JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant/defendant has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned District Judge, Una, in Civil Appeal No. 76 of 1997, dated 12.05.2003, vide which, learned Appellate Court while dismissing the appeal so filed by the present appellant upheld the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Court No. 1, Una, in Civil Suit No. 175/89, RBT No. 505/95/89, dated 30.04.1997, whereby learned trial Court had decreed the suit so filed by the present respondents/plaintiffs and held parties to be joint owner in possession of the suit land in equal shares as parties had perfected their title into ownership by afflux of time and it further held that mutations No. 1 and 2 were illegal and defendants were restrained from ousting the plaintiffs from the suit land. 2. This appeal was admitted on 08.10.2003 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the findings of the learned trial Court and first Appellate Court are based on misinterpretation and misreading of the evidence? 2. Whether the findings of the learned trial Court and first Appellate Court are perverse?” 3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of this appeal are that respondent/plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as ‘plaintiff’) filed a suit to the effect that Shiba @ Shiv Ram s/o Bhupa was the original owner of the suit land and in June 1950, he mortgaged the same with possession for a sum of Rs. 2,600/- to Atma Singh, father of the parties. Atma Singh remained in possession of same as a mortgagee till his death in the year 1980 and thereafter his five sons succeeded to his estate as his legal heirs and were in joint possession of the suit land in equal share. Khasra No. 1699 was a Tubewell which was sunk by plaintiffs at their own cost. Mortgage created by Shiba remained unredeemed and as the land was not redeemed within the prescribed period, the mortgagee had become full owner of the same by afflux of time. As per plaintiffs, Lakha son of Shiba on 11.11.1964 sold his interest in the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2 to the extent of ¾ share and in favour of defendant No. 1 to the extent of 1/4th share and mortgage money was kept with them. As per plaintiffs, Lakha son of Shiba on 11.11.1964 sold his interest in the suit land in favour of defendant No. 2 to the extent of ¾ share and in favour of defendant No. 1 to the extent of 1/4th share and mortgage money was kept with them. Defendants after such purchase of the suit land from Lakha had several occasions to redeem the suit land by releasing the mortgage amount to mortgagee. As per plaintiffs, after the death of Atma Singh, parties to the suit succeeded to the same as mortgagee and came in possession of the same and mortgage remained unredeemed during the period of limitation, as a result of which, parties of the suit became full owners of the suit land by afflux of time who earlier were mortgagees of the suit land. Thus, as per plaintiffs, defendants lost their all rights under sale deeds dated 11.11.1964. As per plaintiffs, defendants had secured fake redemption entries of mortgage in dispute vide mutations No. 1 and 2, dated 14.04.1988 by colluding with local Patwari and revenue authorities which mutations were attested at the back of plaintiffs. As per plaintiffs neither they received notice of mutation nor they had appeared before any authority or had received their monetary share in mortgage. As per plaintiffs order passed by Collector 2nd Grade, dated 14.4.1988 was thus illegal and without jurisdiction and in fact no redemption could be ordered after expiry of period of limitation. On these bases, the plaintiffs filed the suit praying for the following relief. “It is, therefore, prayed that decree for declaration to the effect that the parties are joint owners and joint possession of the land in suit in equal shares as detailed in the headnote of the plaint, situated in village Behdala Tehsil and District Una as entered in Jamabandi for the year 1987-88 having perfected ownership in it as mortgagee with possession by afflux of time and mutation No. 1 and 2 procured by defendants with the collusion of the revenue authorities are illegal without jurisdiction and have no binding effect on the rights of the plaintiffs with a consequential relief of permanent injuncti9on restraining the defendants from ousting the plaintiff from the suit land may please be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants with cost and any other relief the court may deem fit may please also be granted.” 4. Defendants No. 1 and 2 denied the claim of plaintiffs and stated in their written statement that defendant No. 2 was in possession of the suit land as its owner since the time of purchasing the same and that plaintiffs and defendants No. 1, 3 to 4 had no right or interest in the suit land. As per defendants No. 1 and 2 suit land was validly redeemed by defendant No. 2 on payment of Rs. 2600/- as redemption money to Shri Atma Singh vide receipt dated 01.06.1976 and plaintiffs and remaining defendants had no right or interest over the suit land and it was in fact defendant No. 2 who was exclusive owner in possession of the same. It was further the case of the defendants No. 1 and 2 that suit land was redeemed in the year 1976 well within the period of limitation and mutation was rightly attested in their favour. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues. “1.Whether the parties are joint owners in possession of the suit land in equal shares, as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether defendant No. 2 is exclusive owner in possession of the suit land, as alleged? OPD2 3. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to the equitable relief as alleged in preliminary objection No. 4 of the W.S.? OPD. 4. Whether the suit in the present form is not maintainable? OPD. 5. Whether plaintiffs have no locus-standi to file the present suit? OPD. 6. Whether plaintiffs have no cause of action? OPD. 7. Whether defendants are entitled to specific costs, as alleged? OPD 8. Relief.” 6. On the basis of evidence led by the parties both ocular as well as documentary in support of their respective cases, the issues so framed were answered by the learned trial Court as under. “Issue No.1 : Yes. Issue No.2 : No. Issue No.3 : No. Issue No.4 : No. Issue No.5 : No. Issue No.6 : No. Issue No.7 : No. Issue No.8 (Relief) : The suit is decreed as per operative portion of the Judgment.” 7. Vide its judgment and decree dated 30.04.1997, learned trial Court held that the execution of mortgage in favour of Atma Singh, father of the parties and further execution of sale deed in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 by Lakha s/o Shiba is not in dispute. Vide its judgment and decree dated 30.04.1997, learned trial Court held that the execution of mortgage in favour of Atma Singh, father of the parties and further execution of sale deed in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2 by Lakha s/o Shiba is not in dispute. Dispute was only regarding the validity of redemption of the suit land. Learned trial Court held that the case of the defendants was that they had purchased the suit land from Lakha s/o Shiba vide sale deed allegedly executed in the year 1964 and the payment of redemption was alleged to have been made on 01.06.1976. Learned trial Court further held that it was not understood as to what prevented the said defendants to make payment before 1976 and even if it was presumed that any payment was made in the year 1976 even then nothing was brought on record to show as to why mutation of redemption was not got sanctioned during the life time of mortgagee Atma Singh. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiffs had specifically pleaded that when sale deed was executed in the year 1964 then why suit land was not got redeemed till the year 1976 and if payment was presumably made in the year 1976 then why mutation of redemption was not sanctioned during the lifetime of Atma Singh. Learned trial Court also held that the written documents mentioned by DW1 which were purportedly executed before Tehsildar Una regarding payment made by his brothers were not produced by DW1. Learned trial Court also held that the receipt was also silent on the subject matter for which same was executed and no description of land which was redeemed was mentioned on it. Learned trial Court also held that defendants had not produced any witness in support of validity of receipt Ext. D-1 and as such, receipt Ext. D-1 seemed to be suspicious. It further held that if payment was in deed made then it was for the defendants to have had redeemed the land as early as possible but they took no steps to get suit land mutated during the life time of their father. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that inference which could be drawn was against the defendants that no receipt of redemption/payment was executed by them in favour of their father Atma Singh. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that inference which could be drawn was against the defendants that no receipt of redemption/payment was executed by them in favour of their father Atma Singh. Learned trial Court also held that defendants had not produced any local witness of the village to support their contentions that they were the owners in possession of the suit land. It further held that as redemption of the suit land by the defendants was not proved, it could not be said that mutations were rightly sanctioned in their favour. It further held that as defendants had failed to prove redemption and their contention regarding payment of mortgage amount having been made by defendant No. 2 to their father did not appear to be correct and appeared to be suspicious, therefore it was for the defendants to have had proved receipt Ext. D-1 but they had miserably failed to prove the redemption. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that inference that could be drawn was that as the suit land had not been redeemed within the period of limitation by the mortgagor, the parties are joint owners and in joint possession of the suit land in equal shares and defendant No. 2 had failed to prove his exclusive possession as owner over the suit land. 8. Feeling aggrieved by the findings so returned by the learned trial Court, defendant No. 2 Karam Singh filed the appeal. 9. Learned Appellate Court vide its judgment and decree dated 12.05.2003 held that pleadings demonstrated that suit land was admittedly mortgaged by one Shiba in the year 1950 in favour of Atma Singh, father of the original parties to the suit and Atma Singh admittedly had died in the year 1980 and during his life time there was no sanction of mutation regarding redemption of suit land. Learned Appellate Court also held that there was no mention of receipt Ext. D-1 dated 01.06.1976 in mutations Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4 dated 14.04.1988 which was being relied upon by the defendants. Learned Appellate Court also held that there was no mention of receipt Ext. D-1 dated 01.06.1976 in mutations Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4 dated 14.04.1988 which was being relied upon by the defendants. Learned Appellate Court also held that it was settled principle of law that mortgage can be redeemed with or without intervention of the Court and a mortgagee can always pay mortgage consideration or money without the intervention of the Court and if this fact is proved from the evidence on record, the mortgage would be deemed to be redeemed. Learned Appellate Court further held that since Atma Singh had admittedly died on 20.04.1980, which was evident from death certificate Ext. D-2 and Ext. D-1, the purported receipt was written on 01.06.1976, however the same was never brought to the notice of Revenue Officers for the purpose of sanctioning of mutation and mutations Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4, dated 14.4.1988 also demonstrated that there was no mention of receipt Ext. D-1, dated 01.06.1976 at the time of sanctioning as the said mutations. Learned Appellate Court held that had the mortgage consideration of Rs. 2600/- been paid to Atma Singh on the basis of receipt Ext. D-1, dated 1.6.1976, then the revenue officer would have certainly mentioned this fact in mutations Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4. Learned Appellate Court held that there was nothing in the said mutations to show as to when the mortgage consideration of Rs. 2600/- was received by Atma Singh during his life time and strangely immediately after death of Atma Singh the question of payment of mortgage consideration was raised by the defendants. On these bases, it was concluded by learned Appellate Court that mortgage consideration was not proved to be paid on the basis of receipt Ext. D-1 or on the basis of mutations Ext. D-3 and Ext. D-4. Learned Appellate Court further held that due execution of receipt Ext. D-1 had not been proved as the same was shrouded with suspicious circumstances and much reliance could not be placed upon the testimony of Hardev Singh (DW2) who appeared to be an interested witness being close to defendant Karam Singh. D-3 and Ext. D-4. Learned Appellate Court further held that due execution of receipt Ext. D-1 had not been proved as the same was shrouded with suspicious circumstances and much reliance could not be placed upon the testimony of Hardev Singh (DW2) who appeared to be an interested witness being close to defendant Karam Singh. It further held that after conclusion of arguments on application filed by respondent/plaintiff Piar Singh under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one affidavit was sought to be filed by plaintiff Piar Singh and filing of said affidavit was not opposed by the appellant. 10. Learned Appellate Court also held that it was clear from the contents of said affidavit of Piar Singh that plaintiff had made a declaration that land measuring 0-16-38 sq. metres comprised in Khewat No. 286, Khatauni No. 529 and Khasra No. 1241 as entered in jamabandi for the year 1987-88 had never been part of the mortgaged land with the father of deponent by Shiv Ram son of Bhupa in the year 1950, thus the controversy stood narrowed down as it is made clear that land mentioned in para 2 of the said affidavit shall not be deemed to be part of mortgaged land. It further held that the land sold by Avtar Singh and Jagtar Singh sons of defendant No. 1 Dharam Singh vide sale deed dated 20.06.2002 bearing Khasra No. 1241, measuring 0-16-38 sq. metres situate in village Behdala, Tehsil and District Una as entered in jamabandi for the year 1987-88 shall be free from encumbrances and plaintiffs would have no legal right or interest over this parcel of land. On these bases, learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal filed by the present appellant and upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. 11. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and also gone through the records of the case as well as judgments passed by both the learned Courts below. 12. I will deal with both substantial questions of law together. 13. A perusal of the plaint demonstrates that the case set up by the plaintiffs was that the suit land was mortgaged by its original owner namely Shiba @ Shiv Ram, s/o Bhupa with possession for a sum of Rs. 12. I will deal with both substantial questions of law together. 13. A perusal of the plaint demonstrates that the case set up by the plaintiffs was that the suit land was mortgaged by its original owner namely Shiba @ Shiv Ram, s/o Bhupa with possession for a sum of Rs. 2600/- in favour of Atma Singh, father of the parties and that Atma Singh remained in possession of suit land as a mortgagee till his death in the year 1980 and his five sons succeeded to his estate as his legal heirs and were coming thereafter in joint possession of the same in equal share. It was however the case put up in the written statement by defendants that mortgage so created by Shiba was redeemed before the filing of the suit. Contention of plaintiff has find favour with both learned Courts below who have concurrently held that mortgage created by Shiba remained unredeemed within the prescribed period and thus mortgagees had become full owner of the suit land by afflux of time. 14. Article 61 of the Limitation Act prescribes that period of limitation to redeem or recover possession of immoveable property mortgaged is 30 years from the time when the right to redeem or recovery of possession accrues. 15. A three judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram (dead) through Legal representatives versus Sheo Ram and Others, (2014) 9 Supreme Court Cases 185 has held that while Article 61 of the Limitation Act refers to right to redeem or recover possession, right of mortgagor to redeem is dealt with under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 62 of the same was only applicable only to usufructuary mortgages and not to any other mortgage. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that right of usufructuary mortgagor though styled as “right to recover possession” is for all purposes, the right to redeem or recover possession. Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that right of usufructuary mortgagor though styled as “right to recover possession” is for all purposes, the right to redeem or recover possession. It has further held that thus while in case of any other mortgage, right to redeem is covered under Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act, however, in case of usufructuary mortgage, right to redeem and recover possession is dealt with under Section 62 of Transfer of Property Act and special right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein i.e. when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that this distinction in a usufructuary mortgage and any other mortgage is clearly borne out from the provisions of Sections 58, 60 and 62 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that usufructuary mortgage cannot be treated on par with any other mortgage, as doing so would defeat the scheme of Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act and said right of usufructuary mortgage is not equitable right but it has statutory recognition under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. It has been further held by Honble Supreme Court that in case of usufructuary mortgage, mere expiry of a period of 30 years from the date of creation of the mortgage does not extinguish the right of the mortgagor under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in para 62 of the judgment as under. Hon’ble Supreme Court further held in para 62 of the judgment as under. “Right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession.- In the case of a usufructuary mortgage, the mortgagor has a right to recover possession of the property together with the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee (a) where the mortgagee is authorized to pay himself the mortgage money from the rents and profits of the property,-- when such money is paid; (b) where the mortgagee is authorized to pay himself from such rents and profits or any part thereof a part only of the mortgage money, when the term (if any) prescribed for the payment of the mortgage money has expired and the mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee the mortgage money or the balance thereof or deposits it in court hereinafter provided.” 16. By placing heavy reliance upon this judgment, Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant has argued that as it has been clearly and categorically laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court that the period of limitation to redeem the mortgage is not to commence from the date of creation of mortgage, the judgment and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below are perverse as they are contrary to the law as it stands declared on the subject by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. Mr. Thakur urged that this appeal was liable to be allowed on this count alone. 17. On the other hand, Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 argued that the judgment being relied upon by the appellants was not applicable in the facts of the present case because the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court was only in case of usufructuary mortgage and the present case is not case of usufructuary mortgage. On these bases, it was urged by Mr. Sharma that as the appellant otherwise could not point out any infirmity or perversity with the findings returned by both learned Court below vis-à-vis the material placed on record by the parties, the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below do not warrant any interference. 18. In the background of submissions made above, it has to be decided by this Court firstly as to whether the mortgage in issue is usufructuary mortgage or not. 19. 18. In the background of submissions made above, it has to be decided by this Court firstly as to whether the mortgage in issue is usufructuary mortgage or not. 19. Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act contemplates various kinds of mortgages i.e. simple mortgage, mortgage by conditional sale, usufructuary mortgage etc. Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that where the mortgagor delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage money, the transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee. 20. Thus conditions precedent for a mortgagee to be an usufructuary mortgagee inter alia are that a mortgagee either delivers possession or expressly or by implication binds himself to deliver possession of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage money, and to receive the rents and profits accruing from the property or any part of such rents and profits and to appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage money, or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of the mortgage money. Such transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee. 21. Coming to the facts of the present case. It stands established on record that possession of the mortgaged property was delivered by the mortgagor to the mortgagee and it can also be inferred from the records that mortgagor had authorized the mortgagee to retain such possession until payment of mortgage money. However, there is no material on record from which it can be inferred that the mortgagor had authorized mortgagee to receive rents and profits accruing from the property and appropriate the same in lieu of interest, or in payment of the mortgage money or partly in lieu of interest or partly in payment of mortgage money. 22. Section 62 of the Transfer of property Act provides as under. “62. 22. Section 62 of the Transfer of property Act provides as under. “62. In the case of a usufractuary mortgage, the mortgagor has a right to recover possession of the property together with the mortgage deed and all documents relating to the mortgaged property which are in the possession or power of the mortgagee,-- (a) where the mortgagee is authorized to pay himself the mortgage money from the rents and profits of the property,-- when such money is paid; (b) Whether the mortgage is authorized to payment himself from such rents and profits or any part thereof a part only of the mortgage money, when the term (if any) prescribed for the payment of the mortgage money has expired and the mortgagor pays or tenders to the mortgagee the mortgage money or the balance thereof or deposits it in Court hereinafter provided.” Thus, as per Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession of the property accrues if all the conditions as contemplated in clause (a) or Clause (b) of the said Section are fulfilled. 23. The mere fact that possession was given by the mortgagee over certain property does not necessarily show that the mortgage was a usufructuary mortgage as defined in the Transfer of Property Act (see Jangali Singh v. Ramjag Singh, AIR 1944, Allahabad 198). 24. Mere possession of land does not amounts to a mortgage being usufructuary mortgage unless it is shown that the income of the land was to be apportioned towards the payment of interest or partly towards the payment of principal or partly towards payment of interest. 25. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narpatchand A. Bhandari, v. Shantilal Moolshankar Jani and another, AIR 1993 Supreme Court 1712 has held that as could be seen from the definition of ‘usufructuary mortgagee’ in clause (d) of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, an usufructuary mortgagee is a transferee of a right to possession of the mortgaged property and the right to receive the rents and profits accruing from such property. 26. 26. In view of above discussion and law cited above including law declared by three judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram’s case referred supra, it is evident that it is only in a case of usufructuary mortgagee that special right of usufructuary mortgagor to recover possession commences in the manner specified therein i.e. when mortgage money is paid out of rents and profits or partly out of rents and profits and partly by payment or deposit by mortgagor, until limitation does not start for purposes of Article 61 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. However, this is not so for other mortgages. 27. Coming to the facts of the present case. It is apparent and evident from the material on record including the averments made in the plaint and the written statement that the mortgage in issue was not usufructuary mortgage as defined in clauses (a) to (d) of Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the absence of said mortgage being a usufructuary mortgage, the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram’s case is not applicable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the findings returned by both the learned Courts below to the effect that suit land has not been redeemed within the period of limitation by the mortgagor and accordingly, the parties are joint owners and in joint possession of the suit land in equal shares. 28. Besides this, there are concurrent findings returned against the present appellant by both the learned Courts below that defendant No. 2 failed to prove his exclusive possession as owner over the suit land. There are also concurrent findings returned against the appellant by both the learned Courts below that defendant No. 2 has failed to adduce any direct evidence qua the execution of receipt Ext. D-1. Both learned Courts below have held that plaintiffs have successfully proved that execution of receipt of payment Ext. D-1 was doubtful and defendants failed to explain as to why the suit land was not got mutated if the same was in fact redeemed on 01.06.1976 during the life time of their father Atma Singh. 29. D-1. Both learned Courts below have held that plaintiffs have successfully proved that execution of receipt of payment Ext. D-1 was doubtful and defendants failed to explain as to why the suit land was not got mutated if the same was in fact redeemed on 01.06.1976 during the life time of their father Atma Singh. 29. During the course of arguments, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant also could not demonstrate as to how these findings returned by both learned Courts below were contrary to the records and thus perverse or are bad in terms of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Singh Ram’s case referred to above. Therefore, it cannot be said that the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below are based on misinterpretation and misreading of the evidence or are perverse. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 30. In view of discussion held above, as there is no merit in the present appeal, the same is therefore dismissed. No orders as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, also stands disposed of.