Surjya Kumar Deb, S/o. Late Girendra Chandra Deb v. Dulal Deb, S/o. Late Rajkumar Deb
2017-06-30
T.VAIPHEI
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT & ORDER : The sole question which falls for consideration in this civil revision is, whether the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sonamura, West Tripura is correct in rejecting the application of the petitioner for filing written objection against the application of the respondent No.1 for appointing a survey commissioner for identifying the individual shares of the parties by metes and bounds so as to facilitate the passing of the final decree. 2. The facts, which are material for disposal of the civil revision, are not in dispute. The first appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court dismissing the suit of the petitioner and decreed as follows: “The appeal is allowed on contest without cost. Consequently, the judgment passed by the Ld. Trial Court in T.S.(P) No.02/2009 is set aside and reversed, i.e. preliminary decree is passed in T.S.(P) No.02/2009 declaring 1/7th share of each of the plaintiffs and principal defendants by metes and bounds provided that the land measuring 0.60 acre be shown against the share of the plaintiff No.2 (Smti. Nihar Bala Deb). The parties are to make amicable partition of the suit land within 3 months from the date of present judgment and decree. Failure to make amicable partition by each of the parties to the suit may approach to the Collector, West Tripura, Agartala as required by the Order XX, Rule 18, Civil Procedure Code for partition.” According to the respondents, though three months have lapsed, the petitioners are resisting partition of the suit land as per the said preliminary decree of the appellate court, which prompted them to file the application for identifying their individual shares in the land sought to be partitioned by appointing a survey commissioner. The petitioner opposed the said application and sought for time to file a written objection. As already noted, the trial court by the impugned orders dated 2-11-2016 and dated 3-1-2017 declined to grant the time. Aggrieved by this, this civil revision is filed by the petitioner. 3. It is seen from the impugned orders that there are two aspects to be kept in mind in the instant case. The petitioner firstly wants to file a written objection and secondly, wants time to file the written objection.
Aggrieved by this, this civil revision is filed by the petitioner. 3. It is seen from the impugned orders that there are two aspects to be kept in mind in the instant case. The petitioner firstly wants to file a written objection and secondly, wants time to file the written objection. Whether the concept of filing written objection finds a place when the respondents are filing the type of application, which is meant for separation and identification of the shares of the individuals in the suit land sought to be partitioned? It is the contention of Mr. R.G. Chakraborty, the learned counsel for the petitioner, that once such an application is filed by the respondents, the judgment debtor like the petitioner herein has the right to be afforded an opportunity to oppose the same and this is what he did before the trial court; the trial court is clearly acting contrary to law in rejecting his application for time to fie the written objection. Moreover, submits the learned counsel, the trial court has failed to consider the provisions of Order XX, Rule 18, CPC in passing the impugned orders. He, therefore, contends that the impugned orders are liable to be set aside and the petitioner should be permitted to contest the said application of the respondents by filing the written objection. Mr. B.N. Majumder, the learned counsel for the respondents, supports the impugned orders, and submits that no jurisdictional error is committed by the learned Civil Judge which calls for the interference of this Court. 4. As already noticed, the appellate court has already passed a preliminary decree declaring the respective shares of the parties to the suit and directed the parties to amicably partition the suit land failing which they might approach the Collector as required by Order XX, Rule 18 CPC. No appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the preliminary decree. Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from such a decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree.
No appeal was preferred by the petitioner against the preliminary decree. Section 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where any party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from such a decree, he shall be precluded from disputing its correctness in any appeal which may be preferred from the final decree. When the amicable partition of the suit land as advised by the trial court was opposed by the petitioner, the respondents approached the trial court for appointment of survey commissioner to separate the suit land and identify the individual shares of the parties by metes and bound. It is a settled legal position that final decree proceedings are in continuation of preliminary decree proceedings and there is no executable decree unless the final decree is passed. The final decree is not a decree in execution of the preliminary decree but a decree in a suit. In a partition suit, after the preliminary decree is passed, it is the duty of the court to pass a final decree. The rule does not, therefore, contemplate filing of any application by a party nor prescribes any limitation within which such application can be made for passing final decree. It is also because a partition cannot be said to be disposed of till a final decree is passed. It is the final decree which is to be enforced. In L. Guran Ditta v. T. R. Ditta, AIR 1935 Privy Council 12, the Privy Council observed that where a preliminary decree for partition has been passed, the decree cannot be made effective without a final decree. Thus, a final decree enforces what has been decided, declared and decreed by the court. In other words, till the final decree is passed, there is no executable decree as envisaged by Order XX, Rule 18 CPC because it is only the final decree which is executable. The difference between a preliminary decree and a final decree is succinctly explained by the Apex Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande (DEAD) by LRs v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande, (1995) 3 SCC 413 as under: “3. ……. A preliminary decree is one which declares the rights and liabilities of the parties leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings.
……. A preliminary decree is one which declares the rights and liabilities of the parties leaving the actual result to be worked out in further proceedings. Then, as a result of the further inquiries conducted pursuant to the preliminary decree, the rights of the parties are fully determined and a decree is passed in accordance with such determination which is final. Both the decrees are in the same suit. Final decree may be said to become final in two ways: (i) when the time for appeal has expired without any appeal being filed against the preliminary decree or the matter has been decided by the highest Court; (ii) when, as regards the court passing the decree, the same stands completely disposed of. It is in the latter sense the word ‘decree’ is used in Section 2(2) of CPC. The appealability of the decree will, therefore, not affect its character as a final decree. The final decree merely carries into fulfillment the preliminary decree.” 5. Thus, from the authorities noticed in the foregoing, it is quite obvious that there is no question of invoking Order XX, Rule 18 CPC when a final decree has not been passed by the trial court. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court has erred in not considering the both the letter and spirit of the provisions of Order XX, Rule 18, CPC. In the view that I have taken, there is no improper exercise of jurisdiction or illegality committed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Sonamura in rejecting the time petition of the petitioner. 6. For what has been stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this civil revision, which is hereby dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. The trial court shall now expeditiously proceed with the case under Order, XXVI, Rules 13 and 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure and pass the final decree in accordance with law, if it has not already proceeded with. The parties are directed to appear before the trial court on 17-7-2017 at 10 AM without fail. It is made clear that when no stay order is passed by the High Court, it is invariably to be understood that no proceeding need be halted due to the mere pendency of a revision petition in connection therewith.