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2017 DIGILAW 276 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Patel Dushyantkumar

2017-02-03

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has preferred present criminal appeal feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 27.04.2005 passed by learned Extra Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana in Sessions Case No. 127 of 2004. 2. Brief facts of the prosecution is that the complainant Nilamben Barot, w/o. Subhashbhai Anandbhai Barot, resident of village: Visnagar has filed a complaint before Visnagar Police Station, vide C.R.I. No. 86 of 2003 for the offences punishable under Sections 307, 326, 447, 504, 114 of IPC read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. By the complainant, it has been asserted that on 15.3.2003 at about 9-45 PM at night, accused No. 1 to 3 gave filthy abuses to the complainant by saying that why did you reprimanded us prior to two to three days. Therefore, in reply to the same husband of the complainant told that why did you call girls from outside which is not permitted in society. Therefore, accused persons got enraged and accused Dushyantbhai Patel has inflicted blow of Trishul and knife to the complainant on left shoulder and at the same time, as husband of the complainant came there and intervened, the accused Amitbhai Bhikhabhai had inflicted blow of knife on back as well as on right side of back. It is further the case of prosecution that accused Kiranben has also inflicted blow of stick on head of complainant and as the quarrel was increasing, the mother in law as well as other relative of the complainant has intervened and save the complainant from further beatings. Thus, all the accused persons in abatement of each other assaulted upon complainant and prosecution witnesses with deadly weapons with clear intention to cause death of the complainant. Thereafter, injured was taken to Government Hospital and complaint was filed before A.S.I. The Investigating Officer pursuant to said complaint has recorded statement of witnesses and took appropriate steps by executing panchnama and by recording statement of witnesses and after completion of detailed investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed. Since the case was to be conducted by the Sessions, the same was committed to the Sessions under Section 209 of the IPC, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 127 of 2004. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after receipt of the said case, has framed the charges against accused persons vide Exh. Since the case was to be conducted by the Sessions, the same was committed to the Sessions under Section 209 of the IPC, which was registered as Sessions Case No. 127 of 2004. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after receipt of the said case, has framed the charges against accused persons vide Exh. 8 and since the accused persons have pleaded not guilty, the guilt was recorded and the case was put up for trial. 3. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the evidences and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which read as under:- S. N. PW Exh Name of PW Particulars 1 2 19 Nilamben Subhashchandra Barot Complainant 2 5 30 Subhashbhai Anandbhai Barot Husband of complainant and injured witness 3 1 14 Makwana Mahendrabhai Motibhai Panch witness 4 6 31 Patel Vishnubhai Ambalal PW of scene of offence 5 7 33 Patel Natwarlal Shankarlal PW of recovery of weapon 6 8 35 Patel Dahyabhai Ishwarbhai PW 7 9 37 Pathan Pirkhan Allarakhha PW 8 13 55 Natwarlal Shankarlal Patel PW of recovery of weapon from accused Dushyant 9 3 21 Dr. Mansangbhai Laljibhai Chaudhari Medical officer, Visnagar General Hospital 10 4 24 Dr. Arvindbhai Kantilal Kapadia Medical officer General Hospital Mehsana 11 10 40 Dr. Mustak Mahm Gulam Rasul Medical officer, Civil Hospital Ahmedabad 12 11 45 Himmatsinh Bhupatsinh Rajput PI, Visnagar Police Station List of document : Exhibit Particulars 15 Panchnama of Injured witness Subhashbhai Barot 20 Complaint files by Nilamben 22 Certificate of injured witness Subhashbhai Barot 23 Medical certificate of Visnagar Hospital of Nilamben Barot 26 Medical certificate of Mehsana Civil Hospital of Subhashbhai Barot 27 Case papers of Nilamben from Mehsana Civil Hospital 28 Case papers and X-ray plates 29 Certificate of Nilamben from Mehsana Hospital 32 Panchnama of scene of offence 34 Panchnama of recovery of weapon 36 Panchnama of recovery of muddamal 43 Certificate of treatment of Subhashbhai Barot from Ahmedabad Civil Hospital 46 Panchnama of recovery of weapon from Dushyantbhai 47 Notice of District Magistrate 48 Despetch note 49 Yadi of FSL to Visnagar  Police Station 50 Letter of FSL to Visnagar Police Inspector 51 FSL report sent to Police Inspector 52 Serological report 53 Deputation purshis 56 Closure purshis 4. After leading the evidence, the prosecution has given closure purshis and subsequently further statement also came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Code. During the course of trial, the depositions have been analyzed by learned Additional Sessions Judge and upon examination of the documentary evidences as well as oral evidences, the issues which were framed, were dealt with by learned Additional Sessions Judge and after considering overall material on record, learned Extra Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana, was pleased to pass the judgment and order dated 27.4.2005, whereby, in exercise of powers under Section 235(1) of the Cr.P.C., the accused Nos. 1 to 4 are acquitted of the charges under Sections 447, 504, 326, 307 and 114 of IPC read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 5. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of challenge in the present Criminal Appeal filed by State. The present Criminal Appeal appears to have been admitted on 4.2.2008, which came up for final disposal. 6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Chintan Dave appearing for the State has vehemently contended that there is cogent evidence on record and thereby, learned Judge has committed grave error of law and jurisdiction whereby the order of acquittal came to be passed. 7. Shri Dave, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has drawn the attention of this Court to the specific charge, which has been framed against accused persons and has contended that injured eyewitness, who was examined by the prosecution at Exh. 19, has specifically established and supported the case of prosecution. Mr. Dave has also pointed out that on the basis of evidence of injured eyewitness itself, the motive put up by the prosecution has been established and entire narration of incident is corroborated by cogent material on record and therefore, the order of acquittal, which has been passed, is erroneous in nature. Shri Dave has further pointed out that the medical evidence, which is adduced by the prosecution witness, also supported the case of prosecution and therefore, for contending this, Mr. Dave, has referred the deposition of Dr. Mansangbhai Laljibhai Chaudhari, who was a Medical Officer at Visnagar General Hospital, whose deposition is referred as prosecution witness No. 3. Shri Dave has further pointed out that the medical evidence, which is adduced by the prosecution witness, also supported the case of prosecution and therefore, for contending this, Mr. Dave, has referred the deposition of Dr. Mansangbhai Laljibhai Chaudhari, who was a Medical Officer at Visnagar General Hospital, whose deposition is referred as prosecution witness No. 3. The opinion given by this doctor witness has specifically conveyed that the injury, which has been caused, can cause with sharp cutting weapon and it has also been conveyed by this witness that if proper treatment is not made available, these injuries can cause the death and therefore, by referring the deposition of this witness, Mr. Dave has contended that the version of prosecution is sufficient to corroborate the case of prosecution. Shri Dave has further contended that this Medical Officer has clearly admitted in his cross-examination that all these injuries, which have been caused, on account of which, there must have been profuse bleeding and these injuries can be done with deadly sharp cutting weapon in nature and therefore, when the medical evidence is supporting the case of prosecution, learned trial Judge has committed grave error in passing the order of acquittal. 8. Shri Dave, learned APP has further contended that on the basis of evidence of Dr. Arvindbhai Kantilal Kapadia, who was examined as prosecution witness No. 4, has also specifically opined that the injuries which have been caused are sufficient enough to succumb the death, if no proper medical treatment is meted out. Mr. Dave, has pointed out that when these injured witnesses were treated, they were completely in conscious state of affairs and therefore, since the evidences of injured witnesses has supported the case of prosecution, there appears to be hardly cogent material available for learned Judge to pass the order of acquittal and therefore, this error committed by learned Additional Sessions Judge deserve to be corrected. 9. Mr. Dave, has further drawn our attention to the evidence of another witness, who was examined as PW-5, Subhash Anandbhai Barot at Exh. 30, and by relying upon this witness, learned APP has submitted that this witness has clearly supported the case of prosecution and therefore, order of acquittal could not have been passed. Ultimately, Mr. 9. Mr. Dave, has further drawn our attention to the evidence of another witness, who was examined as PW-5, Subhash Anandbhai Barot at Exh. 30, and by relying upon this witness, learned APP has submitted that this witness has clearly supported the case of prosecution and therefore, order of acquittal could not have been passed. Ultimately, Mr. Dave has contended that since the medical evidence is corroborating the version of injured eyewitness, this is a fit case to pass order of conviction by reversing the acquittal order passed by learned Judge. 10. Mr. Dave has further contended that weapon, which have been used, have been recovered and on the basis of panchnama recorded at ex.46, Mr. Dave has submitted that dangerous weapon (trishul) which was recovered is recovered at the instance of accused No. 1 and therefore, since when recovery is established at the instance of accused persons, the findings arrived at by learned Judge is erroneous in nature and therefore Mr. Dave contended that when overall material on record is pointing clear finger towards accused persons being responsible for commission of offence, the order passed by learned Judge is required to be disturbed by interfering with it and therefore, ultimately requested to allow the Criminal Appeal filed by State. No further submissions have been made. 11. To oppose the stand of learned APP, the advocate Mr. Buddhbhatti, learned advocate appearing with Ms. Jayshree Bhatt, who represent respondent Nos. 1 to 4, has vehemently opposed the stand taken by learned APP. Mr. Buddhbhatti has contended that case of prosecution has not been substantiated in any form by witnesses, who have been examined. It has also been contended that looking to tenor of evidence of witnesses, the evidence is not believable, as no probable version is coming out. Therefore, Mr. Buddhbhatti has submitted that undue reliance is not to be made while dealing with present acquittal appeal. 12. Mr. Buddhbhatti has further contended that looking to injuries which have been caused, are not possible to be incurred by the weapon, which said to have been recovered and Shri Buddhbhatti has relied upon the evidence and by drawing out attention to the panchnama of recovery, has stated that this recovery cannot be said to be discovery falling under the provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, when the weapons are not corresponding to the injuries, which are reflected on the medical evidence, the case is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. 13. Mr. Buddhbhatti has further submitted that there is no independent corroboration available to the case of prosecution, even from bare reading of evidenced of injured eyewitness, no corroboration is coming out from the said evidence and therefore, when injuries are not corroborated to the weapon, which are made to have been used in committing crime, no case can be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 14. Even looking to medical evidence, the injuries, which are emerging from medical evidence, are also not sufficient in nature to cause death and therefore, there is no question of attraction of Section 307 of IPC. Therefore, Mr. Buddhbhatti has submitted that when main charge is not getting substantiated, there is hardly cogent material to hold the respondents accused guilty of commission of crime and therefore, looking to entire material on record, there appears to be no case made out to reverse the findings arrived at by learned Additional Sessions Judge. 15. Mr. Buddhbhatti, has vehemently contended that in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. 16. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and having gone through the material on record and also gone through the evidences adduced by the prosecution, the reasoning which are taken by learned Judge are not possible to be dislodged. 17. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid evidences. We have carefully gone through the decision delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and reasons assigned therein and we found no distinguishable circumstance, which may lead us to disturb the order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Session Judge. 18. 17. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid evidences. We have carefully gone through the decision delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and reasons assigned therein and we found no distinguishable circumstance, which may lead us to disturb the order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Session Judge. 18. From the aforesaid material on record and the conclusion which has been arrived at by the learned Judge, we see no reason distinguishable to disturb the findings arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge while passing the order of acquittal. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or re-analyze the entire evidence and therefore, the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially support the case of prosecution. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. 19. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter: 19.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 19.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:- [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 19.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para 55, 56 and 57 which read as under: "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 19.4 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, 2014(2) SCC (Cri) 497. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision as under: "(15). In this context, yet another caution struck by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 would also be relevant. 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 19.5 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, 2014(8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "(17). In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha, AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731 this Court observed; 21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P., AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated; 8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 19.6 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, re-appreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, re-appreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 19.7 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 19.8 The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., (2015) 11 SCC 242, has held in Para 6, 7 and 8 as under: "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that; While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 19.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 19.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 , "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W. 7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 20. Looking to aforesaid proposition of law settled by Apex Court, we found that evidence adduced by prosecution in form of Dr. Mansangbhai Laljibhai Chaudhari, who is examined as Prosecution witness No. 3, has deposed before the Court that victims were brought to the hospital for treatment. Both the injured were in conscious state of affairs and their blood pressure was found to be normal. Mansangbhai Laljibhai Chaudhari, who is examined as Prosecution witness No. 3, has deposed before the Court that victims were brought to the hospital for treatment. Both the injured were in conscious state of affairs and their blood pressure was found to be normal. It has also been deposed by this medical officer that these injuries, which have been caused by these two witnesses, can be possible by one weapon or not and in reply to same, he conveyed that it is not possible for him to say exactly and therefore, the injuries which have been cited were not that much serious as deposed by this Medical Officer. Yet another evidence of Dr. Arvindbhai Kantilal Kapadia, Medical Officer, who was deposed as Prosecution witness No. 4 and according to this witness there were fracture injuries found on the injured witness Nilamben. This medical officer has admitted in cross-examination that it is not possible to opine specifically whether these injuries can be caused on account of lack of calcium in body, but this medical officer has specifically deposed that both injured witnesses were in full conscious state of affairs and their condition was absolutely normal and therefore, on the basis of these medical evidences, it is emerged that injuries were not that much serious, which can cause death. 21. From the evidence of Subhash Anandbhai Barot, who was examined as PW-5 at Exh. 30, has tried to prove the motive of commission of crime as projected by prosecution but ultimately from his cross-examination, it has been revealed, upon his admission that there was no immediate quarrel on any issue and there was no any confrontation between them. Therefore, from this injured witness, prosecution appears to have not established the motive beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the learned Judge has rightly arrived at conclusion on the issue of motive having not been established. 22. From another evidence on record, which is produced by prosecution, the recovery of weapon, which is stated to have been established at the instance of accused No. 1, if we refer to panchnama at Exh. 22. From another evidence on record, which is produced by prosecution, the recovery of weapon, which is stated to have been established at the instance of accused No. 1, if we refer to panchnama at Exh. 46, though it is mentioned that, that recovery is at the instance of accused No. 1, but there is no other cogent material which can suggest that, that recovery was in consonance with provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act and in addition thereto, when the medical evidence is not corroborated the injuries, which have been caused, with the weapon, which is said to have been recovered at the instance of accused No. 1, the case cannot be said to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, as rightly concluded by learned trial Judge. 23. From the aforesaid circumstances, which are prevalent on record, we found no cogent and convincing material to dislodge the finding arrived at by learned Judge. The learned Judge has specifically concluded that there is no independent corroboration available with case of prosecution and the evidence of injured eyewitness, especially Nilamben, is not possible to be relied so cogently to connect the respondent accused on actual commission of crime from the evidence on record. The learned Judge has also specifically concluded that the husband of complainant appears to be in habit of drinking liquor and on account of that, there is probability of commission of disturbance and people had inflicted injuries was also possible. It has been specifically concluded by learned Judge that the prosecution has not established the case beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the main motive is concerned about bringing of girl by accused No. 1 from village: Kumbhasan, this episode appears to have taken place before 15 to 20 days from the date of incident, but thereafter the drama company was already in operation and therefore, learned Judge has rightly not believed the case of complainant. 24. So far as the main motive is concerned about bringing of girl by accused No. 1 from village: Kumbhasan, this episode appears to have taken place before 15 to 20 days from the date of incident, but thereafter the drama company was already in operation and therefore, learned Judge has rightly not believed the case of complainant. 24. On the contrary, the theory which has been projected by prosecution by defense side, that Nilamben has sustained injuries on head but looking to medical certificate, these injuries on head is not proved looking to medical certificate and therefore, looking to over all material on record, learned Judge found that case of prosecution and story put up by complainant is not possible to be believable beyond reasonable doubt and prosecution on the basis of this facts and evidence has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, learned Judge appears to have came to a conclusion to acquit the respondents accused from the charges levelled against them. 25. Looking to the reasoning assigned by learned trial Court and looking to fact that learned Judge has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter and came to the conclusion, which we do not want to interfere. We are of the considered view that there is no extra ordinary circumstance, which would warrant us to interfere by order passed by learned Judge and accordingly, we find that appeal being merit-less, same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. 26. In view of the above position prevailing on record and in view of the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and accordingly appeal filed by the State being merit-less, deserves to be dismissed. 27. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 27.04.2005 passed in Sessions Case No. 127 of 2004 by the learned Extra Assistant Judge and Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana, is hereby confirmed. Bail bond shall stand discharged. Records and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith.