Parmeshwar Yadav @ Parmeshwar Gope, son of Sri Mukhan Yadav v. State of Bihar
2017-02-17
NAVANITI PRASAD SINGH
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. 1. This case has been especially assigned to this Bench by order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice. 2. This case, when originally had come up For Admission, this Court had issued notice by order dated 17.07.2008 to the pre-emptors who are private respondents. They have since appeared but have chosen not to file a counter affidavit as matters are matters of record. 3. The writ petitioners are the vendees who had purchased the lands which are all agricultural lands. The vendors, the vendees and the pre-emptors are first and second cousins respectively being descendants from a common ancestor. The petitioners had purchased land vide three separate sale deeds from Chothan Yadav, the late husband of Jamuni Devi and Jamuni Devi herself. These sales, through the sale deeds, are sought to be preempted by respondents No 7 and 8. Respondent No 7 died in course of the proceedings before this Court and is duly substituted and they are all represented. 4. It is not in dispute that so far as the pre-emptors and vendors are concerned, they are first cousins, their grandfather being Gajadhar Gope. The vendees are grandsons of Liladhar Gope. Liladhar Gope and Gajadhar Gope were own brothers. 5. Upon preemption application being filed in respect of the said three sale deeds, the petitioners (purchasers) took an objection that, as required by law mandatorily, the amount of consideration + 10% has to be deposited and receipt thereof annexed to the preemption application which application has to be filed within 90 days of the registration of the sale deeds. The objection was, that in fact in respect of the lands covered by the three sale deeds, no amount whatsoever was deposited within the statutory period. The second objection taken was that in the sale deed itself, it was shown that the petitioners were boundary raiyats as well and the third objection was that the pre-emptors were not boundary raiyats and their claim that their group, that is, descendants of Gajadhar Gope were all undivided and, as such, in respect of those lands, pre-emptors were co-sharers, was a wrong plea as there had been partition in that family and as per lands allotted, the pre-emptors were not boundary raiyats. The sale deeds are of the year, 2001.
The sale deeds are of the year, 2001. Upon notice and objection being taken by the petitioners in the year 2003, the pre-emptors realized the mistake that in respect of lands covered by the three sale deeds, no money had been deposited. The mistake was that though they had intended to deposit the money but they gave description of lands which was in some other area and did not appertain to the lands covered by the sale deeds. They sought for correction but all this happened more than two years after the sale deed and long after the mandatory period of 90 days. The DCLR, noting this issue itself, held that in respect of lands covered by the sale deeds, no deposit having been made within 90 days, as mandatorily required, the preemption application must fail. The DCLR further held that the pre-emptors were not co-sharers of the boundary land and, as such, they could not be termed as boundary raiyat. He, thus, dismissed the preemption application. He also held that they were not co-sharers obviously as there had been partition. This order was not interfered with by the appellate Court of Additional Collector. The pre-emptors, being unsuccessful, filed a revision before the Board of Revenue. The learned Member, Board of Revenue has reversed the order of the DCLR and the Additional Collector and, hence, the writ petition. 6. On behalf of the writ petitioners, it is submitted that the period of 90 days to deposit the consideration + 10% is a mandatory stipulation and has to be scrupulously complied with, preemption being a weak right. Admittedly, on the pleadings of the parties, the consideration and 10% of the amount was not deposited in respect of the lands which were sought to be preempted, the plot number was different, the area was different. No part of the land described, in respect of which money was being deposited, was covered by the sale deed. They were of different revenue thanas. It is almost two years later, the correction was sought for. The fact remains that within the period of limitation, neither the money was deposited in respect of lands covered by the sale deed nor even application for correction was made nor in fact correction allowed. This, in my view, is sufficient to disentitle the right of preemption.
It is almost two years later, the correction was sought for. The fact remains that within the period of limitation, neither the money was deposited in respect of lands covered by the sale deed nor even application for correction was made nor in fact correction allowed. This, in my view, is sufficient to disentitle the right of preemption. It must be remembered that though preemption is a statutory right, it has serious adverse consequences on bona fide transactions. Therefore, Courts have repeatedly held that there has to be strict compliance of the provisions to invoke the right of preemption and defeat someone's legitimate purchase. 7. This Court would, thus, allow the writ petition and set aside the order of Board of Revenue on this issue itself. The other issues need not be gone into. The writ petition is allowed.