JUDGMENT : Ashok Kumar Gaur, J. The petitioner, who is working as a Stenographer in Police Department, has challenged the action of the respondents of initiating process for his compulsory retirement as per Rule 53 (1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services Pension Rules, 1996 (hereafter called, “Rules of 1996”). The petitioner has prayed that the impugned action of the respondents based on letter dated 06.11.2017 (Annex.8) and 16.11.2017 (Annx.7) for compulsory retirement may be quashed and set aside. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed as L.D.C. in 1981 and thereafter, he was appointed as Stenographer on 04.01.1982 and since July, 1992, the petitioner is posted in Police Department. 3. The facts mentioned in the petition, reveals that petitioner claims himself to be possessing unblemished and spotless service record but he alleges that when he was posted as Personal Assistant under one Superintendent of Police, who is respondent No. 5 in the present petition arrayed by name, he deliberately entered adverse entry in Annual Performance Assessment Report of the petitioner for the period from 01.04.2012 to 19.10.2013. The petitioner has further alleged that the said officer also issued 5 charge-sheets to the petitioner and also passed penalty order against him. The petitioner has asserted in his petition that in his entire service career, there are 5 charge-sheet under Rule 17 of the CCA Rules for minor penalty and as such, the service record of the petitioner does not make him a dead wood for the purpose of initiating the process of compulsory retirement. 4. The petitioner has further submitted and given details about his appreciation letters and awards given to him and petitioner has submitted that against the penalty orders and adverse entries in Annual Appraisal Report, the petitioner has filed different writ petitions i.e. SBCWP NOs. 14254/2015, 10487/2014, 11661/2014, 9555/2016 and 10668/2014, which are pending consideration before this Court. 5. 4. The petitioner has further submitted and given details about his appreciation letters and awards given to him and petitioner has submitted that against the penalty orders and adverse entries in Annual Appraisal Report, the petitioner has filed different writ petitions i.e. SBCWP NOs. 14254/2015, 10487/2014, 11661/2014, 9555/2016 and 10668/2014, which are pending consideration before this Court. 5. The grievance in the present petition is with regard to letter dated 06.11.2017 which has been written by Director General of Police (Headquarter) to Superintendent of Police, Sirohi whereby the information has been sought with respect to the service details of the petitioner and in particular there are 7 different orders mentioned in the said order, against which details have been sought and subject mentioned in the letter is “action to be taken against the petitioner under Rule 53 (1) of the Rules of 1996”. The relevant part of the order dated 06.11.2017 is reproduced as hereunder:— ^^iqfyl v/kh{kd] ftyk fljksghA fo"k; % jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼isa’ku½ fu;e] 1996 ds fu;e 53¼1½ ds vUrxZr vfuok;Z lsokfuo`r djus ckcrA egksn;] mijksDr ofj"B 'kklu mi lfpo] x`g foHkkx] jktLFkku t;iqj ls izkIr i= Øekad i&2¼57½x`g&1@2016 fnukad 19&09&2017 ,oa fof'k"V 'kklu lfpo] fof/k ,oa fof/kd dk;Z foHkkx ¼fo/kk;h izk:i.k½ ls izkIr v0'kk0 Vhi Øekad 277 fnukad 04&07&2017 dh izfr ,oa lsok&iqfLrdk rFkk futh i=koyh layXu Hkstdj ys[k gS fd Vhi esa of.kZr fcUnqokj lwpuk vfoyEc miyC/k djkus dk Je djkos& Ø-la- uke deZpkjh@firk dk uke e; in fooj.k 1 Jh v’kQkd eksgEen@lqYrku eksgEen 1& bZvksch ua0 183 fnukad 08-03-2011 2& bZvksch ua0 286 fnukad 05-03-2013 3& bZvksch ua0 344 fnukad 30-04-2013 4& bZvksch ua0 1045 fnukad 31-12-2013 5& bZvksch ua0 443 fnukad 18-07-2014 6& vkns’k fnukad 26-02-1995 7& vkns’k fnukad 27-10-2017 mDr deZpkjh }kjk feyh ltkvksa ds fo:) ;fn vihy dh gS] rks vihy esa gq;s fu.kZ; dh izfr miyC/k djkosA ;fn vihy esa ugha dh gS rks mldh lwpuk ls Hkh voxr djkosaA 6. The petitioner has further grievance that on the basis of said letter, the Superintendent of Police, Sirohi had written him a letter asking the information about the punishments, which have been imposed upon the petitioner during the service and whether petitioner has filed appeals against those punishments or not. The petitioner has been asked to send information on the same day, on which the said letter was issued to him i.e. 16.11.2017. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. The petitioner has been asked to send information on the same day, on which the said letter was issued to him i.e. 16.11.2017. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Tanveer Ahmed, has submitted that two impugned letters/orders make it very clear that respondents are determined to retire petitioner compulsorily by invoking Rule 53 (1) of the Rules of 1996. 8. Mr. Tanveer submits that the details which are given in the letter dated 06.11.2017 do not implicate the petitioner in any manner for a major misconduct and the petitioner has been punished only with minor penalty of stoppage of two grade annual increment in respect of D.O.B. No. 183 dt. 08.03.2011, D.O.B. No. 286 dt. 05.03.2013, D.O.B. 344 dt. 30.04.2013, D.O.B. 1045 dt. 31.12.2013. The counsel submits that in D.O.B. No. 443 dt. 18.07.2014, only waning has been given to the petitioner. 9. The counsel submits that petitioner is also facing a departmental enquiry for major penalty under Rule 16 of the CCA Rules and respondents without taking the departmental enquiry to a logical end want to adopt a shortcut method and to punish the petitioner by way of compulsory retirement. 10. The counsel submits that as far as different penalty orders are concerned, this Court is already ceased with those matters and notices have been issued in all petitions. The counsel submits that the order of compulsory retirement is bound to be passed in view of the preparation made by the respondents by asking the details of service record of the petitioner. 11. The counsel submits that this Court should exercise power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India even against the threatened action which would ultimately be taken against the petitioner. The counsel relies upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of D.A.V. College, Bhatinda etc. v. The State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1971 SC 1731 and counsel submits that as per the law of the Supreme Court, if a prima facie case is made out that fundamental rights are either threatened or violated, petition is required to be entertained by the Court and it is not necessary for any person who considers himself to be aggrieved, to wait till the actual threat has taken place. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted as hereunder:— “5. The relevant portion of the judgment is quoted as hereunder:— “5. A preliminary objection has been urged on behalf of the Respondents that in a Petition under Article 32, only where it is shown that there is a violation of fundamental right that the validity of the legislation or of the legislative competence can be raised and determined, but in these cases as there is no violation of Article 14, 26, 29 and 30 of the Constitution the Petitioners ought not be allowed to challenge the vires of the Act on the ground of the competence of the legislature to enact the impugned law. This question has been dealt with fully in the batch of petitions in which we have just pronounced Judgment, where we had also considered the contentions of the learned Advocate General of Punjab and Shri Tarkunde, the learned Counsel for Respondents 2 in this behalf and hence we do not purpose again to reiterate the reasons in support of the conclusion that a petition under Article 32 in which petitioners make out a prima facie case that their fundamental rights are either threatened or violated will be entertained by this Court and that it is not necessary for any person who considers himself to be aggrieved to wait till the actual threat has taken place. On the. other objection that the Arya Samaj is neither a linguistic or religious minority nor is it a religious denomination we held that it was unnecessary to go into the question of whether it is a separate religious denomination for the purpose of Article 26 (1) (a) or a linguistic minority for the purposes of Article 30 (1) because in our view it would be sufficient for the petitioners if they could establish that they had a distinct script of their own and they were a religious minority, to invoke the protection of Article 29 (1) and 30 (1). We had in those Writ Petitions held that what constitutes a linguistic or religious minority must be judged in relation to the State inasmuch as the impugned Act is a State Act and not in relation to the whole of India. We had in those Writ Petitions held that what constitutes a linguistic or religious minority must be judged in relation to the State inasmuch as the impugned Act is a State Act and not in relation to the whole of India. In this view we rejected the several contentions which are also urged in these petitions namely that Hindus being a majority in India are not a religious minority in ‘Punjab and held that the Arya Samajis who are part of the Hindu community in Punjab are a religious minority and that they had a distinct script of their own the Devnagri which entitled them to invoke the guarantees under the aforesaid provisions of the Constitution.” 12. The counsel has further relied upon the judgment Patna High Court in the case of Bhuvaneshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar & Ors, passed in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 342 of 1994 on 05.07.1994. The counsel submits that the Patna High Court has also held that if there is a violation or even a threat to the fundamental right, the person is free to invoke the jurisdiction of writ court and as such, even in a given case, on apprehension writ petition is maintainable. The relevant para of the judgment is reproduced as hereunder:— “19. In that view of the matter, it is clear that when petitioner has approached this Court, against a threatened demolition of his residential house, it can be said to be a threat to his fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution. When one's fundamental right is threatened, the person concerned can approach a Court of law and need not wait till such threat is translated into reality. This is the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of D.A.V. College, Bhatinda v. State of Punjab reported in AIR 1971 SC 1731 . In paragraph 5, page 1733, the Court held: “that a petition under Article 32 in which petitioners make out a prima facie case that their fundamental rights are either threatened or violated will be entertained by this Court and that it is not necessary for any person who considers himself to be aggrieved to wait till the actual threat has taken place.” 20. There fore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the writ petition is based on apprehension and as such it can not be entertained is far too puerile to receive any serious consideration.” 13. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Roop Chand v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1503 where the Supreme Court has said that when a threat is sufficiently serious, a person/petitioner is not bound to wait till his right has actually been affected and more particularly if it is not disputed that it would inevitably be affected. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner 15. The present petition challenges the action which may be taken on the basis of letters dated 06.11.2017 and 16.11.2017 where information has been sought about service record of the petitioner from the S.P. concerned and further, petitioner has been asked to supply information about the appeals which he has filed against the penalty orders. In the opinion of the Court, the exercise of writing letter or collecting details about service career of the petitioner, do not give cause of action at present to challenge the inter-depart-mental communication and further, explanation from the petitioner. The authorities may take a final view after considering the entire service record of the petitioner and at present, the exercise, which is undertaken, can not be, subject matter of challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 16. The reliance on judgments of the Apex Court, this Court finds that the Apex Court has held that where there is violation of fundamental right or threat to a fundamental right, petition under Article 32 is maintainable before the Apex Court. In the humble opinion of the Court, the said judgment on issue of fundamental rights may not be applicable in the instant case. In the present matter, the employer has to take a final view about any order, which might be passed or might not be passed against the petitioner. The Court at this stage cannot pre-empt any authority to pass the order. 17. The Court finds that the present writ petition has been filed at a premature stage and no final action adversely affecting the rights of the petitioner is taken. The Court has to confine its decision to the existing facts and may not enter into assumptions and inferences. 17. The Court finds that the present writ petition has been filed at a premature stage and no final action adversely affecting the rights of the petitioner is taken. The Court has to confine its decision to the existing facts and may not enter into assumptions and inferences. The petitioner has approached this Court at premature stage and as such, the Court may not enter into merits of the matter, as has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. The Apex Court in the case of Chanan Singh v. Registrar, Co-op. Societies, Punjab, reported in AIR 1976 Supreme Court 1821 has held that writ petitions are not to be entertained at premature stage and if no punitive action is taken, only on speculation, writ cannot lie. Para 4, 5 & 6 of the judgment is quoted as hereunder:— “4. The first point raised in objection by the second respondent is that the writ petition is premature since no action has been taken finally against the appellant, the disciplinary proceedings are still pending and the explanation of the appellant is under consideration. It is only in the event of the appellant being punished that any grievance can arise for him to be agitated in the proper forum. 5. Other obstacles in the way of granting the appellant relief were also urged before the High Court and before us, but we are not inclined to investigate them for the short reason that the writ petition was in any case premature. No punitive action has yet been taken. It is difficult to state, apart from speculation, what the outcome of the proceedings will be. In case the appellant is punished, it is certainly open to him either to file an appeal as provided in the relevant rules or to take other action that he may be advised to resort to. It is not for us, at the moment, to consider whether a writ petition will lie or whether an industrial dispute should be raised or whether an appeal to the competent authority under the rules is the proper remedy, although these are issues which merit serious consideration. 6. It is not for us, at the moment, to consider whether a writ petition will lie or whether an industrial dispute should be raised or whether an appeal to the competent authority under the rules is the proper remedy, although these are issues which merit serious consideration. 6. We are satisfied that, enough unto the day being the evil thereof, we need not dwell on problems which do not arise in the light of the view we take that there is no present grievance of punitive action which can be ventilated in court. After all, even the question of jurisdiction to re-open what is claimed to be a closed enquiry will, and must, be considered by the Managing Director. On this score, we dismiss the appeal but, in the circumstances, without costs.” 19. In the opinion of the Court, if any action is taken against the petitioner, which ultimately affects his right, he is always free to approach the Court for redressal of his grievance, however, at this juncture to conclude that respondents will come out with order of compulsory retirement, the Court is unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even initiation of process is bad and writing is on the wall that petitioner would be punished by way of compulsory retirement, the Court finds it difficult at this juncture to draw a conclusion that even this exercise will ultimately result into passing of the order of compulsory retirement. 20. The court is also not supposed to comment upon the exercise, which is being initiated or whether the material which is being collected against the petitioner is sufficient or not for taking action for compulsory retirement. In the result, the writ petition is devoid of merit and the same is dismissed.