty to protect public interest by picking up the best among those available and willing to work nor can the States by their action frustrate, delay or negate the judicial process of administration of justice which so heavily banks upon the assistance rendered by the members of the Bar.” 24. Finally it was held that though no lawyer has a right to be appointed as Government Counsel or Public Prosecutor at any level, and he/she does not have any vested right to claim extension of appointment, yet the process of selection must be fair, reasonable and transparent. In the end, three mechanisms were set out for a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory selection of lawyers for the State. The first is that there must be a fair assessment by the State Government of its requirement of such lawyers considering the work load in High Court. This was emphasized as in Brijesh Singh Chahal, State of Haryana came under a heavy criticism by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, since public money was spent as fee and retainership of many Law Officers from whom no work or little work was taken. This was emphasized as in Brijesh Singh Chahal, State of Haryana came under a heavy criticism by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, since public money was spent as fee and retainership of many Law Officers from whom no work or little work was taken. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India had to say this for the State of Haryana, which was quoted in Brijesh Singh Chahal :- “Thus, the engagement of excess Law Officers without assessing the quantum of work and without resorting to fair and transparent selection method, resulted in allowing more than 50 per cent Law Officers without work and payment of idle salary of Rs.2.22 crores.” 25. This may or may not be the situation in the State of Uttarakhand. This Court sincerely hopes that it is not, yet it would only be fair and reasonable and in step with good governance, if the State Government makes an assessment of its requirement, assessment based on the work load in the High Court and then makes these appointments, as otherwise we too may have a situation like the one referred to in Brijesh Singh Chahal case, and this was the precise apprehension of the Hon’ble Apex Court. 26. The second aspect, which was emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court is given in paragraph 49.2, which was that the process of selection and assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process. This process was again left to the State Government, which can appoint a Committee of Officers to carry out the same. The only aspect which was emphasized again as follows:- “The process and selection of appointment would be fair and reasonable, transparent and credible if the Government or the Committee as the case may be also stipulates the norms for assessment of merit and suitability.” 27. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment was emphasized by the Hon’ble Apex Court in para 50 of the judgment, which reads as under: “50. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment shall in the absence of any statutory provisions regulating such appointments involve consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, if the appointment is at the district level and the High Court if the appointment is for a cases conducted before the High Court. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment shall in the absence of any statutory provisions regulating such appointments involve consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, if the appointment is at the district level and the High Court if the appointment is for a cases conducted before the High Court. It would, in our opinion, be appropriate and in keeping with the demands and transparency, objectivity and fairness if after assessment and finalization of the selection process a panel is sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned for his views on the subject. The Chief Justice could constitute a Committee of Judges to review the names recommended for appointment and offer his views in regard to professional competence and suitability of candidates for such appointments. Appointments made after such a consultative process would inspire confidence and prevent any arbitrariness. The same procedure could be followed where candidates are granted extension in their terms of appointment in which case the Committee appointed by the Government and that constituted by the Chief Justice could also look into the performance of the candidates during the period they have worked as State Counsel.” 28. It was again recorded in para 51.3 as under: “The Committee shall on the basis of norms and criteria which the Government concerned may formulate and in the absence of any such norms, on the basis of norms and criteria which the Committee may themselves formulate conduct selection of Law Officers for the State and submit a panel of names to the Chief Justice of Punjab and Haryana who may set up a Committee of Judges to review the panel and make recommendations to the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice may, based on any such recommendations, record his views regarding suitability of the candidates included in the panel. The Government shall then be free to appoint the candidates having regard to the views expressed by the Chief Justice regarding their merit and suitability. The procedure for assessment of merit of the candidates and consideration by the High Court will apply in all cases where the candidates are already working as State Counsel but are being given an extension in the term of their appointment. The procedure for assessment of merit of the candidates and consideration by the High Court will apply in all cases where the candidates are already working as State Counsel but are being given an extension in the term of their appointment. Having said that we must hasten to add that we are not interfering with the appointments already made in the States of Punjab and Haryana which can continue to remain valid for the period the same has been made but any extension or reappointment shall go through the process indicated by us in the foregoing paragraphs.” 29. It is undoubtedly true that as far as the observations made in para 51.6 are concerned, it was primarily that the procedure regarding selection and appointment of Law Officers in the State of Punjab and Haryana and for that reason it confined its directions for these two States only, yet what was also said must be reiterated again This was as under: “….We have confined our directions to the said two States only yet other States would do well to reform their system of selection and appointment to make the same more transparent, fair and objective, if necessary, by amending the relevant LR Manuals/Rules and Regulations on the subject.” 30. After hearing the learned Advocate General for the State, this Court finds that as far as the initial process of selection is concerned, the State already has a policy in the shape of its “Litigation Policy, 2011”, which is annexed with the counter affidavit, wherein in Chapter III, it has laid down a process under which Law Officers for the High Court are to be selected, which is by a Committee under the Chairmanship of the Chief Secretary of the State, with the following four members: (i) Principal Secretary/Secretary, Law and Legal Remembrancer Member (ii) Principal Secretary/Secretary, Home, Government of Uttarakhand Member (iii) Additional Secretary, Law and Additional Legal Remembrancer, Government of Uttarakhand Member (iv) Joint Secretary, Law and Joint Legal Remembrance Member Secretary 31. Under the Policy the Committee will examine the eligibility, experience and the suitability of only such candidates who have been Advocates for atleast three years. There are other guidelines as well. Under the Policy the Committee will examine the eligibility, experience and the suitability of only such candidates who have been Advocates for atleast three years. There are other guidelines as well. It has further been said in the Policy subject to the need and requirement, the Government may also consult either the Chief Justice or the Advocate General regarding the suitability or eligibility of a particular candidate as a Law Officer. 32. Later a Government Order was again passed on 10.02.2016, making it a part of the L.R. Manual, where broad guidelines for selection and appointment of Law Officers are given not only in the High Court but at all levels. As per this Government Order dated 10.02.2016 eligibility has been given for appointment of a Senior Additional Advocate General, Additional Advocate General, Deputy Advocate General, Chief Standing Counsel, Government Advocates, etc. For example in the said Government Order, the qualifications for a Senior Additional Advocate General would be minimum 10 years of practice in the High Court and a designated Senior Advocate. Similar is the qualifications for an Additional Advocate General. For Deputy Advocate General it is 10 years of practice in the High Court, which is again the same for the Chief Standing Counsel and Additional Chief Standing Counsel and Government Advocate, etc. Therefore, the argument of the learned Advocate General would be that even if the directions as contained in Brijesh Singh Chahal case are to be read with the directions pertaining to Uttarakhand, these are in any case met and already exist in Uttarakhand and, therefore, there is no need for any further directions or improvement. 33. After hearing both the parties and after examining the Scheme, which has been placed before this Court, this Court is of a considered opinion that admittedly there has been no assessment of actual requirement of Law Officers as no study as to the actual work load and requirement of Law Officers has been made and therefore, to that extent, it is directed that some mechanism must be set in place to do this as that would only be transparent and fair, before appointing the Law Officers for the High Court. The State Government must make a reasonable and fair assessment for the actual number of Law Officers required, and the number of Law Officers should never exceed the requirement. This would be only reasonable, fair and just. The State Government must make a reasonable and fair assessment for the actual number of Law Officers required, and the number of Law Officers should never exceed the requirement. This would be only reasonable, fair and just. It is made clear that in case such an exercise already undertaken, there would be no need for doing it again. 34. As far as the second aspect regarding the selection and appointment as Law Officers is concerned, this Court is of a considered view that by and large, there is already a system in place in Uttarakhand. The process referred above as the Litigation Policy, etc. do meet the requirement as laid down by the Apex Court. Even though there is an objection to this by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which is that there could be no fair selection unless the Government invites application from the eligible candidates, but this, however, does not seem to be mandatory, as what has also been stated in Brijesh Singh Chahal is that the Committee which is set up for the selection can invite applications from eligible candidates for different positions. It may, hence, not be mandatory. 35. Regarding the consultation with the Chief Justice the clear and unambiguous direction is contained in para 50 of the judgment, which has already been referred above and this Court can do no better but to reproduce what has already been stated in by the Apex Court in the judgment that “the States would do well to reform their system of selection and appointment to make the same more transparent, fair and objective, if necessary, by amending the relevant LR Manuals/Rules and Regulations on the subject”. This would imply the need for a consultation with the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court, as per the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court, and unless it is done the process would not be a fair, transparent and un-discriminatory. 36. With the above directions, the writ petition stands disposed.